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This thesis seeks to answer the principal question as to whether international criminal 
justice systems can serve as adequate truth-ascertaining forums. In doing so, it 
reviews the practice of three international criminal justice systems: the International 
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), the International Criminal 
Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) and the International Criminal Court (ICC). It is not the 
purpose of this research to review the black letter law adopted and applied by these 
international tribunals and court, but rather to review the implementation of the legal 
principles in practice. It is a socio-legal research project which focuses on the practice 
of the tribunals and court. It discusses socio-legal, institutional and political issues 
relating to the ascertainment of the truth in international criminal justice.  
Abstract 
 
In addition, it examines the gaps between the theory and practice of ascertaining the 
truth in the ICTY, ICTR and ICC. It does so principally by exploring the roles of the 
parties, participants and judges in ascertaining the truth. This includes the obstacles 
they face in doing so and the responses given, if any, to accommodate these 
difficulties. Challenges include the politicised climate of most post-conflict societies, 
the remoteness of the crime base areas from the seat of the Court, the lack of 
enforcement mechanisms and reliance on State cooperation, as well as the 
unfamiliarities with the cultural and linguistic features of the affected communities. 
This thesis reveals that these difficulties are not the principal cause of truth-searching 
impediments. Indeed, it is asserted that the ascertainment of the truth can be fair and 
effective notwithstanding these difficulties. It also demonstrates that truth-
ascertaining impediments are mainly caused by failures to adequately investigate the 
crimes and relevant evidence. At the ICTY, investigations have been carried out in the 
most efficient and fair manner possible under the circumstances. By contrast, the 
ICTR and ICC investigations are far from adequate and should be improved. The 
Prosecution should make more efforts to obtain the best evidence available. 
 
It further concludes that international justice systems have set their goals too highly. 
Instead of seeking to meet objectives such as reconciliation, peace and security, they 
should restrict their focus to the question as to whether the guilt of a particular 
accused has been established in respect of the crimes charged.  
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Introduction 
This thesis on ‘The Ascertainment of the Truth in International Criminal Justice’ 
principally explores the following question: 
Topic of this Research 
 
Do international criminal courts and tribunals constitute effective truth-
searching institutions? 
 
This thesis has been inspired by two recent events:  
 
A truth to be found or constructed? 
First, on 30 March 2011 in The Hague, Michelle Parlevliet opened a debate on the 
ascertainment of the truth in international criminal justice. This debate followed the 
showing of the documentary ‘Telling Truths in Arusha’,1 with the following question: 
‘is there a truth to be found or a truth to be constructed’? None of the participants of 
the debate which included two defence counsel who had practiced before a number of 
international criminal tribunals and a judge from the SCSL2 had a clear answer to that 
question.3
 
 This is not surprising since there is no fixed view on how truth is to be 
defined in the context of international criminal justice. It is an important issue since it 
is directly linked to the question of what interpretation should be given to the task of 
ascertaining the truth in international criminal justice. 
The same question was also central to the documentary itself, which was based on the 
trial of a priest, Hormisdas Nsengimana, who was tried for genocide and crimes 
against humanity before the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) and 
                                                 
1 This documentary was shown in the filmhuis in The Hague as part of the Amnesty International Film 
Festival ‘Movies that Matter’. It is a documentary made by a Norwegian filmmaker, Beate Arnestad in 
2010 (SF Norge Produksjon AS). See:  
<http://www.moviesthatmatterfestival.nl/english_index/programma_en/film_en/513> 
2 One of the defence counsel for Nsengimana, Mr. David Hooper QC, was one of the participants of the 
debate. The other participants were Judge Sebutinde, one of the judges in the pending SCSL case of 
Charles Taylor, and Wayne Jordash, former counsel for Issa Sesay. 
3 It appears, however, that Michelle Parlevliet who presided over the debate and asked this question 
had already answered it in an academic writing entitled M. Parlevliet, Considering Truth. Dealing with 
a Legacy of Gross Human Rights Violations, 16(2) Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights 141 
(1998). In this article, she held that the truth is not something that can be found but rather that needs to 
be constructed (at 172). 
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acquitted on 17 November 2009.4 Judge Møse, the presiding judge in this case and 
former President of the ICTR, gave the following answer to the question of whether a 
truth could be found in an international court of law: “That is a bit of a philosophical 
quandary. The question we as judges seek to answer is whether the guilt of an accused 
before us has been proved beyond a reasonable doubt”. In this case, Judge Møse and 
two fellow judges considered that Nsengimana’s guilt had not been established 
beyond reasonable doubt. Had the truth been found? That appeared to be a more 
difficult question to answer.5
  
 
Deficiencies in fact-finding in international criminal justice 
Second, in June 2010, Nancy Combs published a book “Fact-finding Without Facts”6 
with shocking results. It places doubt whether establishing accurate facts in 
international justice is possible. With ample examples of deficiencies in witness 
testimonies in the ICTR, SCSL and East Timor Special Panel, Combs concludes that 
there are insurmountable problems in establishing facts in conflict zones particularly 
in Africa and other non-Western countries where documentary evidence is sparse. 
The problems she addresses are, inter alia, (i) the problem of interpretation both in 
the taking of statements and in court testimony; (ii) cultural differences resulting in 
inaccurate answers; (iii) the inability particularly of uneducated witnesses to read 
maps and measure distances; and, (iv) perjury.7
 
 
Combs argues that some improvement can be made by increasing the budget for 
translation, number of site visits, and prosecutions of perjurers, as well as increasing 
investigation standards. She also suggests that improvement can be achieved by 
allowing judges greater control over the questioning of witnesses.8
                                                 
4 Prosecutor v. Nsengimana, T. Ch. I. Judgement, ICTR-01-69-T, 17 November 2009. 
 She concludes, 
however, that many of these problems cannot be resolved and clearly impede on the 
ability to ascertain accurate facts in international justice. She believes that most of the 
5 Judge Sebutinde did not seem to think so. She made the observation that, in reaching their conclusion, 
the judges had focused too much on contradictions between the in-court testimony of the witnesses and 
their prior statements, which were not taken under oath and should therefore, in her view, be given very 
limited weight. David Hooper, on the other hand, responded by saying that the contradictions were so 
significant that they could not be the result of mistakes but indicated that the witnesses did not tell the 
truth. 
6 N. Combs, Fact-Finding Without Facts, The Uncertain Evidentiary Foundations of International 
Criminal Convictions (Cambridge University Press, 2010). 
7 Ibid, in particular Chapters 1-5. 
8 Ibid, 273-321. 
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defendants are guilty but that their guilt cannot be established beyond reasonable 
doubt in an international court of law. She argues that an unjustified acquittal in 
international criminal justice is more costly than in domestic trials, while an 
unjustified conviction is less costly than in domestic trials. Combs bases her argument 
on the fact that international trials are extremely expensive and the financers are likely 
to be less willing to pay the costs if a large number of the trials end in acquittals. She 
also highlights that acquittals are regularly followed by public outrage, particularly of 
the victims who suffered unspeakable atrocities.9
 
  
In light of the foregoing, Combs offers two solutions in addition to improving fact-
finding accuracy: (1) to apply a flexible standard of proof permitting a lower level of 
certainty, as appropriate in the circumstances;10 and (2) to charge more frequently 
under the joint criminal enterprise mode of liability.11
 
   
Combs’ research is a valuable contribution to the literature because it is the first 
socio-legal research that has been conducted in the area of fact-finding in 
international justice. In reaching her conclusions, she read thousands of transcripts 
and interviewed many defence and prosecution counsel and investigators in the field 
of international justice.  
 
However, her research and conclusions are highly controversial because they question 
the very essence of international criminal tribunals, which is equivalent to domestic 
criminal courts, namely the ability to establish accurate facts. Her research has been 
embraced by some, and criticised by others. Some of the criticism is valid, other less, 
as will be discussed in this thesis. 
 
Defence counsel in international courts and tribunals generally support her views. In 
one case before the ICTR, as well as in a Rwandan genocide case in the Netherlands, 
the defence unsuccessfully sought to introduce her book as expert evidence.12
                                                 
9 Ibid, 352-360. 
 On the 
other hand, Justice Doherty, one of the SCSL judges in the case of Charles Taylor, is 
10 Ibid, 343-364. 
11 Ibid, 321-333. 
12 Such a request was made in the ICTR case of Prosecutor v. Nzabonimana, ICTR-98-44D-T; and in 
the Dutch case of Yvonne Basebya. 
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highly critical of Combs’ book. She suggests that the difficulties Combs describes are 
not unique to fact-finding in international justice but also occur in domestic 
jurisdictions where practical solutions have to be found constantly to practical 
problems. Similarly, practical solutions must be found for practical problems in 
international criminal tribunals. In her view, it cannot be argued that accurate fact-
finding in international justice is impossible per se.13 Given that Combs did not 
observe any of the proceedings personally but rather relied on transcripts, she was not 
in a position to assess the demeanour of the witnesses.14
 
  
Combs’ book also provoked ample academic debate on the limitations of fact-finding 
in international justice and clearly warrants follow-up research. As Professor John 
Jackson has pointed out, some valid criticism can be made against Combs’ research 
and conclusions, but it should be acknowledged that she managed to do what many 
others failed to do. She went out and conducted socio-legal research concerning the 
practical realities of fact-finding in international justice. This is not an easy task. 
Jackson encourages academics to continue the socio-legal work she started.15
 
  
This thesis seeks to take Jackson’s advice and to continue the debate ignited by 
Combs’ socio-legal research with a touch of Parlevliet’s philosophical approach to the 
ascertainment of the truth. It examines the difficulties in ascertaining the truth in 
international criminal tribunals. The central question of this thesis is whether 
international criminal courts and tribunals constitute effective truth-searching 
institutions. If not, what improvements can be made to achieve this goal, if, indeed it 
is possible? 
Aim of this Research 
 
The aim of this research is not to review the black letter law adopted and applied by 
international criminal tribunals, but rather to review the implementation of the legal 
principles in practice. It is a socio-legal research project focusing on the practice of 
the tribunals, discussing socio-legal, institutional and political issues relating to the 
                                                 
13 Observations of the Honourable Justice Teresa Doherty, key speaker at A Socio-Legal Approach to 
Evidence in International Criminal Tribunals, Conference held at the University College of Dublin, 
Dublin, Ireland, 19 November 2011 (“the Dublin Conference”). 
14 Ibid.  
15 Concluding remarks by Professor Jackson at the Dublin Conference. 
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ascertainment of the truth in international criminal justice. It examines the gaps 
between the theory and practice of ascertaining the truth in international tribunals. It 
then explores what improvements can be made to fill these gaps.  
 
This research consists of four parts.  
Structure of this Research 
 
Part I 
Part I analyses theoretical concepts with the aim to define the theoretical framework 
within which the practical issues will be discussed. It looks at the aspirations and 
expectations of the ascertainment of the truth in international justice, as well as the 
limitations of what can be achieved. It also discusses the extent to which the 
ascertainment of the truth is an objective of international justice, and how this 
objective relates to other objectives of international justice.  
 
It explores what is actually meant by ascertaining the truth within the context of the 
function and perceived mandate of international trials. In this regard, it analyses 
whether the ascertainment of the truth corresponds with the reasonable doubt standard 
or whether it is subsumed within the more general restorative aims. It further 
examines the theoretical difficulties to achieve it as well as its scope. The principal 
question of whether these international criminal justice systems are effective as truth-
ascertaining institutions can only be meaningfully discussed after these factors are 
addressed. In so doing, Part I analyses and compares the meaning and scope of the 
ascertainment of the truth in civil law and common law criminal justice systems.  
 
Part I then establishes minimum conditions international courts and tribunals should 
meet to provide an adequate theoretical possibility of ascertaining the truth. 
 
Part II 
Part II examines the method chosen to ascertain the truth and whether it, at least in 
theory, has all the ingredients to succeed in this endeavour. It assesses to what extent 
these procedures comply with the minimum condition set out in Part I. It also 
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identifies the procedural aspects which are potentially problematic in the 
ascertainment of the truth. 
 
Part II will provide a brief overview of two types of methodologies – civil law and 
common law. Mainly these methodologies have influenced the procedure which is 
now adopted and applied in international criminal courts and tribunals. 
 
It then analyses whether the combining of these two types of procedures into the 
emerging international methodology has led to a thoroughly adequate structure of 
international truth ascertainment.  It will address the concern frequently raised that 
mixing bits and pieces of fundamentally different systems with their own distinct 
legal philosophies may create a deformed system. 
 
It further evaluates to what extent the emerging international truth-ascertaining 
methodology, essentially based on Western criminal justice methodologies, can in 
theory be implemented effectively in non-Western countries with potentially different 
views on truth and justice. 
 
Part III 
In Part III, the efficiency of international criminal justice systems as truth-searching 
forums is tested by considering whether the minimum conditions, as set out in Part I, 
are met. This part determines how well the international tribunals and courts have 
done so far in implementing the theoretical task of ascertaining the truth.  
 
Part III examines the truth-searching practice in three international criminal tribunals 
and court: the ICTR, the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia 
(ICTY) and the International Criminal Court (ICC). It explores the roles of the parties, 
participants and judges in ascertaining the truth, the obstacles they face in doing so 
and the response which was given, if any, to accommodate these difficulties. 
Particular attention is paid to the procedural aspects which have been identified in 
Part II as potentially problematic in ascertaining the truth. 
 
Part III discusses the following subjects: 
• Investigations; 
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• Victims and Witnesses; 
• Admissibility and evaluation of the evidence. 
 
Part IV 
From the analysis in Parts I to III, conclusions are drawn regarding the adequacy in 
practice of the ascertainment of the truth in the ICTR, ICTY and ICC. To the extent 
necessary, suggestions for improvement are made.  
 
Part I 
Method and Scope of this Research 
Part I discusses theory rather than practice. In exploring the theoretical concepts that 
are later tested in practice, Part I principally relies on academic sources. It has 
particularly been inspired by the aforementioned debate on the ascertainment of the 
truth, as well as a number of scholarly works including Michelle Parlevliet’s 
academic article on ‘Considering Truth: Dealing with a Legacy of Gross Human 
Rights Violations’.16 Other influential authors exploring the definition of the 
ascertainment of the truth and conditions necessary to ascertain the truth efficiently 
and fairly include Rorty,17 Koskenniemi,18 and David Becker.19
 
 
The theories of Richard Ashby Wilson,20 Hannah Arendt21 and various other 
observers22
 
 are referred to in discussing the extent to which courts should get 
involved in establishing historical facts. To this effect, the views of practitioners in 
international justice are also discussed.  
                                                 
16 Parlevliet, Considering Truth, supra note 3. 
17 R. Rorty, Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity (Cambridge University Press, 1989), 48; R. Rorty, 
Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I (Cambridge University Press, 1991), 
21-45; Parlevliet, Considering Truth, supra note 3, 6. 
18 M. Koskenniemi, Between Impunity and Show Trials, 6 Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations 
Law 1 (2002). 
19 D. Becker, Confronting the truth of the Erinyes: The illusion of Harmony in the Healing of Trauma, 
in T. Borer (Ed), Telling the Truths: Truth Telling and Peace Building in Post-Conflict Societies, 
(University of Notre Dame Press, 2006) 231; at 232 he refers to ‘belief rather than scientific proof’, 
and 242-243. 
20 R. Wilson, Judging History: The Historical Record of the International Criminal Tribunal for the 
Former Yugoslavia, 27 Human Rights Quarterly 908 (2005), 908-942. 
21 H. Arendt, Eichmann in Jerusalem, A Report on the Banality of Evil (Penguin Books, 1994) (first 
published in the US by the Viking Press 1963). 
22 See further below, section ‘Scope of the ascertainment of the truth in international justice’. 
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Part I further gives due consideration to the manner in which Truth and Reconciliation 
Commissions (TRCs) have interpreted their mandate to establish the truth and how 
they deal with difficulties in meeting this mandate. This is considered essential 
because TRCs and international criminal courts and tribunals are established in 
similar circumstances with similar objectives albeit with different types of truth-
ascertaining methodologies.   
 
The scope of the analysis of TRCs is limited. The analysis does not discuss practical 
examples – save for a number of limited references – but focuses on theory. The 
discussion is primarily aimed at explaining the common objectives of TRCs and 
international criminal justice. It points out the limits of any mechanism in meeting 
those objectives and emphasises the difficulties of meeting them all at once in the 
same procedure. The TRC experience demonstrates that the achievement of these 
objectives can be frustrated by seeking to over-achieve as, in particular situations, 
these objectives may be in conflict with each other.  
 
Part I also discusses opinions expressed at conferences or in personal interviews by 
various participants from NGOs or international criminal courts and tribunals. 
Inclusion of such opinions is necessary to analyse the general perceptions of what the 
functions of international criminal courts and tribunals are, or should be. 
 
Part II 
Part II provides a comparative analysis of common law and civil law criminal justice 
systems. The discussion of civil law jurisdictions is based mainly on the Dutch, 
French and German criminal justice systems with occasional references to the Italian, 
Russian and Belgian systems. Whilst this clearly does not give the overall picture of 
all civil law systems, it offers a global picture of the common features among these 
various systems. The discussion of common law jurisdictions is based mainly on the 
criminal justice system of the United Kingdom (UK), the birth country of common 
law. It does not discuss other common law jurisdictions in great detail. 
 
A classification of domestic systems as common law or civil law systems requires 
significant generalisations, omissions of important details and oversimplification of 
legal complexities. This is all the more so in light of the fact that the analysis is 
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limited to a number of jurisdictions only. Each jurisdiction has features unique to its 
own and could form the subject of an entire thesis. In addition, there are debates on 
whether the legal systems can and should still be classified as common law or civil 
law systems.  
 
Domestic systems continue to evolve. Given the massive expansion of international 
relations over the last fifty years, the evolution of domestic systems is a process that is 
heavily influenced by cross-border developments. The European Court of Human 
Rights, the European Union and international treaties have had significant influence 
on European criminal justice systems and led to convergence between the UK 
common law and continental civil law criminal justice systems.23 Simultaneously, 
such European developments influencing the UK system may widen the gaps between 
the UK and non-European common law criminal justice systems. In light of such 
developments, Richard Frase argues that “the value of global models may become 
increasingly limited; the growing complexity and hybridisation of modern criminal 
justice systems tend to undercut the simplicity needed for models to serve their 
descriptive, explanatory, predictive and normative functions.”24
 
  
The impact of international developments on domestic jurisdictions and whether they 
should be re-classified as a result, or not classified at all, is a thesis on its own. This 
is, however, beyond the scope of this research. A more in depth analysis of the 
comparative framework of common law versus civil law and the extent to which it is 
still applicable is given by distinct comparative criminal law scholars like Professor 
Hans Nijboer, Professor Mireille Delmas-Marty, and Professor Mirjan Damaška. 
Their deep and challenging thinking has greatly inspired this thesis.    
 
                                                 
23 M. Delmas-Marty, The ‘Hybridisation’ of Criminal Procedure, in J. Jackson, M. Langer & P. Tillers 
(Eds.), Crime, Procedure and Evidence and International Context, Essays in honour of Professor 
Mirjan Damaška, (Hart Publishing, 2008) 251, at 253; M. Delmas-Marty, Procédure Pénale d’Europe 
(Dalloz, 1995); C. Brants & S. Field, Convergence in European Criminal Justice, in E. Hondius, De 
meerwaarde van de rechtsvergelijking. Opstellen aangeboden aan prof. mr H.U. Jessurun d’Oliveira, 
Nederlandse Vereniging voor Rechtsvergelijking, (Deventer: Kluwer, 1999), 179-180; B. Swart & J. 
Young, The European Convention on Human Rights and Criminal Justice in the Netherlands and the 
UK, in P Fennell, C Harding, N Jorg & B Swart (Eds.) Criminal Justice in Europe: A Comparative 
Study (Clarendon Press, 1995). 
24 R. Frase, Sentencing and Comparative Law Theory, in Jackson, Crime, Procedure and Evidence, 
supra note 23, 351, at 369. 
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The following question comes to mind: why does this thesis rely on a comparative 
framework whose usefulness is disputed? 
 
Most scholars still use this comparative framework, particularly in discussing 
elements of international criminal justice.25
 
 Even if such a classification is no longer 
justified, it is still used in international criminal justice. The scope and word limit of 
this thesis do not permit inclusion of an analysis of Chinese, Sharia or other law 
which has little in common with either common law or civil law. The influence of any 
such laws on international criminal justice is extremely limited, even if debatably they 
should have more impact. 
Comparative research can only be done properly within a well-defined framework. 
Being fully cognisant of the disparities among individual criminal justice systems 
labelled as the same ‘ideal type’ criminal justice system, Damaška has nonetheless 
stressed the importance of ‘comparative modelling’. The complex legal world cannot 
be understood “without constructing analytical models through which to organise and 
interpret the empirical data which bombard our senses.”26
 
 
While Paul Roberts defends the continuing relevance and importance of conceptual 
analysis and modelling in comparative law, he highlights that “constructing ideal-
typical models should be a starting point, rather than the ultimate destination, of 
comparative legal analysis.”27  Indeed, domestic jurisdictions are not “blueprints of 
procedural ideas”.28
 
 
With that in mind, Part II of this thesis will explore what influence, if any, the two ideal type 
methodologies have had on international criminal courts and tribunals. Where necessary, a number of 
                                                 
25 See, for instance, P. Murphy & L. Baddour, International Criminal Law and Common Law Rules of 
Evidence and V. Tochilovsky, The Nature and Evolution of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, in 
Khan, Principles of Evidence, in K. Khan, C. Buisman & C. Gosnell (Eds.), Principles of Evidence in 
International Criminal Justice (Oxford University Press, 2010). See also P. De Hert, Legal Procedures 
at the International Criminal Court in R. Haveman, O. Kavran & J. Nicholls (Eds.), Supranational 
Criminal Law: a System Sui Generis (Intersentia, 2003) 79, 93–94. 
26 P. Roberts, Faces of Justice Adrift? Damaška’s Comparative Method and the Future of Common 
Law Evidence, in Jackson, Crime, Procedure and Evidence, supra note 23, at 300, citing Damaška’s 
reference to Weber. 
27 Ibid, 325. 
28 J. Jackson & M. Langer, Introduction: Damaška and Comparative Law, in Jackson, Crime, 
Procedure and Evidence, supra note 23, at 7-8; M. Damaška, The Faces of Justice and State Authority: 
A Comparative Approach to the Legal Process (Yale University Press, 1986). 
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superficial descriptions, in particular of civil law criminal justice systems, will be corrected. 
International criminal justice systems frequently refer to ‘common law’ or ‘civil law’ without being 
more specific. They have relied over the years on generalised assumptions about common law or civil 
law to justify legal interpretations and modifications.29
 
 These will be addressed. 
Common law jurisdictions are also referred to as ‘Anglo-American’, ‘adversarial’, 
‘adversary’ and ‘accusatorial’ systems; and civil law jurisdictions as ‘continental 
European’, ‘inquisitorial’ or ‘non-adversary’ systems.30
 
 This thesis refers to common 
law and civil law criminal justice systems only. This is done for simplicity reasons, 
but also because the terms ‘common law’ and ‘civil law’ are most value-neutral. To 
refer to these two legal families as ‘Anglo-American’ and ‘continental European’ 
would not do justice to the many other jurisdictions falling under the common law 
and civil law nominators. To refer to them as ‘inquisitorial’ and ‘accusatorial’ or 
‘adversarial’ would not describe the systems accurately as both ideal types are 
accusatorial in the sense of the prosecutor charging the defendant. Also, both have 
adversarial proceedings. Civil law criminal proceedings have their roots in 
inquisitorial proceedings, but have over the years incorporated many adversarial 
features.  
Accordingly, Damaška considers it unfair to continue to brand these systems as 
‘inquisitorial’.31 He argues that the traditional classification of criminal legal systems 
in ‘inquisitorial’ versus ‘accusatorial’ or ‘adversarial’ “does not afford a suitable 
conceptual framework within which to study the contrasts between modern 
continental and Anglo-American criminal processes”.32 Instead, Damaška proposes to 
use the terms ‘adversary’ for common law systems versus ‘non-adversary’ for civil 
law systems.33
                                                 
29 See, for instance Prosecutor v. Tadić, T. Ch. II. Decision on defence motion on hearsay, IT-94-1-T, 
August 1996, para. 13.  
 However, even these terms no longer adequately reflect the ideal-type 
30 Damaška has qualified the two different families as adversary versus non-adversary systems.  See M. 
Damaška, Evidentiary Barriers to Conviction and Two Models of Criminal Procedure: A Comparative 
Study, 121 U Penn L Rev 506 (1972–73), 562. 
31 Ibid, 560-562. 
32 Ibid, 555. 
33 In earlier days, Damaška distinguished three types of criminal procedures: adversarial, inquisitorial, 
and reformed inquisitorial criminal procedures. As inquisitorial type procedures are now all 
increasingly adversarial, at least in parts, the differences between inquisitorial and reformed 
inquisitorial type criminal proceedings have diminished. See Damaška, Evidentiary Barriers, supra 
note 30, 562. 
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systems. As will be discussed in this thesis, the ‘non-adversary’ systems have become 
more ‘adversary’.  
 
Part III 
Part III is in part a follow-up of Nancy Combs’ research on international fact-finding 
realities and discusses her findings and conclusions. Having carefully scrutinised 
Combs’ book on fact-finding without facts, it has become clear to me that there is still 
ample room for further research in this area. Indeed, as Combs herself recognises in 
her book, her research “is preliminary and […] much more needs to be done both to 
quantify [her] findings and to understand their impact”.34
 
   
This thesis is complementary to Combs’ research since it focuses primarily on the 
ICC, a court Combs has not discussed in her book. The ICC could not have been part 
of her research as it had barely begun. Even today, there are no verdicts yet. However, 
a number of confirmation decisions have been rendered. These may reveal whether 
the ICC judges apply a rigorous standard of proof or simply accept the prosecution’s 
allegations on face value without thoroughly scrutinising the supporting evidence. 
Even without verdicts, a number of conclusions can already be drawn on the basis of 
the ongoing proceedings, the investigations that have been conducted thus far and the 
procedural decisions issued by different Pre-Trial and Trial Chambers. In addition, 
while ICTY and ICTR will soon close down, the ICC represents the future. The ICC 
will continue to ascertain the truth, likely facing fact-finding difficulties resembling 
those experienced by the ICTY and ICTR. This is precisely why this research 
principally examines the ICC proceedings. 
 
In so doing, it analyses the truth-ascertaining obstacles that have occurred in the 
ICTY and ICTR. Combs does not include the ICTY in her analysis. The ICTY is 
ascertaining facts relating to a European rather than a non-Western conflict and deals 
with Western witnesses. Combs therefore assumes that the ICTY is not faced with the 
same number of fact-finding impediments as she has identified in the ICTR, SCSL 
and East Timor Special Panels. In addition, until now, the ICC is dealing exclusively 
with African situations. Accordingly, Combs asserts that it is likely that the ICC will 
                                                 
34 Combs, Fact-Finding Without Facts, supra note 6, 366. 
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face similar fact-finding problems to those experienced by the ICTR, SCSL and East 
Timor Panels, even if the ICTY is not as problematic. These are her reasons for 
leaving the ICTY out of her research.35 She has been criticised for failing to include 
the ICTY, which according to Professor Paul Roberts renders her research flawed.36
 
  
This thesis reviews the assumption that the ICTY is not affected by fact-finding 
impediments in the same fashion as the ICTR, SCSL and East Timor Special Panels. 
Accordingly, it compares the fact-finding practice of the ICTR with that of the ICTY 
and determines whether they differ greatly. It is to be expected that the ICC will not 
continue to deal exclusively with African conflicts but may at some point deal with a 
conflict zone in a Western sector. Accordingly, the realities of ascertaining the truth in 
the ICTY and ICTR are both relevant to the ongoing ascertainment of the truth in the 
ICC. 
 
Combs has already extensively discussed the practice of the ICTR. However, it is still 
worthwhile discussing this practice as part of this thesis because significant judgments 
(Government I and II, Bagosora & Nsengiyumva Appeal Judgment, Military II) have 
been passed since she wrote her book. These may alter her conclusions. This project 
includes an analysis of these recent judgments with the aim to determine whether 
there has been any change of approach to ascertaining the truth over the course of 
time. 
 
Contrary to Combs’ book, this research does not refer to fact-finding, but rather to the 
ascertainment of, or search for the truth. Conceptually, ascertaining the truth differs 
from ascertaining the facts as becomes clear in Part I. In addition, this research 
refrains from using the terms ‘fact-finding’ or ‘truth-finding’ notwithstanding that 
these are commonly accepted terms used frequently by scholars.37
                                                 
35 Ibid, 5. 
 Former judge in 
the United States and critical legal philosopher, Jerome Frank, points out that “finding 
facts” is a misleading term. In his view, facts “found” in the court are not ready-made 
“data” waiting somewhere to be found by the court. Frank argues that it is more 
36 Observations of Professor Paul Roberts, one of the speakers at the Dublin Conference, supra note 13. 
37 For instance H. Friman, The International Criminal Court and Participation of Victims: A Third 
Party to the Proceedings?, 22 Leiden Journal of International Law 485 (2009) 485-500; W. 
Schomburg, Truth-Finding in the International Courtroom: The ad-hoc Tribunals for the former 
Yugoslavia (ICTY) and Rwanda (ICTR), Lecture Outline, Utrecht 29 March 2008. 
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appropriate to say that the court creates the facts on the basis of its subjective 
perceptions of the witnesses’ stories.38
 
 The same reasoning applies to the truth. As is 
discussed in Part I, it queries whether the truth can be found or whether it must be 
constructed. Accordingly, the terms ‘truth-finding’ and ‘fact-finding’ are avoided in 
this thesis.  
In discussing the obstacles to ascertaining the truth in international criminal justice, I 
rely on my extensive (over a decade) personal experience and observation in 
conducting investigations in war-affected areas as well as employment at various 
international criminal courts and tribunals. Having interned for the ICTY Office of the 
Prosecutor and participated in the defence of several accused before the ICTR, ICTY, 
SCSL and ICC, I observed on a daily basis in the courtroom as well as the field, 
everyone’s struggle to ascertain the factual allegations accurately and efficiently. I 
conducted investigations in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Sierra Leone, 
Rwanda, Kenya and Kosovo with the aim to collect evidence and interview potential 
witnesses.  
 
While being there, I also conducted interviews with members of the local 
communities concerning their expectations of international justice and their 
perspectives on the truth regarding the conflict through which they had lived.  
 
In and outside Rwanda, I have spoken to at least 200 Rwandan male and female 
adults of both ethnic groups (although more Hutu than Tutsi) about their perceptions 
on ICTR justice. In the DRC, I have had similar discussions on ICC justice with at 
least 100 Congolese of various ethnic groups including Hema, Ngiti and Nande. The 
interviewees were predominantly men in their twenties or older. I also spoke to about 
15 prisoners in DRC and Rwanda.  
 
In Kosovo, I have spoken to approximately 25 male Kosovar Albanians about ICTY 
justice. Women were less forward in DRC and Kosovo. In addition, I have spoken to 
ICTY colleagues from the former Yugoslavia mainly of Serb ethnicity. These 
discussions were mostly informal conducted in French, Swahili or English. In 
                                                 
38 J. Frank, Courts on Trial, Myth and Reality in American Justice (Princeton University Press, 1973) 
23-24. 
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Kosovo, I relied on a translator. The people I interviewed were aware of my role in 
defence, which may have affected their answers. It is possible that their answers 
would have been different had I worked for the Prosecution, or had no affiliation with 
international justice. This is, of course, a problem that any socio-legal researcher, or 
investigator is facing. 
 
Part III is therefore largely based on primary sources and inspired by my personal 
experiences in the field and in international courtrooms. My discussions are also 
based on the experience of other practitioners in international criminal justice.  
 
In addition, I have reviewed all ICTY and ICTR Appeals and Trial Judgments 
through to the end of 2011. I have also reviewed all ICC Confirmation Decisions until 
23 January 2012. Where necessary, I have studied the transcripts to review the 
testimonies of witnesses or legal debates. I have also examined many motions, briefs 
and decisions. In doing so, I have drawn a number of conclusions concerning the 
accuracy and efficiency of the ascertainment of the facts. The review of the case law 
was particularly important for writing the chapter on the evaluation of the evidence. 
 
Any socio-legal researcher seeking to assess the credibility of witnesses or the 
reliability of their testimonies by reading the transcripts is faced with significant 
limitations. Unless a researcher has witnessed the testimony of a witness in court, it is 
difficult to make an assessment of the weight it should be given. A researcher 
attempting to do so essentially wears the hat of a judge without having had the 
opportunity of observing the witnesses.39
 
  
Combs has, however, demonstrated that significant inferences can be drawn from the 
transcripts and detailed judgments rendered by the Trial and Appeals Chambers. For 
instance, the coherence and consistency in approach can be assessed. In cases where 
previous written witness statements are accessible to the public, it is possible to 
compare these statements with the witnesses’ viva voce testimonies and consider 
whether they contradict each other. Regrettably, large parts of the transcripts and 
                                                 
39 At the Dublin Conference, supra note 13, Justice Doherty expressed criticism of Nancy Combs for 
drawing conclusions on the basis of the transcripts without having observed the live testimonies on 
which the conclusions were based.  
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witness statements are confidential and thus not accessible to the public.  
 
In conducting this research, I have faced such limitations, save in the ICTR case of 
Bagosora et al and the ICTY cases of Kupreskic et al, Limaj et al and Haraqija where 
I was a direct observer. I was, however, a party to the proceedings, and may thus be 
perceived as partial. In addition, I cannot make use of confidential material to which I 
have been privy. 
 
This research, therefore, limits itself to making observations on how the judges go 
about evaluating the evidence without drawing conclusions on whether it was fair to 
convict or acquit an accused in a particular case. This research is confined to 
analysing the quality of the evidence produced by the parties, the Chambers’ approach 
to certain categories of witnesses, whether defence and prosecution witnesses are 
treated in the same fashion, whether Chambers have been consistent, and whether 
there has been a change in approach over time. 
 
As a complement to the research of primary sources and jurisprudence, this thesis is 
based on academic literature and addresses the scholarly debate that has arisen in 
relation to the practical realities of the ascertainment of the truth in international 
courts and tribunals.  
 
PART IV 
Part IV draws conclusions on the basis of the research in previous parts.  
 
As Clark rightly observed, in conducting empirical research relating to international 
criminal justice, “self-reflection and recognition that our own “aspirations are often 
taken for empirical facts” are (…) important components of impact assessment.40
 
 
Therefore, I am not offering conclusive answers, but rather material to ponder. 
  
 
 
                                                 
40 J. Clark, Transitional Justice, Truth and Reconciliation: An Under-Explored Relationship, 11 
International Criminal Law Review 241 (2011). 
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PART I 
MEANING AND SCOPE OF  
ASCERTAINMENT OF THE TRUTH 
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International criminal justice systems are set up in post conflict situations, or 
sometimes even during an ongoing conflict. They are often established in respect to 
States in transition where domestic criminal justice may be inadequate due to a 
variety of factors:  massive scale of atrocities committed in the course of the conflict, 
the collapse of the domestic legal infrastructure, and/or its inability to conduct trials in 
a neutral and fair fashion. When a conflict is still fresh, the applicable domestic legal 
system is often unwilling or unable to address past atrocities.
Identified Objectives of International Criminal Courts and Tribunals 
41
 
 
Indeed, the climate in a post-conflict society is often politicized with many unhealed 
wounds. A domestic judicial system in this context may not be suited to deliver 
impartial justice.42 Post-conflict societies have a plethora of problems and require a 
significant transitional period to rebuild. This rebuilding is not limited to physical 
infrastructure but also includes psychological rebuilding necessary to deal with 
communal trauma. It is during this period that international criminal justice systems 
step in to offer a helping hand and deliver ‘transitional justice’.43 Whilst the ICTY 
and ICTR can enter in even in situations where the domestic State itself is willing to 
deal with criminal investigations and prosecutions, the ICC only has jurisdiction 
where a domestic State is unable or unwilling to initiate genuine criminal 
investigations.44
                                                 
41 J. Llewellyn, Restorative Justice in Transitions and Beyond, The Justice Potential of Truth-Telling 
Mechanisms for Post-Peace Accord Societies, in Borer, Telling the Truths, supra note 40, 90. See also 
M. Latimer, Enforcing Human Rights Through International Criminal Law, in M. Lattimer & P. Sands, 
Justice for Crimes Against Humanity (Hart Publishing, 2003) 387, 394-400, describing the difficulties 
and challenges faced by post-conflict societies. 
  
42 Wilson, Judging History, supra note 20, 919: According to Wilson, post-conflict governments often 
“selectively filter the past to invent a new official history and to construct a new vision of the nation. 
These regimes manufacture legitimacy internally to defuse and delegitimate political opponents, and 
externally to assert the government’s human rights credentials to the international community. They 
attempt to create a new shared ‘collective memory’.”; Arendt, Eichmann in Jerusalem, supra note 21, 
270-272. See also S. Cohen, State Crimes of Previous Regimes: Knowledge, Accountability, and the 
Policing of the Past, 20(1) Law and Social Inquiry 7 (1995), 18, 14-15. See also Burying Myths, 
Uncovering Truth, The Economist, 12 March 2010, available at <http://www.other-
news.info/2010/03/burying-myths-uncovering-truth/#more-3311>, last accessed December 2011. 
43 Transitional justice has been described as “the task of doing justice in the time period following the 
end of a conflict or repressive rule, during which a new peaceful, stable and democratic society is being 
established.” (see: Jennifer J. Llewellyn, supra note 41, in Borer, Telling the Truths, supra note 40, 83) 
Transitional justice can be rendered by international or domestic criminal courts, commissions of 
inquiry, referred to as Truth and Reconciliation Commissions (“TRCs”), or other mechanisms allowing 
redress for victims. See further Koskenniemi, Between Impunity and Show Trials, supra note 18, 9-12. 
44 1998 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 2187 UNTS 3, Art. 17(1)(a). The question as 
to whether the ability to conduct trials requires the ability to do so fairly must still be answered in light 
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International criminal courts are set up principally with the purpose of prosecuting 
and, if found guilty, punishing those responsible for the commission of serious 
violations of international humanitarian law.45 This is considered necessary to pay 
tribute to the victims and to end impunity for such crimes with the aim to deter 
potential future perpetrators from doing the same. Bassiouni pointed out that these 
crimes are so serious that they affect mankind as a whole and the only way to work 
towards prevention of their recurrence is to send out a clear message to future 
dictators that they will have to answer for their deeds.46
 
  
The ICC has explicitly acknowledged the right to justice for victims, which was 
defined as follows: “victims’ interests in the identification, prosecution and 
punishment of those who have victimized them by preventing their impunity. When 
the right to justice is to be satisfied through criminal proceedings, victims have a 
central interest in the outcome of such proceedings leading to the identification, 
prosecution and punishment of those who have victimised them. Accordingly, victims 
have a personal and core interest in the determination of guilt or innocence of the 
persons charged.”47
                                                                                                                                           
of the Prosecutor’s invitation to the Libyan highest authorities to challenge the admissibility of the case 
of Saif Gaddafi before the ICC. See: Situation in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya in the Case of the 
Prosecutor v. Saif Al Islam Gaddafi and Abdullah al Senussi, Public Prosecution’s Submissions on the 
Prosecutor’s recent trip to Libya, ICC-01/11-01/11-31, 25 November 2011. 
  
45 UN Doc. S/RES/808, 22 February 1993 (Resolution establishing the ICTY); UN Doc. S/RES/955, 8 
November 1994 (Resolution establishing the ICTR); Preamble of the Rome Statute, supra note 44. 
46 M. Cherif Bassiouni, Searching for Peace and Achieving Justice: The Need for Accountability, 59(4) 
Law and Contemporary Problems 9 (1996), 9-28; M. Cherif Bassiouni, International Crimes: Jus 
Cogens and Obligatio Erga Omnes, 59(4) Law & Contemp. Probs. 63 (1996), 63-74. See also Karl 
Jaspers who suggested this already in 1963, in ‘Lebensfragen der deutschen Politik’, referred to by 
Arendt in Eichmann in Jerusalem, supra note 21, 269-270. See further M. Drumbl, Atrocity, 
Punishment and International Law, (Cambridge University Press, 2007), 60-63; On identifying 
retribution and deterrence as the main purposes of international criminal justice, see R. Amoussouga, 
ICTR Spokesperson, Strong Message to Africa’s Leaders and Warlords, ICTR Newsletter, March 
2008, available at <http://69.94.11.53/English/newsletter/mar08/mar08.pdf>, last accessed 2008. 
47 Prosecutor v. Katanga & Ngudjolo, P. T. Ch. Public Urgent Decision on the Set of Procedural Rights 
Attached to Procedural Status of Victim at the Pre-Trial Stage of the Case, ICC-01/04-01/07-474, 13 
May 2008, paras. 39-42, footnote 102; Prosecutor v. Katanga & Ngudjolo, Confirmation of Charges 
Hearing - Open Session, Opening Statement by Mr. Gilissen, ICC-01/04-01/07-T-38-ENG ET, page 
45, lines 8-13 (“With the Court and the participants, we contribute – and I believe this firmly – we 
represent hope, the hope for justice, the hope in justice.  You can believe me, on the ground there is a 
burning thirst for justice. They need justice, which is necessary, because the justice that they wish for is 
one of the conditions for the return to real peace on the ground”). See also the opening statement of 
Ms. Bapita, another victim representative, at page 52 lines 1-7: “The victims want you to know that 
they are thirsting for justice. This is the first time that they can speak out.  Five years later, can you 
imagine what they have had to deal with over the last five years, how they crave for justice?  And to 
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The prosecution of the perpetrators of serious violations of international humanitarian 
law is further believed to be necessary to restore and maintain international peace and 
security. In respect of the ICTR and ICTY, the Security Council used its powers 
under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, to adopt military and non-
military measures deemed appropriate to maintain or restore international peace and 
security.48
 
  
These objectives correspond with the ICTY’s First Annual Report, which notes that 
the mandate of the Tribunal is “to do justice, to deter further crimes and to contribute 
to the restoration and the maintenance of peace”.49 Similarly, the Humanitarian Law 
Centre and other human rights organisations in the former Yugoslavia embraced the 
establishment of the ICTY because it constituted an effort to resist the culture of 
impunity in the former Yugoslavia, as well as stop the violence by fighting this 
impunity.50
 
   
The ICTR Resolution refers to an additional objective, namely, its contribution to the 
process of national reconciliation.51
                                                                                                                                           
that end, they hope that at the wake of this hearing the charges against these suspects will be 
confirmed.  They also that they will not be victimised anew, be it by individuals or by institutions.” 
 The ICTY Resolution, on the other hand, does not 
48 It can do so by virtue of Art. 39 of Chapter VII of the 1945 Charter of the United Nations, 892 UNTS 
119, which provides that: 
“The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to peace, breach of peace, or act of 
aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken in accordance 
with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and security.” 
49 M. Cherif Bassiouni, Crimes against humanity in International Criminal Law, ed. Kluwer Law 
International (The Hague/London/Boston, 1999 2nd ed), page 236. This corresponds with the view 
expressed by Mr. Joinet in the ICTY contempt case against Florence Hartmann, holding that one of the 
purposes of international criminal justice is to set an example in order to prevent persons in the future 
from committing massive human rights violations. See Prosecutor v. Hartmann, IT-02-54-R77.5-T, T. 
16 June 2009, page 288. 
50 Prosecutor v. Hartmann, IT-02-54-R77.5-T, T. 17 June 2009, pages 383-384 (per Ms Kandic). See 
also Michael Mansfield who cited Martin Luther King’s famous phrase “There can be no peace without 
Justice” in the context of the bloody Sunday inquiry. See: Expensive, but justice must be done, Article 
published in The Independent, 13 June 2010. 
51 UN Doc. S/RES/955, 8 November 1994. Concerns have been expressed about these objectives. They 
make no reference to principles of due process, which, according to Howard Morisson, former defence 
attorney at the ICTY and ICTR, suggests that the political agenda at the time of drafting did not 
prioritise defence issues. See H. Morrison, International Criminal Tribunals, Counsel, June 2001, 14-
17, at 14. See also, L. Hammond, Professor, University of Texas, statement before the United States 
House of Representatives International Relations Committee, 28 February 2002, expressing concern 
about the objective to restore peace: “From the beginning ... the ICTY was established to carry out a 
specific political purpose: to restore peace. ... There may be nothing wrong with this purpose, but it is 
not one that should guide a court that exists to assure just trials. There is no hint of any presumption of 
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explicitly refer to reconciliation as an objective,52 but a number of judgments have 
nonetheless referred to such an objective. For instance, in Deronjic, the Chamber held 
that “[t]ruth and justice should also foster a sense of reconciliation between different 
ethnic groups within the countries … of the former Yugoslavia”.53 In Erdemovic, the 
Trial Chamber stated that efforts to end impunity ‘would contribute to appeasement 
and give the chance to the people who were solely afflicted to mourn those among 
them who had been unjustly killed.’54
 
 
Similar objectives are set out in the Preamble of the Rome Statute, stating that, 
“during this century millions of children, women and men have been victims of 
unimaginable atrocities that deeply shock the conscience of humanity”. Such grave 
crimes “threaten the peace, security and well-being of the world” and concern the 
international community as a whole “and must not go unpunished”. Their “effective 
prosecution must be ensured … to put an end to impunity for the perpetrators of these 
crimes and thus to contribute to the prevention of such crimes”.55
 
  
There is no explicit reference to reconciliation. However, it is regularly suggested that 
“peace, security and well-being of the world” can only be achieved if former 
opponents are reconciled in a new stable order.56
 
  
The ICC recognises an additional objective of international criminal justice, that is, to 
give a voice to victims through participation in the proceedings and offer them a 
                                                                                                                                           
innocence, or of the possibility that persons brought before the Tribunal might not be “responsible for 
serious violations” of law.... [T]here exists an always present pressure to gain convictions.” 
52 UN Doc. S/RES/808, 22 February 1993. 
53 Prosecutor v. Deronjić, T. Ch. Judgment on sentence, IT-02-61-T, 30 March 2004, para. 133. 
54 Sentencing Judgment, IT-96-22-T, 29 November 1996, para. 65. See also J. Temminck Tuinstra, 
Defence Counsel in International Criminal Law (T.M.C. Asser Press, 2009), footnote 141, where 
question marks are raised about the goal of retribution at the ICTR. 
55 Preamble of the Rome Statute, supra note 44; text of the Rome Statute circulated as document 
A/CONF.183/9 of 17 July 1998 and corrected by procès-verbaux of 10 November 1998, 12 July 1999, 
30 November 1999, 8 May 2000, 17 January 2001 and 16 January 2002. The Statute entered into force 
on 1 July 2002. See also R. Goldstone & N. Fritz, In the Interests of Justice” and Independent 
Referral: The ICC Prosecutor’s Unprecedented Powers, 13 Leiden Journal of International Law 655 
(2000), 656. See also: Jugde Kirsch, who is optimistic about preventive function of ICC at: 
http://wwwold.icc-cpi.int/library/about/newsletter/16/en_01.html   
56 J. Bolton, The Global Prosecutors: Hunting War Criminals in the name of Utopia, 78 Foreign 
Affairs 157 (1999), 657-658. See also S. de Gurmendi, The Role of the International Prosecutor, in R. 
Lee (Ed.), The International Criminal Court: Elements of Crimes and Rules of Procedure and Evidence 
(Transnational Publishers Inc., 2001) 175, at 181. 
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forum of redress for their losses.57 This function does not exist in the ICTY and ICTR 
where victims have a voice only if they testify. However, each of these international 
tribunals and court intend to offer victims a forum where they can tell their truth in an 
officially sanctioned forum.58 This “truth-telling” function of international courtrooms 
aims to “break their silence” and so instil in them “a sense of empowerment and 
control”.59 Whilst the international tribunals and court were not established to serve as 
therapeutic centres for victims, Doak argues that, to the extent possible, they should 
“maximize their healing potential and minimise their harming potential”.60 Safferling, 
on the other hand, is of the viewpoint that any healing objective would overstrain the 
system and should, therefore, be dealt with by TRCs.61
 
  
In summary, the acknowledged primary purpose of international criminal justice is 
the punishment of alleged perpetrators of international humanitarian law with the 
additional aims to 
(1) put an end to impunity;   
(2) do justice to the victims and give them a voice, as well as a forum; 
(3) deter any potential future perpetrators from doing the same; 
(4) restore and maintain the international peace and security; 
(5) reconcile former enemy fighters. 
 
Achievability of the Identified Objectives  
These objectives are both retributive and restorative in nature. They resemble the 
                                                 
57 I. Bonomy, The Reality of Conducting A War Crimes Trial, 5 Journal of International Criminal 
Justice 348 (2007), 4; Fiona McKay, Civil Reparation in National Courts for Victims of Human Rights 
Abuse, in Lattimer & Sands, Justice for Crimes Against Humanity, supra note 41, 283, at 285; L. 
Francis & J. Francis, International Criminal Courts, the Rule of Law, and the Prevention of Harm: 
Building Justice in Times of Injustice, in L. May & Z. Hoskins (Eds.), International Criminal Law and 
Philosophy (Cambridge University Press, 2010) 58, 70-71. 
58 P. Akhavan, Justice in The Hague, Peace in the Former Yugoslavia? A Commentary on the United 
Nations War Crimes Tribunal, 20 Human Rights Quarterly 737 (1998), 737-816. 
59 M. Minow, Between Vengeance and Forgiveness: Facing History After Genocide and Mass Violence 
(Boston: Beacon Press 1998), 66; See also J. Doak, The Therapeutic Dimension of Transitional 
Justice: Emotional Repair and Victim Satisfaction in International Trials and Truth Commissions, 11 
International Criminal Law Review 263 (2011), 270-271; See also, as Debra L. DeLaet put it, in light 
of the purpose of healing, “truth telling needs to be conceived as a process emphasizing the need of 
survivors to tell their stories, to be listened to, and to have their experiences validated, rather than as a 
means to an end in which the truth is primarily a product intended to serve as an authoritative record of 
atrocity or as a basis for punishing the guilty.”; D. DeLaet, Gender Justice, A Gendered Assessment of 
Truth-Telling Mechanisms, in Borer, Telling the Truths, supra note 40. 
60 Doak, The Therapeutic Dimension of Transitional Justice, supra note 59, at 291. 
61 C. Safferling, The Role of the Victim in the Criminal Process – A Paradigm Shift in National 
German and International Law? International Criminal Law Review 11 (2011) 183-215. 
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objectives of Truth and Reconciliation Commissions (“TRCs”), which similar to 
international courts seek to reconstruct facts.62 However, international criminal 
procedures differ from TRC procedures in that the latter do not involve criminal 
prosecutions. In addition, they often grant amnesty to some or all of the identified 
perpetrators.63 TRCs focus on producing a report containing an official version of 
events. By contrast, the focus of international criminal justice is on the fair and 
efficient identification and accountability of the perpetrators of massive human rights 
violations. Its primary purpose is therefore retributive.64
 
 
It is, however, often assumed that the identified restorative objectives in international 
tribunals will be met by holding individuals accountable for their deeds.65 Indeed, 
there is great optimism as to how much international tribunals and courts can 
achieve.66 As Klabbers phrases it, “we have all fallen under the spell of international 
criminal law and the beauty of bringing an end to the culture of impunity.”67
 
 
                                                 
62 Koskenniemi, Between Impunity and Show Trials, supra note 18, 9-12; Llewellyn, Restorative 
Justice in Transitions and Beyond, supra note 41, 91, 93-95. 
63 General or blanket amnesty, which is also referred to as amnesia, was granted in many countries in 
South America, imposed by former regimes. In South Africa, blanket amnesty was rejected; amnesty 
was given on an individual basis only. See W. Haubrich, Wahrheitskommissionen, dargestellt an den 
Beispielen von El Salvador, Guatemala und Südafrika, Verlag Mainz, Wissenschaftsverlag, Aachen, 1. 
Auflage 10 (2003) 199-245. In some TRCs the names of the identified perpetrators are not published. 
See also: Llewellyn, Restorative Justice in Transitions and Beyond, in: Borer, Telling the Truths, supra 
note 40, 83 at 85-87. See also W. Haubrich, Truth Commissions Compared: El Salvador, South Africa 
and Guatemala, The George Washington University Law School, Public International Law Seminar, 
Washington, 28 April 1997. Some observers are critical to the granting of amnesty. However, this may 
be a necessary measure to ensure future peace where stability can only be assured with the cooperation 
of former belligerents and other parties potentially connected to past wrongdoing. See Llewellyn, 
Restorative Justice in Transitions and Beyond, supra note 41, 85-87. 
64 M.B. Dembour & E. Haslam, Silencing Hearing? Victim-Witnesses at War Crimes Trials, 15 
European Journal of International Law 151 (2004), at 152. 
65 T. Waters, [Redacted]: Writing and Reconciling in the Shadow of Secrecy at a War Crimes Tribunal, 
draft paper published in materials for The ICTR Legacy from the Defence Perspective, Conference held 
in Brussels, Belgium, 24 May 2010, Part I. See also: “Bringing Justice to the Former Yugoslavia – The 
Tribunal’s Core Achievements,” (ICTY website: http://www.un.org/icty/glance/index.htm); M. Scharf 
& W. Schabas, Slobodan Milosevic on Trial: A Companion (Continuum, 2002), 97-98; R. Kerr, Peace 
through Justice? The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 7 Southeast 
European and Black Sea Studies 379 (2007). It is similarly often assumed that a TRC enquiry or 
international criminal trial will impact favourably on the peace and stability in a country and contribute 
to reconciliation. See for instance A. Allan & M. Allan, The South African Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission as a Therapeutic Tool, 18 Behavioural Sciences and the Law 474 (2000). 
66 P. Akhavan, The International Criminal Court in Context: Mediating the Global and Local in the 
Age of Accountability, 97 American Journal of International Law 712 (2003), 712. 
67 J. Klabbers, Just Revenge? The Deterrence Argument in International Criminal Law, 12 Finish 
Yearbook International Law 249 (2001), 250. For similar observations, see F. Megret, Three Dangers 
for the International Criminal Court: A Critical Look at a Consensual Project, 12 Finish Yearbook 
International Law 193 (2001), 201. 
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Empirical research is, however, lacking to conclude whether this is indeed the case. 
Such assertions are frequently based on mere speculations.68 Wishful thinking is often 
equated with empirical evidence. Amongst other scholars, Debra L. DeLaet holds that 
such assumptions are based on “idealistic aspiration rather than a concrete reflection 
on the actual records of trials and truth commissions as truth-telling mechanisms”.69 
In reality, the impact of truth-telling mechanisms on any of these concepts may be 
exaggerated.70 Drumbl suggests that such exaggeration stems from a blind faith in 
international tribunals and courts without giving due weight to the complexity of the 
situations in which they operate.71 As Doak puts it, “transitional justice is not magic 
bullet”.72 It has even been argued that the impact of international justice is counter-
productive.73 In any event, the impact is far less understood than the mechanics of 
truth-telling processes.74 This lack of understanding is increased by the fact that 
concepts such as peace, justice and reconciliation are abstract, ambiguous and 
disputed.75
 
  
It is impossible to verify whether the goals are achievable and have been achieved 
                                                 
68 J. Clark, Transitional Justice, Truth and Reconciliation: An Under-Explored Relationship, 11 
International Criminal Law Review 241(2011), 243-244. 
69 Debra L. DeLaet: Gender Justice, A Gendered Assessment of Truth-Telling Mechanisms, in Borer, 
Telling the Truths, supra note 40, 151 at 169; also see Becker, Confronting the Truth of the Erinyes, 
supra note 19: at 232 he refers to ‘belief rather than scientific proof’, and 242-243. See also B. 
Hamber, “Nunca Más” and the Politics of Person: Can Truth Telling Prevent the Recurrence of 
Violence? in Borer, Telling the Truths, supra note 40, 207 at 211.  
70 For instance, the TRC of South Africa has been criticized for not having achieved reconciliation. The 
TRC responded to this criticism by emphasizing that reconciliation is a process, truth is the road to 
reconciliation, not the end; the TRC is only part of the journey toward reconciliation. See Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission of South Africa, Report (Juta Press, 1998), Vol. 5, Chapters 5, 8, page 97. 
See further Becker, Confronting the Truth of the Erinyes, supra note 19, at 233, where he states that 
“confusion about such concepts as truth, justice, trauma, and healing lead to false expectations by both 
victims and society about the nature of reconciliation and the extent of reparation possible in the 
aftermath of human-made disasters”. See also Ambos, pointing out that, for instance, the international 
criminal tribunals are still too new to know whether they will have a deterrent effect. But realistically, 
given that the powers of functions of international tribunals are limited, their objectives and goals are 
also limited: K. Ambos, Crimes Against Humanity and the International Criminal Court, in L. Sadat 
(Ed.), Forging a Convention on Crimes Against Humanity (Cambridge University Press, 2011) 297. 
71 Drumbl, Atrocity, supra note 46, 9-10. 
72 Doak, The Therapeutic Dimension of Transitional Justice, supra note 59, 264. See also Francis & 
Francis, International Criminal Courts, supra note 57, 70-71, raising doubt as to whether deterrence 
can be achieved. 
73 C. Eisnaugle, An International ‘Truth-Commission’: Utilizing Restorative Justice as an Alternative 
to Retribution, 36 Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law (2003) 209, 233. 
74 D. Becker, Cross-National Comparative Analysis, in H. van der Merwe, V. Baxter & A. Chapman 
(Eds), Assessing the Impact of Transitional Justice: Challenges for Empirical Research (2009) 51. 
75 D. Chuter, War Crimes, Confronting Atrocity in the Modern World, (Lynne Rienner Publishers Inc, 
Ministry of Defence, Colorado 2003), 251; A. Chapman, Approaches to Studying Reconciliation, in 
van der Merwe, Assessing the Impact of Transitional Justice, supra note 74, 144 at 144-145; Francis & 
Francis, International Criminal Courts, supra note 57, at 60. 
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until adequate empirical research is conducted into the impact of international justice 
on its goals. Until then, as ICTY Prosecutor Blewitt puts it, “[t]he simplified 
dichotomy between reconciliation and justice serves academic discourse more than it 
accurately describes reality”.76
 
 
If expectations are too high or unrealistic, they may have an adverse effect on the 
ultimate achievement of international justice. They could actually lead to great 
disillusion with international justice itself.77 Rather, expectations must be “informed 
and pragmatic”,78 and limited to “what can reasonably be accomplished”.79 The 
potential of international tribunals in achieving the identified objectives should be 
recognised but not romanticised.80 Only then may international justice make a modest 
contribution to the above objectives.81
 
 
Some practitioners and observers take it a step further and take the view that 
international trials should focus on trying alleged perpetrators only and not get side-
tracked by peripheral issues such as reconciliation. If trials effect reconciliation, then 
that may be an asset, but it should not be the focus. Other institutions, such as TRCs, 
have been set up with the particular objective of seeking to reconcile former enemies. 
International tribunals should not be overly ambitious in trying to achieve the same.82
 
 
The validity of this point will be examined in Part IV.  
For international tribunals to have the potential to impact positively on any of the 
above objectives, their judgments must be perceived as truthful. It is often claimed 
The Ascertainment of the Truth as an Objective of International Justice 
                                                 
76 G. Blewitt, The International Criminal Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, in 
Lattimer & Sands, Justice for Crimes Against Humanity, supra note 41, 145 at 151. 
77 Clark, Transitional Justice, Truth and Reconciliation, supra note 68, 244. See also Doak, The 
Therapeutic Dimension of Transitional Justice, supra note 59, at 275. 
78 Clark, Transitional Justice, Truth and Reconciliation, supra note 68, 244. See also Drumbl, Atrocity, 
supra note 46, 9-10. 
79 Chuter, War Crimes, supra note 75, 278. 
80 Drumbl, Atrocity, supra note 46, 10. 
81 C. Safferling, The Role of the Victim in the Criminal Process – A Paradigm Shift in National 
German and International Law?, supra note 61, 115. 
82 See Justice Doherty’s observations at the Dublin Conference, supra note 13. See also: J. Ku & J. 
Nzelibe, Do International Tribunals Deter or Exacerbate Humanitarian Atrocities, 84 Washington 
University Law Review 777 (2006); E. Stover, The Witnesses: War Crimes and the Promise of Justice 
in The Hague, University of Pennsylvania Press (2005). 
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that there can be no justice, deterrence, lasting peace or reconciliation without truth.83 
The ascertainment of the truth is therefore the principal objective of TRCs. Truth is 
considered a necessary instrument to achieve reconciliation.84
 
  
Similarly, NGOs, civil society groups, academic scholars and other observers of 
international justice consider the ascertainment of the truth to be one of the core 
objectives of international justice. Only if the truth is established in international 
justice will the unspeakable crimes be uncovered and spoken about: “truth now peace 
forever”.85
 
 
In Borer’s view, the purpose of trials and tribunals, arguably, “is the discovery of 
facts about past actions and the assignment of blame for these actions. Not only do 
trials contribute to justice and the rule of law – important qualities of positive and 
                                                 
83 The revelation of why, how and by whom atrocities were committed is expected “to prevent 
impunity, transform social relations and the meaning of past violence, and affect how people will act in 
the future.” See Hamber, “Nunca Más”, supra note 69, 211. See also Koskenniemi, Between Impunity 
and Show Trials, supra note 18, 4: “only when the injustice to which a person has been subjected has 
been publicly recognised, the conditions for recovering from trauma are present and the dignity of the 
victim may be restored. Facing the truth of its past is a necessary condition to enable a wounded 
community - a community of perpetrators and victims - to recreate the conditions of viable social life.” 
However, there are also observers who are more skeptical about the effect of truth on other objectives. 
For instance, at footnote 63 in Borer, Telling the Truths, supra note 40, Borer points out that some 
scholars do not agree that uncovering past facts is a necessary condition for, or even a contributing 
factor to building a lasting peace. Tristan Anne Borer also holds that truth does not automatically lead 
to reconciliation. See T. Borer, Truth Telling as a Peace-Building Activity: A Theoretical Overview, in 
Borer, Telling the Truths supra note 40 1, at 30-31, 36; Clark, Transitional Justice, Truth and 
Reconciliation, supra note 68, 247. See also K. Asmal, L. Asmal & R. Robert, Reconciliation Through 
Truth: A Reckoning of Apartheid’s Criminal Governance (David Philip Publishers, 1996); S. Dwyer, 
Reconciliation for Realists, 13 Ethics and International Affairs 82 (1999); Akhavan, Justice in The 
Hague, supra note 58, 741; Michael Mansfield, “There can be no justice without truth” in: Expensive, 
but justice must be done, Article published in The Independent, 13 June 2010. 
84 S. Kurtenbach, Dealing with the Past and Imagining the Future, in L. Reychler & T. Paffenholz 
(Eds.), Peace-building: A Field Guide (Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2002), 327; cited in Borer, Truth 
Telling as a Peace-Building Activity, supra note 83, 17-18. See also Pasternak, 
Wahrheitskommissionen, supra note 64. However, as noted ibid, there are also scholars who question 
the unit of truth and reconciliation.  
85 This was the sub-title of Echoes of Genocide: Bosnia 1995-2005, Conference hosted by the Center 
for Holocaust and Genocide Studies & Filmtheatre Kriterion, held in The Hague, Netherlands, 25 
September 2005. At this Conference, the Commission for Missing Persons observed that “if not for the 
ICTY many crimes would not have been registered; for that, the ICTY is a success”. Moreover, in a 
leaflet announcing the various speakers at this Conference, the Research and Documentation Centre 
(RDC) made the following submission, highlighting the importance of fact recordings: 
“We are aware that the search for truth and justice in Bosnia and Herzegovina in the next few years is 
an important precondition for confidence building, reconciliation and long – lasting peace. There are a 
lot of facts and stories that should be heard and recorded. I am inviting you to collaborate with the 
RDC and bring us any information you have in connection with the crimes committed during war in 
Bosnia, and Herzegovina. Victims were not defeated only because they were killed, humiliated, raped, 
imprisoned, or forced to leave their homes. The first sign of victim’s final defeat, and in that context, a 
criminal’s victory, is the silence about their suffering. Do not allow anyone to keep you silent.” 
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sustainable peace – they can also forge a sense of collective memory, thus serving as 
a tool of nation building, another quality necessary for fostering sustainable peace”.86
 
  
The Resolutions establishing the ICTY and ICTR do not list the ascertainment of the 
truth as one of the objectives of these tribunals. Their Statutes also make no reference 
to the ascertainment of the truth as an objective of international criminal justice. The 
Rules of Procedure and Evidence initially adopted were equally silent on the 
ascertainment of the truth as a function of the tribunals.  
 
Notwithstanding this absence of any explicit reference to the ascertainment of the 
truth, it has, from the beginning, been clearly and explicitly acknowledged as one of 
the objectives of the ICTY and ICTR and has gained importance over time. 
 
During the inter-State debates that preceded the adoption of the Security Council 
Resolution to establish the ICTY, Ms. Albright, who represented the United States of 
America, stated:87
 
 
The lesson that we are all accountable to international law may have finally taken hold in our 
collective memory. This will be no victor’s tribunal. The only victor that will prevail in this 
endeavour is the truth. 
 
In a follow-up meeting, she repeated her submission on the importance of the 
establishment of the truth and added:88
 
 
Truth is the cornerstone of the rule of law, and it will point towards individuals, not peoples, as 
perpetrators of war crimes. And it is only the truth that can cleanse the ethnic and religious 
hatreds and begin the healing process. 
 
                                                 
86 Borer, Truth Telling as a Peace-Building Activity, supra note 83, 20-21. Also see M. Osiel, Mass 
Atrocity, Collective Memory and the Law (Transaction Publishers, 1997). See also Professor Filip 
Reyntjens, researcher of Great Lake District, who considers that the objective of contributing to 
reconciliation in Rwanda indicates that the ICTR is meant to be a truth-finding institute although it has 
not been greatly successful at achieving either reconciliation or truth. See personal interview with F. 
Reyntjens, conducted in Antwerp, Belgium, 20 December 2004. 
87 States comments on UN Doc. S/RES/780, 6 October 1992, published in: V. Morris & M. Scharf, An 
Insider’s Guide to the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, A Documentary 
History and Analysis (Volume II) (Transnational Publishers, 1995) 165 (Ms. Albright, United States of 
America) [emphasis added]. 
88 UN Doc. S/RES/827, 25 May 1993, Record on Debate on Resolution 827, published in Morris & 
Scharf, An Insider’s Guide to the ICTY, ibid, 185 (Ms. Albright, United States of America) [emphasis 
added]. 
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Thus, according to Ms. Albright and other State representatives,89
 
 the ascertainment 
of the truth was one of the core objectives of the ICTY and the ICTR, established 
subsequently.  
Many NGOs, academics, international criminal judges, prosecutors and other persons 
concerned place similar emphasis on the ascertainment of the truth. For instance, Mr. 
Joinet, a retired French judge who has fulfilled a number of human rights positions in 
the Council of Europe and United Nations, was called as an expert in the ICTY 
contempt case of former ICTY prosecutor Ms Hartmann.90 In the course of his 
testimony, he held that the ultimate purpose of international criminal justice is 
obviously to establish the truth.91
 
 
The Presiding Judge in the ICTY case against Prlic et al stated:  
 
I am a bit like Digenious ^ , who was walking in Athens with a lantern in daylight and he was 
asked what he was doing, and he answered, "I'm looking for a human, a human being," I myself 
am looking for the truth.  I'm the judicial counterpart of this famous person, and I'm looking for 
the truth.”92
                                                 
89 See, inter alia, the submissions of Mr. De Araujo Castro, representative of Brazil:  
  
“.... A cry for justice breaks from every heart, and that cry cannot go unheeded. Brazil favours strong 
action to ensure the full ascertainment of the truth about each of the cases of war crimes and crimes 
against humanity committed in the territory of the former Yugoslavia. Convinced that effective 
prosecution and punishment of the perpetrators of these crimes is a matter of high moral duty, Brazil 
supports the establishment of an international criminal tribunal to bring to justice the individuals found 
to be responsible for such abominable acts. It is in that spirit that we will vote in favour of the draft 
resolution before the Security Council.”[emphasis added]. Published in: Morris & Scharf, An Insider’s 
Guide to the ICTY, ibid, 161 (States comments on UN Doc. S/RES/780, 6 October 1992)). 
90 Prosecutor v. Hartmann, IT-02-54-R77.5-T, T. 16 June 2009, 238-242. 
91 See ibid, 292, lines 6-7; also 310 and 316. See also Ms Kandic representing the Humanitarian Law 
Centre in the former Yugoslavia, another witness in the Florence Hartmann contempt case, who stated 
that one of their objectives was to promote the judicial truth as established by the ICTY in Serbia and 
they discussed the evidence underlying the ICTY judgments in great detail. See ibid, 383. See also, 
inter alia, Research and Documentation Centre Sarajevo (http://www.idc.org.ba/aboutus.html), Mirsad 
Tokaca, President of RDC: Truth Now Peace Forever: “We are aware that the search for truth and 
justice in Bosnia and Herzegovina in the next few years is an important precondition for confidence 
building, reconciliation and long – lasting peace.” Paper published in leaflet of Echoes of Genocide, 
supra note 85. See also Michael Johnson, former Registrar of the War Crimes Chamber in Sarajevo, 
and former senior member of the Office of the Prosecutor at the ICTY, noting at the same conference 
in response to a clear message from someone in the audience “catch them!”: “You say, ‘catch them!’ 
But what does that mean? The Tribunals are designed to be slow because ‘catching them’ is a process; 
the evidence needs to be carefully presented and evaluated. The Tribunals are not there simply to 
‘catch them’ but to establish the truth.” 
92 Prosecutor v. Prlić et al, IT-04-74, T. 10 February 2009, 63, lines 6-10. See also T. 36553, Monday, 
9 February 2009 – examination of Stojić defence witness Slobodan BOŽIČ: 
“My colleague from the Bench was saying that there is no trick, when somebody asks a question to 
somebody. We're all looking for the truth. We're not trying to trick anyone. The Prosecutor has 
documents, and he develops his theory on the basis of these documents, and moreover to trick a former 
prosecutor or former judge is very difficult”. 
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In the ICTY case against Dronjic, the Chamber recognized that the tribunal is 
mandated “to search for and record, as far as possible, the truth of what happened in 
the former Yugoslavia”.93 Also, the first ICTR judgement in Akayesu refers to the 
ICTR objective “to establish the truth in its judgment”.94 In many other cases before 
the ICTY or ICTR, the mandate of ascertaining the truth is relied on in resolving 
procedural issues.95
 
  
Meanwhile, by amendment of 1 July 1999,96 which two years later was also 
incorporated into the ICTY Rules,97
 
 a reference to truth-ascertainment has been 
included in the ICTR Rules of Evidence of Procedure. Rule 90(F)(i) of the ICTY and 
ICTR Rules of Procedure and Evidence provides that “[t]he Trial Chamber shall 
exercise control over the mode and order of interrogating witnesses and presenting 
evidence so as to … [m]ake the interrogation and presentation effective for the 
ascertainment of the truth”.  
The ICC goes a step further than the ad hoc international criminal tribunals in 
explicitly recognising a truth-ascertaining function in its Statute. In contrast to the 
ICTY and ICTR Statutes, the ICC Statute embodies an explicit duty on the Prosecutor 
and Chambers to establish the truth. Pursuant to Article 54(1)(a) of the Rome Statute, 
the Prosecutor shall “[i]n order to establish the truth, extend the investigation to cover 
all facts and evidence relevant to an assessment of whether there is criminal 
                                                 
93 Prosecutor v. Deronjić, T. Ch. Judgment on sentence, IT-02-61-T, 30 March 2004, para. 133. 
94 Prosecutor v. Akayesu, T. Ch. I. Judgment, ICTR-95-4-T, 2 September 1998, para. 131. 
95 See for instance, Prosecutor v. Kupreškić, T. Ch. II. Decision on communication between the parties 
and their witnesses, IT-95-16-T, 21 September 1998, para. (ii); Prosecutor v. Ndindiliyimana et al, T. 
Ch. II. Decision on defence motions alleging violation of the prosecutor’s disclosure obligations 
pursuant to Rule 68, ICTR-00-56-T, 22 September 2008, para. 61 and conclusion; Prosecutor v 
Popović et al, A. Ch. Decision on appeal against decision on impeachment of a party’s own witness, 
IT-05-88-A, 1 February 2008 para. 24; Prosecutor v. Limaj et al, T. Ch. II. Decision on prosecution’s 
third motion for provisional admission of written evidence in lieu of viva voce testimony pursuant to 
rule 92bis, IT-03-66-T, 9 March 2005, para. 4; Prosecutor v. Stakić, IT-97-24-PT (Transcript) 25 
November 2002, page 9437; See further R. May & M. Wierda, Trends in International Criminal 
Evidence: Nuremberg, Tokyo, The Hague, and Arusha, 37(3) Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 
725 (1998), 745; C. Buisman, Evidence before International Criminal Courts and Tribunals, in I. 
Bantekas, International Criminal Law (4th Ed) (Hart Publishing, 2010), 473. 
96 http://69.94.11.53/ENGLISH/rules/010799/6.htm. 
97 By amendment of 12 April 2001, which came into effect on 4 May 2001 (IT/32/Rev. 20), available 
at <http://www.icty.org/x/file/Legal%20Library/Rules_procedure_evidence/IT032_rev20_en.pdf>. 
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responsibility under this Statute, and, in doing so, investigate incriminating and 
exonerating circumstances equally”.  
 
Article 69(3) of the Rome Statute further states that “[t]he Court shall have the 
authority to request the submission of all evidence that it considers necessary for the 
determination of the truth”. In addition, a similar provision as ICTY/ICTR Rule 
90(F)(i) has been incorporated in the ICC Rules. According to ICC Rule 43(a), the 
Presiding Judge, in consultation with the other members of the Chamber, “shall 
determine the mode and order of questioning witnesses and presenting evidence so as 
to: (a) Make the questioning of witnesses and the presentation of evidence fair and 
effective for the determination of the truth”. 
 
The ICC Chambers also ruled that their task is to establish the truth. They make a 
distinction between Pre-Trial Chambers and Trial Chambers. Pre-Trial Chambers 
consider whether there are substantial grounds to believe that a suspect is guilty as 
charged pursuant to Article 61(7) of the ICC Statute. Trial Chambers consider 
whether there is no reasonable doubt that the accused is guilty as charged. Given the 
difference in standards, it has been held that the Pre-Trial Chamber is not a truth-
finder, whilst the Trial Chamber is.98 The truth in relation to the guilt of the defendant 
is not yet determined during the confirmation of the charges proceedings, but only 
during the trial itself.99
 
 
The ICC judges and the parties refer to establishing the truth almost on a daily basis. 
ICC judges have stated on numerous occasions that the Chamber’s mission is to 
manifest the truth.100 The truth provides the basis for questions from the bench to 
witnesses. In addition, the truth determines whether victim participants can ask a 
particular question to a witness,101
                                                 
98 Prosecutor v. Katanga & Ngudjolo, Public Urgent Decision on the Set of Procedural Rights 
Attached to Procedural Status of Victim at the Pre-Trial Stage of the Case, ICC-01/04-01/07-474, 13 
May 2008, para 55; also Prosecutor v. Katanga & Ngudjolo, Decision on the confirmation of charges, 
ICC-01/04-01/07-717, 30 September 2008, paras. 109-110. 
 or whether evidence of which the defence had 
99 Prosecutor v. Katanga & Ngudjolo, Decision on the confirmation of charges, ICC-01/04-01/07-717, 
30 September 2008, paras. 112-113. 
100 Prosecutor v. Katanga & Ngudjolo, ICC-01/04-01/07, T. 8 June 2010, 14. See also, for instance, 
submissions from the parties made on 8 November 2011 (ICC-01/04-01/07, T. 8 November 2011).   
101 See, for instance, Prosecutor v. Katanga & Ngudjolo, T. 11 June 2010, 33 where it was established 
that, in principle, legal representatives are permitted to ask questions of clarification after the end of the 
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received no advance notice or documentary evidence can be admitted.102  Guidelines 
have also been adopted to ensure that the cross-examination contributes to the 
ascertainment of the truth.103
 
  
Right of Victims to the Truth 
The single judge of a Pre-Trial Chamber at the ICC has interpreted the personal 
interests of victims to include the “well-established” right to the truth.104 She defined 
this as the right to “the determination of the facts, the identification of the responsible 
persons and the declaration of their responsibility”.105 This right can be satisfied 
through means other than international criminal proceedings,106 but when criminal 
proceedings are used as a tool to grant victims their right to the truth, such 
proceedings should: “(i) bring clarity about what indeed happened; and (ii) close 
possible gaps between the factual findings resulting from the criminal proceedings 
and the actual truth.”107
 
  
Accordingly, the issue of the guilt or innocence of persons prosecuted before the ICC 
is not only considered to be relevant, but also to affect “the very core interests of 
those granted the procedural status of victim in any case before the Court insofar as 
this issue is inherently linked to the satisfaction of their right to the truth”.108
                                                                                                                                           
Prosecution’s re-examination to help in the establishment of the truth. However, in the particular 
circumstances, the Chamber disallowed the proposed questions because they would prolong the 
testimony, given that the defence would then have a right to re-examine the witness, which could affect 
the quality of the evidence.  
 In this 
regard, it was held that the victims' central interest in the search for the truth can only 
be satisfied if “(i) those responsible for perpetrating the crimes for which they 
102 See, for instance, Prosecutor v. Katanga & Ngudjolo, T. 30 March 2010, page 5; T. 25 May 2010, 
pages 6-7, 40-45 (new evidence: allowed to ascertain the truth; potential prejudice: calling back of 
witness; emphasising the importance of spontaneous statements for the manifestation of the truth but 
this may justify that a certain number of additional questions be asked; T. 26 Feb 2010; 4 Feb 2010, 
pages 6, 10; 8 June 2010, pages 14-15; 14 June 2010; 22 June 2010; 23 June 2010: pages 48-49. 
103 Prosecutor v. Katanga & Ngudjolo, Directions for the conduct of the proceedings and testimony in 
accordance with rule 140, 01 December 2009, ICC-01/04-01/07-1665-Corr, para. 71. 
104 Prosecutor v. Katanga & Ngudjolo, Public Urgent Decision on the Set of Procedural Rights 
Attached to Procedural Status of Victim at the Pre-Trial Stage of the Case, ICC-01/04-01/07-474, 13 
May 2008, paras. 32-36. 
105 Ibid, para. 32 footnote 39. 
106 Ibid, para. 33. 
107 Ibid, para. 34. 
108 Ibid, para. 35. 
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suffered harm are declared guilty; and (ii) those not responsible for such crimes are 
acquitted, so that the search for those who are criminally liable can continue”.109
 
 
Whilst ICTY and ICTR Chambers have recognized their mandate to search for the 
truth and “bring justice to both victims and their relatives and to perpetrators”110
 
, they 
have not explicitly granted a right to victims to the truth and justice. 
However, in the view of an increasing number of scholars, the right to know the truth 
for victims of massive human rights violations is an emerging norm of customary 
international law as well as a general principle of law.111 According to some 
observers, this right would then naturally extend to victims before the international 
criminal tribunals.112
 
 
Joinet expressed the view that victims have the right to the truth in international 
criminal justice.113 He defined this as the right to access to information.114 He 
emphasized the importance of the right of victims to uncover the ‘whole’ truth and 
referred to it as symbolic or moral reparation, as opposed to material reparation 
through damages granted to victims before the ICC and numerous domestic criminal 
justice systems.115
 
  
Joinet acknowledged that such access to information may not be given to victims 
immediately, given that international criminal justice is understandably slow, and 
there may be good grounds not to disclose information to the public while the 
criminal investigations are carrying on, but sooner or later, massive human rights 
violations should not remain hidden. Accordingly, Mr. Joinet held that, for 
international criminal tribunals to play their full role in uncovering the truth, they 
                                                 
109 Ibid, para. 36. 
110 Prosecutor v. Deronjić, T. Ch. Judgment on sentence, IT-02-61-T, 30 March 2004, para. 133. 
111 See, inter alia, Y. Naqvi, The Right to the Truth in International Law Fact or Fiction, 88 ICRC Int. 
Rev. 245 (2006), at 267 and 268; J. Mendez, The Human Right to Truth, in Borer, Telling the Truths, 
supra note 40, 115. 
112 See the submissions of Mr. Joignet in Prosecutor v. Hartmann, IT-02-54-R77.5-T, T. 16 June 2009, 
257, firmly stating that victims have a right to the truth and justice. See also Prosecutor v. Katanga and 
Ngudjolo, ICC-01/04-01/07-T-38-ENG ET, Confirmation of Charges Hearing - Open Session, Opening 
Statement by Mr. Diakiese, page 56, lines 5-7. 
113 Prosecutor v. Hartmann, IT-02-54-R77.5-T, T. 16 June 2009, 238-242. 
114 Ibid, 258. 
115 Ibid, 292-293; T 17 June 2009, 332-333. 
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must be transparent and, as soon as possible, inform the victims of the evidence which 
is available about the crimes committed against them.116
 
  
Reservations about the Ascertainment of the Truth as an Objective 
In conclusion, the legal instruments of the ICC and their interpretation by the ICC 
judges leave no room for disputing that the ascertainment of the truth is a core 
objective of the court. It is also part of the evolving international vocabulary. The 
same can be said in respect of the ICTY and ICTR, notwithstanding the silence on the 
ascertainment of the truth in their Statutes and Resolutions.  
 
However, similar to peace, justice and reconciliation, the notion of truth is ambiguous 
and disputed.117 Parlevliet refers to it as an “elusive concept”.118 Its relationship and 
compatibility with the other objectives is also unclear and ill defined.119
 
 In order to 
test the efficiency of the ascertainment of the truth, it is important to be clear on the 
term. 
There are voices raising concern in regard to the recognition of the ascertainment of 
the truth as a core objective of international justice. Common law practitioners in the 
international field are not as familiar with such vocabulary as their colleagues with a 
civil law background. They, therefore, take a critical view on the ascertainment of the 
truth as an objective of international justice. Common law practitioners often take the 
stance that international trials should focus strictly on whether the prosecution has 
proved the allegations against the defendants beyond a reasonable doubt, nothing 
more, and nothing less. They are concerned that a focus on ascertaining the truth 
would distract the triers of fact from the essence of the criminal trial. They regard a 
trial as a forum to determine the guilt of the defendant, rather than the truth of what 
happened. A TRC, on the other hand, can focus on establishing the truth. In their 
view, the two issues should not be conflated.120
                                                 
116 Ibid, T. 16 June 2009, 287. 
  
117 Clark, Transitional Justice, Truth and Reconciliation, supra note 68, 247-253; Chuter, War Crimes, 
supra note 75, 203-241. 
118 Parlevliet, Considering Truth, supra note 3, 2, 4. 
119 Clark, Transitional Justice, Truth and Reconciliation, supra note 68, 260-261; Chuter, War Crimes, 
supra note 75, 251; Francis & Francis, International Criminal Courts, supra note 57, 58-60. 
120 There are also voices against such acknowledgement. Practitioners in international justice who 
adhere to this school of thought are often of the view that international trials should focus exclusively 
on trying alleged perpetrators of international humanitarian law and leave the establishment of the truth 
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These practitioners are not alone in their view. Observers, most importantly Hannah 
Arendt in her book ‘Eichmann in Jerusalem’, held that the exclusive focus of a 
criminal court should be on the weighing of the charges brought against the accused, 
rendering judgment and meting out due punishment.121
 
 
However, the search for the truth in international justice does not need to be 
incompatible with the standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt. Yet, the existence 
of such concerns demonstrates that there are different views on what the 
ascertainment of the truth as an objective signifies. Thus, an in-depth discussion on 
the meaning of the ascertainment of the truth, both in the context of legal and 
sociological political debates, appears necessary and will follow.  
 
Meaning in domestic criminal justice systems 
Meaning of the Ascertainment of the Truth 
In order to determine the meaning of the ascertainment of the truth in international 
criminal justice, it is helpful to examine what interpretation domestic criminal 
jurisdictions have given to this term. 
 
Truth has a particular legal meaning in domestic criminal justice. Criminal justice 
throughout the world and history seeks to identify perpetrators of crimes committed 
within a society. The method of doing so changes over time and differs from society 
to society. Any criminal justice system, at least in theory, seeks to punish only those 
who are guilty of committing the crimes charged and liberate anyone who is wrongly 
accused. In some jurisdictions, the process in which the guilt of an alleged perpetrator 
of a crime is tested is referred to as ascertaining the truth about the guilt or innocence 
of the accused. Other jurisdictions do not use such terminology, as frequently or 
explicitly. 
 
                                                                                                                                           
to TRCs, which were set up explicitly to deal with that objective. In an ‘off-the-record’ conversation on 
9 December 2010 in The Hague, one Prosecutor, one member of Chambers and one member of a 
defence team each expressed such a view. It is noteworthy that each of them has a common law 
background. 
121 Arendt, Eichmann in Jerusalem, supra note 21, 9, 10, 19, 225, 253. See also Koskenniemi, Between 
Impunity and Show Trials, supra note 18, 25. 
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A distinction is often made between trials conducted in a civil law and a common law 
criminal justice system. Whilst both types of trials inquire into, and reconstruct past 
events, it is generally assumed that the former emphasises the importance of 
establishing the truth to a much greater extent than the latter. The questionable 
validity of this assumption will be addressed in the following discussion on common 
law and civil law interpretations of ascertaining the truth. 
 
Civil Law Justice Systems: Meaning of Ascertainment of the Truth 
In many civil law systems, the mandate of ascertaining the truth is perceived as the 
main goal of criminal proceedings. It is considered to be ‘a precondition to a just 
decision’ and in that sense the ‘true ultimate aim’ of the criminal justice process.122 
Countries, such as France, Belgium and Germany, have explicitly recognized the 
ascertainment of the truth as an objective of criminal justice in their criminal codes of 
procedure.123
 
  
The aim of ascertaining the truth in civil law criminal justice systems has been 
described as the goal, to the extent humanly possible, to reach a factually accurate 
verdict.124
                                                 
122 Damaška, Evidentiary Barriers, supra note 30, 580–581; E. Grande, Dances of Criminal Justice: 
Thoughts on Systematic Differences and the Search for the Truth, in Jackson, Crime, Procedure and 
Evidence, supra note 23, at 153; M. Damaška, Evidence Law Adrift (Yale University Press, 1997), 120. 
 The truth that is assessed in a civil law criminal trial is referred to as an 
123 German criminal proceedings are guided by the principle of investigation pursuant to which the 
truth must be ascertained ex officio by the public prosecutor and the court with regard to all 
incriminatory and exculpatory evidence (§§ 160(2), 155 (2), 206 of the German Code of Criminal 
Procedure (Strafprozeßordnung (StPO)) an english translation of which is available at 
<http://www.iuscomp.org/gla/index/html>). See further § 244.2 StPO, which provides: ‘In order to 
establish the truth, the court shall, proprio motu, extend the taking of evidence to all facts and means of 
evidence relevant to the decision.’ See also M. Bohlander, Basic Concepts of German Criminal 
Procedure – An Introduction, Durham Law Review, 1 Durham Law Review 26 (2011) 9; T. Weigend, 
Rechtsvergleichende Bemerkungen zur Wahrheitssuche im Strafverfahren, Festschrift für Ruth Rissing-
van Saan, 2011, 749-766, at 756. M. Bohlander, Radbruch Redux: The Need for Revisiting the 
Conversation between Common and Civil Law at Root Level at the Example of International Criminal 
Justice, 24 Leiden Journal of International Law 393 (2011), 402. Similarly, Art. 310 of the French 
Code of Criminal Procedure (Code de Procédure Pénal (CPP),official translation available at 
<http://www.legifrance.gov.fr>) provides: ‘The presiding judge is vested with a discretionary power by 
which he may, on his honour and his conscience, take all the measure he deems necessary for the 
discovery of the truth’ (unofficial translation given by the author). In other countries, such as The 
Netherlands, the ascertainment of the truth is not explicitly recognised but the commentary to the 
Dutch Code of Criminal Procedure refers to it as the principal objective of criminal proceedings. See: 
Memo of Information (‘Memorie van Toelichting’), Kamerstukken II 1913/14, 286, nr. 3).  
124 J. Nijboer, Das Streben nach materieller Wahrheit im Strafprozeß, in P. Lang, Criminalia: 
Beweisprobleme und Strafrechtssysteme, (Frankfurt am Main), band 9, 1997, 23, at 28 [hereinafter 
‘Nijboer, Wahrheit im Strafprozeß’]. 
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objective, material, substantive or ontological truth.125 This truth goes beyond the 
truth of the parties. Jointly with all parties and participants, a neutral and impartial 
judge searches for correct answers on the theoretical assumption that “an objective 
reconstruction of reality is attainable”.126
 
   
The objective truth should, however, not be confused with absolute truth or scientific 
truth, whose existence has been denied by many sceptics.127 Even if absolute truth 
exists, it would be impossible for human beings to establish with certainty what the 
absolute truth is.128 In epistemology, a distinction is made between truth (‘reality’ or 
‘proposition’) and the criteria on which a specific notion of the truth is accepted 
through consensus in different situations, without being certain that the truth has in 
fact been discovered. This distinction leaves room to use terms such as ‘ascertaining 
the truth’ without having the illusion that human beings can achieve more than 
establishing with a high level of certainty what has occurred in their framework of 
experience.129
 
  
In this interpretation of the truth, a verdict whose accuracy is not absolutely certain 
can still be consistent with the objective truth. On the basis of the evidence available, 
the objective truth is then the most reliable outcome that can be achieved in a 
courtroom run by human beings. Provided that all efforts are made to ascertain the 
truth, the truth-searching mandate has been successfully completed notwithstanding 
the absence of a guarantee of the accuracy of the outcome. The efforts referred to here 
include everyone involved in the criminal process, including the triers of fact and law 
(professional judges, sometimes assisted by lay assessors), the parties (prosecution 
                                                 
125 E. Grande, Dances of Criminal Justice, supra note 122, 147; Nijboer, Wahrheit im Strafprozeß,ibid 
24–29 ; Damaška, Evidentiary Barriers, supra note 30, 581; See further H. Lévy-Bruhl, La Preuve 
Judiciaire (1964); W. Butler, Russian Law (Oxford University Press, 2003), 256. 
126 J. Whitman, No Right Answer?, in Jackson, Crime, Procedure and Evidence, supra note 23, 371, at 
386. Whether this belief is realistic is questionable. See Damaška, Truth in Adjudication, 49 Hastings 
Law Journal 289 (1998). This is also acknowledged by civil law jurists.  
127 Damaška, Evidentiary Barriers, supra note 30, footnotes 199, 568.  
128 F. Cornford, The Republic of Plato: Translation and Commentary (58th Ed.) (Oxford University 
Press, 1976), 227-235; I. Murdoch, Metaphysics as a Guide to Morals (Chatto & Windus, 1992), 11-
12; K. Malek, Abschied von der Wahrheitssuch, Strafverteidigertag, held in Berlin, Germany, 25-27 
March 2011, 1-6. 
129 Ibid; Nijboer, Wahrheit im Strafprozeß, supra note 124, 26-28. See also, W. Wagenaar, Vincent 
plast op de grond, Nachtmerries in het Nederlands recht (Uitgeverij Bert Bakker, 2006), 9. 
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and defence) and participants (civil parties). The defendant has no obligation to 
participate in this process, but it is generally in his interest that he does.130
 
 
Elisabetta Grande has qualified this all-inclusive truth enquiry as a ‘rumba’ dance, 
which is “performed by a variable number of dancers occasionally alone and 
occasionally in groups with many shifts and continuous substitutions of dancers and 
roles. It is a genuinely communal performance in the collective search of an objective 
truth”.131 A similar observation – albeit not in the dancing metaphor – was made by a 
French judge at the ICC who has pursued his entire career in the French legal system 
prior to his arrival at the ICC. While addressing the defence, prosecution and victim 
participants, he stated: “We are jointly seeking to establish the truth, and each party, 
each participant, has a role to play”.132
 
 
This process is intended to lead to the objective truth, which is fully justified in a reasoned written 
decision.133 The objective truth is therefore verifiable, transparent and subject to public scrutiny and 
appeal to a higher court. It is also predictable as a consistent methodology is applied. The outcome is, 
therefore, not coincidental but upholds the certainty of the law.134
 
  
Common Law Justice Systems: Meaning of Ascertainment of the Truth 
In common law systems, the extent to which the ascertainment of truth is a core 
objective of criminal justice is questionable. The term ‘ascertainment of the truth’ is 
part of the legal vocabulary used in civil law systems but not, or at least not as firmly, 
as that used in common law systems.  
 
A common law adversarial trial is structured along the line of burdens on the parties 
and regulations as to how and what kind of evidence can be presented to the triers of 
fact, rather than along the line of searching for an objective truth. Practitioners and 
observers take the view that dispute resolution in a fair and equal manner is the prime 
                                                 
130 Bohlander, Radbruch Redux, supra note 123, 402; Damaška, Evidentiary Barriers, supra note 30, 
558-559; A. Beijer, 34 Bewijs, in J. Boksem (Ed.), Handboek Strafzaken (Kluwer B.V., 2006), 34.1.4 
Strategy of the Accused and Counsel (the advice to defendants is to participate actively). 
131 Grande, Dances of Criminal Justice, supra note 122, 148, 155. 
132 Prosecutor v. Katanga & Ngudjolo, T. 4 February 2010, ICC-01/04-01/07-T-96-Red-ENG, 31; T. 
10 February 2010, ICC-01/04-01/07-T-99-Red-ENG, 12, where Judge Cotte held: “All of us, even 
though we have different missions, wish to establish the truth.”  
133 De Hert, Legal Procedures at the ICC, supra note 25, 114; See also Art. 353 French CPP. In France 
and Belgium, when the Chambre d’Assize, consisting of lay and professional adjudicators, renders 
judgement in cases of felony, no reasoned written decision must be delivered. 
134 Whitman, No Right Answer?, supra note 126, 383.  
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objective of criminal justice. It is considered more important than the accuracy of the 
outcome.135 This dispute is between two equal parties. On the one hand, there is the 
prosecution, and on the other hand, there is the defendant. The court must settle the 
dispute in a fair manner, because only then can it bring about just results.136
 
 The 
pivotal issues are equality of arms between the two parties and giving a voice to the 
defendant.  
Amongst others, his Honour Judge Peter Murphy defines the objective of common 
law trials as follows:137
 
 
Trials are adversarial contests engaged in by parties who have much to lose and gain, 
and the goal of a party to a case is not to explore objective truth, but to persuade the 
trier of fact that his own version of the facts is the correct one.  
 
Some scholars, however, opine that the central question of any criminal trial lies in 
‘discovering the truth of an accusation’.138 Goodpaster observes that the high regard 
for fairness intends to contribute to this goal. Truth and justice are intertwined, and 
the fairness of the procedure determines the accuracy of the results.139
 
  
                                                 
135 Personal interview with B. Gumpert, conducted in Arusha, Tanzania, 6 September 2006; Damaška, 
Evidentiary Barriers, supra note 30, 103, 123, 134, 136, 580-581: “It is openly stated by some 
common law lawyers that the aim of criminal procedure is not so much the ascertainment of the real 
truth as the just settlement of a dispute”.; Frank, Courts on Trial, supra note 38, 7; Doak, The 
Therapeutic Dimension of Transitional Justice, supra note 59, at 276-277; J. Thibaut & L. Walker, A 
Theory of Procedure, 66 California Law Review 541 (1978) 541-566. 
136 Grande, Dances of Criminal Justice, supra note 122, 147-148, 152; also J. Rawls, A Theory of 
Justice (Revised Edition) (Harvard University Press, 1999). 
137 P. Murphy, Evidence, Proof, and Facts, A Book of Sources (Oxford University Press, 2003), 6. 
Also: De Hert, Legal Procedures at the ICC, supra note 25, 93. See also Damaška, Evidentiary 
Barriers, supra note 30, 581-582; Frank, Courts on Trial, supra note 38, 102: The judgment itself is not 
so much in the nature of a pronouncement on the true facts of the case; it is, rather, a decision between 
the parties. If, however, proceedings are structured as an official inquiry, the concern for ascertaining 
the facts of the case is much more central. Also Morgan is reported to have observed, with some regret, 
that a law-suit is not a forum for the discovery of the truth, but “a game in which the contestants are not 
the litigants but the lawyers”. See also Lord Bingham: “The common law judge, it is often said, unlike 
his counterpart in a civil law system and unlike the other investigators I have mentioned, is not 
concerned with establishing the truth of what did or did not happen on a given occasion in the past but 
merely with deciding, as between adversaries, whether or not the party upon whom the burden of proof 
lies has discharged it to the required degree of probability.” Lord T. Bingham, The Business of Judging, 
Selected Essays and Speeches (Oxford University Press, 2000), 4.  
138 S. Uglow, Criminal Justice (2nd Ed) (Sweet & Maxwell 2002), 207. In his view, this is true of 
today’s as well as medieval justice although the mechanism for uncovering the truth has changed 
radically. The most important scholar in this respect is W.L. Twining, Theories of Evidence: Bentham 
& Wigmore (Stanford: Stanford University Press 1985); Weigend, Rechtsvergleichende Bemerkungen, 
supra note 123, 651-753. 
139 G. Goodpaster, On the Theory of the American Adversary Criminal Trial, 78 Journal of Criminal 
Law and Criminology 118 (1987). 
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Twining, one of the leading scholars on evidence and proof, refers to rectitude of 
decision as an important social value. He defines this term as “the correct application 
of valid substantive laws to facts established as true”.140 He nonetheless concedes that 
this important social value must be balanced against other factors, such as the security 
of the state, the fairness of the proceedings and public expenditure. In light of such 
other objectives, “[t]he pursuit of truth as a means to justice under the law commands 
a high, but not necessarily overriding priority as a social value”.141
 
  
The rulings of the English Courts have been ambiguous as to whether the 
ascertainment of the truth is a primary aim of adversarial proceedings. It can hardly be 
read to support one view over the other. In one case, the Court of Appeal defined the 
judge’s mandate as: “above all … to find the truth, and to do justice according to 
law”, and as being “at the end to make up his mind where the truth lies”.142 In a later 
case, the Court of Appeal, however, said that “[t]he due administration of justice does 
not always depend on eliciting the truth. It often depends on the burden of proof.”143
 
 
Thus, common law trials are more focused on procedural fairness than the search for 
an objective truth. Unlike civil law jurisdictions, barely any thought has been given to 
the concept of truth-ascertainment in common law procedures. No doctrine or 
definition of the term has been adopted. Yet, no trial can be entirely divorced from 
truth ascertaining, as it equals an attempt to reconstruct accurate past facts. This 
exercise can only be conducted if there is an assumption that the reconstruction of 
facts that occurred in the past is in principle possible. The method to reconstruct past 
events is, however, different. 
 
In common law jurisdictions, there is little faith in the neutrality of any fact finder, 
given that human beings always assimilate information selectively. Such cognitive 
limitations, it is said, prevent fact finders from ascertaining the objective truth through 
a neutral inquiry.144
                                                 
140 Twining, Theories, The Rationalist Tradition: ‘Assumptions about fact-finding in adjudication’, 
reprinted in Murphy, Evidence, Proof, and Facts, supra note 137, 70-76. 
  
141 Ibid. 
142 Jones v. National Coal Board [1957] 2 QB 55, 63-64 per Denning LJ. 
143 Air Canada v. Secretary of State for Trade [1983] 2 AC 394 at p. 411, per Lord Denning M.R. 
144 Damaška, Evidence Law Adrift, supra note 122, page 95; Grande, Dances of Criminal Justice, supra 
note 122, at 147, 152.  
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Twining affirms that determinations concerning the truth about allegations are 
generally made under uncertain conditions. Present knowledge about past events is 
typically based on incomplete evidence. Therefore, “establishing the truth about 
alleged past events is typically a matter of probabilities or likelihoods falling short of 
complete certainty”.145
 
 
Similarly, Frank held:146
 
 
The axiom or assumption that, in all or most trials, the truth will out, ignores, then, the 
several elements of subjectivity and chance. It ignores perjury and bias; ignores the 
false impression made on the judge or jury by the honest witness who seems untruthful 
because he is frightened in the court-room or because he is irascible or over-scrupulous 
or given to exaggeration. It ignores the mistaken witness who honestly and 
convincingly testifies that he remembers acts or conversations that happened quite 
differently than as he narrates them in court. It neglects, also, the dead or missing 
witness without whose testimony a crucial fact cannot be brought out, or an important 
opposing witness cannot be successfully contradicted. Finally it neglects the missing or 
destroyed letter, or receipt, or cancelled check. 
 
Therefore, the aim is not to ascertain an objective truth, but rather to establish a 
procedural truth. This then is the outcome of a battle between two parties who each 
present their truth to a passive arbiter. In civil law doctrinal terminology, such a truth 
is referred to as a formal truth. This is defined as a relative truth primarily based on 
the evidence produced by the parties in a civil suit.147
 
 The conclusion of the triers of 
fact drawn from the evidence presented in court reflects the formal truth. This 
conclusion is not presumed factually accurate. It merely reflects whether the party 
who had the burden of proving his claim failed or succeeded in doing so.   
This is similar to the truth that is established in a common law criminal trial. After 
hearing all the evidence, a jury will consider whether the prosecution has proved its 
case against a defendant beyond a reasonable doubt. An acquittal does not mean that 
the defendant is not guilty; it only means that the prosecution failed to establish the 
                                                 
145 Twining, Theories, supra note 140, 70-76. See also Damaška, Evidentiary Barriers, supra note 30, 
584; De Hert, Legal Procedures at the ICC, supra note 25, 93; M. Redmayne, Doubts and Burdens: 
DNA Evidence, Probability and the Courts, (1995) Criminal Law Review 464, 479. 
146 Frank, Courts on Trial, supra note 38, 14-16, 20-21, 47, 80. As Frank states, trial judges or juries are 
fallible witnesses of fallible witnesses: 80. See also J. Frank, Not Guilty (Gollancz, 1957). 
147 It is stated ‘primarily’ because also in civil suits, judges play an active role in an attempt to reach an 
outcome that is factually correct. Nijboer, Wahrheit im Strafprozeß, supra note 124, 24. 
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defendant’s guilt. Whilst it is certainly the aim to convict the guilty and acquit the 
innocent, there is clear appreciation that the same set of facts may lead to different 
truths in different court settings with different prosecutors, defence counsel and jury 
members. In that sense, truth is considered to be relative as it is dependent on the 
human beings who participate in the trial.148 The outcome that is established at the 
end of the battle between two parties is a courtroom truth. It is less consistent and 
verifiable than the truth established in a civil law courtroom, which is set out in full 
detail in a written judgement.149 By contrast, a verdict issued by a jury in a common 
law courtroom consists of one or two words: “guilty” or “not guilty”. The manner in 
which the jury’s verdict is reached is unknown to the public.150
 
  
Elisabetta Grande refers to the truth that comes out of this process as an ‘interpretive truth’, a second-
best truth which common law practitioners view as the only realistically discoverable truth.151 She 
compares the two-party system with a ‘tango’ justice. As it takes two to go to tango, it also takes two 
“to produce a reconstruction of reality that can be equated to truth”.152
 
 
The Objective and Procedural Truths Compared 
It appears that the difference between ‘material’, ‘objective’ or ‘ontological’ truth, 
and ‘formal’, ‘interpretative’, ‘relative’ or ‘procedural’ truth is that the former 
presupposes a true version of events that is out there to be discovered. By contrast, the 
latter is a truth that is established on the basis of the information that is presented post 
facto in the courtroom.  
 
Conceptually, there is a very clear distinction between these two types of truths. In 
practice, however, the difference between them is not as significant. This is 
particularly true, given that both civil law and common law jurists most often accept 
that there will always be some doubt about the final outcome of the inquiry. Indeed, 
common law and civil law scholars and practitioners alike have acknowledged that it 
                                                 
148 Frank, a true sceptic of any real possibility of attaining the truth in the court-room, points out that, 
until cases arise and are decided, one does not know one’s legal rights and duties. Those are 
determined in Court, not in the abstract. See Frank, Courts on Trial, supra note 38, 12-13, where he 
gives an example of a wrong finding of fact. He refers to Borchard’s book, Convicting the Innocent 
(1932), reporting 65 cases of wrongful convictions. He also says that one is unaware of how many 
guilty men escaped the boat through mistakes in fact-finding. 
149 See supra note 133. 
150 This is said to give the jury an uncontrollable and incorrigible power and is therefore criticised. See 
Frank, Courts on Trial, supra note 38, 112-113. 
151 Grande, Dances of Criminal Justice, supra note 122, 147-148. 
152 Ibid, 148. 
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is impossible for any human assessor to acquire absolute certainty of any fact 
including those to which they were a witness themselves.153
 
 
The objective truth has been described as the most reliable outcome that can be 
achieved in a courtroom run by human beings on the basis of the evidence available. 
If the objective truth is viewed in this way, there is little difference from the 
procedural truth because they are both determined by the procedure. Thus, the focus 
in any truth-searching exercise is on the procedure more than the result. If the truth-
searching procedure is fair then the outcome is accepted as truthful until and unless 
proven wrong in appeal or review proceedings. In such a situation, the outcome will 
be overturned in either system. Yet, both types of criminal justice systems have 
adopted a procedure which is believed to produce the safest, most accurate results. 
Some scholars would therefore argue that both methods of criminal proceedings seek 
to establish the truth.154
 
 
The main distinction between the material and procedural truth is the methodology 
applied to obtain the truth. Different notions of truth go combined with different 
procedural arrangements.155 In establishing the procedural truth, the persuasion of the 
argument prevails. The search for the objective truth, on the other hand, is a quest for 
right answers.156
 
 
The most essential difference between the two types of methodologies is that the 
common law criminal justice system constitutes a regulated two-party battle. The civil 
                                                 
153 W. Pompe, Het bewijs in strafzaken. Uit: Vijf opstellen van Willem Pompe. Met een herdenking 
door G. Th. Kempe (Tjeenk Willink: Zwolle, 1975), 51, where Pompe states that a judge must interpret 
the words of a witness and accused, which is not an easy task. It requires an understanding of the 
person’s language and person; the words cannot be simply taken on face value. See also G. Williams, 
The Proof of Guilt (London, 1955), 133-134; referred to in Pompe, at 53-54; M. Pols, Algemeene 
Rechtsgeleerdheid, De wettelijke bewijsleer in strafzaken, (Themis, 1882), 337–339, 342, referencing 
W. Modderman, Verhandeling over de Wettelijke Bewijsleer in Strafzaken (Utrechtsch Gen. Kunsten 
en Wetenschappen, 1867) 44–45; Frank, Not Guilty, supra note 146, Frank, Courts on Trial, supra note 
38, 14-16, 20-21, 47, 80. 
154 Weigend, Rechtsvergleichende Bemerkungen, supra note 123, 751-753. 
155 Grande, Dances of Criminal Justice, supra note 122; Damaška, Evidence Law Adrift, supra note 
122, 120; Damaška, Evidentiary Barriers, supra note 30, 578; Damaška, Truth in Adjudication, supra 
note 126. 
156 Whitman, No Right Answer?, supra note 126, at page 381. See further R. Dworkin, No Right 
Answer?, in P. Hacker & J. Raz (Eds.), Law, Morality and Society: Essays in Honour of HLA Hart 
(Clarendon Press, 1977) 58-84; W. Lucy, Adjudication, in J. Coleman & S. Shapiro (Eds.), The Oxford 
Handbook of Jurisprudence and Philosophy of Law (Oxford University Press, 2002) 208-221. 
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law criminal justice system is an all-inclusive judge-led inquiry. The party-driven 
systems have stricter regulations and more prescribed burdens than judge-led systems 
in regard to the presentation and admissibility of the evidence.157
 
 A judge-led system 
is more flexible allowing more room for a case-to-case evaluation based on fairness 
and truth.  
The Scope of the Search for the Truth 
The truth-ascertaining methodology applied in common law and civil law 
jurisdictions will be explored below in Part II. Here, suffice it to say that the 
difference between the two methodologies should not be overestimated. The essence 
of a criminal trial in every system is the same, that is, to inquire into the guilt or 
innocence of the accused. In both types of systems, the trial is focused on whether the 
accused should be found guilty as charged and punished appropriately. The scope of 
the inquiry is defined by the charges brought by the prosecutor or in some 
jurisdictions by the investigative judge. Trial judges or juries cannot lay charges and 
can only render judgment if a case is brought before them. This is referred to as the 
principle of procedural passivity.158
 
  
Moreover, the scope of any courtroom inquiry is limited to the question of guilt or 
innocence of the specific crimes charged. The indictment sets the parameters of any 
such inquiry, which is referred to by some scholars as the tyranny of the indictment. 
Given its limiting effect, this principle is said to frustrate the ascertainment of the 
truth.159
 
 
Both methods further include safeguards to the defendant, and apply a standard 
equalling that of proof beyond reasonable doubt.160
                                                 
157 J. Kokott, The Burden of Proof in Comparative and International Human Rights Law, Civil and 
Common Law Approaches with Special References to the American and German Legal Systems 
(Kluwer Law International, 1997), 2; Bohlander, Radbruch Redux, supra note 123, 402. 
 Indeed, as absolute certainty is 
158 Guarnieri & P. Pederzoli, The Power of Judges: A Comparative Study of Courts and Democracy 
(Oxford University Press, 2003), 10. 
159 Pompe, Bewijs in Strafzaken, supra note 153, 36–37. 
160 This is similar to the ‘conviction intime’ standard, applied in France by the Cour d’Assize consisting 
of a jury and a judge, which is set out in Article 427 of the French Code of Criminal Procedure: 
“‘[e]xcept where the law otherwise provides, offences may be proved by any mode of evidence and the 
judge decides according to his innermost conviction (…)”. See J. Nijboer, Strafrechtelijk Bewijsrecht 
(5th Ed.) (Ars Aequi Libri, 2008), 45–48; M. Damaška, Free Proof and its Detractors, 43 American 
Journal of Comparative Law 343 (1995), 344, 345; France: J. Boré, la cassation en matière pénale, 
1985, LGDJ, No. 1902 and Art. 335 CPP; Belgium: Art. 342 CPP.  
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unachievable, reasonable certainty is the highest certainty that can be reached which 
is still acceptable to the human conscience.161 If at the end of the case, there is a 
reasonable doubt remaining about the guilt of the accused, he must be acquitted. This 
is in line with the common law standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt as well as 
the civil law principle of in dubio pro reo, pursuant to which doubt must be 
interpreted in favour of the accused.162 This also correlates with the presumption of 
innocence which, at least in theory, is an internationally widespread presumption.163
 
  
The “reasonable doubt” standard has been defined as follows:164
 
 
.... in dealing with matters of importance in your own business affairs, your own 
business or personal affairs, you do not allow slight, whimsical doubts to deter you 
from going along; you brush them aside and go ahead. But surely, there comes a time 
when, in dealing with matters of your own affairs, you stop to think, and by reason of 
that doubt you decide what you are to do in your business of importance. Well, this is 
the quality and kind of doubt of which the law speaks when it speaks of “reasonable 
doubt”. 
 
This is ultimately a subjective standard which is difficult to define, or to assess 
objectively. The evaluation process is an internal subjective and psychological 
process of the triers of fact, seeking to reach a level of reasonable certainty about 
theguilt or innocence of the accused.165
                                                 
161 Twining, Theories, supra note 140, 70-76. Pompe, Bewijs in Strafzaken, supra note 153, 48; J. 
Nijboer, De waarde van het bewijs (Quint, 1996), 66, 93. 
 Redmaye described this standard is “an 
162 In dubio pro reo is an old Latin term which is used in civil law traditions. See Damaška, Evidentiary 
Barriers, supra note 30, 541. See also Nijboer, De waarde van het bewijs, supra note 161, 66, 93. In 
Germany, reasonable doubt is called vernünftige Zweifel, which must lead to an acquittal pursuant to 
BGHSt 10, 208; StV 1999, 5; NJW 1999, 1562; NStZ-RR 1999, 332. 
163 See for instance Article 6(2) of the European Convention on Human Rights and Article 14(2) of the 
1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 999 UNTS 171. See also Nijboer, 
Strafrechtelijk Bewijsrecht, supra note 160, 202–203. 
164 R. v. Ching, (1976) 63 Cr. App. Rep. 7. See for similar reasoning, Lord Denning in Miller v. 
Ministry of Pensions [1947] 2 All ER 372, 373-374: “Proof beyond a reasonable doubt does not mean 
proof beyond a shadow of doubt. The law would fail to protect the community if it admitted fanciful 
possibilities to deflect the course of justice. If the evidence is so strong against a man as to leave only a 
remote possibility in his favour, which can be dismissed with the sentence “of course it is possible but 
not in the least probable” the case is proved beyond reasonable doubt, but nothing short of that will 
suffice.” See for further discussion A. Kiralfy, The Burden of Proof (Professional Books Limited, 
1987), 14-16. 
165 Nijboer, De waarde van het bewijs, supra note 161, 38–39; C. Cleiren & J. Nijboer (Eds.), 
Strafvordering, Text en Commentaar (Boek II, Titel VI, Afd 3) 1189. This is the same in France. See 
Art. 353 CPP, which sets out the instructions read by a professional judge to jury members of the Cour 
d’Assize before their deliberations: “The law does not ask the judges to account for the means by 
which they convinced themselves; it does not charge them with any rule from which they shall 
specifically derive the fullness and adequacy of evidence. It requires them to question themselves in 
silence and reflection and to seek in the sincerity of their conscience what impression has been made 
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inscrutable, subjective standard which exists largely within the mind of the fact-finder 
in a particular case. All we can do is to describe the sort of reasoning process which 
we feel the fact-finder should adopt in eliminating doubt.”166
 
  
Desired Scope of the Ascertainment of the Truth 
Scope of the ascertainment of the truth in international justice 
International criminal justice does not significantly differ from domestic justice in 
terms of methodology in ascertaining the facts. The prosecutor investigates crimes 
within the jurisdiction of the international tribunal or court. He then charges particular 
individuals who he will seek to bring before the court. If he succeeds, the suspect is 
entitled to select counsel to represent him and a trial will take place in front of a bench 
of three judges. At the end of the trial, the judges must determine whether the charges 
against the defendant have been established beyond reasonable doubt. If there is a 
reasonable doubt, the judges must acquit. Thus, also in international justice, the 
ascertainment of the truth is done in accordance with the standard of proof beyond 
reasonable doubt. The search for the truth is limited to the cases selected and brought 
by the prosecutor.167
 
 
Some scholars, human rights activists and other observers go a step further. They 
consider that it is part of the mandate of international tribunals and courts to provide a 
historical analysis of the context in which the crimes charged were committed. In 
their view, this follows from the mandate to ascertain the truth. For instance, Piragoff 
states that the function of the ICC goes beyond that of an ordinary criminal court in 
that, to the extent possible, the parties and the Chamber have the additional obligation 
to clarify the historical facts underlying the crimes charged.168
 
  
                                                                                                                                           
on their reason by the evidence brought against the accused and the arguments of his defence. The law 
asks them but this single question, which encloses the full scope of their duties: are you inwardly 
convinced?” 
166 Redmayne, Doubts and Burdens, supra note 145; See also D. MacCormick, The Coherence of a 
Case and the Reasonableness of Doubt, 2 Liverpool Law Review 45 (1980), stating that “coherence” 
turns a probable case into a case which is proved beyond reasonable doubt. See further below, section 
‘evaluation of the evidence’.  
167 See further section ‘politically motivated investigations’. 
168 D. Piragoff, Article 69, in O. Triffterer (Ed.), Commentary on the Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Court, Observers’ Notes. Article-by-Article (2nd Ed) (Hart Publishing, 2008), 1321. 
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Such a suggested mandate aligns with the other mandates, particularly of 
reconciliation, peace and security, and the right of victims to the truth. According to 
Waters, the mandate of the ICTY is to generate a definitive and authoritative account 
of the course and origins of a conflict.  This account is to the exclusion of alternative 
historical narratives and is an attempt to combat denial and prevent attempts at 
revisionism. An accurate historical record is said to “promote reconciliation between 
conflicting communities”169, and help educate people, often long subject to 
propaganda, about what really happened, and “help ensure that such horrific acts are 
not repeated in the future”.170
 
  
Judges have expressed similar views. For instance, Judge Meron, one of the appeals 
judges of the ICTR and ICTY, has confirmed that the task of the judges at the 
international criminal tribunals extends the ordinary function of determining the guilt 
of alleged perpetrators: “we are judging cases in these tribunals but we also have a 
mandate to write history and are collecting massive information for future historians 
who can formulate and reformulate (write and rewrite) the history of a country”.171 
Another ICTY judge, Judge Bonomy, has similarly stated that compiling a complete 
historical record of the war is one of the objectives of international criminal justice.172
 
  
These views correspond with the Fifth ICTY Annual Report determining that, 
“through its judicial proceedings the Tribunal establishes a historical record which 
provides the basis for the long-term reconciliation and reconstruction of the 
region”.173 Also at the ICTR, in the Military II case, the Chamber emphasised “its 
obligation to discover the truth about the events that happened in Rwanda in 1994.”174
 
 
                                                 
169 T. Waters, [Redacted]: Writing and Reconciling in the Shadow of Secrecy at a War Crimes 
Tribunal, draft paper published in materials for The ICTR Legacy from the Defence Perspective, 
Conference held in Brussels, Belgium, 24 May 2010, Synopsis and Part I. 
170 Scharf & Schabas, Slobodan Milošević on Trial, supra note 65, 97-98.  
171 Echoes of Genocide, supra note 85. 
172 See Bonomy, The Reality of Conducting A War Crimes Trial, supra note 57, 4. 
173 UN Doc. A/53/219, 7 August 1998, para. 202. Whether international criminal courts and tribunals 
can effectively contribute to reconciliation has been vigorously debated at Tribunal Penal International 
Pour le Rwanda: Modele ou Contre-Modele pour la Justice Internationale? Le Point de Vue des 
Acteurs, Conference held in Geneva in May 2009 [hereinafter “the Geneva Conference”]. 
174 Prosecutor v. Ndindiliyimana et al, T. Ch. II. Decision on defence motions alleging violation of the 
prosecutor’s disclosure obligations pursuant to Rule 68, ICTR-00-56-T, 22 September 22 2008, para. 
61. 
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In these views, the notion of ascertaining the truth in international criminal justice 
must go beyond the ascertainment of the truth in ordinary domestic criminal trials. 
There is an aspiration for international trials to establish not only the facts directly 
implicating the accused on trial, but also depict a more general picture of what 
happened at the time and in the region relevant to the indictment and those 
responsible.  
 
This is, however, very complicated in practice. The judges have a difficult task giving 
correct interpretations to historic events. The correct interpretation of such events is 
often in dispute. Judges are regularly faced with evidence of more than one 
reasonable version of the facts.175
 
 Yet, they have to choose one version as the 
authoritative version of the facts.  
Cultural Context 
Difficult as it is to come to one view on facts within the same cultural context, this is 
much more challenging when dealing with many different cultural contexts, each with 
their own way of looking at the world, moral values and views on what is acceptable 
behaviour. Turner asserts that culturally distinct groups often have different 
understandings of the same events stemming from their distinct cultural frameworks. 
He defines culture as “‘the knowledge people use to generate and interpret social 
behaviour’. Such knowledge is learned and, to a degree, shared. Cultural knowledge 
is coded in complex systems of symbols. People growing up in a society are taught ‘a 
tacit theory of the world’. This theory is then used to organize their behaviour, to 
anticipate the behaviour of others, and to make sense of the world in which they 
live.”176
 
 
When an assessor must evaluate facts in a situation unfamiliar to him, even with the 
best of efforts, he can hardly avoid interpreting these facts in accordance with the 
norms that he has been taught within his own society. According to Rorty, it is 
impossible to climb out of one’s own mind, which is coloured by these societal 
                                                 
175 Wilson, Judging History, supra note 20, 918. 
176 T. Turner, The Congo Wars, Conflict, Myth & Reality (Zed Books Ltd, 2007), 19. See also: Becker, 
Confronting the Truth of the Erinyes, supra note 19, 250-251 where he emphasizes cultural and 
language differences in dealing with truth-finding. Also, see Parlevliet, Considering Truth, supra note 
3, 5; see also P. Winch, The Idea of a Social Science and its Relation to Philosophy (7th Ed.) 
(Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd, 1971). 
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norms.177 Similarly, in Becker’s view, there is only subjective reality. Neutral and 
objective opinions do not exist.178
 
   
Rorty’s and Becker’s points are solid and shared by this author, as well as numerous 
others.179 As aforementioned, any judgement on facts involves subjective, coloured 
judgements. The ascertainment of the truth is not an objective undertaking as often 
assumed.  It is rather a subjective exercise of qualifying events in accordance with the 
assessor’s understanding of the facts. Facts cannot be fully separated from opinion 
because they only exist after being qualified as facts. They are not incontestable, 
colourless objects but are determined by subjective interpretations and perspectives, 
which are influenced by the personal circumstances of the assessor.180 Rorty calls 
facts ‘products of time and change’.181
 
 
An additional problem is that the society where atrocities occurred is typically divided 
in different, often opposing perceptions of what happened during the conflict. This is 
all the more so when the conflict involved different ethnic groups. The perception of 
truth concerning these conflicts can vary significantly across different ethnic 
groups.182 Perceptions of truth are largely related to identity, which is often defined 
by ethnicity.183 The same person may be perceived as a liberator by one side and as a 
war criminal by the other side.184 There is a risk that “trials become a battlefield over 
the official history and future identity of a country”.185
                                                 
177 Rorty, Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity, supra note 17, 48; Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and 
Truth, supra note 17, 21-45; cited by: Parlevliet, Considering Truth, supra note 3, 6. See also T. Franck 
& H. Fairley, Procedural Due Process in Human Rights Fact-Finding by International Agencies, 74(2) 
American Journal of International Law, 308 (1980), 309; J. Leurdijk, Fact-Finding: Its place in 
International Law and International Politics, 14 Netherlands International Law Review 141 (1967), 
141. 
   
178 Becker, Confronting the Truth of the Erinyes, supra note 19, 245-250, particularly 250. 
179 See, for instance, Damaška, Evidence Law Adrift, supra note 122, page 95; Grande, Dances of 
Criminal Justice, supra note 122, at 147, 152. 
180 F. Cornford, The Republic of Plato: Translation and Commentary (58th Ed.) (Oxford University 
Press, 1976), 227-235; I. Murdoch, Metaphysics as a Guide to Morals (Chatto & Windus, 1992), 11-
12. Parlevliet, Considering Truth, supra note 3, 5-7. Frank, Courts on Trial, supra note 38, 23-24. 
181 Rorty, Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity, supra note 17, 22; also cited in: Parlevliet, Considering 
Truth, supra note 3. 
182 Minow, Between Vengeance and Forgiveness, supra note 59, 63. 
183 Parlevliet, Considering Truth, supra note 3, 19.  
184 For example, the acquittal of the former Prime Minister of Kosovo, Mr. Ramush Haradinaj, who 
was prosecuted and tried by the ICTY (although currently being re-tried), was perceived as a just result 
by many Kosovar Albanians, and as a ‘mockery of justice and a mockery of the innocent victims who 
suffered at the hands of Haradinaj’ (statement made by Kostunica) by many Serbs. For many Kosovar 
Albanians, Mr. Haradinaj was one of the heroes who had liberated them from Serb suppression; for 
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One or Multiple Versions of the Truth? 
Only if one of those perceptions exclusively corresponds with the accurate description 
of events, can one speak of an objective or ontological truth. Indeed, as defined by 
Parlevliet, the uncovering of the objective truth means “[r]evealing reality as it truly 
is, without interference of subjective perceptions nor personal or ideological frames of 
reference”.186 She thereby refers to Carr’s definition of truth, that is, “the objective 
matter per excellence. What is true is true for everyone […] independently of what 
anyone believes.”187
 
 
The truth described here leaves little room for conflicting versions of the past because 
only one of them is considered accurate. If more than one perception corresponds 
with the accurate description of events, then they merely qualify as subjective 
perceptions of truth. For these reasons, it is not always evident that there is only one 
correct version of events. Like there is not one way to look at world politics, there is 
arguably not one way to look at the causes of a conflict and who is responsible and 
who are the victims. These are complex questions rarely with straightforward 
answers. As Parlevliet rightly points out, “[w]hat one considers to be true, may not 
seem true to others. Even if there is one truth, which goes beyond particular views and 
is true for all, it is hardly conceivable how one may know this truth, as it requires that 
one could disentangle it entirely from one’s perceptions and ideas.”188
 
 
If there is more than one correct version of events, the acceptance of only one 
authoritative version can be dangerous and manipulative, particularly because the 
engagement of a court with “truth” and “memory” tends to be an engagement with 
                                                                                                                                           
many Serbs, Mr. Haradinaj was a war criminal. See, inter alia, Byzantine Blog, Orthodox Journal at: 
http://byzantinesacredart.com/blog/2008/04/kangaroo-court-releases-haradinaj.html. See also 
Koskenniemi, Between Impunity and Show Trials, supra note 18, 9-13, 34-35. See further Turner, The 
Congo Wars, supra note 176, 19. See also Scharf & Schabas, Slobodan Milošević on Trial, supra note 
65, 98. 
185 Wilson, Judging History, supra note 20, 919; Koskenniemi, Between Impunity and Show Trials, 
supra note 18, 25. See also Chuter, War Crimes, supra note 75, 210-211: “As soon as we turn the court 
into a theatre for confrontations between alleged victims and alleged perpetrators, we stop trying to 
establish truth and turn in the direction of politics and show business.” 
186 Parlevliet, Considering Truth, supra note 3, 5. 
187 Ibid, footnote 13. 
188 Ibid, 5; Doak, The Therapeutic Dimension of Transitional Justice, supra note 59, at 276-277; Z. 
Bankowski, The Value of Truth: Fact Scepticism Revisited, 3 Legal Studies 257 (1981); Chuter, War 
Crimes, supra note 75, 203-215, 232-233. 
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political antagonism. Thus, according to Koskenniemi, “no truth can remain sacred 
within it.”189 As Paciocci puts it, history is “too imbued with complexity, nuance and 
perspective to yield official versions”; historical events also “have to be understood in 
their appropriate larger context”.190
 
  
Accordingly, Becker is a clear supporter of acknowledging the existence of multiple 
versions of reality. Such acknowledgement does not mean that right and wrong no 
longer matter or that everything is relative. It is an acknowledgment, however, of the 
complexity of the reality and that there is no easy, comfortable truth, accepted by the 
society at large. In Becker’s view, truth is often contradictory and can be constructive 
only if it reflects this complexity by including multiple perspectives. The reality is, 
according to Becker, “that people really believe their truths and that they are not 
merely victims of propaganda”.191
 
  
If a court has a mandate to establish accurate historical facts, it cannot adopt two or 
more versions of events. It has to acknowledge one as the authoritative version. In 
general, the outcome of the court examination must be yes or no, guilty or not 
guilty.192 In cases of uncertainty, the court can adopt less specific facts. For instance, 
where the number of victims is unknown, a court can make an estimate. A court 
cannot, however, leave open the identification of the victims and perpetrators, if not 
by name then at least by ethnicity or other group to which they belong. If a court has 
insufficient information to make such or other findings relevant to the charges, then in 
most cases it must acquit the accused due to a failure to establish his guilt beyond 
reasonable doubt.193
 
 
By contrast, historians, social scientists, human rights activists, journalists or others 
who seek to analyse past events, can acknowledge more than one version of what 
happened. They do not need to reach one solid conclusion and have no burden of 
                                                 
189 Koskenniemi, Between Impunity and Show Trials, supra note 18, 25. 
190 D. Paciocco, Defending Rwandans Before the ICTR: A Venture Full of Pitfalls and Lessons for 
International Criminal Law, in La voie vers la Cour penale internationale: tous les chemins menent a 
Rome – The Highway to the International Criminal Court: all roads lead to Rome (Les Journees 
Maximilien-Caron, Editions Themis, Faculte de droit Universite de Montreal, 2003) 6. 
191 Becker, Confronting the Truth of the Erinyes, supra note 19, 242-253 (citation at 250). 
192 Lord Bingham, The Business of Judging, supra note 137, 4. 
193 Ibid, 4. 
 
 
57 
proof. An academically sound historical analysis tends to be pluralistic allowing for 
more than one interpretation of the facts.194
 
  
TRCs can similarly establish various versions of past facts. The TRC established in 
South Africa to address the apartheid regime, has in fact done so. There were clear 
conflicting theories about what happened during the apartheid regime. Particularly 
contrasting were the views of the African National Congress (ANC), considered to be 
the primary liberation group, on the one hand, and the former regime and those 
Afrikaners who had supported the apartheid, on the other. They both largely blamed 
each other for everything. To accommodate both sides, two final reports were issued. 
One was supported by the majority and the other by the minority.195 The majority 
report was highly critical of the former apartheid regime without excusing the crimes 
committed by the ANC. The minority report issued by an Afrikaner commissioner 
was much milder in its criticism of the former regime. It emphasised that apartheid 
was not on trial and that the ANC was responsible for committing massive atrocities. 
Neither was entirely happy with the result as nobody escaped significant criticism.196
 
  
It has been debated whether “a plurality of truths” can and should be accommodated 
in a reconciliation process, or whether “one shared ‘Truth’” much be reached.197
                                                 
194 Wilson, Judging History, supra note 20, 912; Osiel, Mass Atrocity, supra note 86, 119; Minow, 
Between Vengeance and Forgiveness, supra note 59; J. Borneman, Settling Accounts: Violence, Justice 
and Accountability in Postsocialist Europe (1997); Lord Bingham, The Business of Judging, supra note 
137, 4. 
 It 
may not be ideal to acknowledge more than one truth because that undermines the 
idea that there is one authoritative truth, which can have an adverse impact on 
reconciliation. However, this may be the best option for the purpose of reconciliation 
when it is impossible to reach a consensus between radically different, irreconcilable 
195 A minority report was issued by Mr. Wynand Malan, who was on board of the TRC as a 
commissioner. See cited in: Borer, Truth Telling as a Peace-Building Activity, in: Borer, Telling the 
Truths, supra note 83, 23, footnote 84.  
196 The ANC was of the view that the TRC did not adequately distinguish the morality of the violence 
committed by the State, the suppressors, and those committed by those fighting against the suppression 
of the State. It had particular difficulties with the TRC’s finding that the ANC and its organs had 
committed gross violations of human rights “in the course of their political activities and armed 
struggles, for which they are morally and politically accountable”: TRC, Report, supra note 70, 5:239-
242. The Afrikaners who had supported apartheid were critical of the TRC’s finding that apartheid was 
a crime against humanity (ibid, 5:440); cited in Borer, Truth Telling as a Peace-Building Activity, 
supra note 83, footnote 84. 
197 S.McEvoy-Levy, Introduction: Youth and the Post-Accord Environment, in Borer, Truth Telling as 
a Peace-Building Activity, supra note 83, 25. 
 
 
58 
views. The alternative is to adopt one official truth, which is denounced by one or 
more parties to a conflict. In such a situation, the TRC process may have more 
negative than positive consequences for ‘fostering national unity’ and reconciliation 
purposes.198
 
 At least the TRC has the option to acknowledge various truths, whilst a 
court does not. 
Additional Constraints in Establishing Historical Facts in the Courtroom 
There are other constraints in determining historical facts in an international 
courtroom, which are not shared by other analysts of past events.  
 
Although varying from system to system and depending on the methodology applied, 
courtroom proceedings include strict regulations on the type of material that can be 
relied on as evidence in reaching a final conclusion. Such evidence must at least be 
reliable and relevant. In common law jury trials, unreliable or irrelevant evidence may 
not even be shown to the triers of fact. Rules of evidence purposefully restrict the 
nature and range of material that can be produced. This is done not only out of 
fairness to the accused, but also in an effort to reduce the material adduced and 
consequently the time taken to consider it. The findings are limited to the evidential 
material adduced before the court. A failure to adduce sufficient convincing and 
credible evidence results in an acquittal.199 The outcome of a trial may then “not only 
be inadequate in their historical approach, but positively distorting. »200
 
 
Time limits and procedural constraints also limit the scope of the court enquiry. 
Criminal proceedings cannot continue endlessly. The accused is entitled to a fair and 
speedy trial. Compared to historians who are entitled to take years to analyse the story 
of a conflict, criminal proceedings must be completed within a reasonable time.201
                                                 
198 Ibid, 23. 
  
Historians may travel to the conflict area they are analysing, conduct on-sight 
investigations or even live there for some time and get a feeling for the place. 
International courts, on the other hand, mostly operate from geographically remote 
locations and, in creating a historical record, mainly rely on the testimony of 
199 Lord Bingham, The Business of Judging, supra note 137, 4.  
200 Wilson, Judging History, supra note 20, 913-914. 
201 Koskenniemi, Between Impunity and Show Trials, supra note 18, 35; Osiel, Mass Atrocity, supra 
note 86, 116. 
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historians, human rights activists or social scientists who are more familiar with the 
conflict area, as expert witnesses.  
 
In addition, first and foremost, the triers of fact must determine the guilt or innocence 
of a specific individual or individuals on trial and cannot assess facts that are wholly 
irrelevant to the charges in the indictment. By looking at individual criminal liability 
only, central elements of the story are sometimes overlooked.202 Trials are focused on 
individuals in order to avoid the demonization of an entire community. However, the 
counter-effect is that individuals may become the scapegoat for the crimes committed 
by everyone else. Indeed, the focus on individual leaders may “serve as an alibi for 
the population at large to relieve itself from responsibility.”203
 
  
In reality, crimes committed by State entities on a large scale are rarely the work of a 
few individuals. Rather, “the meaning of historical events often exceeds the intentions 
or actions of particular individuals and can be grasped only by attention to structural 
causes, such as economic or functional necessities, or a broad institutional logic 
through which the actions by individuals create social effects. This is why 
individualisation is not neutral in its effects.”204 Therefore, according to 
Koskenniemi, the truth may not be served by a narrow focus on the guilt of 
individuals.205
 
  
Further, when crimes are committed on a large scale, courts cannot judge all crimes 
but must select the most important crimes. In this selection process, crucial aspects of 
the story surrounding the conflict may be ignored. For instance, the Nuremberg trials 
were clearly focused on the Germans as the aggressors invading the whole of Europe, 
more than on their crimes against the Jews. Genocide, undefined until the Genocide 
                                                 
202 Wilson, Judging History, supra note 20, 914-915. 
203 Koskenniemi, Between Impunity and Show Trials, supra note 18, 14. See also Chuter, War Crimes, 
supra note 75, 112. 
204 Ibid, 13-14. See also Waters, [Redacted]: Writing and Reconciling in the Shadow of Secrecy, supra 
note 169, Part II, citing R. Teitel, Bringing the Messiah, 185, stating that these crimes “after all, a set of 
disconnected, deracinated misdeeds, but a patterned evil that itself distorted claims about the past to 
incite present horrors – and precisely because of which a robust judicial strategy of truth-telling is 
required.” See further Wilson, Judging History, supra note 20, 912-913: Historians tend to look more 
broadly than courts, and include in their analysis “cultural context, social patterns, and shared public 
practices and beliefs”. Historians often “locate individual agency within a wider context, thus diffusing 
guilt throughout the social fabric”.  
205 Koskenniemi, Between Impunity and Show Trials, supra note 18, 13. 
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convention of 1948, was not charged.206 Extermination was charged but the focus was 
on the German invasion of Europe. According to many commentators, this focus was 
wrong.207
 
 
Also, the plot often gets lost in endless debates between the parties on procedural 
issues. Such debates are important in order to respect principles of due process but are 
tedious with regard to the overall picture of the conflict.208
 
  
Expressed Reservations on Establishing Historical Facts 
Given these limitations, necessary to guarantee the fairness of the proceedings, courts 
are often perceived as “too selective and limited in scope to reveal the “whole 
story”.209 Indeed, numerous scholars, including Arendt, Todorov and Paciocco, have 
argued that it is impossible to establish accurate historical facts without undermining 
the fairness of the proceedings. Each in their own way affirm that “[h]istory and 
justice cannot be written at the same time, with the same pen, without distorting 
both.”210 In their view, any engagement of the court in writing history would distract 
the attention and focus from where it should be, namely on the rendering of justice 
and determining the charges, nothing else, not even “the noblest of ulterior purposes” 
including the creation of a record “which would withstand the test of history”.211 If 
the court attempts to answer the broader question as to why a conflict occurred and 
who is responsible for what, why and where, or if the court passes judgment on 
competing interpretations of historical explanations of the conflict, a court defeats 
itself and undermines the fairness of the proceedings.212
                                                 
206 The Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide was adopted by 
Resolution 260(III)(A) of the United Nations General Assembly on 9 December 1948: 78 UNTS 277. 
  
207 Wilson, Judging History, supra note 20, 915. However, Arendt observed that those who received 
the death sentence at Nuremberg were those involved in the Final Solution, so the sentencing reflected 
the triers’ reactions to the crime of Genocide even if Genocide was not the verdict. See Arendt, 
Eichmann in Jerusalem, supra note 21, 257.  
208 Koskenniemi, Between Impunity and Show Trials, supra note 18, 35; Osiel, Mass Atrocity, supra 
note 86, 116. 
209 C. Geertz, ‘Local Knowledge’: Further Essays in Interpretative Anthropology (1983), 173; Chuter, 
War Crimes, supra note 75, 233-240; D. Mendeloff, Truth-Seeking, Truth-Telling and Postconflict 
Peacebuilding: Curb the Enthusiasm?, 6 International Studies Review 374 (2004); Clark, Transitional 
Justice, Truth and Reconciliation, supra note 68, 252-253. 
210 Paciocco, Defending Rwandans Before the ICTR, supra note 190, 5. 
211 Arendt, Eichmann in Jerusalem, supra note 21, 253. See also, for instance, Z. Salvatore, Symposia: 
How to Ameliorate International Criminal Proceedings: Some Constructive Suggestions. Foreword, 
5(2) Journal of International Criminal Justice 346 (2007), 346-347. 
212 Arendt, Eichmann in Jerusalem, supra note 21, 5, 91, 253; also see analysis of Arendt’s work in: 
Wilson, Judging History, supra note 20, 909-912. See also T. Todorov, The Touvier Affair, in R. 
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The greater the perceived responsibility of a person, the more difficult it is to produce 
a historical record simultaneously with a verdict on the person’s guilt or innocence. 
The media and human rights activists will already largely have written the historical 
record and analysed who are the most responsible. They may have branded such a 
person as “guilty” long in advance of his trial. In such a situation, the judges are in a 
difficult position should they be asked to consider evidence which challenges the 
‘received’ history about the conflict, including the responsibility of the accused on 
trial. Consequently, the trial process risks becoming an instrument for confirming a 
preordained result rather than an objective investigation based on the evidence that is 
available.213
 
   
Professors Michael Scharf and William Schabas acknowledged that there was 
massive “adverse pretrial publicity” against Milosevic, a widespread belief that he 
was guilty and a public denouncement of him by prominent political leaders before he 
was even brought to The Hague.214 Professional judges are generally expected to rise 
above such adverse pre-trial publicity,215
 
 but this may be difficult in reality.  
Many of the above-cited observers are therefore strongly opposed to a criminal court 
engaging in creating a historical record of the facts underlying the conflict.216 Their 
reservations are shared by a number of judges in international criminal tribunals.   
Judge Denis Byron, former President of the ICTR, asserted that the mandate of the 
ICTR to ascertain the truth is not tantamount to writing the history of Rwanda’s 
conflict. Instead, similar to judges in domestic courts, international judges have to ask 
and answer the simple question whether the charges are proven or not.217
                                                                                                                                           
Golsan (Ed.), Memory, The Holocaust and French Justice: The Bousquet and Touvier Affairs (1996) 
114, 115 at 120; L. Douglas, The Memory of Judgment: Making Law and History in the Trials of the 
Holocaust (2001), 185-96, 207-10; R. Golsan (Ed.), The Papon Affair: Memory and Justice on Trial 
(2000); R. Golsan, History and the “Duty to Memory” in Postwar France: The Pitfalls of an Ethics of 
Remembrance, in H. Marchitello (Ed.), What Happens to History: The Renewal of Ethics in 
Contemporary Thought (2001); N. Wood, Vectors of Memory: Legacies of Trauma in Postwar Europe 
(1999), 113-42; Chuter, War Crimes, supra note 75, 115-125. 
 Similarly, 
213 Paciocco, Defending Rwandans Before the ICTR, supra note 190, 3-13. 
214 Scharf & Schabas, Slobodan Milošević on Trial, supra note 65. 
215 Ibid, 110. 
216 For a more optimistic view, see for instance Wilson who stated that law and history are inextricably 
linked and share similar methods and aims: Wilson, Judging History, supra note 20, 917. 
217 See the Geneva Conference, supra note 173, opening speech by the President of the ICTR 
(Conference notes in author’s archives). 
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Justice Doherty, one of the SCSL judges involved in the case of Charles Taylor, 
described the mandate of the courts as establishing fairly a truth concerning the 
charges beyond a reasonable doubt.218
 
 
Also, the ICTY Chamber in Krstic has stated that it would refrain from analyzing the 
“deap-seated” causes of the Balkan conflict, which was viewed as the work of 
historians and sociologists, and refrain from expressing emotions on the crimes 
committed in Srebenica, with which the accused was charged.219 The Chamber saw 
its own task as a more modest one, that is, to establish, “from the evidence presented 
during the trial, what happened during that period of about nine days and, ultimately, 
whether the defendant in this case, General Krstic, was criminally responsible, under 
the tenets of international law. … This defendant, like all others, deserves 
individualized consideration and can be convicted only if the evidence presented in 
court shows, beyond a reasonable doubt, that he is guilty of acts that constitute crimes 
covered by the Statute of the Tribunal”.220
 
 
These observers and judges rightfully express reservations in respect to a mandate to 
create a historical record. It is important to be realistic as to what can be achieved in 
an international courtroom.221
 
 The judges have a difficult enough task in assessing the 
charges, as will be further explored in Part III of this thesis. Accordingly, it is 
suggested that the task of ascertaining the truth in international criminal justice, like 
in domestic criminal justice, must be interpreted in accordance with the standard of 
proof beyond reasonable doubt. It should be viewed as an aspiration, rather than an 
objective, to get as close to the truth about the charges as humanly possible.  
Wider Scope of Truth-Ascertainment in International Justice 
Even limiting the truth-ascertaining task to the charges, it remains a challenge to carry 
out this task adequately in international justice. Unlike domestic criminal courts, 
international criminal courts and tribunals only have jurisdiction over what are 
considered the most serious crimes so much so that intervention in what is usually a 
domestic matter is warranted. The criminal nature of acts falling within the 
                                                 
218 Dublin Conference, supra note 13. 
219 The Chamber, however, contradicts itself by referring at para. 70 to “an unspeakable human evil”. 
220 Prosecutor v. Krstic, T. Ch. I. Judgment, IT-98-33-T, 2 August 2001, para. 2. 
221 See also Chuter, War Crimes, supra note 75, 233-240. 
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jurisdiction of the international courts and tribunals is considered to be acknowledged 
worldwide and, thus, their prohibition qualifies as an international custom supported 
by State practice.222 Even if not all States agree to criminalise such acts, their nature is 
considered to be so serious that their prohibition has attained a jus cogens status, 
binding all States irrespective of their viewpoint or conventional obligations.223
 
  
Criminal acts can only qualify as such if they shock mankind as a whole due to the 
large scale on which they were committed. An international court or tribunal cannot 
judge an isolated cruel act. A number of stringent threshold criteria must be met first 
before an international court or tribunal can exercise jurisdiction in respect to alleged 
criminal acts. Such acts only fall within the jurisdiction of an international court or 
tribunal if they qualify as war crimes, crimes against humanity, or crimes of genocide.  
 
The threshold criteria that must be met for each of these categories of punishable 
international crimes are not fixed or precise. Neither the codified law nor the 
                                                 
222 According to Article 38(1) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, international custom 
constitutes evidence of a general practice accepted as law. It becomes legally binding on States if there 
is State-practice in respect of the issue and there is a subjective belief that this practice is law (opinio 
juris). If a rule of customary international law is established, only States which have openly and 
persistently opposed the rule, will not be bound by it. See further, M. Shaw, Public International Law 
(1997), 59; P. Kooijmans, Internationaal Publiekrecht in Vogelvlucht (1996); North Sea Continental 
Shelf Cases (Federal Republic of Germany/Denmark; Federal Republic of Germany/Netherlands), 
Judgment of 20 February 1969, 1969 ICJ Rep. 3, at 176. 
223 See A. Verdross, Jus Dispositivum and Jus Cogens in International Law, 60 AJIL 55 (1966), 58, 
where he describes jus cogens norms as absolute norms from which no derogation is permitted; and 
which “do not exist to satify the needs of the individual states but the higher interest of the whole 
international community”; also I. Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law (1998), 515; A. de 
Hoogh, The Relationship between Jus Cogens, Obligations Erga Omnes and International Crimes: 
Peremptory Norms in Perspective, 42 Austrian Journal of Public and International Law 183 (1991), 
187; See also Article 53 of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1155 UNTS 331, 
stating that “such a peremptory norm is accepted and recognised by the international community of 
States as a whole as a norm from which no derogation is permitted and which can be modified only by 
a subsequent norm of general international law having the same character”; also recognised by the 
International Court of Justice in Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of 
the Crime of Genocide, Advisory Opinion of 28 May 1951, 1951 ICJ Rep. 15, 23; Case Concerning 
Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Co. (Belgium v. Spain), Second Phase, Judgment of 5 February 
1970, 1970 ICJ Rep. 3, where the ICJ declared in paras. 33 and 34 that genocide is a crime whose 
prohibition is a jus cogens norm. International law does not provide a list of norms which belong to the 
category of jus cogens norms, but the International Law Commission, while discussing the content of 
jus cogens, concluded that it at least includes unlawful use of force, genocide, slavery, racial 
discrimination and piracy. See Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 1966, vol. II, p. 248. 
See also M. Scharf, The United States and the International Criminal Court, 64 Law and 
Contemporary Problems 67 (2001), 77; A. Clapham, National Action Challenged: Sovereignty, 
Immunity, and Universal Jurisdiction before the International Court of Justice, in Lattimer & Sands, 
Justice for Crimes Against Humanity, supra note 41, 303, at 322-324; R. Cryer, Prosecuting 
International Crimes, Selectivity and the International Criminal Law Regime, (Cambridge University 
Press, 2005), 110-117. 
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underlying customary law is specific on the details but leave ample room for 
interpretation by the judges. Definitions have changed over time and vary from 
tribunal to tribunal.224 However, as a minimum, the crimes charged must have been 
committed in the context of an armed conflict (war crimes), on a widespread scale 
and/or systematically (crimes against humanity), or with the specific intent to destroy 
an ethnic group in part or in whole (genocide).225
 
 
Accordingly, before the judges can assess the guilt of a particular accused for the 
crimes with which he is charged, they must make assessments about the context in 
which the accused allegedly committed these crimes. The determination of whether 
there was an armed conflict is probably the most straightforward one, although the 
distinction between serious riots, terrorism or other rebellious movements within a 
country and an armed conflict is not always easy to ascertain. A distinction is further 
made between national and international armed conflicts. In determining the latter, 
judges must assess the extent to which one of the armed groups was supported by 
another country, which is not always clear-cut. Unless a third State is a clear party to 
the war, any indirect involvement through the support of a local armed group is 
mostly denied and hidden, which makes it difficult to prove it to a standard of proof 
beyond reasonable doubt.226
 
  
When assessing crimes charged as crimes against humanity, the judges must 
determine whether the acts charged were part of a widespread or systematic attack 
against a civilian population. To determine whether the crimes charged were 
widespread, assessments about the scale of the crimes charged, as well as crimes not 
charged, and the overall number of victims must be made.227
                                                 
224 See further G. Mettraux, The Definition of Crimes Against Humanity and the Question of a 
“Policy” Element, in Sadat, Forging a Convention, supra note 70, Chapter VII. 
 Only if the crimes 
charged are part of a large-scale action carried out collectively with considerable 
225 War crimes consist of crimes committed in domestic and international conflicts. The Nuremberg 
and Tokyo Tribunals also had jurisdiction in respect of crimes against the peace. Similarly, the ICC has 
incorporated the crime of aggression. However, a final definition has only recently been adopted and 
will be reviewed again in 2017. Until a final definition is adopted, the ICC has no jurisdiction in 
respect of this crime.  
226 See Prosecutor v. Tadic et al, Decision on the defence motion on jurisdiction, IT-94-1, 10 August 
1995, paras. 57-74. 
227 Prosecutor v. Blaškić, A. Ch. Judgment, IT-95-14/1-A, 29 July 2004, para. 101; Prosecutor v. 
Kordić & Čerkez, A. Ch. Judgment IT-95-14/2-A, 17 December 2004, para. 94; Prosecutor v Limaj et 
al, T. Ch. II. Judgment, IT-03-66-T, 30 November 2005, para. 183; T. Ch. I. Judgment, IT-95-14/1-T 3 
March 2000, para. 206. 
 
 
65 
seriousness and directed against a multiplicity of victims, or amount to singular acts 
of extraordinary magnitude, can they be qualified as ‘widespread’.228 This is a case-
by-case determination treated differently in each court or tribunal.229 At the ICC, the 
term ‘widespread’ still has to be defined by Trial Chamber or Appeals Chamber, but 
the Pre-Trial Chamber has given a similar definition to it as the ICTY and ICTR.230
 
 
The systematic nature of a crime depends on the level of organisation. In the ICTY, 
the crimes charged must have been committed as part of a deliberate pattern, rather 
than randomly.231 Initially, it was necessary to demonstrate the existence of a plan or 
policy, but the Appeals Chamber both for the ICTY and ICTR got rid of this 
requirement.232
                                                 
228 Prosecutor v. Blagojević & Jokić T. Ch. IA. Judgment, IT-02-60-T, 17 January 2005, para. 544; 
Kordić & Čerkez, T. Ch. III. Judgment, IT-95-14/2-T 16 February 2001, para. 179; Prosecutor v. 
Akayesu, T. Ch. I. Judgment, ICTR-95-4-T, 2 September 1998, para. 580.  See also Prosecutor v. 
Rutaganda, T. Ch. Judgment, ICTR-97-3-T, 6 December 1999, para. 69; Prosecutor v. Musema, T. Ch. 
I. Judgment, ICTR-96-13-T, 27 January 2000, para. 204; Prosecutor v. Ntakirutimana et al, T. Ch. I. 
Judgment and sentence, ICTR-96-10-T & ICTR-96-17-T, 21 February 2003, para. 804; Prosecutor v. 
Kayishema and Ruzindana, T. Ch. II. Judgment, ICTR-95-1-A, 21 May 1999, para. 123; Prosecutor v. 
Bagilishema T. Ch. I. Judgment, ICTR-95-1A-T, 7 June 2001, para. 77. 
 At the ICC, on the other hand, the elements of crimes against 
229 See, for instance, Prosecutor v. Tadić, T. Ch. II. Opinion and Judgment, IT-94-1-T, 7 May 1997, 
paras. 660, 714; Prosecutor v. Blagojević & Jokić, A. Ch. Judgment, IT-02-60-A, 9 May 2007, para. 
101; Prosecutor v Limaj et al, T. Ch. II. Judgment, IT-03-66-T, 30 November 2005 paras 191, 194-
195, 204, 210, 211, 226-228; Prosecutor v. Akayesu, T. Ch. I. Judgment, ICTR-95-4-T, 2 September 
1998, para. 173. 
230 Prosecutor v. Bemba Gombo, PT. Ch. II. Decision Pursuant to Article 61(7)(a) and (b) of the Rome 
Statute on the Charges of the Prosecutor Against Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, ICC-01/05-01/08-424, 15 
June 2009, para 83: “The Chamber considers that the term "widespread" connotes the large-scale 
nature of the attack, which should be massive, frequent, carried out collectively with considerable 
seriousness and directed against a multiplicity of victims. It entails an attack carried out over a large 
geographical area or an attack in a small geographical area directed against a large number of civilians. 
The underlying offences must also not be isolated.” See also D. Robinson, The Elements of Crimes 
Against Humanity, in R. Lee (Ed.), The International Criminal Court, supra note 56, 63; R. Dixon, 
Crimes Against Humanity, in Triffterer, Commentary on the Rome Statute, supra note 168, 178. 
231 Prosecutor v. Blagojević & Jokić T. Ch. IA. Judgment, IT-02-60-T, 17 January 2005, para. 544; 
Prosecutor v. Blaškić, A. Ch. Judgment, IT-95-14/1-A, 29 July 2004, para. 101; Prosecutor v. 
Kunarać, Kovać & Vuković, A. Ch. Judgment, IT-96-23 & IT-96-23/1, 12 June 2002, para. 94; Kordić 
& Čerkez, A. Ch. Judgment IT-95-14/2-A, 17 December 2004, para. 94; Prosecutor v Limaj et al, T. 
Ch. II. Judgment, IT-03-66-T, 30 November 2005, para. 183; Prosecutor v. Naletilić & Martinović, T. 
Ch. I. Judgment, IT-9834-T, 31 March 2003, para. 236; Akayesu, T. Ch. I. Judgment, ICTR-95-4-T, 2 
September 1998, paras. 579-580; Prosecutor v. Rutaganda T. Ch. Judgment, ICTR-97-3-T, 6 
December 1999,para. 69; Prosecutor v. Musema, T. Ch. I. Judgment, ICTR-96-13-T, 27 January 2000, 
para. 204; Prosecutor v. Kayishema and Ruzindana, T. Ch. II. Judgment, ICTR-95-1-A, 21 May 1999, 
paras. 123, 124, 581; Prosecutor v. Bagilishema T. Ch. I. Judgment, ICTR-95-1A-T, 7 June 2001, 
paras. 77-78. 
232 Prosecutor v. Blaškić, A. Ch. Judgment, IT-95-14/1-A, 29 July 2004, para. 120; Prosecutor v. 
Prosecutor v. Blagojević & Jokić T. Ch. IA. Judgment, IT-02-60-T, 17 January 2005, para.546; 
Prosecutor v Limaj et al, T. Ch. II. Judgment, IT-03-66-T, 30 November 2005, para. 184; Prosecutor v. 
Semanza, T. Ch. III. Judgment, ICTR-97-20-T, 15 May 2003, para. 329; Prosecutor v Muhimana, T 
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humanity listed in the Statute itself require of an attack that it be carried our pursuant 
to, or in furtherance of, a State or organisational policy to commit such an attack.233 
The extent to which ‘organisational policy’ includes policies of non-State entities is 
currently subject to litigation.234 Scholars disagree on this issue.235
 
 
If genocide is charged, it must be established that the accused possessed the "specific 
intent" or dolus specialis to destroy a targeted protected human group in whole or in 
part.236 Genocidal intent may be inferred from, amongst others:237
 
 
                                                                                                                                           
Ch. III. Judgment, ICTR-95-1B-T, 28 April 2005, para. 527; Prosecutor v Gacumbitsi, T. Ch. III. 
Judgment, ICTR-2001-64-T, 17 June 2004, para. 299. 
233 See Article 7(2)(a) of the ICC Statute, which provides that “Attack direct against any civilian 
population” means a course of conduct involving the multiple commission of acts referred to in 
paragraph 1 against any civilian population, pursuant to or in furtherance of a State or organisation 
policy to commit such attack”. Paragraph 3 to the Introduction to Article 7 in the Elements of the 
Crimes provides that “It is understood that ‘policy to commit such attack’ requires that the State or 
organization actively promote or encourage such an attack against a civilian population”.  Footnote 6 to 
this paragraph states that “a policy which has a civilian population as the object of the attack would be 
implemented by State or organizational action. Such a policy may, in exceptional circumstances, be 
implemented by a deliberate failure to take action, which is consciously aimed at the attack. The 
existence of such a policy cannot be inferred solely from the absence of governmental or organizational 
action”. See further C. Hall, Crimes Against Humanity, in Triffterer, Commentary on the Rome Statute, 
supra note 168; Robinson, The Elements of Crimes Against Humanity, supra note 230, 64, 78; R. 
Dixon, Crimes Against Humanity, in Triffterer, Commentary on the Rome Statute, supra note 168, 178 
at 179; A. Cassese, Crimes Against Humanity, in A. Cassese, P. Gaeta & J. Jones (Eds.), The Rome 
Statute of the International Criminal Court: A Commentary (Volume 1) (Oxford University Press, 
2002) 376; W. Schabas, An Introduction to the International Criminal Court (3rd Ed) (Cambridge 
University Press, 2007), 102. 
234 Situation in the Republic of Kenya, P. T. Ch. II. Decision pursuant to article 15 of the Rome Statute 
on the authorization of an investigation into the situation in the Republic of Kenya, ICC-01/09-19, 31 
March 2010, para. 90; cf Dissenting Opinion of Judge Kaul, paras. 28-32, 40, 51. 
235 M. Cherif Bassiouni and Schabas are of the view that a State-like organisation must be behind the 
policy. See M. Cherif Bassiouni, The Legislative History of the International Criminal Court: 
Introduction, Analysis and Integrated Text (Vol. 1) (Transnational Publishers, 2005), 151-152; M. 
Cherif Bassiouni, Crimes Against Humanity in International Criminal Law (2nd Ed.) (Kluwer Law, 
1999), 245-246; and: Schabas, An Introduction to the International Criminal Court, supra note 233, 
102-104. Robinson, on the other hand, is of the view that non-State policies are also included in the 
definition: see Robinson, The Elements of Crimes Against Humanity, supra note 230, 64; Mettraux, 
The Definition of Crimes Against Humanity, supra note 224; Ambos, Crimes Against Humanity, supra 
note 70, 282-286. 
236 Prosecutor v. Akayesu, T. Ch. I. Judgment, ICTR-95-4-T, 2 September 1998, para. 498; Prosecutor 
v. Krstić T. Ch. I. Judgment, IT-98-33-T, 2 August 2001, para. 571. 
237 Prosecutor v. Seromba, T. Ch. Judgment, ICTR-2001-66-T, 13 December 2006, para. 320, 
confirmed in A. Ch. Judgment, ICTR-2001-66-A, 12 March 2008, para. 176; see also Prosecutor v. 
Gacumbitsi, A Ch. Judgment, ICTR-2001-64-A, 7 July 2006, paras. 40, 41; Prosecutor v. Rutaganda 
A. Ch. Judgment, ICTR-97-3-A, 26 May 2003, para. 525; Prosecutor v. Akayesu, T. Ch. I. Judgment, 
ICTR-95-4-T, 2 September 1998, para. 523; Prosecutor v. Kayishema and Ruzindana, T. Ch. II. 
Judgment, ICTR-95-1-A, 21 May 1999, para. 93; A Ch. Judgment, ICTR-95-1-A, 1 June 2001, para. 
159; Prosecutor v. Nahimana et al, A. Ch. Judgment, ICTR-99-52-A, 28 November 2007, para. 524; 
Prosecutor v. Krstić, A. Ch. Judgement, IT-98-33-A, 19 April 2004, para. 34; Prosecutor v. Jelisić, A. 
Ch. Judgment, IT-95-10-A, 5 July 2001, para. 47. 
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“(a) the general context of the perpetration of other culpable acts 
systematically directed against that same group, whether these acts 
were committed by the same offender or by others, (b) the scale of 
atrocities committed, (c) their general nature, (d) their execution in a 
region or a country, (e) the fact that the victims were deliberately 
and systematically chosen on account of their membership of a 
particular group, (f) the exclusion, in this regard, of members of 
other groups, (g) the political doctrine which gave rise to the acts 
referred to, (h) the repetition of destructive and discriminatory acts 
and (i) the perpetration of acts which violate the very foundation of 
the group or considered as such by their perpetrators”. 
Failing to establish any of the above and the other ‘chapeau’ elements necessarily 
results in an acquittal, or, if raised before the commencement of trial, the dismissal of 
the case for lack of jurisdiction. These elements do not relate to the actus reus or mens 
rea of the accused himself, but are rather described as the contextual elements of the 
crimes. Thus, although the focus of any trial should be on the ultimate issue of guilt or 
innocence of the accused in respect to the charges, there is no escape from making 
findings on events on a broader scale than those charged.  
 
This means that, in order to render judgment in an international case, judges must 
establish facts of historic importance to a much wider audience than those directly 
implicated by the criminal trial that triggers the judges to makes such findings. To 
give an example, a finding that genocide was committed against an identifiable group 
not only has a significant historic and moral importance to the direct victims, but also 
for the history writing of the region in question. The identification of the various 
players directly or indirectly involved in a conflict and the role they played, may be 
necessary to establish that the conflict was of an international nature.  This is also of 
paramount importance in understanding the nature, cause and background of the 
conflict.  
 
The establishment of the direct mens rea and actus reus of the accused is itself of 
historic significance, particularly where the accused in question had a leading political 
or military position in the region under examination. They are usually not the ones 
who pulled the trigger but rather those who committed through or with others, 
ordered, instigated, planned or aided and abetted the crimes charged. The prosecution 
has a difficult task in establishing a nexus between the accused and the crimes 
charged particularly when the accused was remote from the crime scene when the 
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crimes were committed, or there is no obvious link between him and the direct 
perpetrators.238
 
  
Thus, unlike in ordinary domestic trials where the question is usually a simple one, 
‘does the evidence show that he did, or did not commit a certain act?’, in international 
trials the question of guilt is more complex. In order to establish responsibility of 
those behind the scene, many questions have to be answered about the crimes of 
others and the relationship between the direct and indirect perpetrator. It is therefore 
usually much harder to prove a case of such complexity than it is to prove a typical 
murder case in a domestic court. 
 
It must further be established, for instance, whether an act constituted a war crime or a 
legitimate self-defence, collateral damage or deliberate targeting of civilians. Such 
determinations require choices of a historical interpretation of the conflict in terms of 
who were the main aggressors and who were principally targeted.239
 
  
It is therefore clear that the charges against an accused before an international court or 
tribunal are interwoven with historical events. The judges must interpret these events 
in their ultimate determination of whether a particular accused is guilty as charged.240
 
 
However, in light of the difficulties discussed above, it is suggested that the judges 
should not be overly ambitious and seek to write the entire history of the conflict. In 
each case, judges should limit themselves to evaluating the evidence relating to the 
charges against the accused. Any step further to writing history may lead to distortion 
of that history.  
The totality of the judgements rendered by international criminal courts and tribunals 
may, however, contribute to the overall history writing carried out by historians, 
sociologists, human rights advocates, the affected communities and others interested 
in the conflict. The volume of this contribution depends on the extent to which the 
findings of the tribunals are acknowledged as accurate and legitimate. History writing 
is a time-consuming process. In this regard, historians and other observers have an 
                                                 
238 Koskenniemi, Between Impunity and Show Trials, supra note 18, 16-17. 
239 Ibid, 12-13, 17. 
240 Paciocco, Defending Rwandans Before the ICTR, supra note 190, 13. 
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advantage because they are not restrained by the deadlines imposed on the courts. As 
historian and Rwanda expert Guichaoua said at a conference on Rwanda and the 
ICTR, he and other experts on Rwanda will continue to write and review their history 
of Rwanda’s conflict and genocide well after the closure of the ICTR. He showed 
optimism that the truth on Rwanda would eventually come out.241
 
 
Relativism versus Radicalism 
The meaning of ‘the ascertainment of the truth’ in international justice  
The frequent use of expressions such as ‘revealing the truth’, ‘uncovering the truth’ or 
‘truth prevails’ in the context of past serious atrocities, suggests that there is a clear 
assumption that there is one indisputable, objective truth out there that can be found if 
one has sufficient tools to conduct an adequate search for the truth. It suggests that the 
truth that one seeks to establish is more than a procedural truth, which is constructed 
in the course of criminal proceedings.  
 
The difficulties of establishing a non-contested ontological truth, if at all possible, 
have been set out above. These difficulties are particularly evident in international 
justice by comparison to domestic justice. Many different reasonable views exist 
rather than one authoritative correct version.242
 
 
Particularly in the context of serious human rights violations, it can be dangerous to 
take relativism concerning the existence of one objective truth too far. If there are 
only subjective perceptions none of which carries more moral weight than any other, 
then any extremist negationist view would have to be considered in an equal manner 
as any more moderate view.  
 
Such extreme relativism should be avoided because it would undermine the moral 
foundation of any fact-finding exercise, given that the outcome would simply be 
another point of view.243
                                                 
241 The Geneva Conference, supra note 173. 
 Domestic systems would be equally affected by adopting 
such a radical relativist position, as any criminal justice system is based on the 
242 Chuter, War Crimes, supra note 75, 203-240. 
243 Parlevliet, Considering Truth, supra note 3, page 7. 
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assumption that it is in principle possible to reconstruct facts. Convicts are sent to 
prison on the basis of this assumption.  
 
The acknowledgement that the truth has more than one reasonable version is 
consistent with the common law notion of procedural truth, and not inconsistent with 
the civil law notion of objective truth. The objective truth in a civil law judicial 
context has a legal, more than a moral meaning with reference to a particular method. 
As previously stated, an objective truth in civil law systems should not be confused 
with absolute truth, but is rather the safest result humanly possible of criminal 
proceedings.244
 
  
By contrast, when truth is used in the context of human rights violations, it has “very 
strong moral, political and social dimensions”.245 It does not only relate to uncovering 
facts, it also has a strong normative value as well as an imposing tone. Truth is 
contrasted with the lies of an authoritarian regime or other group having committed 
atrocious crimes. People can no longer tolerate the concealment of their past atrocities 
and demand to know the truth about these atrocities, in order to expose their lies and 
prevent the spreading of false information about what happened in the conflict 
itself.246 The uncovering of the truth is seen as a solution to break with the past and 
prevent the use of propaganda to brainwash people into committing further atrocities. 
Truth also serves to identify those who did wrong and those who suffered this wrong. 
Truth is thus associated with morality and righteousness and aligns with the morally 
correct.247
 
 
It is also believed that, when faced with the ‘truth’, those who are clinging onto their 
inaccurate version of events will have to accept that they were in error. Truth is thus 
seen as a tool to bring different ethnic groups together and work towards a more 
                                                 
244 See above, section ‘Civil Law Justice Systems: Meaning of Ascertainment of the Truth’. 
245 Parlevliet, Considering Truth, supra note 3, 4-5, 31. 
246 An example of this is the nearly 90 years of official denial by successive Turkish governments of 
the genocide committed against the Armenian population between 1915 and 1917 in which an 
estimated number of 1.5 million people lost their lives. Although recently, voices are occasionally 
raised in favour of recognising that this genocide took place, throughout the years, western countries 
have barely pressurised Turkey to do so. See, amongst others, Cohen, State Crimes of Previous 
Regimes, supra note 42, 13-41. There has also been years of official silence about the crimes 
committed during 36 years of Franco’s dictatorship in Spain. Spain’s young democracy agreed to look 
forward, not back. See also Burying Myths, Uncovering Truth, The Economist, supra note 41. 
247 Parlevliet, Considering Truth, supra note 3, 10. 
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truthful and open society.248 The truth, therefore, not only has a backward function in 
determining who was responsible for atrocities committed in the past, but also a 
forward function in working towards a better future society where such atrocities will 
not be repeated.249
 
 
Where a domestic country is too unstable or politically divided to render fair justice, 
the entire hope of the victims of serious atrocities is vested in international tribunals 
and courts. In a conflict zone, there usually is a greater faith in international criminal 
tribunals than domestic courts to establish the truth impartially.250 However, to 
achieve all the objectives international justice has set out to achieve, if at all possible, 
it is not sufficient to establish the truth about past events. This truth must also be 
accepted, acknowledged and internalised by the international community as well as 
the affected communities.251 It then stands a better chance of beating negationism, 
manipulation and cover-ups.252
 
 It would thus be unfortunate if the truth established by 
international tribunals and courts were challengeable. 
Accordingly, an overemphasis on relativism in relation to the objective nature of truth 
would significantly undermine the importance that people, including those who 
                                                 
248 Becker, Confronting the Truth of the Erinyes, supra note 19, 231, 242-253; Borer, Truth Telling as 
a Peace-Building Activity, supra note 83, 25. 
249 Parlevliet, Considering Truth, supra note 3, 10. 
250 This appears from conversations the author has had with people from Kosovo, DRC and Rwanda. 
See also: Max-Planck-Institute for Foreign and International Criminal Law – Ernesto Kiza, Corene 
Rathgeber & Holger-C. Rohne, Victims of War: An Empirical Study on Victimization and Victims’ 
Attitudes towards Addressing Atrocieties (HHamburger Edition HIS-Verlags GmbH, Hamburg, 2006) 
available online at http://www.his-online.de. Participants in this survey interviewed victims in 11 areas 
including DRC, Kosovo and Bosnia. Most of them had greater faith in international justice than in 
domestic justice. See also supra note 42.  
251 Clark, Transitional Justice, Truth and Reconciliation, supra note 68, 250-260; J. Gibson, The 
Contributions of Truth to Reconciliation, 50 Journal of Conflict Resolution 414 (2006); R. Rotberg & 
D. Thompson (Eds.), Truth v. Justice: The Morality of Truth Commissions (Princeton University Press, 
2000); Borer, Truth Telling as a Peace-Building Activity, supra note 83, 22; L. Weschler, “Afterword” 
in State Crimes: Punishment or Pardon, Papers and Reports of the Conference, November 4-6, 1988 
(Queenstown, MD: Justice and Society Program of the Aspen Institute, 1989), 93; also Cohen, State 
Crimes of Previous Regimes, supra note 42, 18; Chuter, War Crimes, supra note 75, 241. 
252 Borer, Truth Telling as a Peace-Building Activity, supra note 83, at 17; also Llewellyn, Restorative 
Justice in Transitions and Beyond, supra note 41, 101-103; DeLaet, Gender Justice, supra note 59, 
151, 153, 173; Hamber, “Nunca Más”, supra note 69, 208-209; P. Hayner, Unspeakable Truths: 
Confronting State Terror and Atrocity (Routledge, 2001), 24; R. Teitel, Transitional Justice in a New 
Era, 26(4) Fordham International Law Journal 893 (2003); Cohen, State Crimes of Previous Regimes, 
supra note 42, 18-19; R. Rotberg & D. Thompson (Eds.), Truth v. Justice, supra note 251, 3; 
Pasternak, Wahrheitskommissionen, supra note 64, 10-14; May & Hoskins, International Criminal 
Law, supra note 57, 218. 
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suffered tremendously, attach to the determination of the truth and negate some of 
their hopes for a better future.  
 
Some level of relativism and acknowledgement that there is more than one reasonable 
perspective is, however, healthy as well as necessary. For an international court to 
have legitimacy and reach its objectives, it must at least consider all competing 
narratives of different parties to the conflict. 
 
This is an extremely difficult task after a conflict covered by blood and suffering on 
all sides. On the one hand, one must be alert not to give too many credentials to 
radical theories which seek to justify the behaviour of the principal aggressors in a 
conflict and thereby underestimate their responsibilities.253
 
 This could undermine any 
possibility for reconciliation since it would not do justice to the side of the principal 
victims and may anger and frustrate them. It could potentially feed extremists and 
would not encourage national and communal healing.  
This is confirmed by Clark’s empirical research in different regions in Bosnia, where 
she spoke to 120 ordinary people from the three ethnic groups, each massively 
denying their own crimes and blaming all on the others. According to Clark, denial is 
the cause of resentment, anger and frustration on all sides and undermines 
reconciliation.254
 
  
Reconciliation would equally be undermined if the extremist voices are not listened to 
at all, no matter how unappealing they are to the assessors. They, themselves, would 
feel undermined and not accept the outcome of the process.255 More importantly, no 
safe and solid truth can be established by listening to the side only of the identified 
victims. This can only establish a partial, one-sided truth, while limiting any 
understanding as to the causes of the violence.256
 
  
                                                 
253 Wilson, Judging History, supra note 20, 941-942.  
254 Clark, Transitional Justice, Truth and Reconciliation, supra note 68, 256-257. 
255 Mirsad Tokaca, President of the Research and Documentation Center Sarajevo 
(<http://www.idc.org.ba/aboutus.html>), speaker at Echoes of Genocide, supra note 85; see also S. 
Nino, Radical Evil on Trial (Yale University Press, 1996), 132-133. 
256 Hamber, “Nunca Más”, supra note 69, 211. 
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This is particularly true where the facts are not clear and different ethnic groups have 
played a role. There are usually perpetrators and victims from all sides even if one 
group has committed atrocities on a much larger scale. Also, victims are not always 
blameless. Sometimes, one person may be a perpetrator and victim at the same 
time.257
 
 
Accordingly, no one possesses “a monopoly on correct interpretation”.258 Conflict 
stories are seldom black and white and as simplistic as they may initially appear. 
Facts may be manipulated for political ends. The recorders of the facts may be easily 
misled by the overwhelming information of gruesome crimes being committed and 
the high number of persons being victimised.259 Led by the horrific stories during 
ethnic wars, everyone can become subject to manipulation. Yet, the story may deserve 
at least some nuance. Nuance brings complexity and ambiguity and may result in 
more acquittals or mitigated sentences. The end result is, however, closer to reality.260
 
 
Therefore, it is important that an international tribunal identifies the wrongs suffered 
and perpetrated by all sides. Only then can the truth stand the test of challenge. Its 
credibility must not be allowed to be undermined by the identified wrongdoers or 
their associates. Simultaneously, this very credibility must be acceptable to all sides 
of the conflict.261
 
  
                                                 
257 About such complexities, see also Becker, Confronting the Truth of the Erinyes, supra note 19, 242-
253, 245. See also Chuter, War Crimes, supra note 75, 105. 
258 J. Habermas, The Theory of Communicative Action. Vol. I: Reason and the Rationalization of 
Society, translated by T. McCarthy (Polity Press, 1991, originally 1981), 100, cited in: Parlevliet, 
Considering Truth, supra note 3. 
259 A former war qualified this as “tyranny of victimology”, as cited in Chuter, War Crimes, supra note 
75, 100-106; A. Cutter, Journalists: Must They Remain Neutral in Conflict?, 36(2) United Nations 
Chronicle (1999); M. Ignatieff, The Warrior’s Honour: Ethnic War and the Modern Conscience 
(1988), 24-25. 
260 See Burying Myths, Uncovering Truth, The Economist, supra note 41; also see: Paciocco, 
Defending Rwandans Before the ICTR, supra note 190, 5; Parlevliet, Considering Truth, supra note 3, 
18-19; Chuter, War Crimes, supra note 75, 44-51, 100-106 (“complexity is an enemy” (45)). 
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Construction of a Collective Truth 
The only possible truth that would have legitimacy and be acknowledged as accurate 
is one that is produced with the involvement of all parties. The end result would then 
reflect a “collective truth”, somewhere in between black and white.262
 
  
The process to obtain such a result must be transparent and allow for all voices to be 
heard in an equal manner, even if what they say is ultimately rejected. Having 
carefully balanced the different perspectives, the triers of fact must choose the most 
reasonable and plausible interpretation of facts.263 This does, however, not go without 
difficulty or criticism. No matter how fair the triers of fact seek to be to all parties to 
the conflict in addressing the wrongs and sufferings from all sides, it appears difficult, 
if not impossible, to satisfy them all. There will always be people or groups unhappy 
with the result.264 The important matter is that most reasonable people can live with 
the end result, and that the blatant lies are filtered out in the course of the process.265
 
 
Accordingly, as in domestic criminal justice, the truth is determined by the procedure. 
As Ignatieff puts it, “the past has none of the fixed and stable identity of a 
document.”266 It cannot be found, but must be constructed by a fair and democratic 
procedure in which the most persuasive argument wins. It is the fairness of the 
procedure rather than the certainty of the outcome, which determines the legitimacy 
and authoritative nature of the truth.267 Accordingly, truth “is more a notion of 
humanity than of science”.268
 
  
                                                 
262 Parlevliet, Considering Truth, supra note 3, 19. 
263 Parlevliet, Considering Truth, supra note 3, 10; Llewellyn, Restorative Justice in Transitions and 
Beyond, supra note 41, 99. 
264 M. Ignatieff, Articles of Faith, 25(5) Index of Censorship 110 (1996), 114: ‘Agreement on a shared 
chronology of events might be possible though even this would be contentious; but it is impossible to 
imagine the three sides ever agreeing on how to apportion responsibility and more blame. The truth 
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265 Parlevliet, Considering Truth, supra note 3, 11, 17, 19, Ignatieff, Articles of Faith, supra note 264, 
114; Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth, supra note 17. 
266 Ignatieff, Articles of Faith, supra note 264, 114. 
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Transitional Justice, supra note 59, 276-277. 
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Rorty has pointed out that it is difficult to define truth, but it is possible to identify 
certain “conditions in which a search for the truth will most likely be successful”.269 
He and others refer to “undistorted communication”, “reciprocity and mutual 
recognition” and “free and open encounter” as such conditions.270 Instead of an 
objective truth, the truth that is established in such an environment is an inter-
subjective truth, as it is defined by communication between human beings, rather than 
the relationship between a human being and the external, objective reality.271
 
  
Conditions for the Effective Ascertainment of the Truth in International Trials 
 
Listening to all sides in the context of international trials includes the prosecutor, 
defence and victims. It is particularly important and challenging for the triers of fact 
to listen to the side of the accused in full equality without a preconceived idea of his 
guilt.272 This is not always easy, given the extensive pre-trial media attention given to 
the more notorious accused persons before international criminal tribunals.273 In any 
event, this author shares the view of the above-cited scholars Rorty and Becker, that 
neutrality is a myth.274 This does not, however, prevent triers of fact from ascertaining 
the truth accurately to the extent humanly possible. Arguably, rather than seeking to 
be neutral, triers of fact should seek to keep a distance from the information and 
information providers with whom they are confronted, while engaging genuinely with 
the information. In engaging with the information, triers of fact should not choose one 
side over the other, but they do not need to abstain from choosing any side. Instead, 
they should engage with all sides.275
                                                 
269 Rorty, Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity, supra note 17, 176, footnote 11; cited in Parlevliet, 
Considering Truth, supra note 3, 13; and Rawls, A Theory of Justice, supra note 136, 13, 17-22. 
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Articles of Faith, supra note 264, 119. 
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272 Parlevliet, Considering Truth, supra note 3, 17. 
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footnotes 213-215. 
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Such engagement with all sides at a distance is essential for the establishment of a full 
truth rather than a partial truth based on one side only. It may be part of a legitimate 
defence to present the court with an alternative narrative of what occurred during the 
conflict and with whom lies the responsibility.276 The downside is that the accused 
may turn the trial into a propaganda show. For instance, the accused, or counsel on his 
behalf, can use the trial as a forum for politics, or to point to the guilt of people not on 
trial.277
 
 
The context in which crimes were committed cannot be ignored and may offer a 
better understanding as to why the crimes were committed. Particular political, 
historic, social and economic circumstances are needed for crimes against humanity, 
war crimes or genocide to be perpetrated. However, contextualisation is not always 
easy to distinguish from justification or exoneration of these crimes. Going too far in 
this could potentially conflict with the purpose of doing justice to the victims by 
acknowledging the harm done to them. The accused should thus not be allowed to use 
the context to excuse his criminal conduct. At most, it would mitigate his criminal 
conduct.278
 
 
Yet, he must be able to express unpopular views as part of his defence. The accused 
has a special status. He is the one facing a long prison sentence, and is protected by 
due process principles. In a specific case, granting due process to the accused may be 
in conflict with the mandate of ascertaining the truth.279
                                                 
276 M. Osiel, Why Prosecute? Critics of Criminal Punishment for Mass Atrocity, 118(22) Human 
Rights Quarterly 118 (2000). 
 In particular, the fairness of 
the procedure may limit the access of the triers of fact to relevant information. For 
instance, what if relevant and reliable information is produced late and the accused 
had no advance notice thereof and could thus not prepare a defence to address the new 
information? Or what if it was obtained unfairly? In such situations, seemingly a 
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choice has to be made between respecting the fair trial rights of the defendant and the 
search for the truth.  
 
Also rights, such as the right to silence, the right not to incriminate one-self, the right to counsel and 
the right to privacy are frequently considered to frustrate the ascertainment of the truth because the 
individual cannot be taken by surprise or lured into speaking.280
 
 
In the commentaries and literature, the terms ‘ascertainment of the truth’ and 
‘effective prosecutions’ are often used inter-changeably – although they clearly do not 
mean the same thing281 – and are contrasted with fair trial guarantees.282 Damaška, for 
instance, opines that it is often naively denied that, usually, what is gained on the 
front of individual rights is lost on the front of fact-finding precision, and vice versa. 
Indeed, “in the criminal process, concern for individual rights will often set limits to 
the pursuit of truth and conflict with the desire to establish the facts of the case. This 
potential “zero-sum” effect is denied mostly by those who claim that they have 
established an ideal social order. Actual failure to realize the ideal leads them to 
idealize the real.”283
 
  
Arguably, however, and contrary to Damaška’s assertion, fact-finding precision and 
protection of due process principles can go hand in hand without undermining either 
or both. A vigorous protection of the rights of the accused does not need to hinder a 
thorough search for the truth. Whilst effective prosecutions with the fewest possible 
barriers caused by principles of due process may lead to more convictions, they may 
not necessarily lead to more accurate results. There is a compelling argument that 
respecting individual rights contributes to ascertaining the truth.284
                                                 
280 Pompe, Bewijs in Strafzaken, supra note 153, 38–42. 
 For instance, 
putting pressure on someone to answer questions often results in inaccurate answers 
281 See for instance Borer, Truth Telling as a Peace-Building Activity, supra note 83, 20-21, D. 
Piragoff, supra note 168, 1321; Koskenniemi, Between Impunity and Show Trials, supra note 18, 35. 
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(Part II, Criminal Appeal Act 1995, available at <www.ccrc.gov.uk/>  
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Criminal Justice, supra note 138, 13. 
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and may distort the truth.285
 
 Further, if obtaining evidence irregularly carries no 
consequences, there is no encouragement to stop using irregular methods to obtain 
such evidence, which would adversely affect the overall quality of the proceedings 
and thus the end product.  
Fair trial rights were introduced to prevent miscarriages of justice and determine the 
boundaries of the search for the truth. Arguably, the most adequate truth-searching 
model reflects a fair balance between the rights of the defendant on the one hand, and 
the need for effective prosecutions on the other. Professor ‘t Hart, former Dutch 
prosecutor and legal scholar, is of the firm view that these objectives are not in 
conflict with each other but must be considered as two sides of the same coin of 
justice.286 Only if the rights and obligations of the prosecution and defence are 
equally balanced in the truth-searching process can the end result be accurate.287
 
 
In conclusion, there is a constant struggle to find the right balance between protecting 
the interests of the accused as well as the interests of the victims. There are various 
types of methods that could be put in place to achieve the ‘happy middle way’, 
provided they comply with a number of minimum conditions. These minimum 
conditions are: 
 
• greatest access to relevant and reliable information from all sides; 
• engagement at a distance by the triers of fact; 
• transparency; 
• democratic, open and fair procedure to accused and victims. 
 
                                                 
285 In modern times, there are ample examples where pressure has led to a miscarriage of justice. For 
instance, the Dutch case Schiedammer parkmoord, which concerned a miscarriage of justice caused by 
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Libri, 2003). 
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Part II will consider to what extent the international criminal justice model complies 
with these minimum conditions and identify the procedural elements which are 
potentially problematic in ascertaining the truth. Bearing the above definition of truth 
and the conditions to achieve it in mind, Part III will review how adequately 
international criminal tribunals ascertain the truth in the practical reality of their daily 
operation. More specifically, it will examine the selection of cases, the investigations, 
presentation and evaluation of the evidence in the ICTY, ICTR and ICC. In so doing, 
it will evaluate to what the extent the potentially problematic procedural elements 
identified in Part II are problematic in reality. 
 
In carrying out this socio-legal research, it should be borne in mind, as Becker stated, 
that truth “cannot and should not be developed with the idea of a master plan or with 
fantasies about a clear-cut tool kit that is applicable in any context of conflict in the 
world. So our first and most important set of recommendations to any actor in this 
field is about humility in reference to the enormity of the task, public honesty as to the 
limited goals we are able to achieve, and a capacity to respect and reflect the special 
characteristics of a given local context.”288
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Origins of the Legal Principles of the ICTY and ICTR  
When the Yugoslavia and Rwanda Tribunals were set up in 1993 and 1994 
respectively, the only precedents available were the Nuremberg and Tokyo Tribunals, 
which had been established fifty years earlier.289 Similar to these earlier tribunals, the 
drafting of the Statute and Rules of Procedure and Evidence finished very rapidly. 
Time was of the essence, given that both tribunals responded to ongoing wars and 
threats of renewed and increasing violence.290
 
  
Both the ICTY and ICTR, which were initially almost identical in their structure, 
operation and legislative framework, were established on the basis of a Security 
Council resolution.291 Resolution 808, pursuant to which the ICTY was established, 
assigned the Secretary-General the task of submitting a report containing a draft 
Statute for the anticipated tribunal. Since the UN has no legislative branch, the 
Secretary-General assigned the task of drafting the Statute of the ICTY to the Office 
of Legal Affairs (‘ALO’) in New York. The procedure was fast. Within three months 
the Statute was drafted and adopted. Since government positions communicated to the 
ALO remained secret there are no records of the drafting process.292
 
  
According to M. Cherif Bassiouni, who was part of the drafting process, many States 
made proposals during this process. To avoid lengthy debates on issues where no 
consensus existed between various States, the Security Council did not allow any 
                                                 
289 London Agreement, 8 August 1945; Tokyo Charter, 26 April 1946; Y. Beigbeder, Judging War 
Criminals, The Politics of International Justice (St. Martin’s Press Inc, 1999), 54-56. 
290 In Rwanda the war shifted to a neighbouring country, the nation formerly known as Zaire, now 
called the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). 
291 The ICTY was established pursuant to Resolution 808, adopted on 22 February 2003: UN Doc. 
S/RES/808. The ICTR was established pursuant to Resolution 955, adopted on 8 November 1994: UN 
Doc. S/RES/955. In each of these cases the Security Council used its powers under Article 39 of 
Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, allowing it to adopt military and non-military 
measures it deems appropriate to maintain or restore international peace and security. This Article 
provides: “The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to peace, breach of peace, 
or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken in 
accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and security.” 
292 See M. Cherif Bassiouni & P. Manikas, The Law of the International Criminal Tribunal for the 
Former Yugoslavia (Transnational Publishers Inc, 1996), 219-221; S. Johnson, On the Road to 
Disaster: The Rights of the Accused and the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia, 10(1) International Legal Perspectives 111 (1998), 113-115. 
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amendments once it received the draft Statute.293 Pursuant to Security Council (‘SC’) 
Resolution 827, the draft Statute was adopted without change.294 Save for the 
provisions stipulating the crimes, the ICTR Statute was copied word for word from 
the ICTY Statute and attached to the SC Resolution establishing the ICTR.295
 
  
Given the lack of a clear precedent, the drafters of the Statute had a difficult task in 
drafting a legal framework in a legal vacuum. The predominantly American drafters 
mainly referred back to a system they knew best: ‘common law’ as applied in 
American courtrooms.296 Bassiouni confirms that the tribunal that had been created 
“is more akin to court systems found in common law jurisdictions, particularly that of 
the US.”297
 
 This is particularly with regard to the manner in which its functions were 
separated. 
Unlike the Nuremberg Charter, which had already incorporated the main evidentiary 
principles,298
                                                 
293 For debate on the drafting process, see Bassiouni & Manikas, The Law of the Tribunal for the 
Former Yugoslavia, ibid, 221-226.  
 the ICTY and ICTR Statutes did not include any evidentiary guideline. 
294 UN Doc. S/RES/827, 25 May 1993; UN SCOR 48th Sess, 3217th mtg, at 7, UN Doc S/PV.3217 (25 
May 1993). 
295 V. Morris & M. Scharf, The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (Volume II) 
(Transnational Publishers, 1998), Preface xvii.  
296 ICTY, First Annual Report (1994), UN. Doc. A/49/342; UN Doc. S/1994/1007, available at 
http://www.icty.org/x/file/About/Reports%20and%20Publications/AnnualReports/annual_report_1994
_en.pdf>, last accessed January 2012. 
297 Bassiouni & Manikas, The Law of the Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, supra note 292, 798. 
Judge Cassese also recognized that “for historical reasons, there currently exists at the international 
level a clear imbalance in favour of the common-law approach” Prosecutor v. Erdemović, A. Ch. 
Separate and Dissenting Opinion of Judge Cassese to Judgment of Appeals Chamber, IT-96-22-A, 
section IA, [3]. 
298 See for instance Article 19 pursuant to which “[t]he Tribunal shall not be bound by technical rules 
of evidence. It shall adopt and apply to the greatest possible extent expeditious and non-technical 
procedure, and shall admit any evidence which it deems to have probative value”. The Nuremberg 
Charter also included a provision pursuant to which specific items of documentary evidence, including 
signed statements and depositions, were to be admissible (Article 13(c)). See further Article 20, on the 
basis of which the Tribunal might require to be informed of evidence before it was offered, so that it 
could rule on its relevance. Article 21 provided that judicial notice was to be taken of “facts of 
common knowledge”, and of official government documents, reports of the United Nations, acts and 
documents of national committees for the investigation of war crimes, and the records of military or 
other tribunals. Overall, the Nuremberg Tribunal adopted simplified evidentiary rules and took a very 
liberal approach towards evidence allowing all evidence in. The reason for this approach was that the 
trials were conducted by professional judges who were not prone to being influenced by improper 
evidence. The result of this liberal approach was that it was even allowed for the prosecutors to 
introduce ex parte affidavits against the accused over the objections of their attorneys. Pursuant to Arts. 
17(a), (b), (c) and 24(f) of the Charter, the judges further had the power to call witnesses, require the 
production of documents and other evidentiary material or even interrogate defendants. See further 
Morris & Scharf, International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, supra note 295, 7; T. Taylor, The 
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In adopting the rules of procedure and evidence, the Statutes left the task of designing 
evidentiary principles exclusively to the judges.  
 
By virtue of Art 15 of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia 
(ICTY) Statute and Art 14 of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) 
Statute the Rules of Procedure and Evidence were adopted on 11 February 1994 and 
29 June 1995 respectively. The ICTY Rules of Procedure and Evidence served as a 
model for the ICTR Rules of Procedure and Evidence. Accordingly, as initially 
adopted, the ICTY and ICTR Rules were almost identical except for minor 
differences.299
 
 
The principal drafters of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the ICTY were the 
judges of the Trial and Appeal Chambers, in co-operation with States and 
organisations from all over the world.
300 
The purpose of this inclusionary approach 
was to ensure that different domestic legal systems would be considered and 
incorporated.
301
 However, representatives of common law systems, particularly the 
US, played the most influential role in the drafting process of the ICTY Rules.302 In 
particular, the role of the American Bar Association (‘ABA’) was significant.303
                                                                                                                                           
Anatomy of the Nuremberg Trials (Bloomsbury Publishing Limited, 1993), 241; American Bar 
Association Section of International Law and Practice, Report on the International Tribunal to 
Adjudicate War Crimes Committed in the Former Yugoslavia 27 (1993); See May & Wierda, Trends in 
International Criminal Evidence, supra note 95, 94 and further. 
 
299 This was the intention of the Security Council, as similar rules of procedure in the two tribunals 
would ensure consistency in the development of international criminal procedural matters. This also 
ensured a quick adoption of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence at the ICTR without having to 
elaborate on issues that were already discussed in detail in relation to the ICTY Rules. This is also in 
compliance with ICTR Statute, Art 14, which provides that ‘[t]he judges shall adopt …the Rules of 
Procedure and Evidence…of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia with such 
changes as they deem necessary’. See also Morris & Scharf, International Criminal Tribunal for 
Rwanda, supra note 295, 413, 417-418. 
300 Morris & Scharf, International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, supra note 295, 414. 
301 Ibid, 413-14. This inclusionary approach starkly contrasts with the manner in which the rules of the 
Nuremberg Tribunal were drafted. In accordance with Article 14(e) of the Nuremberg Charter, the four 
chief Prosecutors drafted the rules, eleven in total, which were accepted by the judges with the 
necessary amendments on 29 October 1945. 
302 The US representatives presented comprehensive proposals of rules: IT/14, 17 November 1993. 
303 One of the participating judges, Judge McDonald, presented a complete draft set of rules prepared 
by a special committee of the American Bar Association (IT/INF 6/Rev 2, 18 January 1994). Many of 
the proposed rules were adopted. See Bassiouni & Manikas, The Law of the Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia, supra note 292, 863–864; Morris & Scharf, International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, 
supra note 295, 177. 
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Many of the participating judges also came from common law countries.304
 
 
Consequently, similar to the Statutes, the Rules of Procedure and Evidence are 
predominantly common law rooted. This is particularly the case with regard to the 
procedure, which is based on the adversarial approach of common law.  
However, from the outset, there have been important departures from common law, 
rooted in civil law. Over the years, through interpretation, re-interpretation and 
amendments of the rules of procedure and evidence, as well as the adoption of new 
rules, these points of departure from common law have been strengthened.305
 
 Civil 
law has become increasingly influential. 
Origins of the Legal Principles of the ICC 
 
The ICC Statute and Rules of Procedure and Evidence have a much longer drafting 
history. The need to set up a permanent international criminal court had been 
recognised after the ad hoc and post facto Nuremberg and Tokyo Tribunals had been 
established. During the Cold War, however, any debates on the establishment of such 
a court had been discontinued. Negotiations were resumed in 1989 and a draft Statute 
was prepared by the International Law Commission (ILC). This Statute was then 
discussed by an Ad Hoc Committee and Preparatory Committee. It appeared that 
there were wide disparities in views among States both in respect of procedural 
technicalities and the political desirability of such a court. Therefore, it was a difficult 
and lengthy process to finalise a Statute.306
 
 
The establishment of the ad hoc tribunals gave an extra impetus to continue the 
negotiations for the ICC. After several years of negotiations between representatives 
from many jurisdictions, common law and civil law alike, as well as many NGOs, the 
                                                 
304 Bassiouni & Manikas, The Law of the Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, supra note 292, 863-
864. 
305 A. Mundis, From “Common Law” Towards “Civil Law”: The Evolution of the ICTY Rules of 
Procedure and Evidence, 14(2) LJIL 367 (2001); K. Ambos, International Criminal Procedure: 
“Adversarial”, “Inquisitorial” or Mixed?, 3 International Criminal Law Review 1 (2003), 1-37; A. 
Orie, Accusatorial v. Inquisitorial Approach in International Criminal Proceedings prior to the 
Establishment of the ICC and in the Proceedings before the ICC in A. Cassese, P. Gaeta & J. Jones 
(Eds.), The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: A Commentary, Vol II, 1439, (Oxford 
University Press, 2002). 
306 See, among others, Philippe Kirsch QC, Introduction, XXIII – XXVIII; and: Morten Bergsmo / Otto 
Triffterer: Preamble; and Otto Triffterer: Part I. Establishment of the Court, in: Triffterer, Commentary 
on the Rome Statute, supra note 168. 
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Rome Statute was adopted on 17 July 1998. The reason that it took so long was that 
many different views, notably those from common law and civil law jurists, had to be 
reconciled.307 In 2002 the ICC Rules of Procedure and Evidence were adopted. 
Similar to the negotiation process that preceded the adoption of the Rome Statute, 
debates on the rules by a preparatory committee consisting of representatives of States 
Parties to the Rome Statute together with NGOs lasted for a number of years. The 
Assembly of States Parties subsequently approved and adopted the Rules created in 
this process.308
 
  
In drafting the ICC Statute and Rules, the drafters had an advantage over the drafters 
of the ICTY and ICTR Statute and Rules, in that the ICTY and ICTR Statute and 
Rules provided a modern and fresh example for the ICC. The drafters carefully 
examined the legal provisions adopted by the ICTY and ICTR, in particular with 
regard to the Rules.309 In essence and nature, the ICC Rules are similar to the ICTY 
and ICTR Rules and are clearly influenced by them.310
 
 Some of the rules were copied 
almost word for word from the ICTY and ICTR Rules. 
Despite the instructive example the ICTY and ICTR Rules provided, the formulation 
of rules at the ICC also diverged. Unlike in the drafting process of the ICTY and 
ICTR Statutes and Rules, there was a powerful lobby from civil law jurisdictions, in 
particular France, seeking to assert their influence over the drafting of the ICC Statute 
and Rules. They succeeded. The ICC Statute and Rules are, from the outset, a true 
hybrid of civil law and common law principles.  
 
Accordingly, the ICTY, ICTR and ICC are all rooted in a combination of civil law 
and common law principles. It is debatable whether such a mixed system can serve as 
an appropriate truth-ascertaining model. The two systems differ significantly, both in 
structure and in legal philosophy. They cannot be separated from the cultural and 
                                                 
307 P. Kirsch, ‘The Preparatory Commission Today’, Establishment of the International Criminal 
Court, Seminar held in Helsinki, 23 February 2000 (Publications of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 
2000), 12. 
308 S. Ferandez de Gurmendi, Elaboration of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, in Triffterer, 
Commentary on the Rome Statute, supra note 168, 235-257. 
309 D. Piragoff, supra note 168, 1318; Friman, Inspiration from the International Criminal Tribunals, 
in Triffterer, Commentary on the Rome Statute, supra note 168, 377-379. 
310 Ibid. 
 
 
86 
political norms of the societies in which they have evolved. They are not the product 
of a cursory configuration of rules, but have developed over the course of time. 
 
A number of scholars and practitioners have suggested that it is not advisable to 
combine procedural aspects rooted in culturally different systems into a new criminal 
procedure.311
 
 Taking parts from a system without the corresponding parts may 
deprive the new system of the protection mechanisms that were built into the original 
system. Mixing can particularly go wrong if the foundation of a legal principle or its 
underlying philosophy is misunderstood. This may result in an erroneous 
interpretation of it in a different legal context.  
For instance, Haveman pointed out that it is difficult to merge different legal doctrines 
from inherently different and often incompatible systems, and take them out of their 
context without fully comprehending the origins and rationale behind those 
principles.312 Nijboer warned against copying elements from one system into another 
without carefully examining whether they could work in the other system.313 Indeed, 
as suggested by Hongju Koh, evidentiary principles “are so rooted in their historical 
and cultural context that they cannot be transplanted piecemeal from common law to 
civil law jurisdictions”.314
 
 
The difficulties of transplanting legal concepts from one domestic criminal procedure 
into another are increased when this other procedure is an international procedure 
emerging from scratch. Judge Cassese understood the difficulties of transplanting 
domestic legal concepts into international criminal proceedings. He rightly pointed 
out that domestic legal principles cannot be “mechanically imported into international 
criminal proceedings.”315
                                                 
311 M. Hallers et al (eds): The Position of the Defence at the ICC, and Role of the Netherlands as Host 
State, based on Conference at The Hague on 3rd and 4th November 2000 (Rozenberg Publ, A’dam 
2002), presentation of J. Ackerman, 127-128. 
  
312 Haveman, Supranational Criminal Law, supra note 27, 3-5. 
313 Nijboer, De waarde van het bewijs, supra note 161, 51-57, 85; see also L. Armytage, Educating 
Judges: Towards a New Model of Continuing Judicial Learning (Kluwer Law International, 1999), 
268. 
314 H. Koh, Mirjan Damaška: A Bridge Between Legal Cultures, in Jackson, Crime, Procedure and 
Evidence, supra note 23, 29, 34. 
315 Prosecutor v. Erdemović, A. Ch. Separate and Dissenting Opinion of Judge Cassese to Judgment of 
Appeals Chamber, IT-96-22-A, section IA, para. 2. 
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It is particularly difficult to determine the ideology or legal thinking that would suit a 
melting pot of two fundamentally different systems. Ideologies are intertwined with 
the legal structure and societies in which those systems emerged over time. It is 
unclear whether the different ideologies underlying different domestic legal systems 
are even compatible and how they can merge successfully, if at all. The difficulties 
that come with the process of merging fundamentally different legal systems into a 
new one can potentially lead to a schizophrenic system.  
 
Jackson argued that the international criminal procedure has evolved in a pragmatic 
rather than a principled manner. In his observation, it has mixed common law and 
civil law procedures with scant regard to Damaška’s warning “that a mixing of 
procedures can produce a far less satisfactory fact-finding result in practice than under 
either Continental or Anglo-American evidentiary arrangements in their unadulterated 
form.”316
 
  
In order to test the validity of these observations, a comparative analysis of these two 
types of criminal justice is provided. They are defined in terms of their compatibility 
with the conditions identified in Part I: (i) greatest access to relevant and reliable 
information from all sides; (ii) engagement with the information at a distance; (iii) 
transparency; and,  (iv) democratic, open and fair procedure.  
 
Next, it is considered whether the international criminal justice model, combining 
parts of civil law principles with parts of common law principles, meets these 
conditions, and can accordingly serve as an efficient theoretical truth-ascertaining 
framework.  
 
Comparison of civil law and common law methodologies 
 
 
Access to Relevant and Reliable Information  
                                                 
316 J. Jackson, Faces of Transitional Justice: Two Attempts to Build Common Standards Beyond 
National Boundaries, in Jackson, Crime, Procedure and Evidence, supra note 23, 221, at 240, with 
reference to M. Damaška, The Uncertain Fate of Evidentiary Transplants: Anglo-American and 
Continental Experiments, 45 American Journal of Comparative Law 839 (1997), 852. 
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Part I has established that the ascertainment of the truth is a core objective of civil law criminal 
proceedings. This requires a methodology that facilitates the collection, presentation and assessment of 
the largest possible quantity of quality information relevant to the case. Accordingly, prosecutors and 
investigators must make all efforts to present to the triers of fact the most complete and unbiased 
material truth as possible. The triers of fact include professional judges who also adjudicate on legal 
issues that arise in the course of the proceedings.
Civil Law Jurisdictions 
317
 
 
The prosecution represents the State,318 but is not viewed as a mere party to the proceedings 
representing the interests of the State exclusively. Serving the public interest is the primary duty of the 
prosecutor,319 who in many jurisdictions has attended the same judicial training as professional 
judges.320 In most civil law jurisdictions, the prosecutor is in charge of searching for incriminating and 
exonerating evidence equally.321
                                                 
317 In the Netherlands, only professional judges take part in deliberations on law and fact. The Code 
d’Instruction introduced a mandatory jury system in the Netherlands in 1811. However, two years later 
upon Napoleon’s defeat, the Netherlands immediately abolished the jury (‘Geesel- en worgbesluit’, 11 
December 1813, art. 16) and never re-introduced it. See: J. M. van Bemmelen, Strafvordering. 
Leerboek van het Nederlandsche strafprocesrecht (3rd Ed.) (‘s-Gravenhage, 1947), 78-80. Many other 
civil law systems, however, use mixed tribunals, consisting of lay members and professional judges 
jointly, for particular categories of crimes. In France and Belgium, there is the Cour d’Assize, which 
renders justice in very serious offences such as murder and rape. It consists of professional judges and 
lay members sitting together as triers of fact. In Russia, a defendant of serious offences can choose 
between a jury or a judge as a trier of fact. Germany also uses lay judges sitting alongside professional 
judges in all cases save in cases involving minor offences, which are treated by a single professional 
judge. On appeal, lay members can outvote professional judges. See Bohlander, Basic Concepts of 
German Criminal Procedure, supra note 123. See further C. Buisman, Civil Law (‘Fact Finders’), in 
Khan, Principles of Evidence, supra note 25. 
 
318 In many civil law jurisdictions, the prosecution is hierarchically structured and is answerable to the 
Ministry of Justice. See Nijboer, Wahrheit im Strafprozeß, supra note 124, 33, 36, 51, 62, 84. 
319 In France and the Netherlands, the proper name for the office responsible for prosecuting cases is 
not Prosecution Office, but Public Ministry (‘Ministère Public’; ‘Openbaar Ministerie’); and in the 
Netherlands the persons responsible for prosecuting cases are not referred to as Prosecutors, but as 
Officers of Justice (‘Officieren van Justitie’); in Germany, they are members of the State Attorney 
Service (‘Staatsanwaltschaft’). However, it is made explicit that the prosecutor’s role extends beyond 
representing the State only. See further Bohlander, Basic Concepts of German Criminal Procedure, 
supra note 123, 19. 
320 Nijboer, Wahrheit im Strafprozeß, supra note 124, 33, 36, 51, 62, 84. For instance, in The 
Netherlands, prosecutors attend a judicial education for eight years together with professional judges. 
At the end of this education, the prosecutors carry the title of “standing magistrates” (staande 
magistratuur); and the judges carry the title of “sitting magistrates” (zittende magistratuur). In Italy, 
even after its judicial system underwent drastic reforms, the public prosecutor (Pubblico Ministero) is 
still part of the magistracy (magistratura). Judges and prosecutors are recruited, appointed (for life) and 
salaried in the same manner and can easily rotate from the one to the other. This lack of separation 
between the judiciary and prosecutors has been criticized. See W. Pizzi & L. Marafioti, The New 
Italian Code of Criminal Procedure: The Difficulties of Building an Adversarial Trial System on a 
Civil Law Foundation, 17(1) Yale Journal of International Law (1992); M. Costi ‘Italy’, 80-92, in 
Buisman, Civil Law, in Khan, Principles of Evidence, supra note 25. See further Guarnieri & 
Pederzoli, Power of Judges, supra note 158. 
321 See, for instance, Germany: § 160(2) StPO. See also Bohlander, Basic Concepts of German 
Criminal Procedure, supra note 123. The prosecution has a similar obligation in the Netherlands. See 
Beijer, Bewijs, supra note 130, 34.1.4 Strategy of the Accused and Counsel. See also Arts 50–54quater 
of the Italian Criminal Code of Procedure. 
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Many civil law jurisdictions also rely on an investigative judge for investigations, 
although a number of civil law jurisdictions including Germany and Italy have 
abolished the investigative judge.322 In jurisdictions where an investigative judge is 
still involved in criminal investigations, he is viewed as independent of the parties. He 
plays a double role of overseeing the fairness of the investigations as well as 
collecting incriminating and exonerating evidence independent of the police and 
prosecutor. The collection of evidence includes the hearing of witnesses, usually in 
the presence of the parties.323
 
  
The exact role and scope of the duties of an investigative judge vary from country to 
country. In some countries, such as France and Spain, the investigative judge is very 
active in collecting evidence, and is in charge of issuing indictments.324
                                                 
322 Germany has abolished the investigative judge in 1975. There is an ‘Ermittlungsrichter’ who is 
assigned to a case as a pre-trial judge and controls the legality of investigative methods most of which 
need prior judicial authorization. Upon request of the prosecutor, the Ermittlungsrichter may conduct 
an interview with a witness if there is fear of the witness disappearing or retracting his or her 
testimony. In addition, an arrested defendant must be brought before this judge promptly after his 
arrest. See further H. Jung, The German Versus the French Procedural Tradition, in M. Delmas-Marty 
(Ed.), The Criminal Process and Human Rights: Toward a European Consciousness (Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers, 1995), 60–61; Z.J. Wang, Criminal Justice System in Germany, in R. Frase & T. Weigend, 
German Criminal Justice as a Guide to American Law Reform: Similar Problems, Better Solutions?, 
Boston College Intl and Comparative L Rev, 1995 11 <http://www.freewebs.com/criminalprocedure>, 
3-4; Weigend, Rechtsvergleichende Bemerkungen, supra note 123. In 1987, the investigative judge was 
similarly abolished in Italy. Instead, there is a preliminary investigation judge (Giudice per le indagini 
preliminari, ‘GIP’) (Art. 328 CPP), whose role is similar to that of the German Ermittlungsrichter. It is 
an impartial body which exercises judicial control over the investigations and decides on the issuing of 
search warrants, pre-trial detention and coercive measures. In addition, this judge presides over a 
special hearing to admit evidence (incidente probatorio) if requested by the parties during the 
investigation and there is a substantial risk that evidence will otherwise be lost. See M. Costi ‘Italy’, in 
Buisman, Civil Law, in Khan, Principles of Evidence, supra note 25. In Russia, there is no specific 
investigative judge. Nonetheless, judges take a more active role throughout the investigative stage than 
they do in the later stages of trial. Investigators are responsible for making all decisions concerning the 
pre-trial collection of evidence. However, a court order is required to allow the investigators to conduct 
certain evidence-gathering actions. The court may also order investigators to allow the defence to 
conduct its own investigation by interviewing witnesses and experts, collecting evidence, and gaining 
access to individuals and documents if doing so is deemed necessary for the case. See Butler, Russian 
Law, supra note 125, 263. 
 In other 
countries, the prosecutor rather than the investigative judge is dominis litis of the 
323 Unless someone has a reasonable fear for his life, health, security, family life or his social economic 
status, and the investigative judge considers there are good grounds for him to stay anonymous from 
the accused. 
324 See, for instance, Art. 81 of the French CPP which states that an investigative judge may undertake 
any investigative step he deems useful for the discovery of the truth and which is in accordance with 
the law. The decision of an investigative judge to issue an indictment is rendered after hearing the 
parties and the requisition of the prosecutor. On the basis of those observations as well as the dossier 
compiled in the course of the judicial investigations, the investigative judge determines whether there 
is sufficient evidence available to issue an indictment against an identified suspect. 
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investigations. This means that he is in charge of the investigations and has the 
responsibility of charging identified suspects.325
 
  
The extent to which the defence has an independent role in conducting investigations 
on behalf of the defendant also varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. In Germany, 
Italy, Russia and the Netherlands, the defence is allowed to conduct its own 
investigations. However, the funds available for such investigations can be limited in 
cases where the State, rather than the defendant, pays for the defence.326 In France, on 
the other hand, the defence cannot conduct its own independent investigations. Since 
1993, the defence is instead in a position to ask the investigative judge to conduct 
certain investigative tasks. These include the ordering of a medical examination, the 
organizing of a confrontation, a site visit, or a hearing.327
 
  
Once the investigation has been finalised, the prosecutor, or in some countries, the 
investigative judge, produces a dossier detailing every investigative step taken during 
the investigations.328 The dossier includes exonerating and incriminating evidence 
produced by all parties, including the defence.329
 
  
Prior to the commencement of the trial, the judges receive full disclosure of the 
dossier and are thereby made aware of the whole case and all the evidence available. 
If, in the view of the judges, the dossier is incomplete, they may order the prosecutor 
or investigative judge to conduct further investigations, provide additional materials, 
                                                 
325 This is, for instance, the case in The Netherlands. See: Nijboer, Strafrechtelijk Bewijsrecht, supra 
note 160, 191-195.  
326 The defence counsel for Onesphore Rwabukombe, a Rwandese who is tried before the Superior 
Regional Court of Frankfurt am Main (Oberlandesgericht Frankfurt am Main) for crimes committed in 
Rwanda in 1994, informed the author that she has no funds for investigations. The Chamber granted 
her request for the reimbursement of travel expenses and a hotel while in Rwanda. However, the hours 
she was working on the case were not reimbursed. In addition, she had to wait for nearly nine months 
to be authorised to conduct onsite investigations in Rwanda. The information is based on a personal 
interview with defence counsel Nathalie VonWistinghausen on 13 May 2011. See further: Damaška, 
Evidentiary Barriers, supra note 30, 519-520.  On Russian law, see Butler, Russian Law, supra note 
125, 257. On Dutch law, see Beijer, Beweijs, supra note 130, 34.1.5 Composition of the ‘Dossier’. 
327 See M. Bouazdi, ‘France’, in Buisman, Civil Law, in Khan, Principles of Evidence, 65, supra note 
25, at 68-69. 
328 In France, Spain and Belgium, the investigative judge compiles the dossier. In the Netherlands, on 
the other hand, the prosecutor is responsible for compiling a dossier but will include the observations 
of the investigative judge and documents proposed by the defence. See Beijer, Bewijs, supra note 130, 
34.1–2 The Role of the Officer and Judge. 
329 Both the investigative judge and the prosecutor are expected to seek out evidence of innocence as 
well as guilt. See for instance Art 183 and further of the French Code Procédure Pénale. 
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and/or schedule additional witnesses.330 They can do so up to the deliberation stage. 
In addition, they may unlimitedly conduct their own independent examination in court 
and are not restricted by what the parties present.331
 
  
Accordingly, the judges are not solely dependent on the prosecutor to produce sufficient convincing 
evidence to sustain a conviction.332 The prosecutor must produce sufficient evidence to demonstrate the 
existence of a prima facie case. Otherwise, a case will be dismissed prior to trial.333 However, once the 
dossier has been finalised, the judges are in a position to complement or supplement the evidence 
presented by the parties, both in favour and against the accused. The parties call most of the witnesses, 
but the judges can call additional witnesses if necessary to complete the picture.334
 
  
In addition, judges rather than the parties are in control of the examination of 
witnesses. The parties can ask questions of their own witnesses as well as the 
witnesses called by the other party. The defendant himself can as well, even if 
assisted by counsel.335 The concept of cross-examination is unknown to civil law 
jurisdictions.336 The parties cannot be overly confrontational with the witnesses in 
challenging their evidence and must treat them with due respect. As Sybille Bedord 
puts it: “The sporting spirit, the notion of the law as a game of skill with handicaps to 
give each side a chance, is entirely absent on the Continent.”337
 
  
                                                 
330 Kokott, Burden of Proof, supra note 157, 9. For Netherlands, see Arts 258(6), 316(2) and 420 of the 
Dutch CCP. See further Beijer, Bewijs, supra note 130, 34.1-2 The Role of the Officer and Judge). In 
some jurisdictions, a trial will only take place if the triers of fact consider that there is sufficient 
evidence to proceed. See for instance, Russia where a preliminary hearing is held to determine, inter 
alia, if the investigation has been sufficiently complete to proceed to trial. Butler, Russian Law, supra 
note 125, 272. 
331 De Hert, Legal Procedures at the ICC, supra note 25. In Italy, on the other hand, judges nowadays 
fully rely on the parties for the production of evidence. Judges can only introduce evidence 
exceptionally when allowed by the law (Art. 190(2) CPP). They can call witnesses ex officio, but only 
when absolutely necessary (Art. 507 CPP). See M. Costi, ‘Italy’, in Buisman, Civil Law, in Khan, 
Principles of Evidence, supra note 25. In Germany, the courts are not bound by any declarations of the 
parties and investigate the facts on their own motion (Arts. 155(2) and 244(2)). See Bohlander, Basic 
Concepts of German Criminal Procedure, supra note 123, 19. 
332 In many civil law jurisdictions, the Criminal Codes of Procedure and Evidence do not explicitly 
indicate that the prosecutor has any burden of proving the case against the defendant. For instance, Art. 
338 of the Dutch CCP states that the judge may only convict if persuaded of the guilt of the accused on 
the basis of evidence, which meets the legally required standards. It does, however, not indicate that the 
prosecutor must prove this guilt. See further, Beijer, Bewijs, supra note 130, 34.1-1 Evidence: General. 
333 See, for instance, Arts 242–255 of the Dutch Code of Criminal Procedure. 
334 Beijer, Bewijs, supra note 130, 34.1–2 The Role of the Officer and Judge. 
335 Bohlander, Basic Concepts of German Criminal Procedure, supra note 123, 2, footnote 4. 
336 In 1988, Italy has introduced the concepts of examination, cross-examination and re-examination 
(Arts. 498, 499 CPP). The judge is only allowed to ask questions after the parties, and the parties have 
the right to ask further questions following the judge’s questions (Art. 501 CPP).  
337 Damaška, Evidentiary Barriers, supra note 30, foot note 200. 
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The judges may elicit information from the witnesses beyond what has been elicited 
by the parties. When examining a witness, judges have access to all prior statements 
made by such a witness and may ask a witness to clarify any answers given 
previously. In addition, they can confront witnesses with the statements of other 
witnesses and ask them to explain any contradictions.338
 
  
In many civil law jurisdictions, civil parties representing the victims of the alleged crimes are allowed 
to participate in criminal proceedings. Victims may only participate if they have established that their 
harm is personal, exists at the time of the application, and is directly linked to the offence.339 The 
modalities of victim participation vary from country to country. Where victim participation is allowed, 
the participatory rights of victims are limited to their direct interest, which is a claim to financial 
compensation for the alleged harm suffered. In some jurisdictions such as France, civil parties are 
treated as parties with full participatory rights equal to the prosecutor and defence. Civil parties can 
question witnesses at trial or call their own witnesses in a similar manner as the prosecutor and 
defence.340 Civil parties cannot be heard as sworn witnesses, but the judges may decide to hear them 
without requiring the taking of an oath.341
 
 
Judges receive all evidence and then decide whether to exclude parts of it or accredit 
it less weight.342 Technical rules governing the admissibility, presentation and 
evaluation of the evidence are generally not engaged unless the evidence was 
obtained irregularly or is privileged.343
                                                 
338 See for instance, Art. 292 of the Dutch Code of Criminal Procedure. See also Damaška, The Faces 
of Justice and State Authority, supra note 28, 162. 
 For instance, hearsay evidence is admissible. 
339 See Art. 2 of the French CPP; (Req. 1 June 1932, D. 1932.1.49, note H. Mazeaud. Any harm not yet 
materialized cannot sustain a civil action (crim. 26 June 1973, Bull 299, J.C.P. 1973). In Germany, 
instead of victims, the term ‘aggrieved persons’ is used. They can conduct private accessory 
prosecutions, which are then joined with the Prosecution’s case. See C. Safferling, The Role of the 
Victim in the Criminal Process – A Paradigm Shift in National German and International Law?, supra 
note 61, 187-200. 
340 The calling of witnesses is, however, not an automatic right but requires the approval of the 
investigative or trial judge, See Art. 82-1 of the French CPP, setting out the right of the civil party to 
submit a request in writing to the investigative judge to call a witness; and Art. 86 of the French CPP, 
allowing victim participants to produce evidence only on request of the judge. For Germany, see 
Zheng, Criminal Justice System in Germany, supra note 322, 10–11; C. Safferling, The Role of the 
Victim in the Criminal Process – A Paradigm Shift in National German and International Law? Supra 
note 61, 187-200. In The Netherlands, the victim cannot present evidence and his is limited to his 
request for compensation. See Cleiren & Nijboer, Strafvordering, supra note 165, Boek 1, Titel IIIA, 
Rechten van het slachtoffer, Art. 51 (Van Maurik) 173–208. 
341 Crim. 28 January 1958, Bull. Crim. No. 91, on this matter the Cour de cassation stated that no one 
can be both party and witness in the same case. In Netherlands, victims are allowed to make unsworn 
statements. See Cleiren & Nijboer, Strafvordering, supra note 165, Boek 1, Titel IIIA, Rechten van het 
slachtoffer, Art. 51 (Van Maurik) 173–208. 
342 See, inter alia, V. Tochilovsky, Nature and Evolution of the Rules, in Khan, Principles of Evidence, 
supra note 25, 161-164. 
343 Most civil law jurisdictions recognize testimonial privileges for close family, husbands, wives or 
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This, however, does not suggest that Courts can always rely on a written statement 
instead of oral testimony. It can usually do so only if the statement was taken by an 
investigative judge or other judicial officer in the presence of the parties.344 A finding 
of guilt can further not be based solely on written statements.345 Most civil law 
jurisdictions apply a rule of immediacy, pursuant to which witnesses have to be heard 
directly by the triers of fact in the presence of the accused. They should also testify 
exclusively to what they have personally observed.346
 
  
                                                                                                                                           
registered partners, violation of which normally leads to exclusion. See for instance the German case: 
BGH St 11, 216. Also, communications between counsel and client, or doctor or psychiatrist and 
patient, are usually privileged, and can, therefore, not be used as evidence if seized. See for instance the 
German case: BGH St 18, 229. In The Netherlands, testimonial privileges for close family are set out in 
Arts. 217 and 219 of the Dutch Code of Criminal Procedure; and the professional privilege in Art. 218 
of the Code. The grounds to exclude illegally obtained evidence have been expanded, particularly in 
Germany when it concerns violations of the fundamental rights of the accused. The German Supreme 
Court (‘‘Bundesgerichtshof’’ (BGH)) has developed a theory based on the defendant’s ‘‘sphere of 
rights’’ (‘‘Rechtskreistheorie’’). According to this approach the admissibility of the illegally obtained 
evidence depends on whether the violation in obtaining the evidence substantially aﬀects the 
defendant’s sphere of rights or if it is only of subordinate or no signiﬁ cance to him. See: 
Entscheidungen des Bundesgerichtshofs in Strafsachen (BGH St) 11, 213. See further C. Roxin, 
Strafverfahrensrecht (25th edn, 1988) 182; Weigend, Rechtsvergleichende Bemerkungen, supra note 
123, 754. 
344 In the Netherlands, for instance, The record of a witness’s sworn declaration made to an 
investigative judge can be relied on as a viva voce declaration, provided that the parties were present 
and had the opportunity to ask questions, and that the witness has died, cannot reasonable appear or has 
security concerns (see Art. 295 of the CCP). In Germany, § 250 (1) StPO sets out the general rule that 
the reading out of prior statements cannot replace the witness’s in court testimony. However, § 251 
StPO sets out the situations in which the general rule can be departed from. See further E. Löwe & W. 
Rosenberg, Die Strafprozessordnung und das Gerichtsverfassungsgesetz: § 250 StPO (24th Ed. 1987) 
24-26; L. Meyer-Gossner, Strafprozessordnung § 250, Rn.12, Rn. 3, 4 (49th ed. 2006). Under influence 
of the European Court of Human Rights, the reliance on witness statements in lieu of oral testimony in 
any other circumstances has significantly diminished. See: Unterpertinger v. Austria, Judgment of 24 
November 1986, 1986 ECHR (Ser. A.) 110; Barbera, Messegué & Jabardo v. Spain, Judgment of 6 
December 1988, 1988 ECHR (Ser. A.) 146; Isgro v. Italy, Judgment of 19 February 1991, 1991 ECHR 
(Ser. A.) 194; Asch v. Austria, Judgment of 26 April 1991, 1991 ECHR (Ser. A.) 203; P.S. v. Germany, 
Judgment of 20 December 2001, 2001 ECHR; Kostovski v. The Netherlands, Judgment of 20 
November 1989, 1989 ECHR (Ser. A.) 166; Delta v. France, Judgment of 19 December 1990, 1991 
ECHR (Ser. A.) 191, para 35; Lüdi v. Switzerland, Judgment of 15 June 1992, 1992 ECHR (Ser. A.) 
238; Saïdi v. France, Judgment of 20 September 1993, 1993 ECHR (Ser. A.) 2619; Lucà v. Italy, 
Judgment of 27 February 2001, 2001 ECHR; Cardot v. France, Judgment of 19 March 1991, 1991 
ECHR (Ser. A.) 200; Kamasinski v. Austria, Judgment of 19 December 1989, 1989 ECHR (Ser. A.) 
168; Windisch v. Austria, Judgment of 27 September 1990, 1990 ECHR (Ser. A.) 186. 
345 AM v. Italy, Judgment of 14 December 1999, 1999 ECHR; Saïdi, supra note 344, paras. 43-44, 
Unterpertinger, supra note 344, paras. 31-33; Lucà, supra note 344, paras. 39-45; Kostovski, supra 
note 344; Delta, supra note 344; Lüdi supra note 344. 
346 See, for instance, § 250 StPO which incorporates the German version of the immediacy principle, 
and the German case BGH St 26, 332 where it was held that the examination of a witness in the 
absence of the accused leads to exclusion of the testimony as evidence. See further Löwe & Rosenberg: 
Die Strafprozessordnung, supra note 344; L. Meyer-Gossner, Strafprozessordnung § 250, Rn.12 (49th 
ed. 2006), Rn. 3,4; See also Bohlander, Basic Concepts of German Criminal Procedure, supra note 
123. As for the Dutch principle of immediacy, see Nijboer, Strafrechtelijk Bewijsrecht, supra note 160, 
70–71; G.J.M. Corstens, Het Nederlands Strafprocesrecht, (Deventer Kluwer 2008, 6th edition) 615–
618. 
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A former US judge and distinguished legal scholar, Jerome Frank describes the 
‘investigatory’ or ‘truth’ method of trying cases as conducting “an intelligent inquiry 
into all the practically available evidence, in order to ascertain, as near as may be, the 
truth about the facts of that suit.”347 The criminal investigation must be unbiased, 
impartial and non-prejudicial.348
 
  
At the end of the trial, judges withdraw to deliberate in private and write their 
judgment. If they are convinced that the accused is guilty, they will enter a conviction 
and simultaneously determine the appropriate sentence. If they are not so convinced, 
they must acquit.349 Dissenting opinions, if any, are not published. Only the majority 
opinion is reflected in the judgment.350
 
 
Irrespective of the verdict (guilty or not guilty), both parties may lodge an appeal 
against it before the Court of Appeal. The Court of Appeal examines all findings de 
novo, which means that the parties may produce additional evidence, introduce a new 
line of defence or prosecution and/or adopt a new strategy. The appeals judges are 
active and may recall witnesses heard at trial or heard by an investigative judge prior 
to trial. They may also conduct their own investigations, possibly with the assistance 
of an investigative judge. The Court of Appeal routinely overturns verdicts. In such 
situations, the Court of Appeal may refer the matter back to the court of first instance, 
order a re-trial by another court of first instance or determine the matter itself. 351
 
 
After the Appeals Chamber renders its judgment, an appeal is still open before the 
Supreme Court or Court of Cassation as it is called in Belgium and France. Cassation 
                                                 
347 Frank, Courts on Trial, supra note 38, 80. 
348 Nijboer, Wahrheit im Strafprozeß, supra note 124, 31–32; Malek, Abschied von der Wahrheitssuch, 
supra note 128. See, however, Russia, where the aspiration is to establish the ‘judicial’ truth. To 
establish the ‘judicial’ truth, it is required that criminal proceedings are conducted in accordance with 
the relevant legal provisions. An investigation does not need to have been ‘full, comprehensive, or 
objective.’ See Butler, Russian Law, supra note 125, 256. 
349 Nijboer, Strafrechtelijk Bewijsrecht, supra note 160, 23, 81, 82, 196–200. 
350 H. Kötz, Emeritus Professor at the University of Hamburg, Director of the Max Planck Institut für 
Ausländisches und Internationales Privatrecht, author of the pre-advice ‘Die Begründung 
höchstrichterlicher Urteile’, 1982: Die Begründung höchstrichterlicher Urteile, in E. Hondius, De 
meerwaarde van de rechtsvergelijking. Opstellen aangeboden aan prof. mr H.U. Jessurun d’Oliveira, 
Nederlandse Vereniging voor Rechtsvergelijking, 57 (Deventer: Kluwer, 1999) 23, 29–32. 
351 See in relation to the Dutch system Beijer, Bewijs, supra note 130, 34.2.10 Evidence on Appeal; De 
Hert, Legal Procedures at the ICC, supra note 25, page 124. In relation to the German system, see: L. 
Meyer-Gossner, Strafprozessordnung § 337, 27 (49th ed. 2006).  
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is allowed against both convictions and acquittals.352 This is not a trial de novo; the 
Supreme Court will marginally examine whether the defendant has received a fair 
trial and whether the issues have been properly adjudicated. The test applied by the 
Supreme Court is whether the judges in the first instance or on appeal could have 
reached their verdict on the basis of the evidence available; not whether they should 
have reached this verdict.353
 
   
Thus, the determination of guilt or innocence does not become final until it has been 
tested on three levels, two of which include a full test of the facts. This in 
combination with the thorough investigation preceding the trial is in agreement with 
the truth-ascertaining objective.  
 
In summary, the ascertainment of the truth does not only indicate that the criminal 
process is aimed at a factually accurate result, but it also refers to a particular 
methodology in obtaining that result. The methodology exists in many different 
versions, but is generally aimed at acquiring the greatest quantity of attainable and 
available relevant information to enable active triers of fact and law to assess and 
reconstruct the fullest possible picture. 
 
The English system and other common law systems modelled on the English system 
can be described as a battlefield. To quote Frank: “I want, therefore, to stress the fact 
that litigation in our courts is still a fight. The fighting, to be sure, occurs in a court-
room, and is supervised by a government officer known as a judge. Yet, for the most 
part, a law-suit remains a sort of sublimated, regulated brawl, a private battle 
conducted in a court-house”.
Common Law Systems  
354
 
 
The parties can argue their dispute with any means they wish to use within the limits 
of the law. They are autonomous. The parties are responsible for gathering the 
                                                 
352 The acquittal on appeal of Mr. Kouwenhoven, charged with delivery of weapons to Charles Taylor, 
then President of Liberia, in violation of a UN embargo, was quashed by the Court of Cassation, 
holding that the Court of Appeal had not adequately explained why it had refused to hear two 
anonymous witnesses. See C. Hornby, Dutch court to re-examine Liberia arms dealing case, Reuters 
Amsterdam, 20 April 2010. 
353 See, in relation to the Dutch system: HR 23 October 1973, NJ 1974, 31; HR 4 January 2000, NJ 
2000, 225. See further: Beijer, Bewijs, supra note 130, 34.2 Discussion of Evidence in Cassation. 
354 Frank, Courts on Trial, supra note 38, 7.  
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evidence they wish to rely on at trial. At trial the prosecution presents its case first, 
followed by the defence. If the prosecution fails to establish a prima facie case, the 
defence has no case to answer. An acquittal will then be entered without the need to 
hear from the defence.355
 
  
The parties call their witnesses one by one and examine them after they have taken 
the oath to tell the truth. Leading questions, unless they concern matters not in 
dispute, are prohibited. The opposite party subsequently has an opportunity to cross-
examine the witnesses. The cross-examining party is entitled to ask leading questions 
of the witness.356 The examining party will then be able to ask some final questions in 
re-examination, but only on matters raised in cross-examination.357 Nobody can ask 
any questions of the defendant unless he decides to testify under oath during the 
defence case. In that instance, the defendant would be examined like any other 
witness.358
 
  
The parties, themselves, decide what information to elicit from the witnesses. The 
triers of fact simply listen, but cannot themselves ask questions to the witness. In 
examining and cross-examining the witnesses, parties intentionally attempt to put the 
best portrayal of their version of the truth. Being an efficient party to the criminal 
proceedings requires the discrediting of adverse witnesses. It also requires the 
presentation of the party’s own witnesses in the best possible light while concealing 
the weaknesses in their testimony and boosting up their credibility. Consequently, if 
the parties are successful in doing so, there is a risk that “the trial court is denied the 
benefit of observing the witness’s actual normal demeanour, and thus prevented from 
accurately evaluating the witness.”359
                                                 
355 See further, P. Richardson & D. Thomas, Archbold (Sweet & Maxwell, 2006), paras. 4-292-4-297; 
Kiralfy, The Burden of Proof, supra note 164, 18. 
 Nonetheless, a vigorous cross-examination is 
considered the most efficient tool to test the credibility of the witnesses and to 
unmask dishonesty and uncertainty. It therefore seeks to ensure that the triers of fact 
are aware of the weaknesses in the evidence.  
356 J. Sprack, A Practical Approach to Criminal Procedure (12th Ed.) (Oxford University Press, 2008), 
para. 20.43. 
357 Richardson, Archbold, supra note 355, paras. 8-72, 8-116, 8-247. 
358 Ibid, paras. 8-49; Criminal Evidence Act 1898 (UK) s. 1; amended and repealed in part by the Police 
and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (UK). 
359 Frank, Courts on Trial (n 12 above) 83-86. 
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In presenting their cases and cross-examining the witnesses of the opposition, both 
parties are bound by ethical obligations. They cannot, for instance, deliberately 
mislead the court or produce evidence with the knowledge that it is false. However, 
particularly for defence counsel, defending the interests of their clients is more 
important than helping to establish the truth about their guilt or innocence, unless 
their clients are truly innocent or have pleaded guilty. This is true in any system, civil 
law and common law systems alike. In civil law systems, however, there is more 
judicial control in the manner in which evidence is being collected and the witnesses 
are being questioned.360
 
 
There is a clear separation between the triers of law and the triers of fact. The trial is 
presided over by a judge, who is the trier of law. A jury, also present at trial, is the 
trier of fact.361 The jury and judge are passive in the process and allow the parties to 
proceed in the manner they choose, provided they abide by the rules. The jury is silent 
throughout the trial and the judge will only intervene where necessary to ensure the 
fairness and integrity of the proceedings, 362 which may include some supplementary 
questioning to clarify issues that arise. Such an intervention is, however, the exception 
rather than the rule, unless triggered by an objection from one of the parties. The 
judge must always rule on objections made by either side, but rarely intervenes if no 
objection is made.363
 
 
As the overseer of the fairness and integrity of the proceedings, the judge must protect 
the accused from unfair prejudice. In doing so, he may exercise his discretionary 
powers in an attempt to ensure that the form in which the case is presented to the 
jurors will lead them to decide on it fairly.364
                                                 
360 Damaška, Evidentiary Barriers, supra note 30, 558-559, 561; Nijboer, Strafrechtelijk Bewijsrecht, 
supra note 160, 185–186; De Hert, Legal Procedures at the ICC, supra note 25; In Italy, on the other 
hand, judges nowadays fully rely on the parties for the production of evidence. Judges can only 
introduce evidence exceptionally when allowed by the law (Art. 190(2) CPP). They can call witnesses 
ex officio, but only when absolutely necessary (Art. 507 CPP) See also Costi, ‘Italy’, in Buisman, Civil 
Law, in Khan, Principles of Evidence supra note 25. 
 The judge should, for instance, prevent 
361 Sprack, Criminal Procedure, supra note 361, supra note 356, para. 19.01. 
362 Ibid, para. 20.02. 
363 Damaška, Evidentiary Barriers, supra note 30, 525-526. In continental European systems where lay 
members are included in rendering the verdict, lay members are entitled to play an active role in the 
criminal proceedings and ask questions to the witnesses and accused (545). 
364 Armytage, Educating Judges, supra note 313, 256-258. 
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evidence that is irrelevant, unreliable or unfairly prejudicial, from being presented to 
the jury. The reason for excluding such evidence from the jury is to avoid that a 
conviction is based on it.365 As John Henry Wigmore stated, the purpose of rules of 
evidence is “to guard the tribunal (particularly the jury) against erroneous 
persuasion”.366 The jury may, however, erroneously believe that any evidence they 
review is relevant and reliable because otherwise, it is assumed, it would have been 
excluded.367
 
 
The judge will rarely exclude evidence on his own initiative. Usually, one of the 
parties will invite the judge to use his discretion.368
 
 If he decides to exclude the 
evidence, the jury is not even aware that the excluded evidence exists. In some cases, 
the jury therefore renders its verdict on incomplete evidence.  
In acquittal cases, the verdict of the jury is final,369
                                                 
365 De Hert, Legal Procedures at the ICC, supra note 25, 107; Damaška, Evidence Law Adrift, supra 
note 122, 46. John Henry Wigmore (1863-1943) and James Bradley Thayer (1831-1902) considered 
that exclusionary rules and jury were inter-related. Edmund Morgan (1956) has challenged these 
perspectives on the ground that non-jury trials in common law jurisdictions also apply the exclusionary 
rules; and jury trials today and in the past in civil law jurisdictions have never applied any of this type 
of exclusionary rules. See for similar thoughts Damaška, Evidentiary Barriers, supra note 30, 514; A. 
Levin & H. Cohen, The Exclusionary Rules in Nonjury Criminal Cases, 119 U. Pa. L. Rev. 905 (1971); 
H. Hammelmann, Hearsay Evidence: A Comparison, 67 L.Q. Review 67 (1951); Murphy, Evidence, 
Proof, and Facts, supra note 137, 4: “Indeed, there is a school of thought that, if it were not for jury 
trials, we would not have rules of evidence at all, and the Continental Romano-Germanic systems of 
law are often held up as apparent proof of this point”. Murphy holds that neither the history of common 
law nor contemporary common law sustains such a conclusion, given that the common law rules of 
evidence apply to civil and criminal cases and jury and non-jury trials. See also J. Thayer, A 
Preliminary Treatise on Evidence at the Common Law (1898), where Thayer states that the 
exclusionary rules were included from preventing jury to be misled. Re-printed in Murphy, Evidence, 
Proof, and Facts, supra note 137, 35. 
 unless highly compelling new 
evidence comes to light or the verdict can be shown to have been “tainted” by 
366 J. Wigmore, A Treatise on the System of Evidence in Trials at Common Law (3rd Ed) (Little, Brown 
& Co) (VII Works 599), re-printed in Murphy, Evidence, Proof, and Facts, supra note 137, 52. See 
also De Hert, Legal Procedures at the ICC, supra note 25, 107; Damaška, Evidence Law Adrift, supra 
note 122, 46. According to the Honourable Justice Peter Murphy, two additional purposes for 
introducing rules of evidence were to rectify the disadvantage on which the accused was placed until 
the 19th century, and to avoid perjury, fabrication and attempts to pervert the course of justice. See 
Murphy, above, 4. 
367 C. Callen, Cognitive Strategies and Models of Fact-Finding, in Jackson, Crime, Procedure and 
Evidence, supra note 23, 165. 
368 Murphy, Evidence, Proof, and Facts, supra note 137, ‘An Introductory Essay’, 5-6. Common law 
jurists generally feel uncomfortable if the judge intervenes too much in the conduct of the parties. 
Damaška, Evidentiary Barriers, supra note 30, 570. Also Damaška, Evidence Law Adrift, supra note 
122, 2. 
369 Sprack, Criminal Procedure, supra note 356, para. 21.42. 
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interference with the jury.370 In case of a conviction, the verdict can be appealed 
before a Court of Appeal, consisting of judges only.371 There is no jury. Factual issues 
can only be the subject of an appeal where the verdict is unsafe, or where there is said 
to be fresh evidence. Leave to appeal must first be granted by a single judge on the 
papers alone.372
 
  
On allowing an appeal the Court may direct either that the defendant stand acquitted, 
or that there should be a fresh trial at first instance.373 The evidence is tested only 
marginally and witnesses are called only in exceptional circumstances. When the 
Court of Appeal is presented with new evidence on appeal which could not have been 
introduced earlier with due diligence, it will hear the new evidence directly. On the 
basis of such a hearing, the Court of Appeal must consider whether the new evidence 
caused it to entertain a reasonable doubt about the conviction.374
 
  
The Court of Appeal does not lightly overturn errors. Where a party fails to exploit all 
procedural tools available to it, it cannot complain to the Court of Appeal on the 
grounds that a miscarriage of justice has occurred.375
                                                 
370 The judge’s inappropriate instructions, or failure to instruct the jury appropriately, is challengeable, 
but not the jury’s verdict except in exceptional situations. Armytage, Educating Judges, supra note 
313, 256. 
 There is particular reluctance to 
371 In England and Wales a Court for the determination of appeals in criminal cases was first 
established late, in 1907. It was established as a reaction to public concerns expressed in respect of the 
criminal justice system following a significant miscarriage of justice. See Armytage, Educating Judges, 
supra note 313, 259. The case in question concerned Mr. Adolf Beck who had been wrongfully 
identified by fifteen honest witnesses. 
372 If the single judge refuses leave to appeal, the application can be renewed in front of the full, three 
judge, court, but Legal Aid is not available to cover the cost of such applications.  
373 For more details on the test on appeal and examples of successful grounds of appeal, see 
Richardson, Archbold, supra note 355, paras. 7-43 – 7-101. 
374 R v Stafford & Luvaglio [1974] AC 878. Prior to this judgement, the standard was whether the new 
evidence might have led the original jury to entertain a reasonable doubt about the guilt of the accused 
(R v. Parks (1961) 46 Cr. App. R. 29). The change was criticized because it requires judges to usurp 
the jurors’ role. There are also practical problems, because, although the Court of Appeal has heard and 
observed the new evidence, it has only access to the written record of the evidence presented at trial 
and is not in a position to know the basis on which the jury decided to convict and whether the new 
evidence would have made a difference. Instead, as suggested by Lord Devlin, the Court of Appeal 
should be much readier to exercise its power to order a re-trial under Criminal Appeal Act 1964 (UK) s. 
1; Criminal Appeal Act 1968 (UK) s. 7; Criminal Justice Act 1988 (UK) s. 43. See Lord P. Devlin, The 
Judge and the Jury: Sapping and Undermining The Judge (1981). Also Armytage, Educating Judges, 
supra note 313, 264. 
375 Damaška, The Faces of Justice and State Authority, supra note 28, 126-127, 145; R v. Cooper 
[1969] 1 QB 267, “a case in which every issue was before the jury and in which the jury was properly 
instructed, and, accordingly, a case in which this Court will be very reluctant indeed to intervene. It has 
been said over and over again throughout the years that this Court must recognise the advantage which 
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reverse the jury’s decision on the facts, provided that the case has been fully and 
fairly laid before it. The reasoning is that the Court of Appeal is not given an 
opportunity to see or hear the witnesses and can, therefore, not form a first-hand 
impression of the witnesses’ demeanour.376 This reluctance has been criticized as it 
effectively deprives a convicted person of a remedy against miscarriages of justice 
involving no error of law or irregularity of procedure.377
 
 It is clearly in contrast with 
the civil law approach where the filing of an appeal by either party is an automatic 
right both against a conviction and an acquittal.  
In summary, the parties run the proceedings and the jury decides by whom they are 
convinced, bearing in mind the burden and standard of proof. The extensive 
participation of the parties and their autonomy is often perceived as the most 
significant feature of the common law trial and reflect its adversarial nature. Fuller, 
for example, expressed the view that “[t]he essence of the adversary system is that 
each side is accorded a participation in the decision that is reached, a participation that 
takes the form of presenting proofs and arguments.”378 The jury is also an important 
element of this system.379
 
 
To conclude on the issue of access to information, civil law and common law 
jurisdictions both have their own distinct way to channel information which 
ultimately forms the foundation for the findings of fact. The triers of fact in civil law 
jurisdictions receive all relevant available information, including from the victims. By 
contrast, the common law triers of fact only receive relevant information which is 
presented by the parties and considered reliable enough as a basis for a conviction. 
Whilst this reduces the chances of wrongful convictions, it does not automatically 
strengthen the ascertainment of the truth. The latter does not only seek to ensure that 
                                                                                                                                           
a jury has in seeing and hearing the witnesses, and if all the material was before the jury and the 
summing-up was impeccable, this Court should not lightly interfere.” 
376 Armytage, Educating Judges, supra note 313, 259-263. 
377 Ibid, 264. In 1993, the Royal Commission on Criminal Justice produced a report (Cm. 2263 (1993)) 
in which it recommended to replace the wholly inadequate Court of Appeal. This recommendation was 
supported by Sir John May in his report on the Guildford Four (July 1994). See also Criminal Cases 
Review Commission (Part II, Criminal Appeal Act 1995; www.ccrc.gov.uk/); and: Uglow, Criminal 
Justice, supra note 138, 11. 
378 Damaška, Evidentiary Barriers, supra note 30, 570. 
379 See J. Langbein, The Origins of Adversary Criminal Trial (Oxford University Press, 2003), 178. See 
also G. Fletcher, The Grammar of Criminal Law, (Oxford University Press, 2007), 136-142. 
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innocent defendants are acquitted, but also that guilty defendants are convicted.380 For 
that reason, the civil law method of presenting all relevant information to the triers of 
fact may be more efficient. The downside of this is that the triers of fact may be 
influenced by relevant, but unreliable information.381 They may for instance have 
formed an opinion on the papers concerning the guilt of the accused before the trial 
has even begun.382
 
 In addition, witnesses in civil law jurisdictions are not subjected to 
a cross-examination. Witnesses are thus more protected from unpleasant questioning, 
but their credibility is not tested in a similarly vigorous manner. 
Thus, of the two, the civil law method guarantees the greatest access of the triers of 
fact to relevant information from all sides. However, this includes unreliable 
evidence, which should be excluded in the ultimate determination of the facts. 
Whether this is done depends on the ability of the triers of fact to engage, yet keep a 
distance from the information and sources subject to their evaluation. In common law, 
the unreliable information has been filtered out before the triers of fact get to see the 
information. Accordingly, there is less risk that a finding is made on unreliable 
evidence. All in all, both methods have advantages and disadvantages. 
 
Engagement at a Distance 
 
Common law jurisdictions rely mainly on laypersons to determine the facts. Civil law 
jurisdictions rely on professional judges. Professional judges are the more obvious 
choice to ascertain the truth. This is because the determination of the guilt of a 
defendant includes the legal qualification of facts, which may be too complex a task 
                                                 
380 Damaška, Evidentiary Barriers, supra note 30, 579-580. 
381 Wagenaar, Vincent plast op de grond, supra note 129, 9. 
382 Damaška, Evidentiary Barriers, supra note 30, 558–9, 561; Weigend, Rechtsvergleichende 
Bemerkungen, supra note 123, 756. See also Pompe, a distinguished Dutch scholar, who argues that the 
prior review by judges of the dossier does not respect the accusatorial nature of the trial because judges 
may already have formed an opinion about the evidence prior to the hearing. Pompe, Bewijs in 
Strafzaken, supra note 153, 55–64. He suggests, therefore, that judges do not review the dossier in 
detail prior to the trial. A.L. Melai, on the other hand, argues that judges should carefully review the 
dossier because they are responsible for ensuring that the guilt assessment is complete and fair. (A. L. 
Melai, ‘De onbevangen strafrechter’, Delikt en Delinkwent (DD) 1975, 124–127). J. F. Nijboer 
discusses both views and is more inclined to support the view of Melai without ignoring that Pompe 
has raised an important point. See Nijboer, Strafrechtelijk Bewijsrecht, supra note 160, 185–186. In 
Italy, on the other hand, since the reform of the system in 1988, the judges no longer have access to the 
investigative dossier. See Art. 431 of the Dutch Code of Criminal Procedure.   
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for a layperson. Judges are also more academically trained in civil law jurisdictions 
than judges in common law jurisdictions.383
 
 
In searching for the truth, professional judges are seeking to get to the essence of the 
testimony by engaging in dialogue with the witnesses and the defendant. 
Simultaneously to determining whether the defendant has done as alleged, judges 
seek to comprehend his motive for doing so. The defendant’s state of mind is 
important to determine his culpability and what sentence, if any, would be 
appropriate. Accordingly, judges assess both the credibility and the personality of the 
defendant and witnesses and thus engage with the information. Yet, they have been 
trained to be impartial and evaluate the facts in a dispassionate manner. Professional 
judges are therefore assumed to be less susceptible to improper influence from 
irrelevant or prejudicial information than jurors. In reality, the ability to remain 
impartial in the process varies from judge to judge.384
 
  
A trial by jury is more random. A defendant can be lucky or unlucky with the 
personalities and independent minds of the jurors. They are randomly selected from 
society.385 The defendant can ask that individual jury members be disqualified if they 
can demonstrate bias on their part.386
 
 In other situations, the defendant’s fate is in the 
hands of twelve unknown citizens who may, or may not be fair and open minded with 
regard to his innocence.  
In the eyes of many civil law practitioners and some common law practitioners,387
                                                 
383 Bohlander, Radbruch Redux, supra note 123, 405. 
 it 
is curious that the common law system entrusts jurors, who have no legal 
384 The ability of judges to engage fully and understand where the accused is coming from has been 
questioned in light of the fact that judges tend to be from a different class as the accused. See M.G. 
Rood, H.L. Wedeven, J.C.M. Leyten, C.J.M. Schuyt: Class justice and Judge & politics intertwined:  
‘De plaats van de rechterlijke macht in de Nederlandse samenleving: preadviezen’ in: Handelingen der 
Nederlandse Juristen-Vereniging, Zwolle, 105 (1975) deel I.  
385 See Sprack, Criminal Procedure, supra note 361, paras. 18.01-18.25. 
386 Ibid, 18.30-18.34. 
387 Frank, Courts on Trial, supra note 38, 108-124. See also Murphy, Evidence, Proof, and Facts, 
supra note 137, 4, where Murphy suggests that some may “argue that jury trial is in many ways 
aberrational, and that a better approach would be to examine the use of evidence by a judge sitting 
alone.” If there is any truth in the film ‘twelve angry men’, it is well possible that dominant characters 
persuade other jury members to convict. Or, as research into jury verdicts in the UK has pointed out, 
jury members may have agreed with the majority because they were tired and wanted to go home. 
Given that a near absolute majority is required for a verdict, the liberation can take long. See also 
 
 
103 
qualification or forensic expertise, with the ultimate decision on guilt or innocence of 
the accused no matter how notorious or legally complex the case may be.388 Often, 
the determination of the ultimate issue requires an understanding of the law because it 
involves a determination as to whether the facts qualify as a crime and whether it was 
committed with the requisite mens rea. It is difficult to imagine that, in just a few 
days, the jurors without any legal background could grasp the often complex legal 
matters. Where legal definitions are fluid, the jurors would even operate as legislators, 
and there is no way of verifying whether the jury has understood the judge’s 
instructions.389
 
 
It is particularly striking that, on the one hand, enough faith is placed in jurors to 
render a verdict while, on the other hand, they are not sufficiently trusted with 
evidence which prejudices the accused unfairly because it may render them biased 
against the accused.390
 
  
Lacking expertise and full information, it is questionable whether jury members can 
engage with the information. It is further contested that jury members can evaluate the 
information in a dispassionate manner. Research has demonstrated that jury members 
are regularly manipulated by the media or other prejudicial information that may 
place the accused in a bad light.391
 
  
Yet, in the common law tradition, professional judges are viewed with suspicion. 
They usually come from a different class than the persons on trial. They are, 
therefore, not viewed as the peers of the defendants.392
 
  
                                                                                                                                           
Wigmore, A Treatise on the System of Evidence, supra note 363, 2511; L. Cohen, The Probable and 
the Provable (Clarendon Press, 1977), 108-110. 
388 Although there is now provision for complex cases such as high level fraud to be tried by a judge. 
389 Frank, Courts on Trial, supra note 38, 110-120. 
390 Ibid, 143-144. 
391 Research done by the Law Commission for England and Wales suggests that “a previous conviction 
of indecent assault on a child, because of the “all-round negative evaluation” of such a person, will 
have a significant impact on the jurors perception of the defendant’s credibility as a witness whatever 
the offence charged”, available at <http://www.lawcom.gov.uk/library/lccp141/summary.htm>. 
392 See supra note 384. See also Damaška, Evidence Law Adrift, supra note 122, 2; reference to 
Thayer, A Preliminary Treatise on Evidence at the Common Law (1898), 266. There is also criticism in 
civil law jurisdictions. In the Netherlands, for instance, until recently, most judges were white male 
from the higher classes of society. See: L. de Groot-van Leeuwen, De rechterlijke macht in Nederland: 
samenstelling en denkbeelden van de zittende en staande magistratuur (Arnhem, 1991), 193. 
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This explains why greater faith is placed in lay members of society than on 
professional judges to determine the guilt or innocence of an accused.393 Trial by jury 
is considered pivotal to criminal justice and “the final check against suppression of 
liberty by the state.”394 It has been described as “the lamp that shows that freedom 
lives”395 and has enormous popular support. According to Lord Bingham, Lord Chief 
Justice, this support for trials by jury is shared by judges who are uncomfortable 
making decisions on facts, given that no authority or rational rules can assist them. 
The trier of fact is merely dependent on ‘his own unaided judgment’.396
 
  
An additional safeguard is offered by the fact that the judge is mandated to sum up the 
case to the jury and explain coherently the principles of law applicable in the case. He 
must be more careful in presenting the facts. He cannot be seen to attempt to 
influence the jury one way or the other. He should caution the jury in respect to 
certain categories of dubious evidence, such as evidence from a co-perpetrator. The 
judge must also clearly indicate that it is for the jury, not him, to decide on what 
evidence to rely and whether guilt has been proved beyond a reasonable doubt. He 
must further emphasize that the jury cannot convict the accused unless all of the 
jurors are convinced beyond reasonable doubt that he is guilty as charged, or, after a 
long period of deliberation and a further judicial direction, by a majority of not less 
than 10-2.397 By contrast, judges render verdicts solely or in a bench of three, two of 
whom must agree with the verdict.398
                                                 
393 This faith has grown historically. During past dictatorial regimes, particularly under the monarchies 
of the Tudors and Stuarts, the jury was viewed as the more lenient trier of fact. For a long time, jurors 
had the power to pardon a defendant and acquit him irrespective of the evidence. They took advantage 
of this power where they considered the punishment or the law on which it was based too harsh. 
Therefore, it occurred from time to time that a defendant was acquitted on compassionate or political 
grounds rather than the lack of evidence. This faith in juries continued to be strong, as was evidenced 
in a vigorous popular and parliamentary protest in 1986 against proposal to conduct complex cases of 
serious fraud without a jury, Fraud Trials Committee Report (1986), see Armytage, Educating Judges, 
supra note 313, 256; Lord Bingham, The Business of Judging, supra note 137, 3; Damaška, 
Evidentiary Barriers, supra note 30, 584-586; L. Radzinowicz, A History of English Criminal Law 
(Stevens & Sons, 1948), 91-97. 
 
394 J. Brady, Fair and Impartial Railroad: The Jury, The Media, and Political Trials, 2 Journal of 
Criminal Justice 241 (1983), 241; Sprack, Criminal Procedure, supra note 356, para. 19.01. 
395 Lord Devlin, Trial by Jury (Stevens & Sons Ltd, 1956, 1966) 164 as cited in Lord Bingham, The 
Business of Judging, supra note 137. See also A. Gray, Mockery and the Right to Trial by Jury 6(1) 
Queensland University of Technology Law and Justice Journal 66 (2006); Brady, Fair and Impartial 
Railroad, ibid, 241; Frank, Courts on Trial, supra note 38, 108. 
396 Lord Bingham, The Business of Judging, supra note 137, 3. 
397 The unanimity rule is set out in the UK Criminal Justice Act 1967, § 13. Prior to 1967, unanimity 
was required for a conviction. Likewise, in the US, until 1972, there was a unanimity requirement for 
conviction. In Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404 (1972) and Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356 (1972) 
 
 
105 
 
The impression commonly held by supporters of trial by jury is that lay triers of fact 
are more lenient, and require more evidence in support of a conviction. Lay triers of 
fact do not routinely determine whether an accused is guilty as charged. It has been 
suggested that they, therefore, often feel a greater responsibility for the fate of the 
defendant, who could end up serving a long prison sentence as a result of their 
finding.399 Professional judges, on the other hand, become depersonalized with the 
consequence that convicting becomes less of a “unique human drama” and thus less 
of a “big deal”. Also, they are more inclined to use a mathematical test, based on prior 
experience: e.g. if factor x is present then result y will follow.400
 
  
If at all true, this in itself does not guarantee more accuracy in ascertaining the facts, 
given that an acquittal is not necessarily more reliable than a conviction. Accuracy 
and even fairness cannot be tested by the number of acquittals, but rather by the 
procedure as a whole leading to the outcome. The assessment of jurors which leads 
them to doubt may be inaccurate. Their doubt may have been based on sympathy for 
the defendant rather than on the actual evidence.401 According to Honourable Judge 
Murphy, jurors “are extremely susceptible to being affected, either positively or 
negatively, by a combination of dialectic and rhetoric”.402
 
  
In conclusion, it is difficult to determine which type of trier of fact is best suited to 
engage with the information while simultaneously keeping a distance. It depends on 
the personality of individual judges and jury members. Both open minded and biased 
judges and jurors exist. However, truth-ascertainment is more consistent when done 
by a constant pool of professional judges than a continuously changing selection of 
jurors. 
                                                                                                                                           
the US Supreme Court held that jury unanimity was not constitutionally mandated. See Damaška, 
Evidentiary Barriers, supra note 30, 536-537. For summing up by the judges, see Juries Act 1974 (UK) 
s. 17; Richardson, Archbold, supra note 355, paras. 4-404i–4-404r (general summing up directives 
concerning caution in respect of dubious evidence); paras. 13–68; 4-410–415 (warning in relation to 
bad character evidence admitted to show propensity to commit offences or to be untruthful and general 
summing up directions); paras. 14-12–14-24 (Turnbull warning concerning identification evidence). 
398 However, as stated above, many civil law courts include jurors as triers of fact. See supra note 317. 
399 Damaška, Evidentiary Barriers, supra note 30, 538-539. Also Frank, Courts on Trial, supra note 38, 
347. 
400 Ibid. 
401 Frank, Courts on Trial, supra note 38,110-114. 
402 Murphy, Evidence, Proof, and Facts, supra note 137, 9. 
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Transparency 
 
On most issues, civil law proceedings are conducted in a much more transparent 
manner than common law proceedings. All information that is collected during the 
investigation is compiled in a dossier that is accessible to all. The defence has a right 
to inspect and challenge the dossier for incompleteness.403 The defence can do that 
before the prosecutor, investigative judge or the court. The defence can also ask that 
missing materials be added to the dossier, which can in principle not be denied. 
Information can only be withheld from the defendant where a concrete interest of the 
investigation so requires.404
 
  
The transparency of the proceedings is, however, undermined where necessary to 
protect witnesses. Many civil law jurisdictions allow the use of witnesses whose 
identities are not disclosed to the defence.405
                                                 
403 In France and Belgium, the right of the defence to inspect the dossier during the investigative stage 
has been introduced by laws of 4 January and 24 August 1993 under influence of the European Court 
of Human Rights (Lamy v. Belgium, Judgment of 30 March 1989, 1989 ECHR). In addition, Article 
281 of the French Code Procédure Pénale establishes a compulsory disclosure for all parties ‘as early 
as possible’ and in any case at least 24 hours before the start of trial. 
 The European Court of Human Rights 
(“ECHR”) has accepted that, under circumstances, granting anonymity may be 
404 See, for instance, the Dutch case: Dutch Supreme Court: Hoge Raad (HR), 26 May 1987, 
Nederlandse Jurisprudentie (NJ) 1988, 177, stating the principle of full disclosure of all materials in 
and outside the dossier upon request of the defence. Art. 30(1) sets out the materials to which the 
defendant must have access. Art. 30(2) of the Dutch CCP sets out the exception of a concrete 
investigative interest. Such interest may include the protection of prosecution sources. See Beijer, 
Bewijs, supra note 130, 34.1.5 Composition of the ‘Dossier’. For France, see Arts. 2bis and 114 of the 
French CPP (le secret de l’enquête et de l’instruction) defence counsel has a right to have access to all 
confidential materials but he must respect the secrecy of the criminal investigations. Counsel may 
make photocopies of the files for the accused unless the investigative judge considers that such 
disclosure would create a risk that pressure be put on victims, persons being examined or their counsel, 
witnesses, investigators, experts or other persons connected with the criminal proceedings. In those 
circumstances, access of the accused to confidential material can be denied, provided that the 
investigative judge gives explicit written reasons for such denial within five days. This denial is subject 
to appeal with the president of the Chamber of investigations. (Art. 114 CCP; 
<http://archives.cnb.avocat.fr/VieDuConseil/VDC_dossierspublications_rin.php>).  
405 See for instance, the Netherlands, Arts. 226(a)-(d) and 344a(2) CCP. See further Cleiren & Nijboer, 
Strafvordering, supra note 165, Boek II, Titel III, Afd 4A, Arts 226a-f (Van der Meij) 865-881; 
Nijboer, Strafrechtelijk Bewijsrecht, supra note 160, 178-182; A. van Hoorn & E. De Wet 
getuigenbescherming – een uitzonderlijke regeling (1996); Beijer, Bewijs, supra note 130, 34.2.10: 
Anonymous Declarations. See further Russia, where anonymous statements may be admitted, provided 
that the specific procedural rules concerning the admission of such statements are met, requiring 
documentation and authentication. See further Butler, Russian Law, supra note 125, 272. The 
European Court of Human Rights has allowed this practice provided that a finding of guilt is not solely 
or primarily based on the testimony of anonymous witnesses.  
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necessary to protect the safety of a witness.406 However, this is permissible only if the 
defence is offered full counterweight to offset the prejudice caused by such use. A 
finding of guilt cannot be based solely on anonymous witnesses.407
 
 The triers of facts 
are always aware of the identities of the witnesses. 
In common law jurisdictions, the defence is entitled to full pre-trial disclosure of any 
incriminating evidence the prosecutor intends to use at trial. Only in exceptional 
circumstances can information be withheld from the defence. In the United Kingdom 
non-disclosure to the defence is increasingly acceptable. Since 2008, the use of 
anonymous witnesses is even permitted in exceptional circumstances.408 The defence 
is further in possession of its own evidence, as well as the exonerating evidence 
collected and disclosed by the prosecution.409
 
 The triers of fact, on the other hand, are 
not in possession of any evidence, unless one of the parties adduces it in court.  
The judges’ reasoning in reaching their factual findings is transparent. Each step in 
the evaluation process is described and justified in a written public verdict. This 
ensures that judges rely on reliable and relevant evidence only in their ultimate 
findings of fact. A reasoned verdict also creates precedent. By contrast, jurors 
deliberate freely and reach a conclusion in full independence of rules or precedent 
without disclosure of their thought process.410
                                                 
406 Doorson v. The Netherlands, Judgment of 26 March 1996, 1996 ECHR. 
 Apart from giving the jury an 
appropriate warning as to the reliability of the evidence that was admitted, the judge 
407 Kostovski v. The Netherlands, Judgment of 20 November 1989, 1989 ECHR (Ser. A.) 166; Van 
Mechelen & Ors v. The Netherlands, Judgment of 23 April 1997, 1997 ECHR; Visser v. The 
Netherlands, Judgment of 14 February 2002, 2002 ECHR. 
408 See R v Davis [2008] UKHL 36; [2008] AC 1128; R v Horncastle & Ors [2009] UKSC 14. 
Parliament even amended the common law principle that the defendant has a right to confront his 
accuser directly. In 2008, it adopted the Criminal Evidence (Witness Anonymity) Act pursuant to 
which witness anonymity is allowed subject to certain conditions. See also: 
http://www.cps.gov.uk/publications/directors_guidance/witness_anonymity.html. The UK is said to 
have gone even further than the European Court of Human Rights permits in accepting criminal 
liability solely on the basis of anonymous witnesses. For further commentaries, see: 
http://ukscblog.com/reflections-on-horncastle.  
409 Sprack, Criminal Procedure, supra note 356, paras. 9.13-9.15. 
410 Frank, Courts on Trial, supra note 38, 123: “To my mind a better instrument than the usual jury trial 
could scarcely be imagined for achieving uncertainty, capriciousness, lack of uniformity, disregard of 
the R’s, and unpredictability of decisions.” Frank further states: “Yet little, practically, is done to 
ensure that these officials, jurymen, “act upon principles and not according to arbitrary will,” or to put 
effective restraints upon their worst prejudices. Indeed, through the general verdict, coupled with the 
refusal of the courts to inquire into the way the jurors have reached their decisions, everything is 
properly conducted according to the procedural rules, the jurors’ decision may be as arbitrary as they 
please; in such circumstances, their discretion becomes wholly unregulated and unreviewable.” (132) 
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has no say in the adjudication of the facts.411 This is to ensure that the triers of fact 
make findings based solely on what they consider to be accurate in light of the 
evidence presented in the case. However, it gives the jury an uncontrollable and 
incorrigible power.412
 
  
Thus, civil law proceedings are clearly more transparent to the triers of fact, but are 
generally less transparent to the accused and the public if required to protect the 
identity of witnesses. 
 
Democratic, open and fair procedure 
It is often assumed that the common law adversarial procedure is more democratic, 
open and fair to the accused. Part I already established that common law criminal 
justice systems focus more on fairness and equality between the two parties than on 
the ascertainment of the truth. Trial by the defendant’s peers is also perceived as more 
democratic than trial by professional judges.
Common Law Systems 
413
 
 
However, in terms of equality of arms, the prosecution has a clear advantage over the 
defendant because it has the massive resources of the state to rely on for 
investigations. The defendant has only his counsel and such resources as can be 
bargained for from limited legal aid funds. Unlike in continental Europe, there is no 
                                                 
411 Murphy, Evidence, Proof, and Facts, supra note 137, 5-6. 
412 Frank, Courts on Trial, supra note 38, 112-113. 
413 Traditionally, democracy and a jury system go hand in hand together. The word democracy stems 
from the Greek words ‘demos’ and ‘kratein’: ‘the people govern’. Democracy is the will of the people. 
The purest form was implemented in the Greek city Athens around 500 BC. Ordinary citizens carried 
out both legislative and judiciary tasks. Judgments were issued by a large jury instead of an educated 
elite. A jury of one’s peers was an important component of the Athens democracy. On the issue of 
democracy, Pericles held: ‘Our constitution is called a democracy because power is in the hands not of 
a minority but of the whole people. When it is a question of settling private disputes, everyone is equal 
before the law; when it is a question of putting one person before another in positions of public 
responsibility, what counts is not membership of a particular class, but the actual ability which the man 
possesses. (…) We give our obedience to those whom we put in positions of authority, and we obey the 
laws themselves, especially those which are for the protection of the oppressed, and those unwritten 
laws which it is an acknowledged shame to break.” Cited in D. Held, Models of Democracy 
(Cambridge, 1987), 16-17. See also J. van den Berg, Th. L. Bellekom, H.M. Th. D. ten Napel, E. M. 
Peeters, Inleiding Staatkunde (Deventer: Kluwer, 1995), Chapter 2 (Democracy, M.J. Trapenburg) 41-
60, particularly 45-47; Brants & Field, Convergence, supra note 23, 182-183. 
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judicial officer involved in the criminal investigations to whom the defendant may 
address himself for assistance.414
 
 
Judges do not participate in the investigations or in the adversarial contest between 
the parties at trial. They cannot intervene to correct errors or technical choices of a 
party, even if they clearly damage the position of that party. If, for instance, defence 
counsel fails to produce a credible and available alibi witness, there is nothing a judge 
can do to assist the defendant. A judge may, in the absence of the jury, question the 
parties’ advocates (particularly the prosecution) as to why particular witnesses are, or 
are not being called. If, however, they were to enter into the arena and effectively 
steer the case in one direction or another by the introduction of evidential material 
against the wishes of the parties an appeal on grounds of partiality would be 
inevitable, and its success likely.415
 
 Thus, the defendant’s fate is largely dependent on 
the competence of his counsel. 
The parties however, have different roles. The prosecution brings a case against the 
defendant. If he so wishes and considers it necessary, the defendant may challenge the 
case against him by calling witnesses and presenting evidence of his own. He may 
simply suggest that the prosecution evidence is insufficient. To win its case, the price 
of which would be the conviction of the defendant, the prosecution must convince the 
triers of fact beyond reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty. The defendant on 
the other hand bears no burden of proof at all, unless otherwise stated in the law or he 
presents an alibi or other positive defence. In such cases, the defendant would be 
required to produce some evidence in support of his assertion.416
                                                 
414 See M. Delmas-Marty & J. Spencer (Eds.), European Criminal Procedures (Cambridge University 
Press, 2002), 168-169. 
 In every other way, 
his active participation in the process of presenting evidence is optional and he is 
415 Ibid, 181-182. 
416 A burden can be placed on the defendant by virtue of common law or statutory law. Where the 
Defence raises the defence of insanity or diminished responsibility, it has the burden to persuade the 
jury that it is more likely than not that the defendant’s contention is true. This is referred to as the 
standard of proof on the balance of probability. Regarding this standard, Lord Denning held in Miller 
v. Ministry of Pensions [1947] 2 All ER 372: “It must carry a reasonable degree of probability….If the 
evidence is such that the tribunal can say: “we think it more probable than not”, the burden is 
discharged, but if the probabilities are equal, it is not.” It has been suggested that such burdens on the 
defence violate the presumption of innocence as set out in R v. Lambert [2002] 2 AC 545. See further: 
Kiralfy, The Burden of Proof, supra note 164; P. Murphy, Murphy on Evidence (10th Ed.) (Oxford 
University Press, 2007), 74-100. 
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presumed innocent until proven guilty. This is a fundamental element of a fair trial.417 
If there is anything less than a perfectly convincing performance by the prosecution, 
the defendant wins.418
 
  
Civil law criminal justice systems are often described as hierarchical and bureaucratic 
in light of their professional judiciary and centralised investigations.
Civil Law Systems 
419 It is also 
sometimes suggested that civil law jurisdictions prioritise the ascertainment of the 
truth at the expense of the fairness of the proceedings.420
 
 
However, the important role played by professional judges in civil law criminal 
proceedings is frequently associated too strongly and negatively with excessive 
bureaucracy, and inquisitorial proceedings.421 Whilst historically, this may have been 
true, it no longer is. In medieval times, criminal investigations were entirely secretive 
and conducted proprio motu by an investigator without any involvement of the 
identified suspect. Upon completion of the investigations, the investigator would 
submit an official dossier (acta inquisitionis) to a court. The court would then 
examine the contents of the dossier. It would determine, solely or primarily on the 
basis of this dossier, whether the accused was guilty or not. This would occur with or 
without having communicated with him or counsel acting on his behalf.422 Torture 
was used routinely in cases where an accused refused to confess and there was 
insufficient other evidence available.423
                                                 
417 Murphy, Murphy on Evidence, supra note 411, 81; R v. Lambert [2002] 2 AC 545, para. 33. 
  
418 This was spelled out in the famous case of Woolmington v DPP [1935] AC 462, per Viscount 
Sankey LC (at 481-2): “Throughout the web of the English criminal law one golden thread is always to 
be seen, that is the duty of the prosecution to prove the prisoner’s guilt. … If, at the end of and on the 
whole of the case, there is a doubt, created by the evidence given by either the prosecution or the 
prisoner, as to whether the prisoner killed the deceased with a malicious intention, the prosecution has 
not made out the case and the prisoner is entitled to an acquittal. No matter what the charge or where 
the trial, the principle that the prosecution must prove the guilt of the prisoner is part of the common 
law of England and no attempt to whittle it down can be entertained.” 
419 Jackson & Langer, Introduction: Damaška and Comparative Law, supra note 28, 1, 3-6.  
420 Damaška, Evidentiary Barriers, supra note 30, 588-589; Cleiren and Nijboer, Strafvordering, Text 
en Commentaar (n 58 above), De verdachte, Boek I, Titel II, Art. 29 (Spronken), 80–81; Pompe, 
Bewijs in Strafzaken, supra note 153, 38–42. 
421 Bohlander, Basic Concepts of German Criminal Procedure, supra note 123, 52. 
422 Damaška, Evidentiary Barriers, supra note 30, 556–7, 560.  
423 Ibid. In accordance with Roman law, torture was not allowed if there already was sufficient 
evidence to prove the defendant’s guilt, or if there was insufficient ground to believe that the accused 
was guilty as charged. However, in practice, torture was used frequently in cases where sufficient other 
evidence was available to prove the defendant’s guilt. There was an urge for a confession even if there 
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In the beginning of the nineteenth century, following the French revolution, this so-
called ‘inquisitorial’ mode of proceeding, which was applied in most of continental 
Europe, was abolished.424 Since that time, significant amendments have been 
introduced into the civil law criminal justice systems which set clear boundaries to the 
unlimited and secretive criminal proceedings previously in place. Particularly Italy 
and Germany have departed rigorously from their inquisitorial past.425 Everywhere in 
continental Europe, whilst the investigation still has somewhat of an inquisitorial 
character, the trial itself has become rather adversarial.426
                                                                                                                                           
was overwhelming evidence because: (1) corporal punishment or the death penalty could only be 
imposed if the accused made a confession; (2) in the event that the accused confessed, he lost his right 
to appeal. As Van de Vrugt observed, torture as a tool of truth-finding is dubious at best and 
demonstrates a complete negation of the suspect as an equal subject of the law. There was criticism 
against the use of torture but most courts continued to allow it for a long time because no alternative 
was available to them to discover the truth. There was a firm belief that torturing an accused in order to 
obtain a confession was an effective means of truth-finding and when this was abolished, there was 
nothing to replace it. One had little faith in witness testimony. Thus, it was a difficult practice to 
abolish this custom. See M. Van de Vrugt, De Criminele Ordonnantiën van 1570: enkele 
beschouwingen over de eerste strafrechtcodificatie in de Nederlanden (De Walburg Pers, Zutphen, 
1978), 141-148; J. van den Berg, Th. L. Bellekom, H.M. Th. D. ten Napel, E. M. Peeters, Inleiding 
Staatkunde (Deventer: Kluwer, 1995), 70-71, 77-78; Bemmelen, Strafvordering, supra note 317, 70–
71, 78–80; A. J. van Weel (Nijmegen), ‘De Nasleep van de Afschaffing van de Pijnbank, in Verslagen 
en mededeelingen van de Vereeniging tot uitgaaf der bronnen van het oud-vaderlansche recht’, 14, 2 
(1975) 355–367. 
 In addition, principles of 
fairness to the accused have increasingly become of paramount importance in 
criminal justice. Such principles are codified in domestic constitutions as well as 
424 For many of those systems, the Code d’Instruction Criminelle (1808) introduced by Napoleon 
served as a model. Torture and other types of pain infliction were abolished. Also less degrading forms 
of asserting pressure on someone to speak or cooperate were banned. In most continental European 
systems, torture was already banned prior to the introduction of the Code d’Instruction Criminelle. In 
practice, however, torture or other types of pain infliction were still carried out. The Code d’Instruction 
Criminelle adopted in 1808 terminated any possibility of inflicting pain. Pursuant to this Code, the 
suspect did not have an obligation to answer questions and a judge could only through persuasion 
attempt to convince the suspect to confess. See Weel, Afschaffing van Pijnbank, supra note 423; 
Bemmelen, Strafvordering, supra note 317. 
425 The German system has sometimes been described as an accusatorial system, in which the 
prosecutor charges, the parties are responsible for presenting evidence and the judge decides on 
innocence or guilt. As stated earlier, unlike most other civil law systems, Germany has abolished the 
investigative judge. The trial also tends to be more adversarial than in other civil law jurisdictions in 
that most witnesses testify viva voce. Some observers have expressed concern that Germany is going 
too far in copying elements from the American adversarial system. See, for instance, Malek, Abschied 
von der Wahrheitssuch, supra note 128, 11-13. In essence, however, Germany is still similar to other 
civil law criminal justice systems where the judge plays a significant role in taking evidence and has a 
great flexibility to admit any type of evidence deemed reliable and relevant. See G. Fletcher & S. 
Sheppard, American Law in a Global Context (Oxford University Press, 2005), 532; Wang, Criminal 
Justice System in Germany, supra note 322. Italy, on the other hand, has really departed from the 
inquisitorial method. See further M. Costi: ‘Italy’, 80-92, in Buisman, Civil Law, in Khan, Principles of 
Evidence, supra note 25. 
426 See for instance, the Netherlands, in Beijer, Bewijs, supra note 130, 34.1.4 Strategy of the Accused 
and Counsel); Cleiren & Nijboer, Strafvordering, supra note 165, De verdachte, Boek I, Titel II, Art. 
29 (Spronken) 65. 
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applicable human rights treaties, most importantly, the European Convention on 
Human Rights (“ECHR”).427
 
  
The right to be tried without undue delay and the right not to incriminate oneself limit 
the scope of criminal proceedings. A defendant is further entitled to be informed of 
the charges against him, review and challenge the prosecution’s evidence and present 
his own evidence. Most civil law jurisdictions have sought to balance the different 
interests at stake to ensure that “truth-finding is not only lawful and effective, but that 
the process is fair and the exercise of state power legitimate”.428 Only if proceedings 
are fair can the truth be safely ascertained.429 In this regard, a German court held that 
the decision whether to exclude evidence is partly based on the consideration ‘‘that 
the truth cannot be ascertained at all costs.’’430
 
  
The prosecutor does not have a strict burden of proof as in common law jurisdictions. 
The judges can fill in the gaps.431 However, the defence has no burden to produce 
evidence favourable to the defendant or even to raise objections where the interests of 
the defence are at stake.432 Where it fails to do either, judges may intervene to protect 
the rights of the defendant and order, proprio motu, additional investigations in order 
to complement the evidence favourable to the defendant.433
 
  
To safeguard the fairness of the proceedings, the defendant, assisted by counsel, is 
given a voice, which he can use at any time he wishes and this voice is heard.434
                                                 
427 Given these alterations, distinguished comparative scholars like Damaška consider it unfair to refer 
to modern civil law criminal proceedings as inquisitorial given its association with the unfair medieval 
criminal proceedings as described above. See Damaška, Evidentiary Barriers, supra note 30, 555, 562. 
 The 
defendant can make unsworn statements, but he cannot give evidence or perjure 
428 Brants & Field, Convergence, supra note 23, 183. 
429 Delmas-Marty, Procédure Pénale d’Europe, supra note 23; ‘t Hart: Openbaar Ministerie, supra note 
286, 167-232. This corresponds with the view of Judge Cotte, a French Judge at the ICC, holding that 
the only objective of criminal justice is the manifestation of the truth, but that this objective can be 
achieved only by ensuring that the substantive debates take place in a fair way. See Prosecutor v. 
Katanga & Ngudjolo, T. 25 May 2010, 40. 
430 Decision of the German Supreme Court (Bundesgerichtshof ): BGH St 38, 372 (373-374). 
431 Kokott, Burden of Proof, supra note 157, 9. 
432 This is, however, ill adviced. Guidance books suggest to counsel to advice their clients to play a 
more active role. See for instance, the Netherlands, in Beijer, Bewijs, supra note 130, 34.1.4 Strategy of 
the Accused and Counsel). 
433 Beijer, Bewijs, supra note 130, 34.1.4 Strategy of the Accused and Counsel. 
434 Damaška, Evidentiary Barriers, supra note 30, 558-9, 561 Beijer, Bewijs, supra note 130, 34.1.4 
Strategy of the Accused and Counsel; Bohlander, Radbruch Redux, supra note 123, at 397. 
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himself. Judges can ask him direct questions without him taking the oath. The 
defendant has the choice to answer or not to answer such questions.435
 
  
The trial itself is fully transparent and open. It is based on the adversarial principle, 
pursuant to which triers of fact and law must hear both parties before arriving at a 
decision. They are also required to give reasons in support of their decision, “and they 
must do so solely on the basis of legal and factual arguments free of personal bias so 
that the judgment will appear impartial.”436
 
 
Everyone involved in the truth inquiry is bound by the law. In gathering evidence, the 
police and prosecutors cannot exceed their powers explicitly granted by the law. They 
are bound by principles of legal certainty and legality. Judges are similarly bound by 
such principles, which prevents them from creating new legal norms. This ensures 
that the parties to the criminal trial have advance notice of the criteria guiding the 
decisions.437
 
 
Accordingly, in both types of criminal justice, fairness is of paramount importance, 
the trial is open and adversarial, and the defendant is given a voice.  
 
Conclusion 
 
In conclusion, both the common law and civil law methods meet the minimum 
conditions of an effective truth-ascertaining system as identified in Part I. It appears 
that the civil law method includes more features required to reconstruct a full and 
transparent picture of events painted with the assistance of everyone concerned 
including the victims. Thus, in theory, this method offers greater opportunities to 
work towards the restorative objectives of international justice.  
                                                 
435 Ibid. In some jurisdictions, such as the Netherlands, a choice to remain silent or tell an obvious lie 
may in certain circumstances be used against the defendant. See, for instance, Art. 286(4) of the Dutch 
CCP, and the Supreme Court’s decisions: HR 15 June 2004, NJ 2004, 464; HR 24 March 1987, NJ 
1987, 893; HR 8 June 1993, DD 93.469; HR 28 May 1996, DD 96.317. See further: Beijer, Bewijs, 
supra note 130, 34.2.3 Interrogation of the Accused; Nijboer, Strafrechtelijk Bewijsrecht, supra note 
160, 219-224; E. Jessurun d’Olivier-Prakken, ‘Bewijs als toetssteen van strafrecht’ (Recht, macht en 
manipulatie (Kempe bundle, Utrecht/Antwerpen 1976), 20; G.J.M. Corstens, Het Nederlands 
Strafprocesrecht, (Deventer Kluwer 2008, 6th edition) 667-668.  
436 Guarnieri & Pederzoli, Power of Judges, supra note 158, 10–11. 
437 Ibid. However, in interpreting the law, some judicial creativity is not only allowed but also desired 
(5). 
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Both types of procedure, however, have their strengths and weaknesses in seeking to 
achieve accurate results. Civil law jurisdictions allow the triers of fact to review all 
evidence, including unreliable evidence that should not be relied on for any of the 
findings. Yet, their triers of fact are judicially trained and are, therefore, at least in 
theory able to separate reliable from unreliable information. As a safeguard against 
erroneous factual findings, they must offer an explanation of their findings, which is 
appealable. Common law systems do not require the triers of fact to explain their 
findings. However, they seek to ensure that the triers of fact can only base their 
findings on relevant and reliable evidence.  
 
It is therefore apparent that the salient factors of the two types of procedure are 
interrelated and interdependent. The totality of these ingredients works as a system. It 
remains to be seen whether these same ingredients still work as a system if they are 
torn apart and mixed with other ingredients in a new procedure.438
 
 
The ultimate accuracy of the outcome in individual cases depends on the people 
involved in the process, as well as the political climate in a country. In civil law 
jurisdictions, a defendant is particularly dependent on the openness of the judge. In 
common law jurisdictions, a defendant predominantly depends on the diligence and 
vigilance of his counsel.439 The overall quality of justice depends on all parties, 
participants and triers of fact and law involved. Their freedom to act in accordance 
with legal principles depends strongly on their political independence. For instance, a 
judge may be less inclined to acquit if that would ruin his career.440
 
 
Even in democratic countries, things go wrong in both types of criminal justice. 
Miscarriages of justice have been brought to light in both common law and civil law 
                                                 
438 See R. Haveman: The Context of the Law, in: R. Haveman, O. Kavran & J. Nicholls (Eds.), 
Supranational Criminal Law: a System Sui Generis (Intersentia, 2003), 9, at 35-36. Also E. van 
Sliedregt, Introduction: Common Civility – International Criminal Law as Cultural Hybrid, 24 Leiden 
Journal of International Law 389 (2011), 389. 
439 Kokott, Burden of Proof, supra note 157, 1. 
440 This fear led the Supreme Court of the Netherlands to collaborate with the German regime during 
the occupation in World War II. Its impartiality and independence were thereby compromised. See J. 
van den Berg, Th. L. Bellekom, H.M. Th. D. ten Napel, E. M. Peeters, Inleiding Staatkunde (Deventer: 
Kluwer, 1995), Chapter 19: ‘De rechterlijke macht” J.Th.J van den Berg, H.-M.Th.D. ten Napel pages 
389-406. 
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procedures.441 It is impossible to determine which method is safer in obtaining 
accurate results, as it is unknown how often miscarriages of justice have gone 
unnoticed. In addition, when miscarriages of justice are referred to, they tend not to 
include wrongful acquittals.442
 
 
The reality of criminal justice is not necessarily in accordance with its theory. Each 
criminal justice system is fallible. In individual cases, fair trial principles are not 
always duly respected, and the triers of fact may be biased. Research has 
demonstrated that miscarriages of justice increase where the cases are higher 
profile.443 When crimes stir up a public outrage and condemnation, mistakes are made 
more regularly. This increases where crimes are hard to prove because they are 
committed by the mafia, a terrorist organisation or other organised crime group. 
Placed under pressure to collect sufficient quality evidence for a conviction, 
overzealous police officers or prosecutors are more inclined to use unlawful methods 
to obtain evidence and secure convictions.444
                                                 
441 See, for instance, the Dutch case Schiedammer parkmoord, which concerned a miscarriage of justice 
caused by the confession of innocent suspects. See further P. J. van Koppen, De Schiedammer 
parkmoord; een rechtspsychologische reconstructive (Nijmegen: Ars Aequi Libri, 2003; Evaluation 
report of the Commission Posthumus in the Schiedammer park-moord, 13 September 2005, 172). As 
for France, examples of miscarriages of justice are given in: Bouazdi, ‘France’, in Buisman, Civil Law, 
in Khan, Principles of Evidence, supra note 25. In the UK, the most well-known miscarriages of justice 
concerned trials involving Northern Irish terrorist suspects. See, for instance, the Birmingham Six, 
Maguire Seven, and Guildford Four, which led to public outrage. See further: Armytage, Educating 
Judges, supra note 313, (Sir Dorabji Tata Memorial Lecture, delivered under auspices of Sir Dorabji 
Tata Trust in New Delhi, 5 January 1999 and in Mumbai on 6 January 1999), 274-275. 
 Ambitious investigators may also be too 
442 See, for instance, C. Walker & K. Starmer (Eds.), Miscarriages of Justice (Oxford University Press, 
1999), Chapter 2. See also Armytage, Educating Judges, supra note 313, 259: “I suppose a purist 
might argue that a miscarriage of justice occurs as much when a guilty man is acquitted as when an 
innocent man is convicted. It is not, however, the acquittal of the guilty which on the whole gives rise 
to public disquiet, and the occasional acquittal of guilty defendants is, I think, generally accepted as the 
price which has to be paid for observance of the beneficial principle that the defendant shall enjoy the 
benefit of any doubt.”  
443 See supra note 441. In respect of the Irish terrorist cases, most notably the Birmingham Six, 
Guildford Four, and Maguire Seven, it was held that “[t]here is a widespread reaction of public 
outrage. The situation is fraught with difficulty, because the responsible police forces come under the 
strongest pressure to bring the perpetrators of such atrocities to justice and jurors would be less than 
human if, despite the strongest judicial warnings, they were not tempted to reflect the sense of outrage 
felt by the community as a whole” (Armytage, Educating Judges, Ch VII ‘The English Criminal Trial: 
The Credits and the Debits’, 252, at 262. See also Pompe, Bewijs in Strafzaken, supra note 153, 49-50. 
444 For instance Malone v. United Kingdom, Judgment of 2 August 1984, 1984 ECHR (Ser. A.) 82; 
Schenk v. Switzerland, Judgment of 12 July 1988, 1988 ECHR (Ser. A.) 140; Unterpertinger v. Austria, 
Judgment of 24 November 1986, 1986 ECHR (Ser. A.) 110; Barbera, Messegué & Jabardo v. Spain, 
Judgment of 6 December 1988, 1988 ECHR (Ser. A.) 146; Kostovski v. The Netherlands, Judgment of 
20 November 1989, 1989 ECHR (Ser. A.) 166; Delta v. France, Judgment of 19 December 1990, 1991 
ECHR (Ser. A.) 191, para. 35; Lüdi v. Switzerland, Judgment of 15 June 1992, 1992 ECHR (Ser. A.) 
238; Saïdi v. France, Judgment of 20 September 1993, 1993 ECHR (Ser. A.) 261. 
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fixated on guilt and, therefore, turn a blind eye to evidentiary leads suggesting 
otherwise.445
 
  
The media closely follows high profile cases and often condemns the alleged 
perpetrator before he has had a chance to defend himself in a court of law. Adverse 
pre-trial media may influence triers of fact. One only has to think of the extreme 
public reactions provoked by cases involving paedophilia or rape, as was recently 
demonstrated in the case of Dominique Strauss-Kahn. The American media 
thoroughly condemned him for raping a hotel employee in New York. The 
prosecution then withdrew the case against him, as it had lost faith in its only 
witness.446 Others were less lucky. In the United Kingdom, a number of Northern 
Irish “terrorists” were erroneously convicted.447  Many “terrorists” have been held by 
the US for years on vague or non-existing charges in an extrajudicial detention camp 
at Guantánamo Bay.448
 
 
These are a few examples to demonstrate that the quality of justice is often 
determined by extra-judicial factors, rather than the criminal justice model which is in 
place. When a miscarriage of justice is identified in a democratic society, usually a 
strong public reaction follows resulting in amendments to the law. In other words, a 
system has a tendency to rectify itself over time and address deficiencies that come to 
light.449
 
  
                                                 
445 In the Netherlands, a blind focus on the guilt of the accused at the exclusion of alternative options 
has been referred to as a tunnel vision (‘koker visie’). The prosecution has frequently been accused of 
applying a tunnel vision which has led to serious errors. See Wagenaar, Vincent plast op de grond, 
supra note 129, 15-17, 30-49, 62-72, 223-225. 
446 http://www.courts.state.ny.us/whatsnew/pdf/dsk_motion_to_dismiss.pdf; 
http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2011/08/22/nyregion/dsk-recommendation-to-dismiss-case.html  
447 See supra note 441. 
448 See, for instance, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Guantanamo_Bay_detention_camp  
449 For instance, in the UK, a Court of Appeal was established in 1907 as a reaction to public concerns 
expressed in respect of the criminal justice system following the case of Mr. Adolf Beck who had been 
wrongfully identified by fifteen honest witnesses. In 1985, a Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) was 
established as a response to criticism with regard to police misconduct, which had resulted in 
miscarriages of justice. See Uglow, Criminal Justice, supra note 138, 177, 180-181, 191; Armytage, 
Educating Judges, supra note 313, 259. In France, reforms were proposed following the Outreau case 
scandal. A Parlimentary Commission investigated the case and drafted a report with recommendation 
to amend the French criminal procedure in order to avoid any repetition at: <http://www.assemblee-
nationale.fr/12/  
dossiers/outreau_aﬀ aire_dysfonctionnements_justice.asp>.   
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Thus, the civil and common law domestic jurisdictions experienced a progression 
steeped in tradition and fashioned over centuries through trial and error. Procedural 
changes that have occurred in this process corresponded with the contemporaneous 
political climate. Legal structures cannot be separated from societal norms, structures 
and culture as developed over time.450
 
  
The more recently formed international criminal court and tribunals did not undergo 
the same historical development. The crimes under the jurisdiction of international 
criminal courts and tribunals are of the worst kind and attract wide public attention. 
Part I has described the ambitious goals international courts and tribunals have set for 
themselves, and the urge felt to do justice to the victims. Many of the accused before 
international tribunals are extremely high profile and have been condemned in the 
media long time before they are brought to justice.451
 
 
In such circumstances, a strong judicial system is needed to withstand the political 
pressure and manipulation from all sides. It is therefore all the more important that the 
international criminal justice model meets the conditions, which have been identified 
in Part I. It has already been pointed out that, at least in theory, the civil law and 
common law criminal procedures both meet the minimum conditions set out in Part I. 
Now, it will be considered whether the combination of the two into the ICTY, ICTR 
and ICC criminal proceedings still meets these conditions.  
 
From the start, the union of civil and common law legal principles had deep tensions 
within it. The international criminal justice systems mix a powerful judiciary 
controlling the conduct of the proceedings with autonomous, independent parties.
Combination of civil law and common law methodologies 
452
 
  
                                                 
450 Jackson & Langer, Introduction: Damaška and Comparative Law, supra note 28, 1, at 3-6. 
451 See above, section ‘Expressed Reservations on Establishing Historical Facts’. 
452 For an analysis of the main features of the two systems and their interaction in international 
jurisdictions, see Vladimir Tochilovsky, Rules of Procedure for the International Criminal Court: 
Problems to Address in Light of the Experience of the ad hoc Tribunals (1999) 46 Netherlands 
International Law Review 343; and V. Tochilovsky, ‘Legal Systems and Cultures in the International 
Criminal Court: The Experience from the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia’ 
in Horst Fischer Horst Fischer, Claus Kress and Sascha Rolf Lüder (eds), International and National 
Prosecution of Crimes Under International Law (Berlin Verlag Arno Spitz, 2001) 627. 
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Investigations and Charging Suspects 
The roles of the parties as described in the Statute and the Rules are based on 
common law. The parties may choose their own strategy and conduct their own 
independent investigations. The Prosecutor is responsible for conducting 
investigations, identifying suspects of crimes falling within the jurisdiction of the 
tribunal and bringing charges against them.453 The defence is responsible for 
gathering evidence in support of the defendant’s case. If the defence faces difficulties, 
for instance because it has been refused access to material essential for the preparation 
of a defence, and it has done all within its means to obtain this material, it may call 
upon the Chamber for assistance.454
 
  
There is no investigative judge or any similar body, and in the ICTY and ICTR, the 
judiciary is not ascribed any investigative role. The ICC, on the other hand, has a Pre-
Trial Chamber, consisting of three judges.455 The Pre-Trial Chamber has multiple 
tasks and is actively involved in the management of the pre-confirmation and 
confirmation phases. It has the task to oversee the fairness of the pre-trial proceedings 
and ensure that there is compliance with the pre-confirmation disclosure obligations. 
However, its role is not comparable to the role of an investigative judge. The Pre-
Trial Chamber has no investigative powers, except in situations where a unique 
investigative opportunity arises. In such a situation, pursuant to Article 56(1)(b) of the 
ICC Statute, the Pre-Trial Chamber may, “upon request of the Prosecutor, take such 
measures as may be necessary to ensure the efficiency and integrity of the 
proceedings and, in particular, to protect the rights of the defence.”456
                                                 
453 Art 16(1) ICTY Statute; Art 15(1) ICTR Statute. 
  
454 ICTY/ICTR Rule 54; Part IX of the ICC Statute. In certain circumstances, a Chamber may order the 
prosecution to obtain certain documents for the defence pursuant to Rule 89 even if the Defence made 
no efforts to obtain such documents. However, in general, a Chamber would only make such an order 
where the Defence has made its own independent efforts “to secure evidence it wishes to use at trial 
other than exculpatory material in the possession of the Prosecution.” (Prosecutor v. Simba, Decision 
on Defence Motion to Obtain Judicial Records Pursuant to Rule 68, ICTR-2001-76-T, 4 October 2004, 
para. 11). 
455 Rome Statute, supra note 44, Art. 56. 
456 In accordance with Article 56(2), such measures may include “(a) Making recommendations or 
orders regarding procedures to be followed; (b) Directing that a record be made of the proceedings; (c) 
Appointing an expert to assist; (d) Authorizing counsel for a person who has been arrested, or appeared 
before the Court in response to a summons, to participate, or where there has not yet been such an 
arrest or appearance or counsel has not been designated, appointing another counsel to attend and 
represent the interests of the defence; (e) Naming one of its members or, if necessary, another available 
judge of the Pre-Trial or Trial Division to observe and make recommendations or orders regarding the 
collection and preservation of evidence and the questioning of persons; (f) Taking such other action as 
may be necessary to collect or preserve evidence.” 
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Where the Prosecutor fails to take such measures without good reason and after 
consultation with him, the Pre-Trial Chamber may take such measures proprio motu if 
necessary to preserve evidence (Article 56(3) ICC Statute). However, this power can 
be exercised in exceptional situations only and, thus, constitutes a limited 
investigative power. 
 
In the ICTY and ICTR, a judge is charged with confirming charging documents and 
issuing arrest warrants provided it is satisfied that the Prosecutor has established a 
prima facie case against an identified suspect of crimes under the jurisdiction of the 
tribunal.457 The defence does not participate in this process. In the ICC, on the other 
hand, a confirmation hearing takes place before the Pre-Trial Chamber. This is after 
the Pre-Trial Chamber has determined ex parte that there is a reasonable ground to 
believe that the defendant is guilty as charged and issued a warrant of arrest or a 
summons to appear.458 The defence is entitled to participate actively in the 
confirmation hearing and challenge the charges. Both parties are entitled to submit 
evidence and call live witnesses in this process.459 Counsel representing victims are 
also allowed to participate and make oral and legal submissions.460
 
  
On the basis of all evidence presented, the Pre-Trial Chamber determines whether 
there are substantial grounds to believe that the suspect committed the crimes 
charged. If so satisfied, the Pre-Trial Chamber issues a decision confirming the 
charges. If not so satisfied, it dismisses the charges.461 It can also modify them or the 
mode of liability, in which case it may order a new confirmation hearing.462
                                                 
457 Art 18(4), Art 19(1) and Art 19(2) ICTY Statute; Art 17(4), Art 18(1) and Art 18(2) ICTR Statute. 
At the request of the Prosecutor, the judge may “issue such orders and warrants for the arrest, 
detention, surrender or transfer of persons, and any other orders as may be required for the conduct of 
the trial” (19(2) ICTY Statute; 18(2) ICTR Statute. A duty or reviewing judge is designated for this 
matter pursuant to Rule 28 ICTY/ICTR.  
 
458 In the case of Katanga, the Prosecutor had initially sought his arrest on the basis of ordering the 
crimes charged as the mode of liability. The Single Judge confirmed the warrant of arrest but added 
common plan as an alternative mode of liability. Eventually, the charges against Mr. Katanga and his 
co-accused Mr. Ngudjolo were confirmed only under the common plan mode of liability. See 
Prosecutor v. Katanga, Decision on the evidence and information provided by the Prosecution for the 
issuance of a warrant of arrest for Germain Katanga, 6 July, 2007, ICC-01/04-01/07-4; Prosecutor v. 
Katanga & Ngudjolo, Decision on the confirmation of charges, 30 September 2008, ICC-01/04-01/07-
717.  
459 Rome Statute, supra note 44, Art. 61; ICC Rules of Procedure and Evidence, Rule 121. 
460 See further below, section ‘victim participation’. 
461 See, for instance, Bahar Idriss Abu Garda whose case was not confirmed due to insufficient 
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Disclosure Obligations 
Since June 2006, through amendment of ICTY Rule 73bis the Chamber in the ICTY 
has the power to invite the Prosecutor in advance of the trial to reduce the number of 
counts charged in the indictment (73bis(D)), or direct him to select those on which to 
proceed (73bis(E)). This amendment was in line with a Report produced earlier by the 
Expert Group which made recommendations to transform the party-based proceedings 
into proceedings controlled more tightly by the judges.463
 
 This amendment was not 
adopted by the ICTR, where the Prosecutor is still exclusively responsible for 
charging defendants without judicial intervention, other than the confirmation of the 
indictment. 
Judicial control particularly at the ICTY has also significantly increased in the areas 
of prior disclosure of material to the bench. Initially, disclosure obligations existed 
only vis-à-vis the opposite party, not the Chamber. In line with common law, the 
Chamber was not intended to have information, other than the indictment, prior to the 
start of the trial. The Defence had no disclosure obligation at all other than to give a 
notification of an alibi or other special defence.464 The disclosure regime has changed 
drastically over the years, although it is still a point of dispute between common law 
and civil law jurists.465
 
  
As a result of the adoption of new rules 65ter, 73bis and 73ter in July 1998 for the 
ICTY, and 73bis and 73ter in June 1998 for the ICTR and subsequent amendments, 
the parties are now required to submit to the Court and opposing party a pre-trial 
brief. It addresses the factual and legal issues and is accompanied by a list of 
                                                                                                                                           
evidence to meet the ‘substantial grounds to believe’ standard: Prosecutor v. Bahar Idriss Abu Garda, 
Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, 8 February 2010, ICC-02/05-02/09-243-Red. 
462 This occurred in the Bemba trial: Prosecutor v. Bemba, Decision Pursuant to Article 61(7)(a) and 
(b) of the Rome Statute on the Charges of the Prosecutor Against Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, ICC-
01/05-01/08-424, 15-06-2009. 
463 ‘Statement by Tribunal President Judge Fausto Pocar to the Security Council 7 June 2006’. 
Published in: Tochilovsky, Nature and Evolution of the Rules in: Khan, Principles of Evidence, supra 
note 25, 173-174.  
464 Rules 67(A)(ii)(a) & (b) obligates the defence to notify the prosecution of its intent to offer the 
defence of alibi or any special defence, including that of diminished or lack of mental responsibility; in 
which case the notification shall specify the names and addresses of witnesses and any other evidence 
upon which the accused intends to rely to establish the alibi or special defence.  
465 This was still in dispute during the ICC negotiations. See Tochilovsky, Nature and Evolution of the 
Rules in Khan, Principles of Evidence, supra note 25, 167-169. 
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witnesses and their particulars, summaries and length of their anticipated testimony, 
as well as a list of exhibits upon which the parties intend to rely.466 At the ICTY, the 
pre-trial judge is designated who is in charge of pre-trial proceedings to ensure to 
ensure that the parties meet their disclosure obligations in a timely manner.467 A 
failure for either party to meet any of the deadlines set for disclosure may lead the 
Chamber to impose sanctions such as the exclusion of testimonial or documentary 
evidence.468
 
 The ICTR did not follow this example. 
In advance of the trial, the Prosecutor is obliged to disclose all this information, as 
well as all supporting material which accompanied the indictment, in advance of the 
trial.469 If disclosure has an adverse impact on the safety of the witness or on the 
ongoing investigations, such disclosure may be delayed until such moment that the 
Trial Chamber considers disclosure thereof to the defence necessary to allow adequate 
time for preparation of the defence. The public may never be informed of the 
identities of witnesses whose safety is at risk and be excluded from large portions of 
their testimonies.470
 
   
The Prosecutor must further allow the defence, if so requested, to inspect any 
documents which are material to the preparation of the defence, intended for use by 
the Prosecutor as evidence at trial, or which have been obtained from, or belonged to 
the accused.471 At the ICC, and since March 2008 at the ICTY as well, the defence is 
likewise required to permit the Prosecution to inspect all materials on which it intends 
to rely. This is, however, only the case in the event that the defence decides to present 
a case after the close of the Prosecutor’s case.472 The ICTR did not adopt a similar 
obligation.473
                                                 
466 ICTY Rule 65ter(E) and (G); ICTR Rule 73bis(D) and 73ter(D), adopted in Fifth Plenary Session, 
1-8 June 1998.  
 
467 ICTY Rule 65ter. 
468 ICTY Rule 65ter(N). 
469 ICTY/ICTR Rules 66(A)(i), 66(A)(ii), 67(A)(i). 
470 ICTY/ICTR Rule 69; 75; Article 67(1)(b) ICC Statute; Rules 81(2) & (4) ICC Rules. 
471 ICTY/ICTR Rule 66(B). 
472 Rule 67(A) of the ICTY Rules now provides: “(A) Within the time-limit prescribed by the Trial 
Chamber, at a time not prior to a ruling under Rule 98bis, but not less than one week prior to the 
commencement of the Defence case, the Defence shall: (i) permit the Prosecutor to inspect and copy 
any books, documents, photographs, and tangible objects in the Defence’s custody or control, which 
are intended for use by the Defence as evidence at trial…” Rule 78 of the ICC Rules requires the 
defence to permit inspection of materials intended for use by the defence as evidence at either the 
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The Prosecution further has an obligation to provide to the Chamber the written 
statements of each witness he intends to call to testify.474 Initially, he only had an 
obligation to disclose those statements to the defence. The ICTR Akayesu case was 
the first case where the Prosecutor was ordered to disclose, not only to the defence but 
also to the Chamber, the statements of the witnesses to be called.475 It soon became 
routine in both tribunals and a legal obligation upon the Prosecutor in 1998.476 In 
some cases, in order to acquire complete knowledge of the facts, judges of a civil law 
background would even ask for disclosure of the exculpatory material that had been 
disclosed to the defence.477
 
  
Closer to the commencement of the trial, the defence at the ICTY is obliged to file a 
statement of admitted facts and law and a pre-trial brief addressing factual and legal 
issues, including the nature of the accused’s defence, the contested issues and the 
grounds on which these issues are contested.478 The defence has a similar obligation 
at the ICC.479 In the ICTR, the defence may be ordered to produce a pre-trial brief,480
 
 
but is in reality rarely ordered to do so. 
Unless it relies on an alibi or special defence, the defence does not need to give details 
about witnesses it intends to rely on, or disclose their statements until after the close 
of the Prosecutor’s case. Initially, the defence had no obligation to provide the 
Prosecutor and/or Chamber with statements of witnesses it intended to rely on. 
                                                                                                                                           
confirmation hearing or trial, and which does not require the trigger of a defence request for inspection 
of prosecution materials. 
473 It should, however, be noted that the ICTR Rule 67(C) still provides for reciprocal disclosure, 
requiring the defence to allow the prosecution to inspect defence material but only if the defence has 
made a request for disclosure under rule 66(B). The notion of reciprocal disclosure was removed from 
the ICTY rules in December 2003 (29th Plenary Session (12 December 2003) (IT/32/Rev.29). 
474 ICTY/ICTR Rules 66(A)(i), 66(A)(ii), 67(A)(i). 
475 Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Decision by the tribunal on its request to the prosecutor to submit the written 
witness statements, 28 January 1997, ICTR-96-04-T. 
476 Rule 73bis(B), adopted by the ICTY on 10 July 1998, IT/32/Rev. 13; and by the ICTR in the 5th 
Plenary Session on 8 June 1998. 
477 Prosecutor v. Stakić (Transcript), 25 November 2002, IT-97-24-PT, 9437. 
478 ICTY Rule 65ter(F). Amended during 21st Session, 15 – 17 November 1999, IT/32/Rev. 17, 
incorporated on 7 December 1999.  
479 Regulations of the Court, Reg. 54. See also Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Decision on Defence disclosure 
by the Defence, 20 March 2008, ICC-01/04-01/06-1235, para. 41; Prosecutor v. Katanga & Ngudjolo, 
Decision on the prosecution’s application concerning disclosure by the defence pursuant to Rules 78 
and 79(4), 14 September 2010, ICC-01/04-01/07-2388. 
480 ICTR Rule 73bis(F). 
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However, since June 2000, the ICTR Chambers have the power to order the defence 
to provide it with copies of such statements,481 and has routinely used this power.482 
Since March 2008, the defence at the ICTY similarly has an obligation to provide 
statements of defence witnesses, but to the Prosecutor only, not the Chamber.483 At 
the ICC, no defence team has yet been ordered to disclose statements of the witnesses 
it intends to call.484
 
  
Such pre-trial disclosure to the Chamber as well as the opposite party has increased 
the Chamber’s prior knowledge of the dossier. This was considered necessary to 
enable the Chamber to control the proceedings more efficiently and ensure more 
expeditious trials.485
 
 However, this disclosure is not tantamount to the disclosure of a 
dossier in civil law systems because none of the items constitute evidence. Its purpose 
is simply to manage the trial—statements or summaries contained in the pre-trial brief 
have no evidentiary value. Only if a witness testifies and his statement is used in 
whole or in part, may such a statement be introduced into evidence.  
The Prosecutor also has an ongoing obligation to disclose to the defence “any 
material, which in the actual knowledge of the Prosecutor may suggest the innocence, 
mitigate the guilt of the accused or affect the credibility of the Prosecution 
evidence”.486 Only in highly exceptional circumstances and with leave of the 
Chamber may exonerating information be withheld from the defence if, for instance, 
its disclosure may affect State security interests,487
                                                 
481 ICTR Rules, Rule 73ter(B), adopted during Eighth Plenary Session: 26 June 2000. 
 or where information was given to 
482 Prosecutor v. Rwamakuba, T. Ch. III. Decision on prosecution motion for disclosure of witness list 
and witness statements, 4 October 2005, ICTR-98-44C; Prosecutor v. Bagosora, Decision on alleged 
deficiencies in the Kabiligi pre-defence brief, 30 October 2006, ICTR-98-41-T), para. 5. 
483 Rule 67 of the ICTY Rules, as amended 3 March 2008 by IT/256.  
484 In the Lubanga and Katanga trials, the Defence was not ordered to disclose statements. See 
Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Decision on Defence disclosure by the Defence, 20 March 2008, ICC-01/04-
01/06-1235, para. 41; Prosecutor v. Katanga & Ngudjolo, Decision on the prosecution’s application 
concerning disclosure by the defence pursuant to Rules 78 and 79(4), 14 September 2010, ICC-01/04-
01/07-2388. Regulations of the Court, Reg. 54, however, allows Chambers to order the Defence to 
provide the witness statements. This regulation provides: ‘At a status conference, the Trial Chamber 
may, in accordance with the Statute and the Rules, issue any order in the interests of justice for the 
purposes of the proceedings on, inter alia… f) The production and disclosure of the statements of the 
witnesses on which participants propose to rely…’ 
485 See Tochilovsky, Nature and Evolution of the Rules, in Khan, Principles of Evidence, supra note 
25, 164-174. 
486 ICTY/ICTR Rule 68(A).  
487 ICTY/ICTR Rule 66(C). The Prosecutor may apply to the Trial Chamber sitting in camera to be 
relieved from the obligation to disclose exculpatory materials if the disclosure thereof to the Defence 
may prejudice further or ongoing investigations, be contrary to the public interest or affect the security 
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the Prosecutor on a confidential basis.488
 
  
This duty does not include an obligation on the part of the Prosecutor to search 
actively for exonerating material. It simply obliges the Prosecutor to disclose such 
materials if he is aware of their existence. At the ICC, on the other hand, the 
Prosecutor not only has a statutory obligation to disclose exonerating evidence, but 
also to search for incriminating and exonerating evidence equally.489 Only in 
exceptional cases and with leave of the Pre-Trial Chamber may the Prosecutor be 
exempted from his disclosure obligations. This occurs when disclosure may affect the 
Prosecutor’s ongoing investigations, put victims and witnesses at risk, or is obtained 
on the basis of an agreement of confidentiality with an NGO.490
 
  
Trial Proceedings 
In the course of the trial, while presenting their cases, the Prosecutor proceeds first, 
followed by the defence, if at all. The parties are entirely free to make strategic 
choices as to what evidence to use and what not to use, provided the disclosure 
obligations have been followed. 
 
The parties call their own witnesses and examine them. The parties are not allowed to 
use leading questions except during cross-examination or if a witness is declared 
hostile.491
                                                                                                                                           
interests of any State (Rule 68(D)). In determining whether the prosecutor is exempt from his 
disclosure duty to the Defence, the Chamber must carefully balance the rights of the accused and the 
interests at stake. See, for instance, Prosecutor v. Karemera, Decision on the prosecutor’s motion for 
special protective measures for witnesses G and T and to extend the decision on protective measures 
for the prosecutor’s witnesses in the Nzirorera and Rwamakuba cases to co-accused Ngirumpatse and 
Karemera and defence’s motion for immediate disclosure, 20 October 2003, ICTR-98-44-T, para. 18. 
 The parties are entitled and expected to cross-examine the witnesses of the 
opposite party. A failure to cross-examine a witness on all aspects of its case may be 
interpreted “as a tacit acceptance of the truth of the witness’s evidence on that 
488 See ICTY/ICTR Rule 70. Rule 70(A) exempts from disclosure the internal working documents of a 
party, while Rule 70(B) to (G) protects sources of certain information given on a confidential basis. See 
Prosecutor v. Brđanin, Public version of the confidential decision on the alleged illegality of rule 70, 
IT-99-36-T, 6 May 2002, para. 18; Prosecutor v. Milutinović, A. Ch. Decision on request of United 
States of America for review, IT-05-87-AR108bis 2, 12 May 2006, para. 38. 
489 Rome Statute, supra note 44, Art. 54(1)(a). 
490 See, for instance: Prosecutor v. Katanga & Ngudjolo, Decision on Article 54(3)(e) documents 
identified as potentially exculpatory or otherwise material to the defence's preparation for the 
confirmation hearing, ICC-01/04-01/07-621, 20 June 2008. See below section ‘Protective Measures’. 
491 Prosecutor v. Limaj et al, T. 2104 – T. 3164; Prosecutor v. Katanga & Ngudjolo, T. 8 Feb 2010, 64-
68. See also K. Khan & R. Dixon, Archbold International Criminal Courts Practice: Procedure & 
Evidence (3rd Ed.) (Sweet & Maxwell, 2009), para. 9-125. 
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matter”.492 The parties are allowed to cross-examine on all issues raised in 
examination-in-chief or affecting the witness’s credibility. With leave of the 
Chamber, the cross-examining party can also enquire into additional matters, or put 
its case to a witness and ask him to comment on it, or explain an apparent 
contradiction.493
 
 
After cross-examination, the party whose witness is on the stand may conduct re-
examination.494
 
 At the ICC, the terms “examination-in-chief”, “cross-examination”, 
and “re-examination” have been left out of the Statute and Rules of Procedure and 
Evidence. This was done deliberately so as not to give preference to the common law 
over the civil law style of the procedure. However, until now, the parties have been 
allowed to cross-examine in a manner similar to common law trials. 
With the purpose of ensuring effective truth-ascertainment and avoiding needless 
consumption of time, the judges exercise control over the manner and order in which 
the parties examine the witnesses and present their evidence.495 Accordingly, they can 
intervene to ensure that the questions posed to the witness are relevant, not leading 
unless in cross-examination, and respectful to the witness. They can also limit their 
time for cross-examination.496 In addition, they can order the parties to shorten the 
examination-in-chief of their witnesses,497 or to reduce the total number of witnesses 
scheduled to be called.498
                                                 
492 Rutaganda v. Prosecutor, A. Ch. Judgment, ICTR-97-3-A, 26 May 2003, para. 310. 
 While the ICTR rules refer to a request from the Chamber 
that the parties reduce witnesses or length of testimony, the ICTY rules use more 
forceful language indicating that it is the Chamber which shall determine the number 
493 Amendments to Rule 90(H) ICTY Rules and Rule 90(G) ICTR Rules (by amendment of 17 
November 1999 at ICTY and 27 May 2003 at ICTR).  
494 ICTY/ICTR Rule 85(B). 
495 Rule 43 ICC Rules; ICTY/ICTR Rule 90(F)(i), as amended in the ICTR on 1 July 1999: 
http://69.94.11.53/ENGLISH/rules/010799/6.htm. The ICTY Rule was amended on 12 April 2001, 
which came into effect on 4 May 2001 (IT/32/Rev. 20), at: 
http://www.icty.org/x/file/Legal%20Library/Rules_procedure_evidence/IT032_rev20_en.pdf 
496 Often, a certain percentage of the time given to the party-in-chief is given to the cross-examining 
party. See, for instance, Prosecutor v. Prlić et al, A. Ch. Decision on prosecution appeal concerning the 
Trial Chamber’s decision on the evidence of witness Milan Babić, IT-04-74-A, 14 September 2006. 
For an overview of cases in respect of judicial control over the proceedings, see Khan & Dixon, 
Archbold International Criminal Court, supra note 486, paras. 8-100 – 8-105. 
497 ICTR: 73bis(C), 73ter(C); ICTY: 73bis(B). See also Prosecutor v. Milošević, A. Ch. Reasons for 
refusal of leave to appeal from decision to impose time limit, IT-02-54-A, 16 May 2002, para. 10, 
where the Appeals Chamber noted that the Chamber's power to control proceedings during the course 
of the trial is an inherent power. 
498 ICTR 73bis(D), 73ter(D); ICTY 73bis(C); 73ter(C) & 73ter(E). 
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of witnesses to be called by the parties and the time available to present the evidence. 
In a similar manner, the ICC judges can exercise control over the presentation of the 
evidence by the parties.499
 
 
In the ICTY, ICTR and ICC, the Chamber is not dependent only on the parties asking 
relevant questions for the establishment of the truth. It can also ask questions of a 
witness. For instance, where important and relevant evidence is not elicited from a 
witness by the parties, the Chamber may seek to elicit this information.500 The 
Chamber’s questions are aimed at clarifying matters raised by the parties and 
participants.501 They “can be closed, they can be open, they can be leading while they 
are -- they are done with a view to finding the truth. … The Chamber has a possibility 
to ask questions which will make it possible to continue together in the search of the 
truth”.502
 
 
New to the proceedings of the ICC is, the victims may participate in criminal 
proceedings and bring matters to the attention of the Court.503 Article 69(3) gives the 
Court a general right to request the presentation of all evidence necessary for the 
determination of the truth. Victims may assist in the determination of the truth and 
may, for that purpose, be permitted to tender and examine evidence. They may also 
put appropriate questions pursuant to Rule 91(3) of the ICC Rules of Procedure and 
Evidence, not only in respect of reparation issues but whenever their personal 
interests are engaged by the evidence under consideration.504
                                                 
499 Prosecutor v. Katanga & Ngudjolo, Order concerning the Presentation of Incriminating Evidence 
and the E-Court Protocol, ICC-01/04-01/07-956, 13 March 2009; Prosecutor v. Katanga & Ngudjolo, 
Decision on the Modalities of Victim Participation at Trial, ICC-01/04-01/07-1788-tENG, 22 January 
2010; Prosecutor v. Ruto, Kosgey and Sang, Pre-Trial Chamber II, Order to the Defence to Reduce the 
Number of Witnesses to Be Called to Testify at the Confirmation of Charges Hearing and to Submit an 
Amended List of Viva Voce Witnesses, ICC-01/09-01/11-221, 10 August 2011. 
 
500 Prosecutor v. Milutinović (Transcript) IT-05-87 (9 August 2006) 1291–1292; Prosecutor v. 
Katanga & Ngudjolo, T. 9 Feb 2010, 20. 
501 Prosecutor v. Katanga & Ngudjolo, T. 9 Feb 2010, 20. 
502 Prosecutor v. Katanga & Ngudjolo, T. 8 Feb 2010, 67. 
503 Art. 68 of the Rome Statute, supra note 44. The Trial Chamber in Lubanga held that in order to 
determine which applicant victims will have the right to participate in the trial, the Trial Chamber will 
consider whether the applicant is a victim of a crime under the jurisdiction of the Court, as provided for 
in Rule 85, and whether the interests of the victim are affected in the proceedings in accordance with 
Art. 68(3) of the Statute. See Prosecutor v. Lubanga, T. Ch. I. Decision on victim’s participation ICC-
01/04-01/06-1119, 18 January 2008. 
504 Ibid, para. 108; Prosecutor v. Lubanga A. Ch. Judgment on the appeal of the prosecutor and the 
defence against Trial Chamber I's decision on victims' participation of 18 January 2008, ICC-01/04-
01/06-1347, 11 July 2008; Prosecutor v Katanga & Ngudjolo, A. Ch. Decision on the Set of Procedural 
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In 1998, the ICTY and ICTR introduced a new Rule 98bis pursuant to which, at the 
end of the Prosecutor’s case, the defence can make ‘half time’ submissions 
challenging the sufficiency of the prosecution evidence to sustain the offences on the 
indictment.505 Only if the judge then considers that the Prosecutor has established a 
prima facie case is there a case to answer for the defence. This is a common law 
practice.506 The ICC has not adopted such a provision, given that the charges have 
already been confirmed on the higher standard of ‘substantial ground to believe’.507
 
 
If new significant issues have arisen during the defence case, which could not 
reasonably have been anticipated, the judges at the ICTY and ICTR may allow the 
Prosecutor to bring evidence in rebuttal.508 If new significant issues arise directly out 
of rebuttal evidence, and the defence "could not be expected to have been addressed 
during the Defence case", the defence can subsequently present evidence in 
rejoinder.509 At the ICC, rebuttal evidence is not permissible.510
 
 
In highly exceptional circumstances, the Prosecutor can apply to re-open his case after 
the close of his case but before the judgment is rendered. This right is not provided in 
the Statute or Rules but has been created by jurisprudence. The Prosecutor can invoke 
this right if he is in possession of fresh evidence, which could not have been found 
with the exercise of reasonable diligence before the close of the case, and its probative 
                                                                                                                                           
Rights Attached to Procedural Status of Victim at the Pre-Trial Stage of the Case, ICC-01/04-01/07-
474, 13 May 2008; Katanga & Ngudjolo, Decision on limitations of set of procedural rights for non-
anonymous victims, ICC-01/04-01/07-537, 30 May 2008; Katanga & Ngudjolo, T. Ch. Decision on the 
modalities of victim participation at trial, ICC-01/04-01/07-1788-tENG, 22 Jan 2010. 
505 Rule 98bis was introduced on 10 July 1998 for the ICTY (IT/32/Rev. 13) and on 8 June 1998 for the 
ICTR (Fifth Plenary Session).  
506 Prosecutor v. Strugar, Decision on defence motion requesting judgment of acquittal pursuant to 
Rule 98bis, IT-01-42-T, 21 June 2004, para. 10; Prosecutor v. Milošević, Decision on motion for 
judgment of acquittal, IT-02-54-T, 16 June 2004, paras. 11-12. 
507 Prosecutor v. Katanga & Ngudjolo, Decision on the admissibility for the confirmation hearing of 
the transcripts of interview of deceased witness 12, ICC-01/04-01/07-412, 18 April 2008, p. 4. 
508 ICTY/ICTR Rule 85(A)(iii). See further Prosecutor v. Delalić et al, A. Ch. Judgment, IT-96-21-A, 
20 February 2001, paras. 273, 275-276; Prosecutor v. Ntagerura et al, T. Ch. III. Decision on the 
prosecutor’s motion for leave to call evidence in rebuttal pursuant to rules 54,73,and 85(A)(iii) of the 
Rules of Procedure and Evidence, ICTR-99-46-T May 21, 2003, paras. 33-34. 
509 ICTY/ICTR Rule 85(A)(iv). See further Prosecutor v. Galić, T. Ch. Decision on rejoinder of 
evidence, IT-98-29-T, 2 April 2003; Prosecution v. Semanza, T. Ch. III. Decision on defence motion 
for leave to call rejoinder witnesses, ICTR-97-20-T, 30 April, 2002, para. 4. 
510 Prosecutor v. Katanga & Ngudjolo, ICC-01/04-01/07-T-222-Red-ENG WT, 24 November, 2010, 
p.72-78; Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Redacted Decision on the Prosecution's Application to Admit 
Rebuttal Evidence from Wtness DRC-OTP-WWWW-0005 ICC-01/04-01/06-2727-Red, 28 April 2011, 
para.36-67. 
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value is of such significance that it outweighs the prejudice against the accused 
caused by its late admission.511
 
 
After the presentation of all the evidence, the parties may present closing arguments, 
including rebuttal and rejoinder arguments.512 At the end of the closing arguments, 
the presiding judge declares the hearing closed and the Chamber withdraws to 
deliberate in private. The Chamber has to consider whether the Prosecutor has 
established the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. Only if the majority is 
so satisfied will the Chamber reach a finding of guilt and simultaneously impose an 
appropriate sentence.513 It will be announced in public and accompanied by a 
reasoned written judgement with separate or dissenting opinions, if any, attached to 
it.514
                            
 
Thus, the criminal proceedings resemble common law proceedings in terms of their 
structure and the roles of the parties. There is no dossier, but rather two cases: one 
presented by the prosecution and the other by the defence. The main departure from 
the common law model is that there is no jury. The judges are responsible for all legal 
and factual determinations throughout the case and must give reasons for any such 
determination. Their power in controlling the conduct of the parties has increased 
over the years, and was strong from the outset at the ICC. Thus, the ICTY, ICTR and 
ICC judges have a very different role from the passive judge in a common law 
jurisdiction. Yet, their role is more limited than it would be in civil law jurisdictions. 
 
Rules of Evidence 
The absence of a jury has given rise to important departures from the common law 
rules of evidence. 
                                                 
511 Prosecutor v. Delalić et al., A. Ch. Judgment, IT-96-21-A, 20 February 2001, paras. 273, 280, 283, 
290; Prosecutor v. Hadzihasanovic et al, Decision on the prosecution’s application to re-open its case, 
IT-01-47-T, 1 June 2005, paras. 31- 46; Prosecutor v. Zigiranyirazo, Decision on the prosecution joint 
motion for reopening its case and for reconsideration of the 31 January 2006 decision on the hearing of 
witness Michel Bagaragaza by video-link, ICTR-2001-73-T, 16 November 2006; Prosecutor v. 
Nyiramasuhuko et al, Decision on Kanyabashi’s motion to reopen his case and to recall prosecution 
witness QA, ICTR-96-15-T, 2 July 2008, para. 23). 
512 ICTY/ICTR Rule 86(A). 
513 Article 23 ICTY Statute; Article 22 ICTR Statute; ICTY/ICTR Rule 87; Rome Statute, supra note 
44, Art. 74(4). 
514 Articles 23(2) and 24 ICTY Statute; Articles 22(2) and 23 ICTR Statute; ICTY/ICTR 88(C); Rome 
Statute, supra note 44, Arts. 74(2), (4) & (5), 75(5). 
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When the ICTY Rules of Procedure and Evidence were adopted, Antonio Cassese J, 
President of the ICTY at the time, stated:  
Based on the limited precedent of the Nuremberg and Tokyo trials, and in order for us, 
as judges, to remain as impartial as possible, we have adopted a largely adversarial 
approach to our procedures, rather than the inquisitorial approach found in continental 
Europe and elsewhere … 
 
…there are two important adaptations to that general adversarial system. The first is 
that, as at Nuremberg and Tokyo, we have not laid down technical rules for the 
admissibility of evidence… [T]his Tribunal does not need to shackle itself to restrictive 
rules which have developed out of the ancient trial by jury system. All relevant evidence 
may be admitted to this Tribunal unless its probative value is substantially outweighed 
by the need to ensure a fair and expeditious trial. An example of this would be where 
the evidence was obtained by a serious violation of human rights. Secondly, the 
Tribunal may order the production of additional or new evidence proprio motu. This 
will enable us to ensure that we are fully satisfied with the evidence on which we base 
our final decisions and to ensure that the charge has been proved beyond reasonable 
doubt. It will also minimise the possibility of a charge being dismissed on technical 
grounds for lack of evidence. We feel that, in the international sphere, the interests of 
justice are best served by such a provision and that the diminution, if any, of the 
accused’s rights is minimal by comparison.515
 
 
The first exception to the adversarial model is reflected in Rule 89(C) of the ICTY 
and ICTR Rules, stating that a Chamber ‘may admit any relevant evidence which it 
deems to have probative value’. The ICC has adopted a similar provision.516
 
  
Similar to civil law criminal proceedings, the drafters of the legal provisions of the 
international criminal tribunals sought to guarantee the greatest access to available 
and attainable information by the adjudicators. Given that the adjudicators of law and 
fact are professional judges, the drafters did not introduce technical barriers to the 
admissibility of evidence, except when it is irregularly obtained.517
                                                 
515 Statement by the President of the International Tribunal to members of diplomatic missions 
concerning the adoption of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the ICTY (UN Doc IT/29, 11 
February 1994), reprinted in Morris & Scharf, International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, supra note 
295, 649, 651. See also UNGA, Annual Report of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of 
Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the 
Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991, 49th Session (29 August 1994) UN Doc. A/49/342, 72, 
para. 24. 
 As held by the 
Trial Chamber in the first ICTY case of Tadic, “the trials are conducted by Judges 
516 See Rome Statute, supra note 44, Art. 69(4), stating that “[t]he Court may rule on the relevance or 
admissibility of any evidence, taking into account, inter alia, the probative value of the evidence and 
any prejudice that such evidence may cause to a fair trial or to a fair evaluation of the testimony of a 
witness, in accordance with the Rules of Procedure and Evidence”. This provision has been interpreted 
in a similar fashion as ICTY/ICTR Rule 89(C).  
517 ICTY/ICTR Rule 95, supra note 512. 
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who are able, by virtue of their training and experience, to hear the evidence in the 
context in which it was obtained and accord it appropriate weight. Thereafter, they 
may make a determination as to the relevancy and the probative value of the 
evidence.”518
 
  
This had led to the adoption of a new rule in the ICTY and ICTR which permits the 
admission of testimonial evidence in the form of a written statement. This possibility 
was initially introduced only in respect to statements which did not intend to prove 
the acts and conduct of the accused,519 and only if certain conditions were met.520 If 
the statement concerned was pivotal to the Prosecution’s case, cross-examination 
could be ordered.521 In the ICTY, this possibility was later extended to statements 
which go to proof of the acts and conduct of the accused, provided that the makers of 
the statements are available for cross-examination.522 Such a statement can be 
admitted without cross-examination if the witness is dead, untraceable or unable to 
testify.523 Since 2009, such a statement can also be admitted if the witness was 
scheduled to testify but failed to attend as a result of improper interference as a result 
of threats, intimidation, injury, bribes or coercion.524
 
 
                                                 
518 Prosecutor v Tadić, T. Ch. II. Decision on defence motion on hearsay, IT-94-1-T, 5 August 1996, 
paras 14, 17; See also Prosecutor v. Brđanin & Talić, Order on the Standards governing the admission 
of evidence, IT-99–36-T, 15 February 2002, Case No IT-99–36-T, para 14; and Prosecutor v Delalić et 
al, T. Ch. Decision on the Motion of the Prosecution for the Admissibility of Evidence, IT-96–21-T, 19 
January 1998, para 20. See also May & Wierda, Trends in International Criminal Evidence, supra note 
95, 745. 
519 ICTY/ICTR Rule 92bis. 
520 As set out in Rule 92bis(B). 
521 Prosecutor v. Bizimungu, Decision on Casimir Bizimungu’s motion to vary witness List; and to 
admit evidence of witness in written form in lieu of oral testimony, 1 May 2008, para 19; Prosecutor v. 
Karemera et al, Decision on Joseph Nzirorera’s motion to admit statements of Augustin Karara, ICTR-
98-44-T, 9 July 2008, para 4; Prosecutor v. Milošević, Decision on prosecution's request to have 
written statements admitted under Rule 92bis, 21 March 2002, paras. 24, 26; Prosecutor v Limaj et al, 
Decision on prosecution’s motion to admit rebuttal statements via Rule 92bis, 7 July 2005, para 5. 
522 ICTY Rule 92ter. It was introduced on 13 September 2006 to expedite the proceedings. See ICTY 
Prosecutor v D. Milošević, (Transcript), 15 January 2007, 354. 
523 ICTY Rule 92quater, introduced on 13 September 2006. Evidence that is pivotal to the 
prosecution’s case is more likely than not admitted under Rule 92quater where it is corroborative and 
cumulative to other evidence. See Prosecutor v. Haradinaj, T. Ch. I. Decision on prosecution’s motion 
for admission of evidence pursuant to Rule 92quater and 13th motion for trial-related protective 
measures, IT-04-84-T, 7 September 2007, paras. 7, 10, 12; Prosecutor v. Prlić . Ch. Decision on the 
prosecution motion for admission of a written statement pursuant to Rule 92quater (Hasan Rizvić), IT-
04-74-T, 14 January 2008, paras. 13, 16 and 22. 
524 Rule 92quinquies ICTY Rules. 
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These new rules, which were not adopted by the ICTR, have clearly undermined the 
principle that witnesses be heard orally in court.525 Directly incriminating statements 
can now be introduced without the judges having had an opportunity to assess the 
demeanour of the witness and without the defence having had an opportunity to ask 
questions to the witness. These new provisions were adopted to accelerate the 
proceedings in light of the completion strategy. The ICTY has been under great 
pressure to complete the cases and close the tribunal. With that purpose in mind, it 
introduced these measures and increased judicial control.526
 
 The ICTR has a similar 
completion strategy but did not consider it necessary to incorporate these changes. It 
is, therefore, questionable whether these curtailments of the principle of orality were 
truly necessary and whether they have even assisted in accelerating the proceedings. 
Neither tribunal has yet closed its doors.  
Ironically, these rules were said to have been inspired by civil law principles.527 
However, in civil law jurisdictions written testimonial evidence is usually only 
admitted if the examination of the witness was conducted by a judicial officer in the 
presence of the parties. This is also more in accordance with the adversarial principle 
as part of fair proceedings enshrined in the human rights conventions, as well as the 
ICTY, ICTR and ICC Statutes.528
 
 Thus, this is an illustration of an adoption of a legal 
principle in international justice based on an erroneous interpretation of domestic 
legal principles. 
No similar rules exist in the ICC Statute or Rules. The only rule regulating the 
admissibility of recorded testimonial evidence is Rule 68, which allows such 
admission only when the parties have an opportunity to examine the witness during 
                                                 
525 Initially, Rule 90(A) of the ICTY and ICTR Rules reflected the principle of orality, stipulating that: 
“Witnesses shall, in principle, be heard directly by the Chambers unless a Chamber has ordered that the 
witness be heard by means of a deposition as provided for in Rule 71.” Whilst ICTR Rule 90(A) still 
reads the same, ICTY Rule 90(A) has been adjusted in a manner undermining the preference for oral 
testimony. ICTY Rule 89(F), which has replaced the original Rule 90(A), reads: “A Chamber may 
receive the evidence of a witness orally or, where the interests of justice allow, in written form.” 
526 UN Doc. S/RES/1503, 28 August 2003; UN Doc. S/RES/1534, 26 March 2004. See also G. Boas, 
Developments in the Law of Procedure and Evidence at the International Criminal Tribunal for the 
former Yugoslavia and the International Criminal Court, 12 CLF 167 (2001), 168-170; Tochilovsky, 
Nature and Evolution of the Rules, in Khan, Principles of Evidence, supra note 25, 163-164. 
527 Tochilovsky, Nature and Evolution of the Rules, in Khan, Principles of Evidence, supra note 25, 
161-174 (3. Incorporation of Civil Law Elements into the Rules).  
528 Article 21 ICTY; Article 20 ICTR: Rome Statute, supra note 44, Article 67. 
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the proceedings, or had such an opportunity during the recording. This reflects the 
civil law practice better than the ICTY position. Until now, it has only been used as 
background evidence not central to the core issues of the case.529 Whether this rule 
can be circumvented and written testimonial evidence can be admitted under the 
general power to admit any relevant and reliable evidence whose prejudice is 
outweighed by its probative value is still a pending issue. It is also still unclear 
whether the transcripts of Prosecutor’s interviews with dead or untraceable witnesses 
can be admitted into evidence if the conditions of Rule 68(a) were not met.530
 
 
The second exception to the adversarial model cited by Judge Cassese is enshrined in 
Rule 98 of the ICTY and ICTR Rules, allowing judges, proprio motu, to order either 
party to produce additional evidence or to summon witnesses and order their 
attendance.531
 
 At the ICC, if one or both of the parties would like additional witnesses 
to be called, they can request the Chamber to call them as Chamber witnesses. 
Pursuant to Articles 64(6) and 69(3) ICC Statute, and Rule 84, the Chamber can also 
decide on its own initiative that additional witnesses be called or documentary 
evidence produced.  
Appellate Proceedings 
Any oral or written ruling from the Chamber is subject to interlocutory appeal if 
certified by the Trial Chamber. Certification may be granted where the decision 
involves an issue that would significantly affect the fair and expeditious conduct of 
the proceedings or the outcome of the trial, and for which, in the opinion of the Trial 
Chamber, an immediate resolution by the Appeals Chamber may materially advance 
the proceedings.532
                                                 
529 Lubanga Decision on the Prosecution’s Application for the Admission of the Prior Recorded 
Statements of Two Witnesses (15 Jan 2009), paras 19-24; Katanga and Ngudjolo, Transcripts (23 Feb 
2010), 48, Rule 68(b) cannot be implemented at the end of the testimony of a witness. 
 There is also appeal, as of right, against a final verdict, whether an 
530 Katanga and Ngudjolo Defence Objections to Admissibility in Principal and in Substance (23 Oct 
2009). For the purpose of the confirmation hearing, the interview of a witness who since died was 
admitted; see Katanga and Ngudjolo Decision on the Admissibility for the Confirmation Hearing of the 
Transcripts of Interview of Deceased Witness 12 (18 April 2008). 
531 Rule 98 of the ICTY Rules states that: ‘A Trial Chamber may order either party to produce 
additional evidence. It may proprio motu summon witnesses and order their attendance’. Rule 98 of the 
ICTR Rules states: ‘A Trial Chamber may proprio motu order either party to produce additional 
evidence. It may itself summon witnesses and order their attendance.’ For concern about this rule, see 
Daniel David Ntanda Nsereko, ‘Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the International Tribunal for the 
Former Yugoslavia’ (1994) 5 Crim. L Forum 507, 538. 
532 ICTY/ICTR Rule 73(B & C); Rome Statute, supra note 44, Article 82.  
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acquittal or a conviction.533 Appeal is, however, not an opportunity for the parties to 
remedy any error of judgment or oversight made at trial.534
 
 The appellate proceedings 
are not equivalent to a trial ‘de novo’, as in civil law systems.  
The ICC Statute has codified more elaborate grounds of appeal. Both parties can 
appeal the decision on the basis of a procedural error, an error of fact or law.535 The 
convicted person can further appeal the decision on any ground affecting the fairness 
or reliability of the proceedings.536 The ICC Statute does not impose conditions on 
bringing new evidence. Pursuant to Article 83(1), the Appeals Chamber has all the 
same powers of the Trial Chamber. If it finds that an unfairness to the defendant has 
affected the reliability of the decision, or a procedural error or error of fact or law has 
materially affected the decision, the Appeals Chamber may call evidence to determine 
the issue itself.537
 
 In light of those powers, the appellate proceedings could develop 
into more substantial proceedings than those at the ICTY and ICTR. Whether they 
will remains to be seen. 
Does the international criminal justice model meet the conditions in Part I?  
Having adopted ample civil law influenced amendments, the ICTY system in its 
current shape represents a modified versions of an adversarial system. It moved closer 
to the ICC which from the outset has been inspired by civil law. The ICTR system has 
not incorporated civil law features to the same extent as the ICTY. However, similarly 
to the ICTY and ICC it represents a modified version of an adversarial system. As the 
ICTR Trial Chamber in Bagosora held, the rules “are broader than either the common 
or civil law systems and they reflect an international amalgamated system without 
necessarily adopting a single national system of evidence”.538
 
 
The efficiency of this international criminal procedure as a truth-ascertaining 
methodology will be tested in Part III. However, some observations can be made with 
                                                 
533 US attorneys consider that the allowance for appeal of an acquittal amounts to “double jeopardy”. 
See, De Hert, Legal Procedures at the ICC, supra note 25, 124.  
534 Prosecutor v Nahimana, A. Ch. Decision on additional evidence, ICTR-99-52-A ,12 January 2007, 
para. 71; Prosecutor v Akayesu, A. Ch. Judgment, ICTR-96-4-A, 1 June 2001 para. 177.  
535 Rome Statute, supra note 44, Art. 81(1). 
536 Ibid, Art. 81(1)(b)(iv). 
537 Ibid, Art. 83(2). 
538 Prosecutor v. Théoneste Bagosora, Case No. ICTR-96-7-T, Decision on the Defence Motion for 
Pre-Determination of Rules of Evidence, 8 July 1998, 4. 
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regard to the compliance of the theoretical framework with the conditions in Part I. 
Seemingly, the combination of the two systems is the cause of a number of 
weaknesses in the international truth-ascertaining procedure.  
 
The access to all available relevant and reliable information is more limited than in 
civil law procedures. There is no dossier and no investigative judge. Instead, the 
Chamber relies on the Prosecutor to select the suspects, and on both parties to conduct 
investigations. The Trial Chamber is not presented with the available exculpatory 
material unless one of the parties introduces it at trial. There may also be 
incriminating, or partly incriminating and partly exonerating, material that the 
Chamber has never seen because neither party, for strategic or other reasons, 
introduces it at trial. Such evidence then is not considered in the ultimate decision on 
guilt or innocence of the accused. The Chamber has increasingly great powers to 
exercise control over the manner in which the parties conduct themselves. They have 
a wide discretion to admit evidence and call additional witnesses. Both the parties and 
the judges are entitled to examine the witnesses.  
Access to Relevant and Reliable Information 
 
The international criminal justice model truly combines the strengths of the judges 
and the parties in acquiring the greatest access to relevant and reliable information. 
This is potentially frustrating both for the parties and for the judges, as the strength of 
their position is weakened by the strength of the position of the other. The manner of 
questioning the witnesses illustrates this clearly. Judges are not in a position to take 
the lead in questioning the witnesses, as they would be in civil law jurisdictions. For 
the main part of the questioning, they have to restrain themselves from intervening in 
the performance of the parties, even if in their view the examination could be 
conducted more efficiently for the ascertainment of the truth.   
 
The parties on their part are considerably more limited in cross-examining witnesses 
than they would be in a common law jurisdiction. They have to be more careful in 
their approach to witnesses and are under significant time constraints. The extent to 
which their cross-examination is ultimately compromised depends on the judges 
before whom they appear. It also depends on the judges whether their compromised 
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position is remedied by the greater powers granted to the judges in questioning the 
witnesses at the end of their examination. These powers are, however, not unlimited 
as judges should not be seen as partial or leading the witnesses to their answers. 
Potentially, the parties and judges can strengthen each other. If a party fails to ask a 
crucial question or produce an important document or witness, the judges can still do 
it. 
 
The roles of the Chamber and parties in collecting the evidence is an aspect that will 
be looked at in more detail in Part III. Another aspect that will be discussed is whether 
the flexibility of the rules of evidence, in particular with regard to admissibility, has 
undermined or strengthened the ascertainment of the truth.  
 
In addition to the parties and the judges, victim participants at the ICC can also 
adduce evidence and examine witnesses. Given that they are allowed to bring 
additional matters to the attention of the court, their participation potentially 
contributes to the ascertainment of the truth. However, a number of observers and 
practitioners consider that the participation of victims in the ICC proceedings is 
troublesome and undermines the ascertainment of the truth.539 Their arguments will 
be further discussed in Part III. Overall, the structure itself offers sufficient access to 
reliable information.  
In principle, it must be assumed that the international judges can engage with the 
information and information providers while keeping a distance. They are selected 
from a pool of diverse candidates from all over the world. They must be “of high 
moral character, impartiality and integrity”, and “possess the qualifications required 
in their respective countries for appointment to the highest judicial offices.”
Engagement at a Distance 
540
                                                 
539 C. Van Der Wijngaert, ICC Judge, lecture on 21 November 2011 in Klatsky seminar in Human 
Rights presented by Frederick K. Cox International Law Centre at Case Western Reserve University 
(Cleveland Ohio), forthcoming publication in: Case Western Reserve University Journal of 
International Law; S. Johnson, Neither Victims nor Executioners: The Dilemma of Victim Participation 
and the Defendant’s Right to a Fair Trial at the International Criminal Court, 16 ILSA J. Int’l & 
Comp. L. 489, 2009-2010. 
 In 
addition, the ICC requires judges to have an excellent knowledge in at least one of the 
540 Article 13 ICTY Statute; Article 12 ICTR Statute; Rome Statute, supra note 44, Art. 23(3)(a). See 
also Rome Statute, Art. 40, emphasising the judge’s independence, and Art. 41 concerning the 
disqualification. 
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working languages of the court. They must also have established competence in 
“criminal law and procedure, and the necessary relevant experience, whether as judge, 
prosecutor, advocate or in other similar capacity, in criminal proceedings”; or 
“relevant areas of international law such as international humanitarian law and the 
law of human rights, and extensive experience in a professional legal capacity which 
is of relevance to the judicial work of the Court”.541
 
  
Their nomination is, however, political which potentially compromises their position. 
In the ICTY and ICTR, judges are appointed by the UN General Assembly upon 
initial nomination by UN Member-States and subsequent pre-selection by the Security 
Council.542 They are elected for a renewable four-year term. It has been argued that 
this undermines their independence. If the UN is not satisfied with the performance of 
the judges, it can be assumed that their contract will not be renewed.543 In the view of 
numerous practitioners, the independence of the judges can only be ensured if they 
are appointed for life.544 At the ICC, judges are elected for nine years. Their 
nomination must be approved by a secret vote of two thirds of the members of the 
Assembly of State Parties.545
 
 
A political nomination in itself does not suggest that the judges cannot be impartial 
and independent of political considerations.546 A judge whose impartiality might 
reasonably be doubted may be disqualified from sitting in a particular case.547
                                                 
541 Rome Statute, supra note 44, Arts. 23(3)(b)(i), (ii) & 23(3)(c). 
 Thus, 
542 Art. 13bis ICTY; Art. 12-3 ICTR. This system follows the one established for the selection and 
appointment of the Judges of the International Court of Justice.  The International Court of Justice 
consists of 15 Judges elected by concurrent votes of the Security Council and the General Assembly. 
543 See S. Johnson, On the Road to Disaster, supra note 292, 119. See also: M Bohlander, The 
International Criminal Judiciary: Problems of Judicial Selection, Independence and Ethics, in M 
Bohlander (Ed.), International Criminal Justice: A Critical Analysis of Institutions and Procedures 
(2007) 325, at 355-361. 
544 Arguments, raised at a Conference, entitled The Position of the Defence at the ICC, and Role of The 
Netherlands as Host-State, held in The Hague on 3-4 of November 2000, published in M. Hallers et al 
(Eds), The Position of the Defence at the ICC, and Role of The Netherlands as Host-State, (Rozenberg, 
2002). See also M. Cherif Bassiouni & Peter Manikas: The Law of the International Criminal Tribunal 
for the Former Yugoslavia (New York: Transnational Publishers Inc, 1996), at 806, stating that the 
eligibility for re-election “could mitigate against the principle of judicial independence”. 
545 Rome Statute, supra note 44, Art. 36. 
546 In the US, the nomination of judges is also political. In the US federal system judges are appointed 
by the President and have to be confirmed by the US Senate. A judge is approved based on his judicial 
qualifications.  
547 See, for instance, the US case Caperton v. AT Massey Coal Co. 129 S Ct 2252 (2009) at: 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Caperton_v._A.T._Massey_Coal_Co. See further: 
http://templelaw.tenintenclients.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/07/McManus_Degnan.pdf 
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in theory the appointed international judges should be able to engage in ascertaining 
the truth impartially and independently. 
 
The ICTY, ICTR and ICC Statutes guarantee the transparent and fair nature of the 
proceedings. The judges must ensure that a trial is fair and expeditious and in 
accordance with the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, “with full respect for the rights 
of the accused and due regard for the protection of victims and witnesses”.
Transparency and Fairness 
548 The 
trials are public. The Chamber may, however, order that proceedings be held in closed 
session to protect victims and witnesses, or confidential information.549 The 
judgement is public and detailed. The defence is a full and autonomous party to the 
proceedings. The defendant can testify under oath or give an unsworn statement.550
 
 
Throughout the proceedings, the principle of equality of arms must at all times be 
respected. The right to equality of arms has been recognized as one of the most 
fundamental elements of a fair trial enshrined in the ICTY, ICTR and ICC Statutes.551 
With regard to the defence, the ICTY and ICTR Statutes and Rules were silent about 
the responsibilities of the Registry. The ICC Rules, on the other hand, include a 
number of provisions, which impose duties on the Registry to arrange defence 
issues.552
 
 
                                                 
548 Article 20(1) ICTY Statute; Article 19(1) ICTR Statute; Rome Statute, supra note 44, Arts. 64(2) & 
64(8)(b). The rights of the accused are enshrined in Article 21 ICTY Statute; 20 ICTR Statute and 
Rome Statute Art. 64. 
549 Rome Statute, supra note 44, Art. 64(7). 
550 Rome Statute, supra note 44, Art. 67(1)(h) (the right to make an unsworn oral or written statement 
in his or her defence); Rule 84bis(A) ICTY Rules (“After the opening statements of the parties or, if 
the defence elects to defer its opening statement pursuant to Rule 84, after the opening statement of the 
Prosecutor, if any, the accused may, if he or she so wishes, and the Trial Chamber so decides, make a 
statement under the control of the Trial Chamber. The accused shall not be compelled to make a 
solemn declaration and shall not be examined about the content of the statement”). The ICTR did not 
incorporate this Rule. However, the judges still have the discretionary power to allow the defendant to 
give an unsworn statement, as the judges did in the case of Bagosora. 
551 Article 21(2) ICTY Statute; Article 20(2) ICTR Statute; Rome Statute, supra note 44, Art. 64; 
Neumeister v. Austria, ECtHR Judgement of 27 June 1968, A-37 [4] [hereinafter ‘Neumeister’]; 
Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case N° IT-94-A, Appeals Chamber, Judgement, 15 July 1999, para 52; 
Prosecutor v. Clément Kayishema and Obed Ruzindana, Case N° ICTR-95-1-A, Appeals Chamber, 
Appeals Judgement, 1 June 2001.  
552 See in particular Rule 20 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence. See further C Buisman, ‘Defence 
and Fair Trial’ Ch VI in: Haveman, Supranational Criminal Law, supra note 27, 231-237. 
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The equality of arms principle must be read in light of the different burdens and roles 
of the different parties. The Prosecutor has the burden to prove the guilt of the 
accused beyond reasonable doubt. The defence has no burden except to provide some 
evidence in support of an alibi or special defence.553 If the defence establishes that the 
alibi or special defence is plausible, it is then the Prosecutor’s responsibility to 
establish beyond reasonable a doubt that the accused is guilty as charged 
notwithstanding this alibi or special defence.554
 
  
Given these different burdens and roles, the parties also have different types of rights, 
powers and obligations. The defence enjoys more rights in order to compensate for 
the greater powers which the Prosecutor possesses. For instance, the accused is 
entitled to full and timely disclosure, and is protected by the presumption of 
innocence and the right not to incriminate himself.555
 
  
Accordingly, the international proceedings appear to be transparent and fair. Whether 
this is true in reality will be addressed in Part III. In particular, it will be considered 
whether the proceedings are indeed transparent, and if not, whether that has an 
adverse impact on the ascertainment of the truth. In addition, the treatment of the 
defence in reality, and its consequences for the ascertainment of the truth, if any, will 
be analysed. 
 
Thus, in theory the system can serve as an adequate truth-ascertaining system. It has 
incorporated most of the minimum safeguards inherent to domestic systems. Because 
it is a judge-led system, the main safeguards of producing reasoned written verdicts 
and a full new hearing on appeal have been incorporated.  
Conclusion 
 
                                                 
553 ICTY/ICTR Rule 87(A); Rome Statute, supra note 44, Art. 31 ICC Statute. 
554 Khan & Dixon, Archbold International Criminal Court, supra note 486, paras. 17-57 – 17-59. For 
ICC, see Rome Statute, supra note 44, Article 66(2), and Rule 79 of the Rules of Procedure and 
Evidence (relating to the obligation upon the defence to dislose its alibi).  
555 Article 21(3) ICTY Statute; Article 20(3) ICTR Statute; Rome Statute, supra note 44, Article 64(3). 
See also Judge Robinson: ‘[w]hat the Prosecutor did in terms of information to the Accused is not 
necessarily a correct basis for determining the Accused’s responsibilities, because the Prosecution has 
obligations under the Rules which the Defence does not have. Conversely, the Defence has rights 
which do not apply to the Prosecution…’Prosecutor v. Milošević, T 17 June 2004, IT-02-54-TC, 
P32086. 
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In reality, this has however been a struggle. The hindrances to an effective 
ascertainment of the truth that have occurred so far in the ICTY, ICTR and ICC are 
numerous and will be analysed in Part III. Most of them are unrelated to the 
methodology, but have rather to do with the implementation. Yet, some observers and 
practitioners continue to criticise the methodology itself. An often-heard legitimate 
criticism is against the ease with which testimonial evidence can be admitted in the 
form of a written statement.556
 
 Unlike in civil law jurisdictions, such a statement is 
not taken by an investigative judge in the presence of the parties. The extent to which 
this, as well as other problematic practices have adversely affected the ascertainment 
of the truth is addressed in Part III. 
The main reason for continued criticism is that practitioners and observers continue to 
think in terms of common law or civil law. They often support the system they are 
most familiar with and criticise the features that have their roots in unfamiliar 
systems.557
 
  
People employed by the international criminal justice systems come from different 
domestic systems. When they arrive at the international forum, they come armed with 
their own legal philosophy and language which they cannot remove completely from 
their minds. They are trained in their domestic jurisdiction and are familiar with the 
terminology and philosophy applied in their own system.558 These different legal 
vocabularies and philosophies must be merged into a uniform legal vocabulary 
inherent and unique to international criminal justice.559
                                                 
556 See Jackson, Transnational Faces of Justice in Jackson, Crime, Procedure and Evidence, supra note 
23, 221, at 238-241; M. Fairlie, The Marriage of Common Law and Continental Law at the ICTY and 
its Progeny: Due Process Model 4 International Criminal Law Review Journal 243 (2004).  
  
557 Bohlander, Radbruch Redux, supra note 123, 410. 
558 According to Pakes, this has led to considerable differential treatment of case-management issues in 
the ICTY. See: F. Pakes, Styles of Trial Procedure at the International Criminal Tribunal for the 
former Yugoslavia, 17 Perspectives in Law and Psychology 309 (2003). See also Sliedregt, 
Introduction: Common Civility, supra note 433. 
559 See also M. Delmas-Marty who refers to such vocabulary as a ‘common grammar’: “I would stress 
that a system of justice conceived by hybridisation will necessarily be distinguishable from its national 
‘parents’ and will progressively become autonomous. In other words, hybridisation goes hand in hand 
with autonomisation. Therefore the system’s coherence cannot be pre-established and cannot simply be 
borrowed from a preexisting one, but must be built. True hybridisation, as distinct from simple 
transplantation, makes it easier to do so by using not only common technical rules, but also a common 
‘grammar’, that is, the guiding, or meta principles that structure the system around general international 
law principles, human rights instruments and a comparison of the main national criminal justice 
systems. This ‘grammar’ then guides the interpretation of the questions of first impression that will 
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Indeed, international criminal justice systems “combine and fuse, in a fairly felicitous 
manner, the adversarial or accusatorial system (chiefly adopted in common-law 
countries) with a number of significant features of the inquisitorial approach (mostly 
taken from States of continental Europe and in other countries of civil-law tradition). 
This combination or amalgamation is unique and begets a legal logic that is 
qualitatively different from that of each of the two national criminal systems: the 
philosophy behind international trials is markedly at variance with that underpinning 
each of those national systems”.560
 
 This philosophy is further influenced by factors 
unique to international criminal justice and unrelated to domestic criminal justice. 
This confuses domestic legal concepts, language and philosophy even more. 
Practitioners and observers must familiarise themselves with this emerging 
international vocabulary and philosophy. Only then can the systems melt 
efficiently.561
 
 This appears to be difficult for many of them, which increases the 
‘hybridisation’ problems. 
In order to discuss thoroughly any of these issues and to evaluate whether the 
international criminal justice systems can in reality be an adequate truth-ascertaining 
systems, it is necessary to place these systems in their proper context. International 
criminal justice systems are more than mere hybrids between common law and civil 
law criminal justice systems. They operate in circumstances which are very different 
from the circumstances in which domestic criminal justice systems operate and, 
therefore, include elements that are unique to international criminal justice.
Unique Context of International Justice 
562
                                                                                                                                           
inevitably arise and makes it possible, when suitable, to integrate in a unified, pluralist manner.”: The 
Hybridisation of Criminal Procedure, supra note 23, 251 at 258-259. 
 The 
560 Prosecutor v. Erdemović, A. Ch. Separate and Dissenting Opinion of Judge Cassese to Judgment of 
Appeals Chamber, IT-96-22-A, para. 3. See also para. 6: Once transposed onto the international level, 
legal concepts may have acquired “a new lease of life, absolutely independent of their original 
meaning”, or they may have been adjusted to the characteristic features of international proceedings. 
See also Tuinstra’s observation that international criminal justice systems “lack a clear philosophy”: 
Tuinstra, Defence Counsel, supra note 54, 103. 
561 See also Justice Doherty’s observation expressed at the Dublin Conference, supra note 13, that we 
should stop thinking in common law and civil law. 
562 Prosecutor v. Erdemović, A. Ch. Separate and Dissenting Opinion of Judge Cassese to Judgment of 
Appeals Chamber, IT-96-22-A, para. 5. See also para. 3: 
“One might wonder why international courts show such great caution in drawing upon national law 
when establishing the meaning of national law concepts and terms. Indeed, such caution might be 
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international criminal justice systems are sui generis rather than hybrid courts.563
 
 
Indeed, as the ICTY Trial Chamber held in Tadic: 
In interpreting the provisions which are applicable to the International Tribunal and 
determining where the balance lies between the accused’s right to a fair and public trial 
and the protection of victims and witnesses, the judges of the International Tribunal 
must do so within the context of its own unique legal framework. (emphasis added)564
 
 
Some of the unique circumstances have been discussed in Part I. International 
criminal courts and tribunals have set themselves very ambitious objectives. They 
aspire to achieve many goals in addition to the accurate assessment of the guilt or 
innocence of a particular defendant. These goals are: end impunity, justice to the 
victims, deterrence, restoration or maintenance of the peace and security, 
reconciliation, and the ascertainment of the truth. 
 
The legal and factual determinations to be made in international justice are extremely 
complex. Particularly in ethnically divided societies, there are different versions of 
events. It is a challenge to collect sufficient reliable evidence in support of allegations 
against a person who did not participate directly in any crimes. This is particularly 
challenging in a war-torn society where many interested parties may either seek to 
manipulate the collectors of information or destroy evidence.  
 
The task of ascertaining the truth in international justice is therefore considerably 
more challenging than in domestic justice. The tools available to international 
criminal justice systems are more limited both in terms of its structure and capacity.  
                                                                                                                                           
regarded as inconsistent with the fact that the whole body of international law owes so much to 
national or municipal rules: as is well known, over the years international norms have greatly borrowed 
from the internal law of sovereign States, particularly from national private law. However, this 
historical spilling over from one set of legal systems into the law of nations does not detract from these 
legal systems (those of States on the one side, and international law, on the other) being radically 
different: their structure is different, their subjects are different, as are their sources and enforcement 
mechanisms. It follows that normally it would prove incongruous and inappropriate to apply in an 
inter-State legal setting a national law concept as such, that is, with its original scope and purport. The 
body of law into which one may be inclined to transplant the national law notion cannot but reject the 
transplant, for the notion is felt as extraneous to the whole set of legal ideas, constructs and 
mechanisms prevailing in the international context. Consequently, the normal attitude of international 
courts is to try to assimilate or transform the national law notion so as to adjust it to the exigencies and 
basic principles of international law.”  
563 Haveman, Supranational Criminal Law, supra note 27, 3-5, where Haveman argues that the ICTY 
and ICTR Systems are more appropriately referred to as Systems Sui Generis than hybrid systems. 
564 Prosecutor v. Tadić, T. Ch. II. Decision on prosecutor’s motion requesting protective measures for 
victims and witnesses, IT-94-1-T, 10 August 1995, para. 27. 
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Structural and Capacity Limitations 
International criminal justice systems suffer from structural limitations since they 
have not been established by an existing State to try perpetrators among its population 
for crimes committed on its territory. Instead, they have been established on an inter-
State level and exercise their function within territories under the authority of 
sovereign States. International criminal courts and tribunals have no autonomous 
power to carry out any act within the territory of a sovereign State without its 
permission and assistance. Investigators of both parties must be given permission to 
enter into the country to conduct on-site investigations and search for potential 
witnesses as well as documentary and forensic evidence. Investigations can only be 
effective if the investigators are able to do their work freely and independently 
without the intervention of local de jure or de facto authorities or other powerful 
groups.  
 
The assistance of the local authorities is required for any investigative act that 
requires a judicial authorisation, for instance a house search or an interview with a 
prisoner. International courts and tribunals do not have their own independent police 
force with any power of arrest or other powers police officers have in domestic 
jurisdictions. Accordingly, in conducting investigations and securing arrests and 
transfers of suspects, international criminal tribunals and courts are entirely dependent 
on State cooperation.565
 
  
The ICTY and ICTR have more means than the ICC to enforce cooperation on 
unwilling States. The ICTY and ICTR have been established by the Security Council 
using chapter VII of the United Nations Charter. Therefore, they have primary 
jurisdiction in respect to crimes described in their Statutes committed in the former 
Yugoslavia or Rwanda.566 All States are under a statutory duty to cooperate fully with 
the ICTY and ICTR.567
                                                 
565 It is noteworthy that, today, there are nine outstanding arrest warrants issued by the ICC which have 
not been executed. See further S. Maupas, Cour pénale internationale: nouvelle victoire américaine, 
Le Monde, 28 July 2010. 
 These tribunals can report any refusal of States to cooperate 
fully to the Security Council, which can then take measures against these 
566 Art 7(2) ICTY Statute; 8(2) ICTR Statute and ICTY/ICTR Rules 8, 11, 56-58. See further Cryer, 
Prosecuting International Crimes, supra note 223, 127-142. 
567 Art. 29 ICTY Statute; Art. 28 ICTR Statute. 
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uncooperative States.568
 
 Whether this option has had the desired impact is 
questionable and will be analysed further in Part III. At least there is some level of 
political pressure the tribunals can assert on unwilling States. 
The ICC, on the other hand, has concurrent jurisdiction and was established on the 
basis of a treaty. In signing the Rome Statute, States-parties have committed 
themselves to cooperate fully with the Court.569 Failure to do so can be reported to the 
Assembly of States Parties. The ICC has, however, no effective power to take 
compulsory measures against States that fail to abide by their obligations. Unlike the 
ICTY and ICTR, the ICC has no power over non-States-parties.570
 
  
These are fundamental structural differences with domestic criminal courts and have 
had significant consequences. As Judge Cassese put it: 
To lose sight of this fundamental condition, and thus simply transplant into international 
law notions originating in national legal systems, might be a source of great confusion 
and misapprehension. The philosophy behind all national criminal proceedings, whether 
they take a common-law or a civil-law approach, is unique to those proceedings and 
stems from the fact that national courts operate in a context where the three fundamental 
functions (law-making, adjudication and law enforcement) are discharged by central 
organs partaking of the State’s direct authority over individuals. That logic cannot be 
simply transposed onto the international level: there, a different logic imposed by the 
different position and role of courts must perforce inspire and govern international 
criminal proceedings.571
 
  
Cassese is right. For instance, the international tribunals and court must be watchful 
so as not to compromise their political independence. Part III will assess whether they 
have dealt with the issue of State cooperation in a responsible manner. It will also 
consider to what extent there is a difference in reality between the ICC and the 
tribunals in terms of their enforcement mechanisms.  
                                                 
568 Where State authorities fail to comply with an obligation under any of the Rules in conjunction 
with Article 29 ICTY Statute or Article 28 ICTR Statute, the President may report the matter to the 
Security Council if satisfied that this is indeed the case (ICTY/ICTR Rule 7bis, Rule 11, Rule 59(B)).  
569 Rome Statute, supra note 44, Part IX. See also Jugde Kirsch: http://wwwold.icc-
cpi.int/library/about/newsletter/16/en_01.html.  
570 This is a problem, for instance, in Sudan, which is not a State-party to the Rome Statute. It has 
closed all borders for investigations carried out by anyone from the ICC. This has meant that the parties 
in the Sudan cases against Bahar Idriss Abu Garda, Abdallah Banda Abakaer Nourain and Saleh 
Mohammed Jerbo Jamus are unable to conduct investigations in the field. This makes investigations 
impossible. See further Cryer, Prosecuting International Crimes, supra note 223, 142-159; Blewitt, 
The International Criminal Tribunals, supra note 76, 145, 150-152; Chuter, War Crimes, supra note 
75, 139-149; May & Hoskins, International Criminal Law, supra note 57, 211, 216. 
571 Prosecutor v. Erdemović, A. Ch. Separate and Dissenting Opinion of Judge Cassese to Judgment of 
Appeals Chamber, IT-96-22-A, para. 5. 
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International courts and tribunals also have insufficient capacity to deal with all the 
crimes committed in a conflict. There is a limited budget, number of investigators, 
cell capacity and courtrooms. Accordingly, international courts and tribunals cannot 
deal with proceedings against more than a handful of alleged perpetrators. This forces 
the collectors of information to conduct selective investigations and focus only on a 
small percentage of the totality of the crimes committed within a particular 
geographical area and time zone. Given the dependence on State cooperation, this 
potentially leads to selective justice based on political rather than legal criteria. It also 
limits the capacity to ascertain the truth, since many aspects of the overall picture of 
the war will never be addressed by the court or tribunal.572
 
 
Cultural Diversity 
The enforcement of international justice is further complicated by the fact that the 
courts and tribunals are geographically, culturally and temporally far removed from 
the crime scene. The geographical distance between the seat of the ICTY, ICTR and 
ICC from the localities whose crimes and perpetrators they are judging makes the 
operation very costly and difficult. Unless the court or tribunal organises site visits, 
only the investigators will usually have visited the crime scene. In most situations, the 
crimes will not be investigated and assessed until years later. Evidence may get lost or 
destroyed in that time period and the memories of witnesses fade. Culturally and 
linguistically, the tribunals and courts are also separated from the local territories and 
their local people. Combs has highlighted the difficulties caused by this cultural and 
linguistic gap in assessing the credibility of the witnesses and interpreting their 
stories. Combs also pointed out that it may be more acceptable to lie in some cultures 
than in others.573
 
  
It is questionable whether the international truth-ascertainment methodology can 
adequately accommodate these unique circumstances. Significantly, only common 
law and civil law principles have ever been properly relied on in international 
criminal justice systems. Raimondo pointed out that ‘multiculturalism’ within 
                                                 
572 Chuter, War Crimes, supra note 75, 139-149. 
573 Combs, Fact-Finding Without Facts, supra note 6, 131-135. See further C. Murphy, Political 
Reconciliation and International Criminal Trials, 224-225, pointing out that such difficulties can also 
undermine reconciliation. 
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international justice systems has been reduced to ‘biculturalism’ consisting of two 
legal families: common law and civil law. To the dismay of some observers,574 other 
legal traditions are removed from most legal discussions.575
 
 
Common law and civil law systems have their differences and different historical 
roots, and reaching compromises between them can be challenging. They are 
nonetheless both Western-types of criminal methodologies and at least share their 
legal foundation. The differences between them are minimal compared to the 
differences with non-Western-types of criminal methodologies. A high number of 
non-Western criminal procedures have been influenced heavily by civil law or 
common law procedures as a result of their imposition during Colonialism. This is not 
to say that such procedures are regarded as legitimate by the local communities even 
if approved by their Government.576
 
  
There are ample countries that have adopted a different style of criminal proceedings. 
Islamic countries, for instance, apply Sharia: a set of legal rules, often misunderstood 
in the Western world.577
 
 In addition, there are various types of local criminal justice 
that have little in common with either common law or civil law. For instance, both 
Rwanda and Northern Uganda have a local justice system in place.  
Two examples of local justice 
In June 2002, Rwanda introduced Gacaca Courts, mixing local traditional conflict-
resolution with a modern retributive legal procedure to deal with genocide cases. 
They have been operational from 2005 until today. Rwanda’s President Kagame 
referred to this initiative as an “African solution to African problems”.578
                                                 
574 Bohlander, Radbruch Redux, supra note 123, 395. 
   
575 F. Raimondo, For Further Research on the Relationship Between Cultural Diversity and 
International Criminal Law, 11 International Criminal Law Review 299 (2011), 307; also B. Jia, 
Multiculturalism and the Development of the System of International Criminal Law, in S. Yee and J. 
Morin (Eds.), Multiculturalism and International Law: Essays in Honour of Edward McWhinney 
(Martinus Nijhoff, 2009) 629, 630-633. 
576 Drumbl, Atrocity, supra note 46, 126-128.  
577 See, for instance: Sadakat Kadri: Heaven on Earth: A Journey through Shari'a Law, January 2012, 
Bodley Head (book review at: http://www.guardian.co.uk/books/2012/jan/20/sharia-heaven-earth-
sadakat-kadri-review. See also Bohlander, Radbruch Redux, supra note 123, 395. 
578 Observations of President Paul Kagame at the International Peace Institute, New York, 21 
September 2009, cited by Human Rights Watch, Justice Compromised: The Legacy of Rwanda’s 
Community-Based Gacaca Courts, May 2011, available at <http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/ 
reports/rwanda0511webwcover.pdf> , last accessed January 2012, 1. 
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The term ‘gacaca’ means grass in Kinyarwanda and stems from the local custom to 
sit on the grass to resolve disputes. In the modern types of Gacaca Courts, people 
indeed sit on the grass in front of the local administration office. Seven judges from 
the local community, with little to no education and limited judicial training,579 decide 
on the fate of the defendants who face allegations of genocide. Initially, the Gacaca 
Courts dealt with all but the most serious category of genocide cases, involving 
planners, leaders, organisers, instigators, well-known killers and rapists. As of 2007, 
Gacaca Courts also had jurisdiction to deal with these most serious cases.580
 
    
Between June 2002 and the end of 2004, adult community members met weekly in a 
general assembly to gather information about what happened during the genocide and 
to identify the victims, perpetrators and lost property. As of 15 January 2005, the 
Government took over and assigned local authorities to collect information.581
 
 These 
local authorities collect their information with the assistance of local villagers and 
then present the accusations to the entire community in a verification hearing. 
Once all information is gathered and verified, the trials begin. All villagers and other 
interested parties can attend and participate in the trials.582
                                                 
579 In 2002, magistrates and law students offered a six-day compulsory training to Gacaca judges, 
which is arguably inadequate to deal with genocide cases. See further Amnesty International, Gacaca: 
A Question of Justice, December 2002, available at <http://www.amnesty.org/fr/library/>, last accessed 
January 2012. 
 A defendant is not assisted 
by counsel, but can bring family members, friends and witnesses to support him. The 
victims can do the same. There is no prosecution. A defendant may confess which 
usually decreases his sentence. If he does not confess, there will be a direct 
confrontation between the defendant and the victims, their supporters, the judges and 
580 Organic Law of 1 March 2007 Establishing the Organization, Competence and Functioning of 
Gacaca Courts Charged with Prosecuting and Trying the Perpetrators of the Crime of Genocide and 
other Crimes Against Humanity, Committed between October 1, 1990 and December 31, 1994, article 
11.  
581 National Service of Gacaca Jurisdictions (SNJG), Procedure for the Gathering of Information in the 
Gacaca Courts, Truth-Justice-Reconciliation, Kigali, November 2004, in: “Monitoring and Research 
Report on the Gacaca Information-Gathering during the National Phase” June 2006 at: 
http://www.penalreform.org/files/rep-ga8-2006-info-gathering-en_o.pdf.  
582 Initially, many community members appeared but over the years, people stopped appearing out of 
fear of being identified as a ‘genocidaire’ or of demonstrating emotions, or because they had to earn a 
living. Local authorities put pressure on people to attend, imposed fines or used defence forces to 
enforce their appearance. In 2004, participation was made compulsory through Article 29 of the 
Gacaca Law. See further HRW, Justice Compromised, supra note 573, 83-93. 
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everyone else who was a witness to the events. Each of them is expected to say 
publicly what they know about the defendant’s conduct during the course of the 
genocide. If the confrontation gets out of hand, the judges may warn any person 
stirring up emotional heat or even charge him with contempt and order his 
imprisonment up to several months. If found guilty, the defendant may face 
community service or a prison sentence with or without special provisions. If he is 
found guilty of property crimes only, the sentence imposed could be compensation.583 
If the defendant has disappeared the judges may contemplate charging a member of 
his family instead.584
 
  
Leaving its deficiencies aside,585 the gacaca type of justice appears to be much more 
community-based and involve everyone concerned.586
 
 
In Northern Uganda, the Acholi community has its own traditional justice system, 
which is more ceremonial than punitive in nature. Mato oput (bitter root or justice) is 
the common nominator in the Acholi justice for healing rituals and blessings 
performed by rwodi moo (anointed chiefs). These ceremonies blend various 
traditional ceremonies. The most well-known traditional ceremonies are the mato oput 
(bitter root or juice), and the gomo tong (bending of spears). Traditionally, if someone 
had been killed, Acholi traditional chiefs led a mato oput ceremony between the 
wrongdoer and a representative of the harmed family. The wrongdoer had to confess 
                                                 
583 See further ibid, 73-80. 
584 Based on personal observation in Gacaca information gatherings and trials in 2005 and 2006. 
585 There is ample criticism. It is often suggested that people cannot speak out freely because they all 
live in the same neighbourhoods and fear for their lives or livelihood, or they fear being accused as 
‘genocidaires’. In addition, the fact that the defendant is not entitled to employ counsel is considered as 
unfair. See HRW, Justice Compromised, supra note 573; C. Tertsakian, Le Château, The Lives of 
Prisoners in Rwanda (Arves Books, 2008), 360-380. 
586 Based on personal observation in Gacaca information gatherings and trials in 2005 and 2006. See 
also: ibid. In addition, see reports of Penal Reform International, Amnesty International and Avocats 
Sans Frontières, published at their websites <www.penalreform.org/>; <www.amnesty.org>; and 
<www.asf.be>. In particular, see Penal Reform International, PRI Research on Gacaca Report No. 4: 
The Guilty Plea Procedure, Cornerstone of the Rwandan Justice System, January 2003, available at 
http://www.penalreform.org/publications/gacaca-research-report-no4-guilty-plea-procedure-
cornerstone-rwandan-justice-system-o, last accessed January 2012; Avocats Sans Frontièrs, Monitoring 
of the Gacaca Courts, Judgment Phase: Analytical Report No. 2, October 2005 – September 2006, 
available at <http://www.asf.be/publications/Rwanda_MonitoringGacaca_RapportAnalytique2_EN 
.pdf>, last accessed January 2012; Avocats Sans Frontièrs, Monitoring of the Gacaca Courts, Judgment 
Phase: Analytical Report No. 3, October 2006 – April 2007, available at <http://www.asf.be/ 
publications/Rwanda_MonitoringGacaca_RapportAnalytique3_EN.pdf> , last accessed January 2012; 
Avocats Sans Frontièrs, Monitoring Des Juridictions Gacaca, Phase de Jugement: Rapport Analytique 
No. 5, janvier 2008 – mars 2010, available at: <http://www.asf.be/publications/Rwanda_ 
MonitoringGacaca_RapportAnalytique5_Light.pdf>, last accessed January 2012. 
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to his wrongdoing, ask for forgiveness and accept to pay compensation. Then, to 
reconcile social divisions, both the wrongdoer and the family representative were to 
drink the blood of a sacrificed sheep mixed with mato oput. The gomo tong was 
performed to seal the conflict resolution between clans. Nowadays, these ceremonies 
are used to reintegrate former members of the Lord Resistance Army (“LRA”) into 
society by offering them forgiveness.587
  
 
Such criminal justice methods differ substantially from the international method. 
These local justice systems can reach out to the direct victims of a conflict in a much 
more engaging and impacting manner than an international court. They may also be 
more efficient in ascertaining the truth. It is often stated that within the local 
community everyone knows exactly what happened and who did what. The truth 
could potentially come out less shaped in a community-based justice model.588
 
  
This corresponds with the initial reaction to the introduction of the Gacaca Courts 
from many Rwandan prisoners. The majority of them had been waiting for justice for 
many years. They were initially very positive about the idea of Gacaca and thought 
that the truth had a better chance of getting out during such trials. They also thought it 
would have a positive effect on reconciliation. They, however, rapidly lost their 
faith.589 Years before the Gacaca Courts were operational, the prisoners had 
introduced their own unofficial Gacaca system in prison under charge of a committee 
of prisoners who presided over, and recorded the Gacaca meetings. The prisoners had 
much greater faith in their own Gacaca system.590
 
 
                                                 
587 T. Allen, Trial Justice: The International Criminal Court and the Lord’s Resistance Army, (Zed 
Books, 2006) 128-168; D. Pain, The Bending of the Spears: Producing Consensus for Peace & 
Development in Northern Uganda, (London International Alert and Kacoke Madit, 1997), published at: 
www.km-net.org/publications/spear.doc. 
588 Truth and reconciliation were among the core objectives of the Gacaca Courts in trying genocide 
cases. See Speech of the Vice-President and Minister of Defence on the Occasion of the Opening of the 
Seminar on Gacaca Tribunals, Kigali, 18 June 2002, reproduced by Penal Reform International in PRI 
Research on Gacaca Report: Rapport III, April – June 2002, available at 
<http://www.penalreform.org/publications/gacaca-research-report-no3-jurisdictions-pilot-phase-o>, 
last accessed January 2012. 
589 See Tertsakian, Le Château, supra note 580, 376-377. 
590 Ibid, 364-366. 
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Impact of Local Justice on International Justice 
These systems, as well as any other system with different rationales and modalities of 
punishment have largely been ignored in drafting, interpreting and implementing the 
legal provisions of any of the international courts or tribunals. This is particularly 
striking because it is mainly these countries that are subject to the jurisdiction of 
international courts and tribunals.591
 
  
Drumbl is of the firm view that indigenous approaches are not sufficiently 
incorporated into the international criminal justice methodology. Too little attention is 
paid to local views on justice and what the communities who suffered the most want 
from international justice. Drumbl proposes that horizontal and vertical approaches be 
included. He defines horizontal approaches as the inclusion of extralegal interventions 
in addition to meting out punishment. Vertical approaches refer to the inclusion of 
bottom-up influence of local communities and societal institutions.592
 
  
Almqvist also emphasised the importance of cultural proximity.593 It is imperative 
that local cultural norms and perceptions are considered. Failure to do so may 
undermine the legitimacy of international tribunals which essentially depends on their 
acceptance by the affected communities, as well as the international community. 
Local communities are less likely to acknowledge international tribunals as legitimate 
if they cannot identify with them at all.594 A lack of consideration for local cultures 
can also affect the ability to ascertain the truth. It would create a gap between the 
assessors and those who are being assessed.595
 
  
According to Doak, international justice focuses predominantly on retribution, while 
it addresses restorative elements inadequately.596
                                                 
591 Drumbl, Atrocity, supra note 46, 7. 
 Clark suggests that further studies 
592 Ibid, 125-127, 181-187. 
593 J. Almqvist, The Impact of Cultural Diversity on International Criminal Proceedings, 4 Journal of 
International Criminal Justice (2006), 746-747. 
594 I. Bostian, Cultural Relativism in International War Crimes Prosecutions: The International 
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, 12 ILSA Journal of International & Comparative Law 1 (2005-2006), 
1-3; See also C. Bickerton, P. Cunliffe, & A. Gourevitch (Eds.), Politics without Sovereignty: A 
Critique of Contemporary International Relations (UCL Press, 2007). 
595 Ibid; see also Raimondo, For Further Research, supra note 575, 299-314; Combs, Fact-Finding 
Without Facts, supra note 6. 
596 Doak, The Therapeutic Dimension of Transitional Justice, supra note 59, 295-296. 
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are required on “how to bridge the gap between transitional justice processes and 
local communities”.597
 
 
International courts seek to be culturally sensitive. They recruit people from all over 
the world. This can lead to difficulties. Lawyers do not all share the same education, 
experience, language and legal qualifications. It is then hard to compare the profiles 
of potential candidates. In addition, many among them, particular those who have no 
background in common law or civil law, may have great difficulties in familiarising 
themselves with the international procedural rules.598
 
 
The new ICC chief Prosecutor is an African woman. Her candidacy was supported by 
the African Union.599 She appears to have been selected in part on the basis of her 
African origin and gender. The ICC thereby hopes to tackle the criticism that it is an 
anti-African court, as it has so far only addressed situations in Africa.600
 
 It remains to 
be seen whether her appointment will strengthen the legitimacy of the court in the 
eyes of African nations. 
Judges are selected on the basis of their geographical representation as well as of the 
principal legal systems of the world.601
 
 Yet, it is questionable whether the recruitment 
of judges worldwide, including those from countries that are subject to the jurisdiction 
of the court, helps to bring the tribunal closer to the affected areas. Judges are 
recruited from the educated elite and may have little familiarity with the villagers 
even from their own country.  
                                                 
597 Clark, Transitional Justice, Truth and Reconciliation, supra note 68, 256. 
598 Chuter, War Crimes, supra note 75, 133-134. Bohlander, Basic Concepts of German Criminal 
Procedure, supra note 123. 
599 African Union, Executive Council, Nineteenth Ordinary Session, 23-28 June 2011, Malabo, 
Equatorial Guinea, EX.CL/Dec.665(XIX): Decision on African Candidatures for Posts Within the 
International System, Doc. Ex.CL/673(XIX). 
600 F. Bensouda, caution africaine de la CPI, published in Slate Afrique, 12/12/2011; and Women’s 
Initiative for Gender Justice, Election of the Prosecutor for the International Criminal Court, available 
at <http://www.iccwomen.org/documents/Prosecutor-Election-2011.pdf>.  
 See also her own interview in Jeune Afrique where she states clearly that she intends to defeat the 
accusation that the Court is racist against Africa: 
http://www.jeuneafrique.com/Article/ARTJAJA2657p050-051.xml0/cpi-gambie-laurent-gbagbo-cour-
penale-internationalefatou-bensouda-non-la-cpi-n-est-pas-a-la-solde-des-blancs.html. 
601 Article 13bis(1)(c); Article 13ter(1)(c) ICTR Statute; Article 12bis(1)(c); Article 12ter(1)(c) ICTR 
Statute.  
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The ICC, more than the ICTY and ICTR, must consider local justice systems, as it 
can intervene only if such systems are perceived as inadequate or unwilling to deal 
with a case.602 Further, the Prosecutor has an explicit statutory obligation to take into 
account the “interests of victims” and the “interests of justice”.603
 
  
The Prosecutor also issued a policy paper in September 2003, encouraging States and 
civil society “to take ownership of the Court”, and promising to consider “the need to 
respect the diversity of legal systems, traditions and cultures”.604
 
  
Thus, the ICC attempts to be cognisant of cultural diversity. Whilst it is important to 
create cultural awareness within international systems, it should not be overlooked 
that cultural differences can also be exaggerated. This is evident from the above-
described local justice systems in Rwanda and Northern Uganda. 
 
Exaggeration of Cultural Differences 
The Gacaca Courts were no longer in use in Rwanda. The traditional version came 
into existence in the pre-colonial period and remained in use until 1962. The Gacaca 
Courts were previously never used for serious crimes before. Rather, they were used 
to settle property, monetary and personal injury disputes. Community elders were the 
mediators between the families involved in the dispute. The emphasis was on social 
harmony rather than punishment and compensation. As a means of reconciliation, the 
losing family could be ordered to offer beer to the community. They were re-
introduced for the purpose of trying the many thousands of suspects of genocide, 
imprisoned for years in the overcrowded prisons in Rwanda. However, apart from the 
name, the modern Gacaca justice system dealing with genocide has little in common 
with the traditional Gacaca justice system. In particular, they differ in the modern 
Gacaca system being retributive more than restorative.605
 
 
                                                 
602 See further Article 17(1)(a) of the Rome Statute, supra note 44. 
603 Article 53(1)(c); Article 53(2)(c); Article 54(1)(b) of the Rome Statute, supra note 44. 
604 ICC paper on some policy issues before the Office of the Prosecutor, ICC-OTP, September 2003 
(published at www.icc-cpi.int/otp/otp_policy.html), 2, 5. 
605 See HRW, Justice Compromised, supra note 573, 17-26. 
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The modern Gacaca Courts are criticised for being heavily Government-controlled as 
well as corrupt and unfair.606 NGOs which have monitored the Gacaca trials cite 
ample examples of defendants being pressured to pay witnesses or judges; Gacaca 
trials being used to settle old scores; and the Rwandan authorities being involved 
directly or indirectly in influencing the outcome. Monitoring Reports state that judges 
and witnesses are frequently bribed, harassed, intimidated or simply pressured to 
conduct themselves in a manner securing convictions.607
 
 At times, this pressure 
appears to come from the community, and at times from the authorities. It is, 
therefore, not infrequent that the Government rather than the community determines 
the fate of the defendants in the name of community justice.  
Similarly, the mato oput and gomo tong were no longer in use for twenty years or 
more when they were reintroduced in 1999. The Acholi elders insist that the mato 
oput ceremony of forgiveness is more suitable to the Acholi culture than retributive 
justice. They want to use the same ceremony in relation to the leaders of the LRA 
against whom the ICC has issued a warrant of arrest.608 Many observers support their 
views and consider that the ICC should not intervene in the local attempts at 
reintegration and reconciliation.609
 
  
Tim Allen, a cultural anthropologist who spent over four years in Northern Uganda, 
expresses a different view. He describes the traditional justice system as “deeply 
flawed” because it does not offer a national solution.610
                                                 
606 See Tertsakian, Le Château, supra note 580, 360-380; HRW, Justice Compromised, ibid; PRI and 
ASF Reports cited above, supra note 582. 
 Allen and his team of 
researchers have conducted many interviews with members of the Acholi community. 
These interviews depict a different reality and suggest that more Acholi people than 
assumed disagree that the mato oput ceremony offers a solid alternative to retributive 
justice. A large number of the interviewed members of the Acholi community, who 
607 See particularly HRW, Justice Compromised, supra note 573, 90-121. 
608 Allen, Trial Justice, supra note 582, 132-138.  
609 For instance: Caritas, Gulu Archdiocese, Traditional Ways of Preventing and Solving Conflicts in 
Acholi, Psychosocial Support Programme, January 2005. See also Drumbl, Atrocity, supra note 46, 
145. L. Hovil & J. Quinn, Peace First, Justice Later: Traditional Justice in Northern Uganda, Refugee 
Law Project Working Paper no. 17, Makerere University, July 2005, available at 
<www.research@refugeelawproject.org>, ways are suggested to reconcile the ICC retributive justice 
with the Acholi restorative justice.  
610 T. Allen, Bitter Roots: The ‘Invention’ of Acholi Traditional Justice, in T. Allen & K. Vlassenroot, 
The Lord’s Resistance Army, Myth and Reality (2010) 242, at 259. 
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are the most affected by the LRA crimes, prefer punishment over forgiveness.611 The 
empirical research conducted by the International Center for Transitional Justice and 
Human Rights Center has reached a similar conclusion.612
 
   
Cultural differences can, therefore, be used in a manipulative manner to justify an 
outdated or inhuman local practice.613 It can also occur that cultural diversity is used 
as a cover-up for an outright lie, or exaggerated for other negative purposes. It is not 
entirely clear what the affected communities want from justice. Opinions also differ 
among individuals within the affected communities.614 The question is then which 
view is authoritative and represents the view of the entire local community most 
accurately.615
 
 
Most likely, individual victims from all over the world have their own views on 
justice and forgiveness. Some of them prefer justice over peace and reconciliation; 
others prefer peace and reconciliation over justice. At least, there does not appear to 
be a striking difference between what victims want in Northern Uganda and Rwanda 
versus in the West. Similar to Western-type justice systems, the Gacaca Courts are 
focused on retributive rather than restorative justice. Many of the Acholi people have 
also stated a preference for retributive over restorative justice. Allen suggests that the 
Acholi people do not constitute ‘a race apart’, but resemble people elsewhere.616
 
 
Thus, the differences between “them” and “us” are perhaps overstated.  
An additional difficulty for the ICC is that it deals with a variety of regions each with 
their own unique cultural framework. The ICC should, therefore, not adopt a “one-
                                                 
611 Allen, Trial Justice, supra note 582, 138-168. See also ibid, 258-261. 
612 International Center for Transitional Justice and the Human Rights Center (Berkeley), Forgotten 
Voices: A Population-Based Survey on Attitudes about Peace and Justice in Northern Uganda (2005), 
available at <http://ictj.org/sites/default/files/ICTJ-HRC-Uganda-Voices-2005-English.pdf>, last 
accessed December 2011. Of the 2585 adults that were interviewed in April and May 2005, 22 percent 
preferred forgiveness and reconciliation, and 66 percent preferred punishment. 
613 See also May & Hoskins, International Criminal Law, supra note 57. 
614 As is clearly suggested by Allen’s empirical research. See above, supra note 582. See also: Max-
Planck-Institute for Foreign and International Criminal Law – Ernesto Kiza, Corene Rathgeber & 
Holger-C. Rohne, Victims of War: An Empirical Study on Victimization and Victims’ Attitudes 
towards Addressing Atrocieties (HHamburger Edition HIS-Verlags GmbH, Hamburg, 2006) available 
online at http://www.his-online.de. Participants in this survey interviewed victims in 11 areas including 
DRC, Kosovo and Bosnia. Most of them are in favour of prosecution of at least those most responsible 
for their suffering.  
615 Allen, Trial Justice, supra note 582, 128-181, particularly 176-177. 
616 Ibid, 181. 
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size-fits-all” approach.617 The success of a specific methodology in one post-conflict 
region does not guarantee its success in another post-conflict region.618
 
  
Thus, it is difficult to create a methodology that would encompass all different 
cultural elements. Each specific situation demands its own individual approach.619 
The international procedure should, therefore, be applied with a level of flexibility so 
it can be adjusted to each situation with its own cultural specifics. In Clark’s view, 
international justice “needs to be contextually and culturally sensitive”.620
 
 
A final issue to be considered is how far international justice should go in 
accommodating local justice practices that are not in accordance with its standards of 
fairness. ICTY Appeals Judge Meron firmly stated that “there can be no cutting 
corners” in upholding due process principles.621 However, not everyone shares this 
view. Drumbl, for instance, has observed that the notion of due process is a typically 
Western concept, which is transplanted to conflict areas where it may not be respected 
in the same manner. While not suggesting due process is irrelevant, he states that 
“justice is not a recipe and due process is not a magic ingredient”.622
 
 
Part III will address the question of whether the international methodology is capable 
of dealing adequately with the cultural challenges, as well as other challenges it is 
faced with in the unique context of international justice. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
617 M. Findlay, Decolonising Restoration and Justice, 10 Current Issues in Criminal Justice (1998) 85-
89; Doak, The Therapeutic Dimension of Transitional Justice, supra note 59, 296; Clark, Transitional 
Justice, Truth and Reconciliation, supra note 68, 245. 
618 Clark, Transitional Justice, Truth and Reconciliation, supra note 68, 245. 
619 Drumbl, Atrocity, supra note 46, 185-187; Findlay, Decolonising, supra note 612, 88. 
620 Clark, Transitional Justice, Truth and Reconciliation, supra note 68, 245. 
621 Cited in M. Drumbl, The Expressive Value of Prosecuting and Punishing Terrorists: Hamdan, the 
Geneva Conventions, and International Criminal Law, 75 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1165 (2007). 
622 Drumbl, Atrocity, supra note 46, 136. 
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Investigations 
 
General Observations 
 
 
As previously held, a minimum condition for a successful truth inquiry is that the 
collectors of the evidence have access to sufficient probative and reliable information 
that is sufficiently relevant to the subject of the inquiry. Thus, the efficiency of 
investigations is of the utmost importance.623
 
  
In addition, it is important that the inquiry is conducted in an unbiased fashion and 
produces information reflecting all views equally and fairly. The goal is to present to 
the adjudicators the fullest picture of the events in question. To the extent possible, 
this picture should be based on all attainable and available relevant, probative and 
reliable incriminating and exonerating evidence.  
 
This is always difficult, given that one seeks to reconstruct facts that have already 
occurred in the past. Evidence may be lost. Documents may have been destroyed and 
witnesses may have died or disappeared. It has already been noted that it is impossible 
to reconstruct the facts fully and to obtain all relevant evidence. One should 
nonetheless seek to get close to this goal. For this, it is important that the inquiry is 
complete and conducted with the utmost care and scrutiny and that all potential leaks 
have been explored. The gathering of evidence is the most essential part of the inquiry 
because without adequate information, the fact finders are in no position to make any 
findings. 
 
Various methods can be applied to achieve this. As aforementioned, international 
criminal justice systems apply the adversarial investigative method. They rely 
exclusively on the parties to collect and produce the evidence. Each is responsible to 
present their side of the story. To produce the fullest picture in such a setting, it is 
                                                 
623 This was recognised by the Registrar from the ICC, Ms Arbia. She said “it break or makes a case”. 
See the Geneva Conference, supra note 173. See also Schomburg, Truth-Finding in the International 
Courtroom: The ad-hoc Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and Rwanda (ICTR), Lecture 
Outline, Utrecht 29 March 2008. 
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essential that both parties have an equal and adequate opportunity to conduct effective 
investigations. For this, both parties must be given adequate time and facilities.624
 
  
Equality of Arms in Practice 
 
Thus, the principle of equality of arms must be upheld throughout the investigations. 
In theory, this principle is applied fully at all stages of the proceedings. In reality, 
however, the parties are never equal, whether on a domestic or international level. On 
a domestic level, the prosecution represents the State and has a police force to rely on 
to conduct the investigations. On an international level, there is no State, but the 
Prosecutor’s office is one of the organs of the tribunal or court. Defence counsel, on 
the other hand, is a visitor. At the ICTY, there is one office to share with all defence 
teams, as well as a limited number of additional offices in another building. The ICTR 
has defence offices for defence teams on trial. It however does not offer paper and 
other work material to the defence. The ICC offers better facilities to the defence 
including offices and office equipment.  
 
In the two ad hoc tribunals, a defence structure has been established to represent the 
defence – in the ICTR by defence counsel themselves and in the ICTY by the 
Registry. Initially, these structures had little significance, but over the years, their role 
and influence has increased to the extent that they are even consulted directly for 
proposed amendments to the rules. The defence is, however, not recognised as an 
official organ of the court, which, according to some commentators, amounts to an 
‘architectural defect’.625
 
  
In the ICC, the Office of Public Counsel for the Defence (“OPCD”), an official 
registry organ, assists the defence and represents its views in any negotiations with 
other sections. The OPCD can also propose rules amendments or object to 
propositions. The OPCD typically asks individual defence teams for their views on 
                                                 
624 Unlike in US or UK, due process principles apply equally to both parties. See Prosecutor v. Tadic, 
Decision on the Prosecutor’s Motion Requesting Protective Measures for Victims and Witnesses, IT-
94-1, 10 August 1995, paras 55, 72. 
625 See E. Groulx, The Defence Pillar: Making the Defence a Full Partner in the International 
Criminal Justice System, Conference paper, The Hague Conference, 3-4 November 2000. S. Johnson, 
On the Road to Disaster: The Rights of the Accused and the International Criminal Tribunal for the 
Former Yugoslavia, 10(1) International Legal Perspectives 111 (1998), 117-119.  
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any issue which touches on the defence. This partly rectifies the imbalance between 
the two parties. It provides the defence with an institutional voice and significant 
assistance in conducting legal research.  
 
Thus, a change in mentality has occurred over the years. Whilst initially the defence 
was merely regarded as an outside and disruptive body to the system, there is 
presently much more comprehension for the position of the defence and it is listened 
to more frequently than in the past.626
 
  
The parties nonetheless remain unequal in conducting investigations. The accused has 
one, possibly two, defence counsel, as well as a handful of supporting staff members. 
The Prosecutor’s office is regarded as one organ. It has, therefore, many more people 
available to work on one case than the defence and a greater budget to spend on 
investigations. Thus, the Prosecutor has an institutional advantage over the defence 
and has significantly more resources available to him.627
 
  
For years, investigators for the prosecution have continually investigated the alleged 
crimes. Unless he is being interrogated or imprisoned, a suspect may not even be 
aware of the investigation against him. In most cases, an accused has not done any 
defence preparations before he is in the custody of the tribunals or court and has 
recruited a defence team. Still later, he receives all incriminating material necessary 
with which to prepare a defence.628
 
  
Once the accused is within the custody of the tribunals or court, his means to prepare 
personally a defence are limited, given that the tribunals or court are located in areas 
remote from the crime scene. In addition, the contacts of the accused with the outside 
                                                 
626 For instance, there is more inclusion of the defence in meetings, and their views are requested and 
considered in rule or other amendments. There is also greater access to parts in the building. Whilst the 
defence initially could only enter the courtroom and defence room of the ICTY, it now has also access 
to the cafeteria and library.  
627 C Buisman, Defence and Fair Trial, in R. Haveman, O. Kavran & J. Nicholls (Eds.), Supranational 
Criminal Law: a System Sui Generis (Intersentia, 2003), Chapter VI, 228-231. 
628 Ibid; See further M. Wladimiroff, Rights of Suspects and Accused, in: Gabrielle Kirk McDonald & 
Olivia Swaak Goldman (eds.): Substantive and Procedural Aspects of International Criminal Law. The 
experience of International and National Courts, Vol I, Commentary, Chapter 11, at 429. See also M. 
Wladimiroff: Position of the Defence: The Role of Defence Counsel before the ICTY and the ICTR, in 
H. Bevers & C. Joubert, An Independent Defence before the International Criminal Court (Intersentia 
2002) 35-42, at 39. 
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world are restricted and subject to monitoring. He, therefore, relies mostly on his 
defence team to conduct investigations and prepare his defence.  
 
In such circumstances, it is not realistic to offer equal means to the defence, nor is it 
necessary in light of their different roles and burdens. The tribunals confirmed that 
equality of arms is not tantamount to equality of means and resources.629 In the view 
of Goldstone, who was the first chief Prosecutor of the ICTY and ICTR, one should 
do away with the notion of equality of arms because it is a promise that cannot be 
fulfilled. Instead, the test should be whether the defence has sufficient resources.630
 
 
The question then is what amounts to sufficient resources. If there is reason for doubt 
concerning the guilt of an accused, it is not to be expected that such doubt will be 
raised by the prosecution. Therefore, it is essential that the defence has sufficient 
means to investigate.  
 
The sufficiency of means must be determined against the background of each specific 
case. Investigations in remote areas are expensive and time-consuming for both 
parties. It includes airfare and possibly expensive hotel fees. If the crime base area is 
wide, it requires additional travel time and expenses. For instance, potential ICTR 
witnesses are spread throughout the world, but mostly in Europe and Africa. 
Particularly many defence witnesses have fled Rwanda in 1994 and now live 
elsewhere. This requires a larger budget for the defence than in a situation where all 
witnesses live in one place. In the DRC, the parties have had to divide their limited 
resources to investigate and meet potential witnesses in places separated by 
considerable distance. Travel and communication in these areas is difficult and time 
consuming. Possible contacts have often moved to different and distant Provinces. 
Others are to be found in remote, country villages or rural areas. Possession of mobile 
phones, the only available telephone, is limited. Security issues have occasionally 
prevented investigations, or limited the opportunity to conduct them.631
                                                 
629 The Prosecutor v. Clément Kayishema and Obed Ruzindana, Case N° ICTR-95-1-A, Appeals 
Chamber, Appeals Judgement, 1 June 2001, [63], [69].  
  
630 Conference of the International Bar Association, held in The Hague, Netherlands, 9 June 2009; also 
see IBA Equality of Arms Review - Issue 3, July 2009. 
631 The Prosecution supervisor of investigations in the DRC case of Katanga & Ngudjolo testified 
about such general obstacles in conducting investigations. See ICC-01/04-01/07-T-81-Red-ENG WT 
25-11-2009 6/79 NB T, page 10. Similar arguments have been raised by the Katanga defence in: ICC-
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Given their more limited budget, such circumstances affect the defence to a much 
greater extent than the Prosecution. For instance, the Prosecution often chooses to 
meet and interview its witnesses, or potential witnesses, in surroundings conducive to 
an interview. Some Prosecution witnesses in the Katanga & Ngudjolo case were met 
on ‘safe’ territory, such as at The Hague, or in Uganda, or elsewhere, where in 
addition the facilities are better. The defence does not have the means to do so, and 
has no office space available to it in the country where it must conduct investigations. 
Accordingly, it has to meet its witnesses in their mud huts or houses, or public places 
such as bars, restaurants or hotel lobbies often without electricity. In addition, the 
defence only has its investigator to rely on for translations.632
 
 
Such circumstances should be taken into account when determining the defence 
investigative budget. The international criminal justice systems are attempting to offer 
the defence the necessary means. In the view of defence counsel, however, the budget 
attributed to the defence is far from adequate.633 The defence must constantly 
negotiate its investigative budget with the registry. The registry generally seeks to be 
reasonable, and over the years, the defence budget has become more realistic. 
Nonetheless, whenever the tribunal or court is faced with budgetary problems, the 
defence budget is generally the first to be downgraded. There are currently pending 
negotiations at the ICC regarding the defence budget for 2012 and after. The ICC 
State Parties have refused to increase the total ICC budget. Therefore, the registry 
intends to reduce the defence expenditure by 15 percent and has proposed drastic cuts 
in their salaries and investigation budget.634
                                                                                                                                           
01/04-01/07-2709-Red, Defence Request for Leave to Meet Four Defence Witnesses in The Hague 
Prior to Their Testimony, 17 February 2011. This is also based on the author’s own experience in 
conducting field operations. 
 Thus, in general, defence counsel 
legitimately consider their resources insufficient.  
632 Ibid. This is also based on the author’s own experience in conducting field operations in DRC. The 
chief Prosecution investigator in the Katanga & Ngudjolo case complained that the Prosecution also 
had a limited amount of safe and suitable interview locations available. She was willing to concede that 
the defence faced similar difficulties. However, she said that she was not in a position to confirm that, 
as a result of more limited funding, the defence suffered from them to a greater extent than the 
Prosecution. See ICC-01/04-01/07-T-81-Red-ENG WT 25-11-2009 6/79 NB T, page 10; ICC-01/04-
01/07-T-81-Red-ENG WT 25-11-2009, p. 59. 
633 David Hooper Q.C. (Interview in The Hague, 3 June 2010), Peter Robinson (Interview in The 
Hague, 21 November 2009) and Gregor Guy-Smith (Interview in The Hague, 12 April 2011). 
634 Discussion Paper on the Review of the ICC Legal Aid System, 626 Annex, internal document – on 
file with the author.  
 
 
161 
 
The Prosecution’s means may not be sufficient either. If done properly, investigations 
are very expensive for both parties, and the prosecution’s budget is not unlimited, 
albeit significantly larger than the budget for the defence.635
 
 In addition, both parties 
suffer from hindrances inherent to international justice, as already touched upon in 
Part II. These hindrances will now be considered in light of the practice of the ICTY, 
ICTR and ICC. 
Prohibition of Contact with the Parties 
 
At the ICTY and ICTR, before the parties are put on the stand, the parties are entitled 
to be in contact with their witnesses and prepare them for testimony upon their arrival 
at the seat of the court. This has led to many legal disputes, as new allegations are 
often made during such meetings. These new allegations are then disclosed to the 
defence in the form of an unsigned "supplementary information sheet" (ICTY) or a 
"will-say statement" (ICTR). Sometimes, they include references to criminal conduct 
of the accused that the witness has never raised before.636 This seriously hampers the 
defence in preparing an effective cross-examination in respect to the new issues. An 
effective cross-examination requires an adequate investigation into the allegations. 
This includes their verification by speaking to other people in the field who have 
knowledge of them. This is a time-consuming exercise.637
 
 
Being routinely confronted with new evidence on the eve of the witnesses’ 
testimonies, the defence in the ICTY case of Limaj et al requested that the meetings 
between the Prosecutor and the witness be videotaped or otherwise transcribed and 
disclosed as a signed statement to the defence. This request was rejected, as the 
“practice of proofing, by both the Prosecution and Defence, has been in place and 
                                                 
635 See ICC-01/04-01/07-T-81-Red-ENG WT 25-11-2009 6/79 NB T, page 10; ICC-01/04-01/07-T-81-
Red-ENG WT 25-11-2009, page 59. 
636 For instance, in the case of Bagosora et al, witness DBQ mentioned one of the four accused, Mr. 
Kabiligi, for the first time in a meeting with the Prosecutor a few days prior to his testimony. See: 
Prosecutor v. Bagosora et al., Decision on Admissibility of Evidence of Witness DBQ, November 18, 
2003. 
637 This is confirmed by the author’s own experience in conducting investigations, as well as that of her 
colleagues. See personal interviews with David Hooper Q.C. (3 June 2010) and Peter Robinson (21 
November 2009) both conducted in The Hague. 
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accepted since the inception of the Tribunal”.638 The Chamber considered that 
alternative measures could be taken to remedy the late notice to the defence, 
depending on the circumstances of each individual situation.639 In most cases, 
Chambers permit the Prosecutor to lead the new evidence in examining the witnesses 
at trial, but postpone the cross-examination to allow the defence adequate time to 
prepare.640 The Appeals Chamber has accepted that it is within the Trial Chambers’ 
discretion to allow witness proofing notwithstanding the silence on this issue in the 
Statutes or Rules.641
 
 
The ICC put an end to this widely endorsed, but highly contentious practice. On 
request of the defence,642 the Trial Chamber in Lubanga held that neither party is 
entitled to proof their witnesses from the moment that they are within the control of 
the Victims and Witnesses Unit (“VWU”) whose task it is to familiarise the witness 
with Court practice and testimony.643 In the case of Katanga & Ngudjolo, the defence 
stated its agreement with the prohibition of “substantive preparation of a witness for 
their in court testimony,” or “a preparation session directly before giving 
testimony”.644 Indeed, it strongly objected to such a practice, which strongly implies 
“rehearsing” or “training” a witness, and is thus “capable of abuse”.645
 
 
However, the defence expressed concern that the manner in which the matter had 
been resolved in the Lubanga case may create unfairness, in particular for the 
Defence. Rather than prohibiting all contact, the defence requested that the parties 
                                                 
638 Prosecutor v. Limaj et al., IT-03-66-T, Decision on Defence Motion on Prosecution Practice of 
"Proofing" Witnesses, 10 December, 2004, p. 2. 
639 Ibid, p. 3; Prosecutor v. Limaj et al., IT-03-66-T, Decision on Joint Defence Motion on 
Prosecution's Late and Incomplete Disclosure, 7 June, 2005, para. 26. 
640 Ibid; see also: Prosecutor v. Bagosora et al., Decision on Admissibility of Evidence of Witness 
DBQ, November 18, 2003; Prosecution v. Bagosora et al, Written Reasons for Oral Decision of 
February 18, 2004 on Motions for Further Postponements of Testimony of Witness DBQ, March 1, 
2004; Prosecutor v. Bagosora et al., Decision on Admissibility of Evidence of Witness DP, November 
18, 2003. In some cases, the new evidence was excluded: Prosecutor v. Nahimana et al, Oral Ruling of 
March 1, 2001, pp. 9564-9562; Prosecutor v. Casimir Bizimungu et al, Oral Decision of December 3, 
2003. 
641 Prosecutor v. Karemera et al, Case No. ICTR-98-44-AR73.8, Appeal Chamber, Decision on 
Interlocutory Appeal Regarding Witness Proofing, 11 May 2007, paragraph 8. 
642 ICC-01/04-01/06-T-58-ENG 30 October 2007, page 73. 
643 Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Decision Regarding the Practices Used to Prepare and Familiarise 
Witnesses for Giving Testimony at Trial, ICC-01/04-01/06-1049, 30 November, 2007. 
644 Defence Observations Regarding Registry Reports 821 and 842, ICC-01/04-01/07-857-Conf, dated 
28 January 2009, para. 10. 
645 Ibid. 
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could meet their witnesses in The Hague prior to the commencement of the 
familiarisation process. The Defence submitted the following arguments:646
 
 
What is of concern to the Defence is if a defence witness were to travel, for 
example, to the Hague, fell immediately into the welcoming hands of the VWU, and 
the Defence were thereafter unable to communicate with their witness, nor, if need 
be, to take a further and more extensive statement from the witness. This is a 
particular concern for the Defence as circumstances often do not permit sufficient 
time and contact with potential witnesses to enable a full and satisfactory review of 
their potential contribution to the case. The Defence lack the financial and logistical 
support available to the Prosecution. It is to be noted that the Prosecution’s 
interviews with their witnesses often run into several days, with a team of 
professional investigators supervising and conducting the interviews, all of which 
are recorded. The Defence do not have that capacity. From experience, many 
defence witness interviews take place in imperfect, and sometimes difficult, 
circumstances. The opportunity to meet with and conduct further fact finding 
interviews with witnesses is an important factor for the Defence in its preparation of 
a complex case and the witnesses presence at the Hague is a further and economical 
opportunity to do that. Such an exercise is to be distinguished from the prohibited 
exercise of ‘rehearsing’ or ‘witness proofing’ as characterized by the Prosecution in 
the Lubanga case and the object of judicial disapproval. 
 
The Trial Chamber did not explicitly rule on these submissions, but simply adopted a 
similar “Protocol on the practices used to prepare and familiarise witnesses for giving 
testimony at trial" to that in Lubanga.647
 
  
In Bemba, the defence requested the Chamber leave to contact witnesses immediately 
prior to trial in order to conduct a limited form of substantial preparation. It raised 
similar arguments of fairness and judicial economy.648
                                                 
646 Defence Observations Regarding Registry Reports 821 and 842, ICC-01/04-01/07-857-Conf, dated 
28 January 2009, paras. 12-14, in particular para. 13. 
 In its Decision on the Unified 
Protocol on the practices used to prepare and familiarise witnesses for giving 
testimony at trial, the majority of Trial Chamber III rejected the Bemba defence 
request on the ground that it saw “no compelling reasons to depart from the 
647 ICC-01/04-01/07-1134, Decision on a number of procedural issues raised by the Registry, 14 May 
2009, para. 18. See also: Décision relative aux modalités de participation des victimes au stade des 
débats sur le fond, ICC-01/04-01/07-1788, dated 22 October 2010, para. 80; Public Version publique 
expurgée de la Décision relative à la requête du Bureau du Procureur aux fins de communiquer avec le 
témoin P-250 (ICC-01/04-01/07-2711-Conf, 18 février 2011), ICC-01/04-01/07-2711-Red, 10 mars 
2011. 
648 ICC-01/05-01/08-620-Corr, Corrigendum Observations de la Défense relatives à la jurisprudence de 
l'Affaire Lubanga sur les questions procédurales se rapportant aux droits de la Défense, 26 novembre 
2009 (notified on 27 November 2010), paras 5-31, and especially para. 9. 
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uncontroversial jurisprudence of the Court and maintains the view that no proofing or 
preparation of witnesses for trial by the parties shall be allowed.”649
 
  
One of the judges, however, issued a partly dissenting opinion in which he stated that 
the parties should be allowed to meet with their witnesses before trial.650
For the purposes of the present Opinion, witness proofing refers to a meeting 
between a witness and the party calling the witness for the purpose of substantive 
preparation of the witness's testimony. It effectively consists of confirming with the 
witness as to whether his/her statement is accurate and complete, presuming that the 
witness already has been given the opportunity to review his/her statement during 
the familiarisation process, and going through the evidence and relevant exhibits. It 
may also include a question and answer session, but should not be a rehearsal of the 
questioning that is to take place during the in-court session. "Rehearsing", 
"practicing", "coaching" or any intentional or unintentional contamination of the 
evidence is therefore not included in the definition.
 He stated as 
follows: 
651
 
 
The judge considered that such a practice is justified on the basis of the ICC rules 
dealing with the presentation of evidence. These rules are more akin to the common 
law than to the civil law system,652 where “the manner in which the evidence is 
presented through the testimony of witnesses is of the utmost importance”.653
 
 He also 
justified it in light of the scale, complexity, geographical and temporal scope of the 
case, and of the cultural and linguistic remoteness from the Court: 
In tackling a case of such magnitude and complexity, I do not believe it is practical 
and reasonable to prohibit any pre-trial meeting between the parties and their 
witnesses. Indeed, under these circumstances, witness proofing could be considered 
as a "genuine attempt to clarify a witness' evidence", and to ensure the smooth 
conduct of the proceedings by enabling a more accurate, complete, methodical and 
efficient presentation of the evidence.654
 
 
                                                 
649 ICC-01/05-01/08-1016, 18 November 2010, para. 34. The Chamber also considered the defence 
request as withdrawn because it was not reiterated in the defence observations on the Unified Protocol 
(para. 35). In these observations, the defence stated that it did not object to the terms of the Unified 
Protocol on Practices for Witnesses Giving Testimony at Trial, while it reserved ‘the right to revisit the 
terms of this protocol, and make additional submissions on its application prior to the commencement 
of the Defence case’. See: ICC-01/05-01/08-992, Defence Observations on the VWU Unified Protocol 
on Practices for Witnesses Giving Testimony at Trial, 3 November 201, para. 4. 
650 ICC-01/05-01/08-1039, Partly Dissenting Opinion of Judge Kuniko Ozaki on the Decision on the 
Unified Protocol on the practices used to prepare and familiarise witnesses for giving testimony at trial, 
24 November 2010, para. 7. 
651 ICC-01/05-01/08-1039, para 17. 
652 ICC-01/05-01/08-1039, para 20. 
653 ICC-01/05-01/08-1039, para 21. 
654 ICC-01/05-01/08-1039, paras 22, 25. 
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Arguably, these are valid points. Time and budgetary limits do not always permit 
adequate preparation time with a witness at his location. The parties must travel a 
considerable distance to conduct onsite investigations and meet with potential 
witnesses. Witnesses are not always easily accessible and traceable. There is no 
guarantee that a party will be able to discuss with witnesses during each, or most of 
their investigation missions. Sometimes months or even years pass by without contact 
between a witness and a party. The stories of the witnesses can change drastically 
over time.655
 
 Thus, it is important for a party to meet its witnesses shortly before their 
testimony to assess the consistency of their testimonies and the witnesses’ credibility. 
This assessment is to be made with a view to finally determine whether they should 
be called in light of the Court’s mandate to ascertain the truth. In addition, such a 
meeting is important to ensure that the witnesses are adequately prepared and 
understand what is expected from them. 
On such grounds, the defence in Katanga & Ngudjolo requested the Chamber to be 
allowed on an exceptional basis to meet four defence witnesses in The Hague prior to 
their familiarisation program.656 This request was based on the fact that, despite its 
very best efforts, the defence had had insufficient time and budget to meet with these 
witnesses in adequate circumstances. It highlighted general obstacles it had faced in 
seeking to conduct effective investigations in geographically remote areas within the 
time limit set and budgetary restraints.657 In particular, it had been difficult to spend 
sufficient time with the witnesses in question. They were detained in the Prison 
Centrale de Makala in Kinshasa, some 2500 kilometers from Ituri, the core 
investigation area. Visiting the prison was, therefore, a serious drain on the defence 
investigation budget. The DRC authorities had obstructed the defence in meeting with 
the detained witnesses on a number of missions.658 Accordingly, the defence had not 
been able to spend a sufficient amount of time with these witnesses, particularly 
compared to the time spent by the Prosecution in meeting their witnesses.659
                                                 
655 This is confirmed by the experience of the author in conducting investigations, as well as of her 
colleagues David Hooper Q.C. (Interview in The Hague, 3 June 2010), Peter Robinson (Interview in 
The Hague, 21 November 2009) and Gregor Guy-Smith (Interview in The Hague, 12 April 2011).  
  
656 ICC-01/04-01/07-2709-Red, Defence Request for Leave to Meet Four Defence Witnesses in The 
Hague Prior to Their Testimony, 17 February 2011. 
657 Ibid, paras. 4-13. See also section ‘equality of arms in practice’. 
658 ICC-01/04-01/07-T-56-ENG CT WT 03-02-2009, pp. 49-51. 
659 ICC-01/04-01/07-2709-Red, paras. 14-21. 
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In addition, the defence highlighted the difficulties in obtaining high-quality 
interviews in an overcrowded noisy prison without any private interview room. It took 
hours for the authorities to make available a work space somewhere in the prison, to 
locate the prisoners sought and to produce them for an interview. Some of the 
detained witnesses had health problems and were, therefore, not always available. The 
defence pointed out that, when the Prosecution interviewed one of them for three 
days, this interview took place outside the prison. Accordingly, the defence argued 
that the effective application of the principle of equality of arms required that the 
defence be given an opportunity to speak with the detained witnesses one last time 
outside the prison.660
 
  
The Prosecution and victim representatives objected to the defence request.661 The 
Chamber acknowledged the difficulties the defence had faced in meeting with the 
detained witnesses. It nonetheless dismissed the request but instead allowed the 
defence to return to the DRC to interview them in the prison before their departure to 
The Hague. It ordered the Registry to contact the DRC authorities to ensure that a 
private office in the prison be made available to the defence and that access to the 
prison be granted immediately upon arrival.662 Thus, the Chamber was prepared to 
accommodate the defence but chose the more expensive and inconvenient option of 
sending two members of the defence back to the DRC over the option of granting an 
exception to the prohibition of contact rule. Consequently, the defence had to conduct 
the interviews in less than ideal circumstances which included excessive noise and 
waiting time. No private and quiet offices are available in Kinshasa central prison.663
 
 
                                                 
660 Ibid, para. 22; citing: IT-04-74-AR73.4, Prosecutor v. Prlić et al., Decision on Prosecution Appeal 
following Trial Chamber’s decision on remand and further certification, 11 May 2007, para. 38. 
 http://www.icty.org/x/cases/prlic/acdec/en/070511.pdf  
661 Bureau du Procureur, Réponse de l'Accusation à la Defence Request for leave to Meet Four 
Defence Witnesses in The Hague Prior to Their Testimony (ICC-01/04-01/07-2709-Conf du 17 février 
2011), 2 mars 2011 ICC-01/04-01/07-2753-Red; Représentants légaux des victimes. Réponse conjointe 
des représentants légaux à la requête de la Défense de G. Katanga intitulée « Defence Request for leave 
to Meet Four Defence Witnesses in The Hague Prior to Their Testimony » (ICC-01/04-01/07-2709-
Conf), 2 mars 2011, ICC-01/04-01/07-2754-Red. 
662 ICC-01/04-01/07-2755-Red, Décision sur la requête de la Défense de Germain Katanga aux fins 
d'être autorisée à rencontrer des témoins à La Haye (article 64-6-f du Statut), 4 March 2011.   
663 This information is based on the author’s own participation. 
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Contact between the parties and their witnesses in The Hague has been allowed on an 
exceptional basis. For instance, in Lubanga such contact was allowed when new 
evidence was disclosed.664 In addition, the Chamber authorised the defence to be in 
contact with its witness in The Hague on two occasions when the witness had brought 
new material. The Chamber reasoned that this contact would save time which would 
otherwise have to be spent in the courtroom to discover its content and eventual 
relevance.665
 
 
In Katanga & Ngudjolo, contact was allowed between the Prosecution and a witness 
after completion of his testimony but before the end of the presentation of all 
evidence. The VWU had terminated the witness’s participation in the witness 
protection program. The Prosecution was granted an opportunity to discuss alternative 
protective measures with the witness if so required.666 In addition, contact was 
allowed in the presence of a jurist from the Registry when an interview given by a 
defence witness was published on the internet while the witness was already in The 
Hague. In this interview, which was entirely new to the defence, the witness 
incriminated the accused in whose favour he was about to give evidence. The defence 
was granted an opportunity to ask the witness about this interview and consider 
whether it should still call him in light of the new incriminating information.667
 
  
Thus, on a case-to-case evaluation, Chambers may authorise contact in the presence 
of the Registry, but in most circumstances, contact is prohibited. This has generally 
been perceived as an improvement to the ICTY and ICTR practice. Prohibition of 
contact is considered to be fairer to the defendant who has a right to know the 
                                                 
664 ICC-01/04-01/06-T-239-Red-ENG CT2 WT 02-02-2010 1-55 EA T, pp. 6-7. See pp. 1-7 for the 
complete debate. 
665 ICC-01/04-01/06-T-280-Red-ENG WT 05-05-2010 (11/05/10), pp. 12-13; ICC-01/04-01/06-T-284-
Red-ENG WT 11-05-2010, pp. 21-24. 
666 Public Version publique expurgée de la Décision relative à la requête du Bureau du Procureur aux 
fins de communiquer avec le témoin P-250 (ICC-01/04-01/07-2711-Conf, 18 février 2011), ICC-01/04-
01/07-2711-Red, 10 mars 2011.    
667 The journalist from Congolese newspaper Milene Info Plus who claimed he had conducted this 
interview with the witness before his departure to The Hague later stated both to the prosecution and 
defence that the content of the article did not reflect the conversation he had with the witness, in 
particular in relation to the allegations made against Katanga. The witness himself denied that the 
interview even took place. Eventually, the witness was called and the parties and participants agreed 
not to ask questions about the interview. See: ICC-01/04-01/07-T-249, 18 April 2011, p 3-19; ICC-
01/04-01/07-T-250, 19 April 2011; ICC-01/04-01/07-T-251, 20 April 2011; ICC-01/04-01/07-T-252, 
21 April 2011. 
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allegations against him in advance of the trial. Such prohibition of contact has, 
however, not prevented the witnesses from raising new allegations. Instead of raising 
them to the prosecution before trial, they now raise them in court directly.668
 
  
Thus, the defence is caught by surprise even more than when such allegations are 
disclosed to it a few days before commencement of the testimony. Prohibition of 
contact also hampers significantly the investigations of both parties, as indicated 
above. The defence is more affected by it because they have more budgetary 
limitations to travel back and forth to the location of the witnesses. Thus, the 
prohibition of contact further undermines the equality of arms between the parties and 
should ideally be reconsidered.  
 
Academics and practitioners have similarly argued in favor of the adoption of witness 
proofing at the ICC. In their view, witness proofing will encourage both the fairness 
and the expeditiousness of trial proceedings at the ICC.669
[...] as it has been developed, practised, and endorsed at the 
international criminal tribunals – appears to be a better modality for 
enhancing the efficiency, integrity, and legitimacy of the truth-seeking 
process than does the prohibition of proofing.
 They have also underlined 
its “capacity to adduce more evidence for consideration at trial,” and the eventual 
“detrimental effects to the truth-seeking process of prohibiting proofing: probative 
evidence lost or distorted by the surprise – to both parties – inherent in sudden witness 
box revelations.” Witness proofing, it has been argued,  
670
 
  
Lack of State Cooperation  
 
In order to establish a record of the crimes committed and the causes of the conflict, 
international criminal courts depend on expert and factual witnesses as well as 
                                                 
668 See, for instance, P-161 in the Katanga & Ngudjolo case who incriminated Katanga for the first 
time in the course of his testimony from 26 February until 15 March 2010, ICC-01/04-01/07-T-109 – 
ICC-01/04-01/07-T-116 (starting from T-109). Similarly, witness P-159 gave evidence against Katanga 
for the first time during his testimony from 17 March 2010 until 29 March 2010 (ICC-01/04-01/07-T-
118 - ICC-01/04-01/07-T-125 (starting from T-119).  
669 Witness Proofing at the International Criminal Court, American University Washington College of 
Law, War Crimes Research Office – ICC – Legal Analysis and Education Project, July 2009, p. 25. 
670 R. Karemaker, B. Taylor and T. Pittman: Witness Proofing in International Criminal Tribunals: A 
Critical Analysis of Widening Procedural Divergence, Leiden Journal of International Law, 21 (2008), 
pp. 683–698, in particular pp. 694 and 698.  
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documentation from governments, the UN and NGOs operational within the territory 
under investigation. To establish that the accused was involved directly or indirectly 
in the crimes charged, international criminal courts and tribunals tend to rely heavily 
on factual witnesses. To establish the context of a conflict and the crime base, they 
tend to rely on expert evidence and reports from governments, the UN and NGOs. 
 
It has already been noted that the international tribunals and court are dependent on 
the cooperation of the authorities of the crime-base State for conducting any onsite 
operations.671
 
 The lack of State apparatus and enforcement mechanisms significantly 
affect the efficiency of the investigations conducted by the parties, as well as the 
ability of the judges to verify the reliability of the information.  
The ad hoc tribunals have faced significant difficulties despite their primary 
jurisdiction and their chapter VII mandate with the result that they have some powers 
to put pressure on States to cooperate. The ICC has no such powers but is fully 
dependent on voluntary state cooperation resulting in very limited powers to 
pressurise States to provide cooperation.672
 
  
The parties require the assistance of the government for various matters. First of all, 
the State must allow the parties into the country. Rwanda has often threatened to close 
its borders.673 This is a problem in Sudan for both parties, neither of which has been 
granted access to Sudan despite ongoing post confirmation proceedings against 
Abdallah Banda and Saleh Jerbo, two opposition rebels.674
                                                 
671 See section ‘Structure and Capacity Limitations’. 
 This has led the defence 
for these accused to request for a stay of the proceedings. It argued that it is 
impossible to prepare an effective defence for the accused due to the ongoing 
insecurity in Darfur and the inability of both the defence and the Prosecution to enter 
672 As Carla Del Ponte pointed out, despite the legal obligation on States to cooperate, this is not 
always enforceable in reality. Carla Del Ponte calls this lack of political independence the greatest 
weakness of international criminal justice. See the Geneva Conference, supra note 173. 
673 As explained by James Stewart in a personal interview conducted in Arusha, Tanzania, 8 October 
2004, the Rwandan government refused co-operation after Carla Del Ponte expressed her 
determination to investigate RPF crimes. The Prosecution was not allowed in for several months. This 
was confirmed by Carla Del Ponte herself at the See the Geneva Conference, supra note 173. 
674 (ICC-02/05-03/09) Banda is the Commander-in-Chief of the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) 
Collective-Leadership, one of the components of the United Resistance Front. Jerbo is the Chief-of-
Staff of the Sudan Liberation Movement/Army. They are tried jointly. There are also outstanding arrest 
warrants against Omar al-Bashir, Ahmed Haroun and Ali Kushayb.  
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the country despite the defence’s best efforts to visit Sudan. In addition, the defence 
stated it was severely restricted in obtaining evidence because a Government authority 
announced a public death threat against anyone who would cooperate with the ICC.675 
This has resulted in severe restrictions on the ability of the defence to secure 
evidence, access documents and ensure the safety of witnesses even when they are 
contacted by phone. Accordingly, the defence considered that the Chamber should 
order a stay since guarantees of a fair trial cannot be met in these circumstances.676
 
 
This is a valid argument, not merely because a minimum condition for having 
international trials is that the crimes can be adequately investigated. The outcome of 
this request is still pending.  
Once in the country, the parties depend on the government for the collection of 
documents in the hands of the State. They also need the government’s authorisation to 
meet and interview potential witnesses in an official function, prisoners or other 
potential witnesses under government control. The parties also rely on the cooperation 
of local authorities for the calling of witnesses. In this regard, the prosecution has a 
clear advantage over the defence. As an organ of the court, it has more means to 
enforce cooperation on the government and often enters into a cooperation agreement 
with the government.  
 
Yet, this can be problematic because, the more the powers of the Prosecutor are 
restrained, the greater the dangers that « selective justice » may occur.677 Indeed, the 
Prosecutor’s dependency on State cooperation makes it very difficult to investigate 
the conduct of persons with links to the government. In the event that the Prosecution 
shows a suspicion towards any such persons, the government may try to manipulate 
the investigations, refuse cooperation or otherwise frustrate the work of the 
Prosecution.678
                                                 
675 ICC-02/05-01/07-48-Red, paras. 33–36. In this filing, Salah Gosh, the Sudanese Director of 
Intelligence, is quoted as saying on 22 February 2009 that “anyone who attempts to put up his hands to 
execute [ICC] plans we will cut off his hands, head and parts because it is a non-negotiable issue”. 
 Prosecutors have admitted that these limitations have forced them to 
676 See ICC-02/05-03/09-274 06-01-2012, Defence Request for a Temporary Stay of Proceedings. 
677 Richard J. Goldstone & Nicole Fritz: “In the Interests of Justice” and Independent Referral: The 
ICC Prosecutor’s Unprecedented Powers, in 13 Leiden Journal of International Law 655-667 (2000) 
658 [hereinafter ‘Goldstone & Fritz, “In the Interests of Justice” and Independent Referral’].  
678 L. Arbour & M. Bergsmo, Conspicuous Absence of Jurisdictional Overreach, 1 International Law 
Forum du droit international 13 (1999), at 18. 
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compromise their investigative focus.679 As one Prosecutor put it, it is an illusion to 
think that international courts and tribunals can be independent from domestic or 
international political authorities.680
 
  
Politically motivated Investigations 
 
Political factors have clearly come into play in determining the Prosecutor’s 
investigative focus in Rwanda. The crimes committed by the RPF guerrillas, who now 
constitute the Government of Rwanda, have barely been investigated, and nobody 
from the RPF side has been prosecuted. As a result, all of the approximately 100 
individuals who have been arrested and indicted at the ICTR are of Hutu ethnicity. All 
are associated with the old regime. While there is little doubt that the large majority of 
killers during the events of April to July 1994 were Hutus, and that a large number of 
the victims were Tutsi, it is near universally acknowledged that the RPF also 
committed atrocities and were responsible for unlawful killings on a large scale.
ICTR 
681 
The UN Commissioner for Refugees estimates that the RPF killed between 25,000 
and 45,000 civilians in 1994.682
 
 
Prosecutors in the ICTR have admitted that political considerations have played a role 
in selecting alleged perpetrators to be brought before the tribunal. Carla Del Ponte, 
former chief prosecutor at the ICTY and ICTR, who lost her position at the ICTR 
when she opened investigations against the RPF, has acknowledged that politics 
controls international justice.683
                                                 
679 Carla Del Ponte made observations to that effect at the Geneva Conference, supra note 173. Del 
Ponte has personally experienced a tendency of the Rwandan government to seek to manipulate the 
ICTR fact-finding process. She also admitted that this had a real impact on the investigations.  
 The frequent difficulties with the Rwandan 
680 See Muna’s observations at the Geneva Conference, supra note 173. 
681 This was the primary reason why, in 2005, Professor Reyntjens publicly denounced his cooperation 
with the ICTR after six months of full-time assistance and several years of part-time assistance. See 
personal interview with Professor Reyntjens, Antwerpen, 20 December 2004. See also Letter to the 
Prosecutor of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda Regarding the Prosecution of RPF 
Crimes from Human Rights Watch, 26 May, 2009, http://www.hrw.org/node/83536. 
682 Cited in: Human Rights Watch, Unfinished Business – Closing Gaps in the Selection of ICC Cases, 
1 Sept 2011 published at: http://www.scribd.com/doc/65101796/HRW-Unfinished-Business-Closing-
Gaps-in-the-Selection-of-ICC-Cases, pages 5-6. See also: L. Haskell and L. Waldorf, The Impunity 
Gap of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda: Causes and Consequences, Hastings 
International and Comparative Law Review, vol. 34 (2011), pp. 70-76. 
683 Resolution 1503 UN Doc S/RES/1503 – splitting ICTY / ICTR Prosecutor on request of Rwandan 
Government with threats of no cooperation. See also Del Ponte’s submissions at the Geneva 
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Government whenever there is a discussion on indicting members of the RPF has led 
the Prosecutor’s Office to decide against issuing such indictments.684
 
 
Many commentators equate this one-sided justice with victor’s justice because those 
who won the war have escaped prosecution and dictate who is prosecuted and who is 
not before the ICTR. In their view, as long as only one side is being targeted for 
prosecution, any efforts to reconcile the different ethnic groups have been frustrated. 
This has also given credibility to the revisionist and negationist theories, which have 
further decreased any chance of reconciliation. Whilst one cannot escape certain 
political pressure, giving in too much to such pressure may undermine all of the 
objectives international courts and tribunals have set out to achieve.685
 
  
In the ICTY, however, the Prosecution adopted a very different strategy. It took a 
tough approach to uncooperative governments. It did not bend to pressure from the 
Yugoslav authorities, but rather pressured them into cooperation with significant 
political and financial bargains.
ICTY 
686
                                                                                                                                           
Conference, supra note 173. After she was replaced by Justice Hassan B. Jallow, the current ICTR 
Prosecutor, the investigations discontinued. At the same conference, Muna, one of the ICTR 
prosecutors, calls it an illusion to think that any decision can be taken without the approval of the 
political authorities and admits that this undermines what they can do effectively for reconciliation 
purposes. 
 Initially, the ICTY investigators had a rough time 
in acquiring access to certain crime-base areas and crucial witnesses, particularly in 
684 This has been the main subject of the Geneva Conference, supra note 173. During two days and a 
half, prosecutors, judges, defence counsel, experts, Rwandan interpreters, journalists and others 
concerned in the story of Rwanda have debated the question as to why the RPF was not prosecuted and 
whether this should be, or should have been done. The general view is that the ICTR’s failure to have 
prosecuted anyone linked to the current regime was clearly politically motivated and amounts to its 
greatest weakness.  
685 See particularly the critical remarks of Belgian investigative judge, Mr. Van Der Meersch, Mr. 
Degni-Ségui, Nsengimana, Sorel and Guichaou, highlighting that, not only reconciliation efforts are 
undermined by one-sided justice, but also the truth-finding function of the tribunal. See the Geneva 
Conference, supra note 173. Another problem is that the ICTR jurisdiction exclusively deals with 
crimes committed in 1994. See also: Cryer, Prosecuting International Crimes, supra note 223, 109-
210; Chuter, War Crimes, supra note 75, 93, 138-139, 189-200, 220-221; Payam Akhavan: Justice and 
Reconciliation in the Great Lakes Region of Africa: The Contribution of the International Criminal 
Tribunal for Rwanda (1997) 7 DjCIL 325, 328; Paciocco, Defending Rwandans Before the ICTR, 
supra note 190; Human Rights Watch, Unfinished Business, supra note 682, 5-6. 
686 P. Lopez-Terres (Chief of Investigations ICTY): Arrest and transfer of indictees. The experience of 
the ICTY, 15 December 2006. Paper presented at the ICC Office of the Prosecutor, 15 December 2006. 
On file with the author. See also: Carla Del Ponte & Chuck Sudetic: Madame Prosecutor: 
Confrontations with Humanity’s Worst Criminals and the Culture of Impunity, Other Press 2009 
(original version in Italian 2008). 
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the Republika Srpska within Bosnia and Herzegovina.687 However, with time and 
persistence, they eventually managed to investigate the bulk of the most significant 
crimes committed by all sides, including Serbs, Croats and Muslim throughout the 
former Yugoslavia.688 More specifically, the Prosecution investigators conducted 
their main investigations in Croatia between 1991 and 1995; in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina between 1992 and 1995; in Kosovo between 1998 and 1999; and in 
Macedonia between May and August 2001.689 Accordingly, it appears that the ICTY 
Prosecutor’s approach worked well. Human Rights Watch observes that the fact that 
the ICTY has investigated crimes committed by all sides in the Yugoslav conflict 
“stands as a record against claims that it was biased against one particular group”.690
 
 
There is still criticism. The ICTY Prosecutor has for instance been criticised for 
seeking to prosecute all sides at all costs and irrespective of the evidence.691 The fact 
that many of the prosecutions of members of the Muslim community have led to 
acquittals may prove that there is some value in this criticism.692
 
 Prosecutions should 
be based on the evidence available, not on any pre-determination to prosecute all 
sides.  
The ICTY Prosecutor was also criticised for failing to prosecute anyone from NATO 
for war crimes committed in the course of the bombing of Kosovo and Serbia in 1999. 
It has been alleged that this decision was based on political, rather than legal 
                                                 
687 Ibid. 
688 There has even been a case against two citizens of Macedonia for crimes committed against ethnic 
Albanians. This case concerned two accused: Ljube Boškoski and Johan Tarčulovski. Ljube Boškoski 
was acquitted and Johan Tarčulovski was sentenced to 12 years. See Judgement of 10 July 2008, IT-
04-82-T.  
689 Ibid. The ICTY had jurisdiction over crimes committed in Macedonia and Kosovo because of its 
open-ended mandate, unlike the ICTR, which is limited to crimes committed in 1994. See also: Cryer, 
Prosecuting International Crimes, supra note 223, 209. 
690 HRW, Unfinished Business, supra note 682, 5. 
691 Cryer, Prosecuting International Crimes, supra note 223, 211-212. Defence counsel John Jones 
clearly shares this criticism of ‘evenhandedness’, which he expressed at a seminar on international 
justice “Between Impunity and Show Trials”, held on 4 February 2012 at Garden Court Chambers. 
692 For instance, out of six KLA members who were on trial in the ICTY, only two were convicted 
(Haradin Bala, Lahi Brahimaj), but the more important defendants (Ramush Haradinaj, Fatmir Limaj) 
were acquitted. However, on 19 July 2010, a partial re-trial was ordered for all three defendants in the 
case of Haradinaj (Appeals Chamber Judgement, IT-04-84-A). Naser Orić, a Muslim commander in 
Bosnia, was acquitted on appeal (Appeals Chamber Judgement of 3 July 2008, IT-03-68-A. Enver 
Hadzihasanovic & Amir Kabura, both in the Bosnian army, received low sentences; on appeal, Kubura 
received 2 years and Hadzihasanovic 3,5 years (Appeals Chamber Judgement of 22 April 2008, IT-01-
47-A). 
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reasons.693 However, as one ICTY Prosecutor, Blewitt, rightly noted, NATO could 
not have been prosecuted before the ICTY, because it only deals with crimes 
committed by individuals. No specific war crimes committed by individuals had been 
identified. If NATO can be blamed for launching an illegitimate war, that in itself 
does not lead to criminal liability under the ICTY Statute, as it is not one of the 
recognised crimes under the jurisdiction of the ICTY.694
 
  
Criticism is unavoidable in any situation where a Prosecutor can only investigate a 
handful of the totality of the crimes. Selectivity is a necessary ingredient of 
international justice. On the whole, however, the ICTY Prosecutor’s selection policy 
has been balanced and fair to victims and perpetrators of all ethnic groups. 
 
At the ICC, politics also appear to have influenced Prosecutorial choices.
ICC 
695 This has 
led to similar scenarios as in Rwanda, namely that the crimes committed by one side 
of the conflict are investigated, whilst the crimes committed by the other side are 
not.696 According to Human Rights Watch, this one-sided justice can be perceived as 
“victor’s justice”, undermining the perceptions of independence and impartiality.697 
As was suggested in Part I, for a successful truth-ascertaining exercise with a 
potentially positive impact on reconciliation, it is important to look into the 
sufferings, and crimes committed by all sides.698 This should be done even if 
“politically inconvenient or otherwise difficult”.699
                                                 
693 Chuter, War Crimes, supra note 75, 189-200; Cryer, Prosecuting International Crimes, supra note 
223, 216-220. 
 If not, the ICC may loose 
legitimacy in the eyes of the affected communities who are all too aware of violations 
committed by various parties. Therefore, Human Rights Watch has a point when it 
states that it is “essential for the credibility of the ICC in its delivery of meaningful 
694 Blewitt, The International Criminal Tribunals, supra note 76, 145, 149. 
695 W. Schabas, Prosecutorial Discretion v. Judicial Activism at the International Criminal Court, 6 
JICJ (2009) 731, 753; W. Schabas, Complementarity in Practice: Some Uncomplimentary Thoughts, 19 
Criminal Law Forum (2009), 5, at 33. 
696 May & Hoskins, International Criminal Law, supra note 57, 219, 242.  
697 HRW, Unfinished Business, supra note 682, 2, 5. 
698 See above, section ‘Relativism versus Radicalism’. 
699 HRW, Unfinished Business, supra note 682, 5. 
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justice that it act impartially and be seen to be doing so.”700
 
 
The Prosecutor can initiate investigations proprio motu on the basis on information received from 
individuals or organizations. He can also initiate investigations on the basis of a referral from any State Party 
or from the United Nations Security Council.701 Until today, 14 cases in 7 situations have been brought 
before the ICC.  Three of the situations are self-referrals by the territorial States (Uganda, the Democratic 
Republic of Congo (“DRC”) and the Central African Republic (“CAR”). Two situations have been referred 
to the ICC by the Security Council (Darfur and Libya).702 Two situations have been opened by the 
Prosecutor proprio motu after having been authorized by the Pre-Trial Chamber to do so (Kenya on 31 
March 2010 and Côte d’Ivoire on 3 October 2011).703
 
 
DRC 
In the first ICC situation, the Democratic Republic of Congo (“DRC”), opened on 23 
June 2004, it appears that no investigations have been conducted in respect of crimes 
allegedly committed by persons on the side of the DRC government. This choice has 
been made notwithstanding the numerous allegations made in respect of its 
involvement in the war in Ituri, the eastern part of DRC.704 This conflict zone is 
subject to the Prosecution’s investigation in other DRC cases (Lubanga and Katanga 
& Ngudjolo). In the Katanga & Ngudjolo case, even specific individuals in the current 
DRC Government and army have been identified as having played a role in the crimes 
charged against Katanga and Ngudjolo.705
                                                 
700 Ibid, 5. 
  
701 Articles 14 and 15 of the Rome Statute. 
702 Darfour : Resolution 1593,  31 March 2005 – Libya : Resolution 1970, 26 February 2011. 
703 See: http://www.icc-cpi.int/Menus/ICC/Situations+and+Cases/  
704 See, for instance, the opening of the Lubanga trial when the defence made the following submission 
(which was not broadcasted in DRC): “The Prosecutor announces proudly this trial, that this trial is the 
trial of the child soldiers, but who gave -- who scandalously gave justification to that criminal practice?  
Who has given awful prestige to the Great Lakes region of Africa and to these children taken up in 
war? Laurent-Desire Kabila who had an army of kadogo. Who was the commander of operations of 
that shameful army, that army of children? His son, Joseph Kabila, today at the head of the country.  
And what is more, which is the army that at this very point in time is enlisting and sending on the hills 
of the Kivus child soldiers? The armed forces of President Joseph Kabila, the army of he who delivered 
to you Thomas Lubanga, Madam Prosecutor. And we want to make -- and you want to make of 
Thomas Lubanga the  emblematic criminal of events which are not of his making and for which  those 
who bear the greatest responsibility are not being prosecuted, and  that is why instead of making or 
rising to the challenge of the international criminal justice a major injustice is being created.  That is 
the nature of the first case brought before the International Criminal Court.” (See ICC-01/04-01/06-T-
109-ENG WT 27-01-2009, pages 31-32). 
705 See in particular the testimonies of Pitchu Iribi DRC‐D02‐P‐0228, ICC-01/04-01/07-T-249 – ICC-
01/04-01/07-T-253, in particular: ICC-01/04-01/07-T-252, 21-04-2011, page 65-67; as well as Ndjabu 
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There are also suspicions that the ICC Prosecution protects the Rwandan regime 
rendering it immune from prosecution for any crimes in the Kivu provinces of the 
DRC allegedly committed by Rwandan armed groups or Congolese armed groups in 
collaboration with Rwanda. The ICC Prosecution maintains close contacts with the 
Rwandan Government. For instance, the deputy Prosecutor attended President 
Kagame’s inauguration as President on 5 September 2011.706
 
  
Having just returned from Kigali, in the Katanga & Ngudjolo case, the Prosecutor 
opened the case with the 1994 Rwandan genocide:707 “At the root of the Congo wars 
is the genocide in Rwanda” he said while inflating the number of people who were 
exterminated in Rwanda within three months to one million fifty thousand.708 It is 
unclear where he derived this number from because it is significantly higher than the 
number of victims acknowledged by the ICTR or any Rwandan expert.709 He then 
went on to explain that some of the génocidaires from Rwanda had escaped to 
neighboring Congo. Their regrouping in DRC had been a crucial factor in triggering 
the two Congo wars. According to the Prosecutor, “[t]he Bogoro attack is the 
consequence of the national and international failures to prevent and control such 
massive crimes”.710
 
  
The Rwandan genocide has, however, no relevance in respect to the Katanga & 
Ngudjolo case. Those Rwandans who regrouped operated from a different area. Thus, 
this opening created the impression that the Prosecution was putting on a show to 
please the Rwandan Government. It also gave the impression that the Prosecutor has 
                                                                                                                                           
Ngabu (ICC-01/04-01/07-T-242-Red-ENG WT 30-03-2011, pages 55-59; ICC-01/04-01/07-T-244-
ENG CT WT 06-04-2011, pages 55-57) directly implicating Mbusa Nyamwisi, currently Minister of 
Sport in the DRC government, Bovic Bolanga, former commissioner for the interior in Mbusa’s 
government, the RCD-K/ML, Colonel Aguru, the RCD-KML and Kinshasa in training and providing 
weapons and other logistics to the militia with the specific purpose of attacking Bogoro and Bunia. See 
also HRW, Unfinished Business, supra note 682, 12-16. 
706 OTP Weekly Briefing, 31 August – 6 September – Issue 53, published at: http://www.icc-
cpi.int/Menus/ICC/Structure+of+the+Court/Office+of+the+Prosecutor/ 
707 ICC-01/04-01/07-T-80-ENG ET WT 24-11-2009 55/73 NB T, 22-26  
708 Ibid, 22. Until today, the exact number of deaths in  
709 Until today, the exact number of deaths in Rwanda has not been established, but estimations are 
made between half a million and a million. See, for instance: 
http://fr.hirondellenews.com/content/view/10504/26/, 8 February 2002 (the Kigali government has 
counted 1074017 deaths, but in fact, only 934218 victims have been identified with certainty). 
710 ICC-01/04-01/07-T-80-ENG ET WT 24-11-2009 55/73 NB T, 22. Similar observations were made 
by the Deputy Prosecutor at pages 26-27. 
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adopted a biased view on historical events which led to the Congo wars. The causes 
of the Congo wars are not established historical facts, but are in dispute.711
 
  
The Prosecutor made no mention of the fact that, according to the UN draft report, the 
APR together with the Alliance des Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du 
Congo (‘AFDL’) and the Forces Armées Burundaises (‘FAB’) committed serious 
violations of human rights and international humanitarian law against Hutu refugees 
in DRC between March 1993 and June 2003.712 Given the targeted, indiscriminate 
and systematic nature of the massacres of the Hutu ethnic group, whose victims 
included women, children, elderly and sick people, and given the systematic use of 
barriers to facilitate the elimination of the Hutu population, the report asserts that, if 
they were proven beyond reasonable doubt before a competent court, “they could be 
classified as crimes of genocide”.713
 
  
Most of these allegations relate to a period which falls neither under the jurisdiction 
of the ICTR, nor of the ICC. However, if the Prosecutor chooses to give a historical 
narrative, it is unfortunate if he addresses one side of the story only. Even in the 
period under the jurisdiction of the ICC, allegations have been made against the 
                                                 
711 See for instance: T. Turner, The Congo Wars, Conflict, Myth & Reality (Zed Books Ltd, 2007). See 
also: HRW, Ituri Covered in Blood: Ethnically Targeted Violence in Northeastern DR Congo, 7 July 
2003, available at <http://www.hrw.org/reports/2003/ituri0703/>, last accessed January 2012; HRW, 
Unfinished Business, supra note 682. 
712 Democratic Republic of the Congo, 1993–2003 Report of the Mapping Exercise documenting the 
most serious violations of human rights and international humanitarian law committed within the 
territory of the Democratic Republic of the Congo between March 1993 and June 2003, June 2010 
(hereinafter ‘UN Draft Report’), pages 74-111, in file with the author. This report was leaked to the 
French journal ‘Le Monde’, which published the information on 26 August 2010 (Christophe Châtelot 
and Philippe Bolopion: L'ONU ne veut pas laisser impunis dix ans de massacre au Congo RDC, Le 
Monde 26 August 2010, at: http://abonnes.lemonde.fr/). The Rwandan government reacted strongly to 
the allegations in this UN draft report, refuting all of them and threatening to withdraw all Rwandan 
soldiers employed for UN peace keeping missions in Africa. See Christophe Châtelot and Philippe 
Bolopion: L'ONU ne veut pas laisser impunis dix ans de massacre au Congo RDC, Le Monde 26 
August 2010, at: http://abonnes.lemonde.fr/. See also: http://rnanews.com/politics/4080-statement-by-
the-government-of-rwanda-on-leaked-draft-un-report-on-drc- 
713 UN Draft Report, paras. 513-518. The UN Draft Report also refers to a joint mission authorized by 
the Commission on Human Rights which, in July 1997, reported to the General Assembly that some of 
the alleged massacres of Hutu refugees in DRC “could constitute acts of genocide”. See Report of the 
joint mission charged with investigating the allegations of massacres and other human rights violations 
taking place in eastern Zaire (now the DRC) since September 1996 (A/51/942), para. 80). In 1998, 
another mission sent by the Secretary-General also reported on the systematic nature of the massacres 
committed against the Hutu refugees in DRC, including, and demanded further investigation to 
determine whether these massacres constituted genocide (511-512). See Report of the Investigative 
Team of the Secretary-General (S/1998/581), appendix, paras. 95-96. See further UN Draft Report 
paras. 510-512.  
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Rwandan government for financing, training and otherwise supporting armed militia 
groups in the Kivu provinces, which were allegedly implicated in committing war 
crimes and crimes against humanity.714 However, the Prosecution’s investigations 
appear to focus merely on crimes committed by the Forces Démocratiques pour la 
Liberation du Rwanda ("FDLR"), the main current opposing army to the Rwandan 
regime. It is a splinter group of Armée de Libération du Rwanda ("ALIR"), which 
succeeded the earlier armed group called Rassemblement pour le retour des Réfugiés 
Rwandais. The initial group was established in 1995 to re-conquer Rwanda and 
overthrow the Rwandan regime. It mainly consists of Rwandan soldiers from the 
former Rwandan army (Force Armée Rwandaise (“FAR”) and interahamwe who fled 
from Rwanda to North and South Kivu in 1994 after losing the war against the 
Rwandan Patriotic Front (“RPF”) led by Paul Kagame, the current President of 
Rwanda.715
 
  
The FDLR is alleged to be responsible for multiple atrocities in DRC. The 
Prosecution alleges that, in January 2009, the FDLR launched a campaign “aimed at 
attacking the civilian population and creating a “humanitarian catastrophe” in the 
Kivu provinces of DRC, in order to draw the world’s attention to the FDLR’s political 
demands”.716 The extent to which this allegation is accurate has not yet been 
established. Witnesses typically identified FDLR soldiers by the fact that they spoke 
Kinyarwanda. However, in light of the fact that many other Kinyarwanda-speaking 
armed groups were operational in the same area, the alleged crimes or part thereof 
could have been carried out by other armed groups.717
 
  
More surprising, however, is that the Prosecution charged Mbarushimana for these 
                                                 
714 This was even acknowledged by the ICC Deputy Prosecutor, yet without any condemnation. See:  
ICC-01/04-01/07-T-80-ENG ET WT 24-11-2009 55/73 NB T, 26-27. See also: HRW, Ituri Covered in 
Blood: Ethnically Targeted Violence in Northeastern DR Congo, 7 July 2003, available at 
<http://www.hrw.org/reports/2003/ituri0703/>, last accessed January 2012, 5-19; Unfinished Business, 
9. 
715 Rwanda: Arming the perpetrators of the genocide, Amnesty International, June 1995. See also: 
Prosecutor v. Mbarushimana, Decision on the confirmation of charges, ICC-01/04-01/10-465-Red, 16 
December 2011, paras. 2-4. 
716 ICC-01/04-01/10-465-Red, 16 December 2011, para. 6. 
717 See: P. Clark, Identification of Armed Groups in North and South Kivu, Democratic Republic of 
Congo, Expert Report in the case of Mbarushimana (for the Defence), DRC-D06-0001-0012. See also 
ibid, paras. 78, 117, 120, 136 where the Chamber found that certain crimes could not conclusively be 
attributed to the FDLR. The Chamber held that the evidence was too thin and speculative to be relied 
on to establish substantial grounds to believe that the FDLR was responsible for those crimes. 
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crimes, although he was in Paris, far remote from the crime base, during the entire 
period covering the charges. The Prosecution describes his role in the alleged FDLR 
crimes as follows: “On the one hand, whilst having full knowledge of the attacks 
perpetrated by the FDLR against the civilian population, he issued several press 
releases on behalf of the organisation in the aftermath of operations, systematically 
denying any responsibility of the group. On the other hand, he engaged in 
international peace talks and negotiations, shrewdly portraying the FDLR as an actor 
seeking peace and stability in the Kivu area”.718
 
  
In the main, Mbarushimana’s post facto press releases deny the involvement of the 
FDLR in alleged crimes and demand international investigations into these crimes. At 
no time is Mbarushimana alleged to have ordered, incited or instigated the crimes. 
Nor is it suggested that he had power to exercise authority over FDLR soldiers.719 
Thus, in fact, all he can be blamed for is being the Executive Secretary of the FDLR. 
However, even if the FDLR can legitimately be described as a criminal organisation, 
membership therein is insufficient to trigger liability under the ICC Statute. No 
wonder, therefore, that the Pre-Trial Chamber by majority held that Mbarushimana 
“did not provide any contribution to the commission of such crimes, even less a 
"significant" one”.”720
 
 
Instead, the Prosecution could have charged one of the FDLR commanders present in 
the DRC. Therefore, one cannot help to wonder whether, in charging Mbarushimana, 
an outspoken enemy of the current Rwandan regime, the Prosecution was led by 
political more than legal motives. Alternatively, it is a sign of inefficient and 
inadequate investigations. 
 
Further prosecution investigations are being carried out in the Kivu provinces. It 
appears that these investigations continue to be focused exclusively on the FDLR, and 
not on any Rwandan or Congolese armed group linked to the current Rwandan 
regime.721
                                                 
718 Document Containing the Charges (DCC), paras 119-120; ICC-01/04-01/10-465-Red, 16 December 
2011, para. 8. 
  
719 ICC-01/04-01/10-465-Red, 16 December 2011, para. 297. 
720 ICC-01/04-01/10-465-Red, 16 December 2011, para. 292. 
721 See also HRW, Unfinished Business, supra note 682, 9, 16-18.  
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Uganda 
The second situation was opened in Uganda on 29 July 2004. In January 2004, the 
Ugandan government had already referred its country to the ICC Prosecutor. On 29 
January 2004, Uganda’s President Museveni and the ICC Prosecutor held a press 
conference together in London to announce publicly that the ICC Prosecutor would 
look into the situation in Northern Uganda.722 These ICC investigations eventually led 
to the arrest warrants of 5 members of the Lord Resistance Army (“LRA”), one of 
whom is confirmed dead.723 From the beginning, the Prosecutor indicated that he 
would also investigate allegations against the Ugandan People’s Defence Force 
(“UPDF”), the Government army which had been involved in an armed struggle with 
the LRA in Northern Uganda. However, today, eight years later, there is no sign that 
the Prosecutor ever scrutinized the conduct of UPDF soldiers. Failing to assess the 
criminal liability, if any, of the Government’s side in the conflict has undermined the 
credibility of the ICC in the eyes of the affected communities in Northern Uganda.724
 
 
Central African Republic 
Bemba’s case is similarly surprising. At the time of his arrest by the ICC, Bemba was 
a powerful political figurehead in DRC and came second in the presidential elections 
in DRC held in 2006. He is the most feared enemy of the current President in the 
DRC, President Kabila, whose popularity and power have significantly weakened 
over the last few years. NGOs have made many allegations against Mr. Bemba and 
his group. Yet, Mr. Bemba has been charged with one attack only, which was 
launched not in DRC but in CAR. This has raised suspicion as to whether the choice 
of charges, as well as the choice of the suspect was not politically motivated. Those in 
support of Bemba were of the view that President Kabila was behind his arrest, as he 
constituted a political threat against him.725
                                                 
722http://www.icccpi.int/menus/icc/press%20and%20media/press%20releases/2004/president%20of%2
0uganda%20refers%20situation%20concerning%20the%20lord_s%20resistance%20army%20_lra_%2
0to%20the%20icc?lan=en-GB. 
 Others have raised a question mark as to 
723 Decision to terminate the Proceedings against Raska Lukwiya, 11 July 2007, ICC-02/04-01/05-248.  
724 Allen, Trial Justice, supra note 582, 99-102; HRW, Unfinished Business, supra note 682, 23-29; 
M. El Zeidy, The Ugandan Government Triggers the First Test of the Complementarity Principle: An 
Assessment of the First State’s Party Referral to the ICC; Adam Branch: Uganda’s Civil War and the 
Politics of ICC Intervention, 21(2) Ethics & International Affairs (2007) 179-198. 
725 Jacques Mbokani: ‘Jean-Pierre Bemba, victime d'un procès politique?’ at: 
http://jeanpierrebemba.org/complot_politique_jBokani.pdf. See also: William W. Burke-White: 
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why Bemba has not been charged for crimes allegedly committed by his armed group 
in the DRC conflict.726
 
 
In addition, he is clearly not the only one responsible for crimes committed in CAR. 
Yet, the Prosecutor has not initiated any investigations into crimes other than those 
allegedly committed by Bemba’s armed group, the Mouvement de Libération du 
Congo (“MLC”). Initially, the Prosecutor alleged that Bemba had sent the MLC to 
CAR on the request of Ange-Félix Patassé, President of the CAR to resist a ‘coup 
d’État’ led by General François Bozizé. The MLC soldiers allegedly raped, pillaged 
and murdered anyone opposing them in the period between October 2002 and March 
2003. Bemba was initially charged under the common plan liability with President 
Patassé as his co-perpetrator.727 The latter, however, was never charged; nor was his 
role in the common plan sufficiently investigated. When asked why Bemba was the 
only person prosecuted in the dossier on CAR, the Prosecutor said that he was 
considered the main person responsible for the alleged crimes. The Prosecutor added 
that, at the beginning, the Prosecution Office thought that Bemba and Patassé were 
jointly responsible, but that the evidence has since demonstrated that the soldiers who 
committed the crimes were those under Bemba’s responsibility.728 In a second 
confirmation hearing, Bemba’s charges were confirmed under the criminal liability 
mode of command responsibility rather than common plan.729
 
 
                                                                                                                                           
Complementarity in Practice: The International Criminal Court as Part of a System of Multi-Level 
Global Governance in the Democratic Republic of Congo, 18 Leiden Journal of Int. Law 557, at 559 
(2005): referring DRC case to ICC has allowed President Kabila to offer a “politically expedient 
solution for the Congolese president to deal with potential electoral rivals”.  
726 HRW Report ‘Ituri Covered in Blood, Ethnically Targeted Violence in Northeastern DR Congo’, 7 
July 2003, at: http://www.hrw.org/reports/2003/ituri0703/ (particularly 36-38); HRW, Unfinished 
Business, supra note 682, 31-33; ICC Hearing against Former Vice-President of DR Congo Jean-Pierre 
Bemba, 7 January 2009, at: 
http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2009/01/07/icc-hearing-against-former-vice-president-dr-congo-jean-
pierre-bemba; Keith Harmon Snow, ‘A People’s History of Congo’s Jean-Pierre Bemba, 18 September 
2007, at http://towardfreedom.com/home/content/view/1123/1/; Joe Bavier, ‘Bemba arrest removes 
rival to Congo President, 25 May 2008, at: http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSL2550628; 
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/country,,HRW,,BEL,,4843fd4a2,0.html 
727 Decision Adjourning the Hearing pursuant to Article 61(7)(c)(ii) of the Rome, ICC-01/05-01/08-424 
15-06-2009. 
728 AFP: “Bemba face à ses juges”, published at the internet site of ‘l’hebdomadaire francais Le Point’, 
22 November 2010. 
729 Prosecutor v. Bemba, Decision Pursuant to Article 61(7)(a) and (b) of the Rome Statute on the 
Charges of the Prosecutor Against Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, ICC-01/05-01/08-424, 15-06-2009, 
paras 341-501. 
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Kenya 
In the Kenya I case, high-up politicians, most notably Ruto, Kenyatta and Muthaura 
have been charged. The Prosecutor has targeted both sides that are held responsible 
for the post-election violence in Kenya at the end of 2007 until January 2008. 
However, the President and Prime Minister are spared. This separation is surprising, 
particularly in the case of Ruto, who was of the same party as Prime Minister Odinga 
(Orange Democratic Movement “ODM”). At the time of the events under the ICC’s 
jurisdiction, they were working closely together and often seen together in videos and 
political rallies.730 Prosecution witnesses made allegations against Odinga.731 Yet, the 
Prosecution claims not to have evidence against him.732 The result is that two 
potential candidates for presidency (Ruto and Kenyatta) cannot participate in Kenya’s 
2012 elections.733
 
 
It remains to be seen how the Libyan and Côte d’Ivoire situations will evolve. For 
now, only the losing sides to the conflicts in Libya and Côte d’Ivoire are facing ICC 
charges. 
 
Causes and Consequences of Selective Prosecutions 
In light of the above examples, there is at least a valid perception that the ICC 
Prosecutor does not act fully independently, or impartially in his investigations. This 
goes against the Prosecutor’s statutory obligations of independence and impartiality, 
as well as its own stated policy. Pursuant to article 42(1) of the Rome Statute, the 
Prosecution “shall not seek or act on instructions from any external source.” In 
accordance with the Prosecutor’s policy, the duty of independence “goes beyond 
simply not seeking or acting on instructions. It also means that the selection process is 
not influenced by the presumed wishes of any external source, nor the importance 
of cooperation of any particular party, nor the quality of cooperation provided. The 
                                                 
730 For instance: EVD‐ PT‐ D12‐ 00237, ICC-01/09-02/11-T-4-ENG ET WT 21-09-2011, 89-91. 
731 Witness 6: ICC-01/09-01/11-T-12-ENG ET WT 08-09-2011, pages 41-42; ICC-01/09-01/11-353, 
Kosgey Confirmation Brief, 24 October 2011, paras. 64-65. See also confirmation hearing, defence 
opening : ICC-01/09-01/11-T-5-ENG ET WT 01-09-2011, at 94.  
732 ICC-01/09-01/11-T-12-ENG ET WT 08-09-2011, page 7. During his press conference on 24 
January 2012, the Prosecutor repeated that he had no evidence against the top authorities of Kenya. 
See: Press Conference held by Ocampo on 24 January 2012 relating to the Pre-Trial Chamber’s 
decision on the confirmation of the charges in Kenya I and II, issued on 23 January 2012. 
733 As was also pointed out by the Ruto defence: ICC-01/09-01/11-T-6-Red-ENG WT 02-09-2011, p 
146. 
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selection process is independent of the cooperation-seeking process.”734
 
 
Some have alleged that this has been the result of allowing States to refer a situation 
to the ICC, as was done by Uganda, DRC and CAR.735 Schabas, for instance, firmly 
believes that self-referrals increase the potential for political manipulation.736 
However, as Robinson points out, political manipulation is not determined by the 
trigger mechanism, but is an inherent problem of international criminal justice.737 
Provided the Prosecutor makes the final decision as to whether a situation should be 
opened in a self-referral State based on the admissibility and complementarity criteria 
set out in the Statute, it makes little difference which State has referred the situation to 
him. Irrespective of who has referred the situation to the ICC, Government members 
targeted for prosecution are likely not inclined to cooperate.738
 
  
The consequences of such selective prosecutions can be quite significant, particularly 
for the secondary objectives of the ICC. As May and Hoskins state:739
“How and which cases are selected for prosecution will affect the image of 
impartiality of the international community. First, especially in deeply divided 
societies where atrocities were committed by members of both sides of a conflict, 
solely singling out representatives of one community for prosecution is likely to 
erode perception of impartiality among the targeted community. Second, local law 
enforcement officials will only serve to entrench, and potentially legitimate, the 
practices too often found within transitional contexts.” 
 
 
                                                 
734 Office of the Prosecutor, International Criminal Court (OTP), “Criteria for Selection of Situations 
and Cases,” draft policy paper, June 2006, pp. 1-2, published at: http://www.icc-
cpi.int/Menus/ICC/Structure+of+the+Court/Office+of+the+Prosecutor/.  
735 W. Schabas, Prosecutorial Discretion v. Judicial Activism at the International Criminal Court, 6 
JICJ (2009) 731, 753; W. Schabas, Complementarity in Practice: Some Uncomplimentary Thoughts, 19 
Criminal Law Forum (2009), 5, at 33; Adam Branch: ‘Uganda’s Civil War and the Politics of ICC 
Intervention’ 21(2) Ethics & International Affairs (2007) 179-198; A. Cassese, Is the ICC Still Having 
Teething Problems?, 4 Journal of International Criminal Justice 434 (2006); M. Arsanjani & W. 
Reisman, The Law in-Action of the International Criminal Court, 99 Am Journal International Law 385 
(2005), at 386-397.   
736 W. Schabas, Complementarity in Practice: Some Uncomplimentary Thoughts, 19 Criminal Law 
Forum (2009), 5, at 16, 22. 
737 D. Robinson, The Controversy over Territorial State Referrals and Reflections on ICL Discourse, 9 
Journal of International Criminal Justice 355 (2011), 355, 368, 369, 377. 
738 L. Arbour & M. Bergsmo, Conspicuous Absence of Jurisdictional Overreach, 1 International Law 
Forum du droit international 13 (1999), at 18. 
739 May & Hoskins, International Criminal Law, supra note 57, 242. 
 
 
184 
Whilst acknowledging that the Prosecutor needs to work efficiently with governments 
in order to broker any success, it is suggested that he should retain his independence 
in selecting suspects. Otherwise, the ICC cannot achieve the goals it has set out to 
achieve. As John Bolton stated, a « politically motivated prosecutor targeting, unfairly 
or in bad faith, highly sensitive political situations » may destabilise the society and 
undermine regional peace and reconciliation efforts.740
 
 If unwelcome prosecutions 
result in the closing of borders, as it has in Sudan, then that is the unfortunate price to 
pay for independent justice. Through political and economic pressure, as was used by 
the ICTY Prosecutor, that may not be a lasting situation. Time will tell. The ICTY 
practice demonstrates that patience and persistence can bring results.  
Securing Arrests 
 
The next difficulty is to have the identified and charged suspects arrested. This has 
been reasonably easy at the ICTR. Most of the suspects had fled Rwanda in 1994 to 
neighbouring countries most of which were prepared to arrest the suspects and 
transfer them to the ICTR. The only suspect at large remaining is Kabuga who is 
alleged to have financed the genocide.741
 
 
This has been much more challenging in the ICTY. For many years, the Yugoslav 
authorities were unwilling to cooperate and arrest the ICTY indictees especially the 
high-level ones. A significant number of arrest warrants were not implemented until a 
new rule 59bis was introduced, explicitly allowing peacekeeping forces deployed in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina to arrest ICTY indictees. As of 1996, many lower-level indictees 
were arrested by NATO forces. However, local NATO commanders were reluctant to 
order the arrest of higher-level indictees like Radovan Karadzic and Ratko Mladic. 
Consequently, in 2001, the ICTY set up a specialised team to track the whereabouts 
of indictees. Its purpose was to provide timely intelligence to governments and 
organisations with the power of arrest. The intelligence gathered by this tracking team 
has been essential in identifying the hiding places of high-level indictees in Bosnia-
                                                 
740 John Bolton : The Global Prosecutors : Hunting War Criminals in the name of Utopia, 78 Foreign 
Affairs 157 (1999), 657-658. Also see : S. Fernandez, de Gurmendi: ‘The Role of the International 
Prosecutor’, in R. Lee (Ed.): The International Criminal Court. The Making of the Rome Statute 175, at 
181 (1999). 
741 Prosecutor v. Kabuga, Case No. ICTR-98-44B- Amended Indicment, 1 Octobre 2004, at: 
http://www.unictr.org/Portals/0/Case/English/Kabuga/kabuga%20041001.pdf 
 
 
185 
Herzegovina and Serbia. Yet, the ICTY still depended on States to act upon this 
information and secure their arrests.742
 
  
The Prosecution thus developed a new strategy to lure governments into cooperation 
by creating strong incentives for doing so. To implement this strategy, the Prosecution 
was dependent on the assistance of the international community. The international 
community demonstrated preparedness to condition aid programs and admission to 
international organizations upon the cooperation of the State concerned with the 
ICTY. For instance, the arrest and surrender to the ICTY of former President 
Milosevic on 28 June 2001 was the direct result of a US threat to boycott a key 
donor’s conference. Croatia communicated Ante Gotovina’s whereabouts, which led 
to his arrest and transfer several months later, only after the European Union (“EU”) 
suspended accession talks with Croatia in March 2005. Serbia arrested a significant 
number of indictees in order to begin the negotiation process to enter the EU. The 
negotiation process was suspended in 2006. The arrest of Karadzic was still not 
sufficient for the EU to re-enter into negotiations with Serbia. Particularly the Dutch 
government insisted that Serbia should not be allowed access to the EU until Mladic 
was arrested. This persistence eventually led to the recent arrests of Mladic and 
Hadzic. There are currently no indictees at large. Thus, the strategy and significant 
efforts of the ICTY Prosecutors has ultimately been very effective.743
 
 
The success of the ICC in arresting suspects has been a mixed bag. The Prosecutor 
has managed to secure the arrests of low and high level indictees including a former 
President and a former President candidate. He has also secured the cooperation of six 
Kenyan suspects, four of whom are now accused, without the need to arrest them. 
Similarly, two Sudanese accused have not been arrested but are, until now, fully 
cooperative. Trials for the Kenyans and Sudanese accused are due to be scheduled. 
 
                                                 
742 P. Lopez-Terres (Chief of Investigations ICTY): Arrest and transfer of indictees. The experience of 
the ICTY, 15 December 2006. Paper presented at the ICC Office of the Prosecutor, 15 December 2006. 
On file with the author. See also: Carla Del Ponte & Chuck Sudetic: Madame Prosecutor: 
Confrontations with Humanity’s Worst Criminals and the Culture of Impunity, Other Press 2009 
(original version in Italian 2008).              
743 Ibid.  
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It is, however, striking that ten outstanding arrest warrants have not been executed.744 
As long as President El Bashir stays in his own country or travels to countries that are 
unwilling to arrest him, the Prosecutor is unable to effect his arrest or that of those at 
his side. It is similarly practically impossible to arrest Koni, who currently appears to 
reside in a border area of Sudan and DRC. His arrest warrant can only be effected if 
the DRC army, ideally with the assistance of other armies, is prepared to launch a 
risky offensive on the LRA base. It is more surprising, however, that the arrest 
warrant against Bosco Ntaganda has still not been executed. Instead of arresting him, 
the DRC authorities promoted him in the army. It is nonetheless the official position 
of the Prosecution that the DRC government cooperates “sans limites”.745
 
  
Lack of Cooperation with the Defence 
 
Governments also frequently frustrate the work of the defence. This is particularly the 
case if it concerns a case against an enemy of the government. In addition, the 
government regularly seeks to obstruct any attempt on the part of the defence to 
incriminate the government as part of its defence. Many international defence counsel 
confirm that this is a real not a mere theoretical problem.746
 
  
The defence has particularly endured difficulties in conducting investigations in 
Rwanda. Most of the Rwandan investigators are not allowed, or do not dare to enter 
                                                 
744 This includes four LRA members (one of the original five has been declared dead: Rascal Luqiua); 
three Sudanese (El Bashir, Aruh, Kusheb); one Congolese (Bosco Ntaganda) and two Libyens 
(Abdullah El-Senoussi and Saif Gaddafi who is in prison and his father is declared dead). There is 
currently no arrest warrant against the Kenyans and Sudanese opposition rebels. 
745 Prosecutor v. Katanga & Ngudjolo, ICC-01/04-01/07-T-258-FR, 12-05-2011, page 39; HRW, 
Unfinished Business, supra note 682, 10.  
746 The author has personally experienced numerous difficulties in conducting investigations in this 
regard in Rwanda, Sierra Leone and DRC. See further M. Wladimiroff, defence attorney with 
experience in the ICTY and ICTR: Position of the Defence: The Role of Defence Counsel before the 
ICTY and the ICTR’, in H. Bevers & C. Joubert, An Independent Defence before the International 
Criminal Court (Intersentia, 2000) 35, at 39-40, where he speaks about his own difficulties in obtaining 
evidence in the Tadic case at the ICTY, and the Musema case at the ICTR. See also Prosecutor v 
Zigiranirazo, No. ICTR-01-73-PT, Request for the Cooperation of the Government of Rwanda (6 May 
2005) where the defence sought the Chamber’s assistance in obtaining access to Rwandan prisons for 
the purpose of interviewing witnesses in there. Also, members of the Katanga defence team, including 
this author, were refused access to potential defence witnesses detained in the Kinshasa central prison. 
This refusal lasted two weeks and was repeated on a subsequent mission. The Defence raised this 
before the Trial Chamber: ICC-01/04-01/07-T-56-ENG CT WT 03-02-2009, pp. 49-51. See also: 
Katanga Defence Request for Leave to Meet Four Defence Witnesses in The Hague Prior to Their 
Testimony, ICC-01/04-01/07-2709-Red, 17 February 2001. ICC-01/04-01/07-2755-Red, Décision sur 
la requête de la Défense de Germain Katanga aux fins d'être autorisée à rencontrer des témoins à La 
Haye (article 64-6-f du Statut), 4 March 2011. 
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Rwanda. A handful of defence investigators live in Rwanda. However, one of them 
fled and sought asylum in The Netherlands. Another one was accused and convicted 
for contempt of court.747 A defence counsel was arrested as a revisionist.748 Even 
though he was not in Rwanda on an official mission of the ICTR, his arrest had a 
significant intimidating effect on other defence counsel. Anyone who brings nuance 
to the Rwandan official story about the genocide risks being charged as a revisionist 
and held liable to minimum ten years imprisonment in Rwanda. 749
 
 
Regularly, defence counsel have difficulties obtaining documents from governments. 
                                                 
747 The information is based on the author’s familiarity with the situation. One of the investigators who 
fled Rwanda quit his job and sought asylum in the Netherlands. Also see Combs, Fact-Finding Without 
Facts, supra note 6, pages 147-148. 
748 On 28 May 2010, a defence counsel before the ICTR was arrested on the allegation that he had 
negated the genocide committed against the Tutsi population in Rwanda in 1994. Since he was in 
Rwanda not on official duty of the ICTR, but to defend one of the opposition leaders arrested on the 
same allegation, the ICTR initially held that he had no immunity. Only when Rwanda showed the basis 
for his arrest, largely on statements defence counsel made before the ICTR in the context of his work, 
the ICTR changed its position and held that there was immunity against prosecution in Rwanda. The 
immunity claim from the ICTR was ignored by Rwanda. He was eventually released on health 
grounds. For ICTR decisions on this, see: Prosecutor v. Bagosora et al, 98-41-A, Order in Relation to 
Aloys Ntabakuze’s Motion for Injunctions Against the Government of Rwanda Regarding the Arrest 
and Investigation of Lead Counsel Peter Erlinder, 9 June 2010 (requesting further information to the 
Rwandan authorities concerning the basis of Erlinder’s arrest); Prosecutor v. Bagosora et al, 98-41-A, 
Further Registrar’s Submissions Under Rule 33(B) of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence in Respect 
of the Appeals Chamber Order to the Registrar dated 9 June 2010, 15 June 2010 (immunity being 
granted after finding that Erlinder was arrested mainly for what he had said in courtroom). For further 
information on the allegations and course of events, see, inter alia: 
http://www.govtrack.us/congress/billtext.xpd?bill=hr111-1426 (US bill of House of Congres, dated 8th 
June 2010, urging Rwanda to immediately release Mr. Peter Erlinder from prison and allow him to 
return to the US); RPGR0678/10/Kgl/NM - COURT DECISION - RDP0312/10/TGJI/GSBO (setting 
out allegations); http://www.newtimes .co.rw/index. php?issue= 14288&article=30153 (“ICTR lawyers 
causing deliberate confusion – Mushikiwabo”); Josh KRON, Jeffrey GETTLEMAN: Lawyers Report 
Intimidation by Rwanda, 12 June, 2010, at: 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/13/world/africa/13rwanda.html ; Niloufer Bhagwat: Lawyers Who 
Reveal the Truth: The Arrest and Threats to the Life of Attorney Professor Peter Erlinder, Global 
Research, 8 June 2010, at: http://www.globalresearch.ca/PrintArticle.php?articleId=19621 ; The 
Associated Press c/o The Canadian Press: bail on medical grounds, 17 June 2010; Associated Press: 
U.S. lawyers departs Rwanda after bail is granted, 20 June 2010, at: 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2010/06/19/AR2010061903158.html?referrer=
emailarticle. 
749 HRW, Justice Compromised, supra note 573; Prosecutor v. Uwikindi, ICTR-01-75-I, Amicus 
Curiae Brief of Human Rights Watch in Opposition to Rule 11 bis Transfer, paras. 40-47. Alison 
DesForges, Human Rights Watch researcher and leading expert for the Prosecution at the ICTR, was 
called a ‘genocidaire’. Professor Filip Reyntjens, who denounced his cooperation with the ICTR since 
only one party to the war is being prosecuted at the ICTR, was the first scholar to be qualified non 
grata by the RPF government in 1995 because his outspoken criticism was not appreciated. Professor 
Reyntjens who spent significant time in Rwanda as a legal adviser and knows a great number of 
leading players well, was very critical of the old regime but is equally critical of the new regime in 
Rwanda. See personal interview with Professor Reyntjens in Antwerpen, 20 December 2004. See also: 
Burying myths, uncovering truth, published by The Economist on 12 March 2010, at: 
http://othernews.info/index.php?p=3311#more-3311.  
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It is not uncommon for defence teams to submit various requests for documents to a 
government without receiving any response. Most States whose authorities are not 
subject to prosecution investigations are much more willing to cooperate with the 
Prosecution than with the defence. This is so because the Prosecution is typically 
regarded as the representative of the court or tribunal. It also has more powers to 
enforce cooperation through political channels. Some countries including the 
Netherlands and Belgium have adopted an explicit policy to treat any request from the 
Prosecutor’s office as a request from the tribunal, which is then routinely 
implemented. A request submitted by the defence, on the other hand, is automatically 
refused unless there is a court order to grant it.750
 
 
If the defence has taken all steps available to it without success, it can address itself to 
the Chamber for assistance.751 If the Chamber is satisfied that the defence cannot 
obtain the information in any other way, and the information is relevant for the 
ascertainment of the facts, or the preparation of the defence, it can order the State to 
provide the documents.752
                                                 
750 Author’s personal experience in the Netherlands in relation to a request for documentary evidence 
relevant to one of the witnesses called in the case of Bagosora et al, ICTR-98-41-T. In Belgium, 
cooperation with the defence absent a Court’s order is prohibited by law. This is sufficient for the 
defence to approach the Chamber for assistance without demonstrating further efforts to obtain the 
documents itself. See: Prosecutor v Bagosora et al, No. ICTR-98-41-T, Decision on Request to the 
Kingdom of Belgium for Assistance Pursuant to Article 28 of the Statute  (21 April 2006) at para. 4; 
Prosecutor v Bizimungu et al, No. ICTR-99-50-T, Decision on Mr. Bicamumpaka’s Request for Order 
for Cooperation of the Kingdom of Belgium (12 September 2007); Prosecutor v Ndindylimana et al, 
No. ICTR-00-56-T, Decision on Ndindliyimana’s Request for the Cooperation of the Kingdom of 
Belgium for the Appearance of Witnesses CBP3 and CBP4 (14 December 2007); Prosecutor v 
Bizimungu et al, No. ICTR-99-50-T, Decision onUrgent Second Motion of Defendant Bicamumpaka 
Regarding Cooperation of the Kingdom of Belgium (27 February 2008) at para. 10. 
  
751 Prosecutor v Simba, No. ICTR-2001-76-T, Decision on the Defence Request for the Cooperation of 
the Rwandan Government Pursuant to Article 28 (28 October 2004); Prosecutor v Karemera et al, No. 
ICTR-98-44-T, Decision on Defence Motion for Exclusion of Witness GK’s Testimony or for Request 
for Cooperation of the Government of Rwanda (27 Nov 2006) at paras.14-15; Prosecutor v Bizimungu 
et al, No. ICTR-99-50-T, Decision on Prosper Mugiraneza’s Motion Pursuant to Rule 68 for 
Exculpatory Evidence, or in the Alternative, Motion for Subpoena to the Government of the United 
States of America (8 December 2004). It is, however, not required that a party exhaust all possible 
mechanisms before requesting the Chamber’s assistance. See: Prosecutor v Bizimungu et al, No. ICTR-
99-50-T, Decision on Prosper Mugiraneza’s Motion Regarding Cooperation with the Government of 
Burundi (30 October 2008) at para. 14. It is sufficient for the defence to demonstrate that it submitted 
requests to the relevant authorities even if they remain unanswered: Prosecutor v Karemera et al, No. 
ICTR-98-44-T, Decision on Joseph Nzirorera’s Motion for Request for Cooperation of Government of 
Rwanda: Statements of Witness BDW (25 July 2007) at para. 7; Prosecutor v Bizimungu et al, No. 
ICTR-99-50-T, Decision on Prosper Mugiraneza’s Motion Regarding Cooperation with the 
Government of Burundi (30 October 2008) at para. 14; Prosecutor v Milutinovic et al, No. IT-05-87-T, 
Decision on Sreten Lukic’s Amended Rule 54 bis Application (29 September 2006) at para. 7.  
752 Prosecutor v Halilovic, No. IT-01-48-T, Decision on Addendum to Further Defence Report re 
Access to Foss Material and Additional Motions re Criminal Record of Prosecution Witnesses Filed on 
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Such an order is, however, not always executed. The defence in the Katanga & 
Ngudjolo case is still waiting for the DRC government to comply with a court order to 
provide it with non-contentious documents such as lists of combatants who 
participated in the demobilisation program, as well as the ranks of those who 
integrated into the Congolese army.753 The international courts and tribunals do not 
have the power to take enforcement measures against a State.754 If a State refuses to 
implement its order, the Chamber can order the Prosecution to obtain the requested 
documents. It has done so in the ICTR on a number of occasions, using its power 
under Rule 98 to request additional evidence.755
 
  
The Prosecution can also make an application to the Chamber for an order for 
cooperation of a State, but this is far less common. Generally, the Prosecution is able 
to resolve cooperation issues without the need for the Chamber’s assistance. 
Nonetheless, in the ICTY case of Gotovina et al, the Chamber ordered the 
government of Croatia to intensify its search for documents requested by the 
Prosecution. It also ordered Croatia to provide detailed reports of its efforts where its 
claim that it could not find the requested documents was not conclusive.756
 
 
Assistance from UN and NGOs 
 
                                                                                                                                           
5 January 2005 and 11 February 2005 (18 March 2005); Prosecutor v Milutinovic et al, No. IT-05-87-
PT, Decision on Second Application of Dragoljub Ojdanic for Binding Orders Pursuant to Rule 54 bis 
(17 November 2005) at para.18; Prosecutor v Milutinovic et al, No. IT-05-87-AR108bis.2, Decision on 
Request of United States of America for Review (12 May 2006) at para. 11. The defence must set out its 
reasons. If this cannot be done without jeopardising the defence strategy, it must so indicate and still 
provide general reasons: Prosecutor v Seselj, No. IT-03-67-PT, Decision on Requests by the Accused 
for Trial Chamber II to Issue Subpoena Orders (3 June 2005). 
753 See ICC-01/04-01/07-2019-Conf-Exp-Red 23-04-2010, Order on the 'Urgent Defence Motion for 
Cooperation of the DRC’, and ICC-01/04-01/07- 2619-Red 17-08-2011, Décision relative à la seconde 
requête de la Défense de Germain Katanga visant à obtenir la coopération de la République 
démocratique du Congo, paras.15-17. Unlike the ICTY and ICTR, the ICC cannot issue binding orders. 
754 Prosecutor v Nahimana et al, No. ICTR-99-52-T, Decision on the Motion to Stay Proceedings in 
the Trial of Ferdinand Nahimana (5 June 2003) at paras. 8-9.  
755 Prosecutor v. Bagilishema (Decision on the Request of the Defence Pursuant to Rule 73 of the 
Rules of Procedure and Evidence for Summons on Witnesses) ICTR-95-1A-T (8 June 2000), paras 18, 
19; Prosecutor v. Bagosora (Decision on the Request for Documents Arising From Judicial 
Proceedings in Rwanda in Respect of Prosecution Witnesses) ICTR-98-41-T (16 December 2003); See 
also Prosecutor v. Karemera (Decision on Motions to Compel Inspection and Disclosure and to Direct 
Witnesses to Bring Judicial and Immigration Records) ICTR-98-44-PT (14 September 2005), para. 11. 
756 Prosecutor v Gotovina et al, No. IT-06-90-T, Order in Relation to Prosecution’s Application for an 
Order Pursuant to Rule 54 bis (16 September 2008). 
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The Prosecution tends to rely heavily on the support of the UN, NATO, Interpol, local 
and international NGOs and civil society groups, and other governments. Such 
support may be necessary to compensate for the lack of cooperation from the regional 
State. Such organisations tend to be much more reluctant to cooperate with the 
defence.757
 
  
Often, before international tribunals and courts have opened their investigations, such 
bodies have been operational in the post-conflict-zone under investigation of an 
international court. Such bodies are therefore usually more familiar with the territory 
than ICC investigators. Their assistance can be useful in providing details of potential 
witnesses as well as documentary or other evidence. They may orientate the 
investigators in their investigative work and bring to their attention the most serious 
crimes committed in a particular region. They may even suggest the names of alleged 
perpetrators.  
 
For instance, MONUC, the UN mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo 
(DRC), has been charged with documenting the massive violations of human rights in 
the eastern part of the DRC.758 It has transmitted a large quantity of their collected 
material to the prosecution of the ICC on the condition that it not be disclosed to the 
defence.759
 
  
Another example of a fact-finding entity which has the explicit mandate to assist the 
investigations carried out by the prosecution of an international criminal tribunal is 
the Humanitarian Law Documentation Project in Kosovo. This is a project of the 
International Crisis Group established in 1999. Its aims are to identify violations of 
international humanitarian law as well as record evidence of such violations in order 
                                                 
757 The author has personally experienced difficulties in securing the cooperation from UN or NGOs. 
See further C Buisman, Defence and Fair Trial, in R. Haveman, O. Kavran & J. Nicholls (Eds.), 
Supranational Criminal Law: a System Sui Generis (Intersentia, 2003), Chapter VI, 198-205. 
758 The Security Council mandate of MONUC includes a human rights component, and MONUC teams 
have on several occasions investigated allegations of specific violations; for instance, in December 
2002 a MONUC team was sent to investigate allegations that grave violations had occurred in 
Mambasa and the surrounding area. The team interviewed over 350 eyewitnesses. See Thirteenth 
report of the Secretary-General on MONUC (S/2003/211), February 21, 2003. 
759 This has led to great difficulties in the Lubanga and Katanga cases because a large quantity of this 
information included exonerating evidence which should in principle be disclosed to the defence. This 
has led to a stay in Lubanga and severe criticism of the prosecutor in the Katanga & Ngudjolo cases. 
See further below, section 6.7 ‘Confidentiality’. 
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to provide information about witnesses and reported crimes to the ICTY.760
 
 In seven 
months, 4700 records were created from victims and witnesses and, together with an 
extensive list of potential witnesses, were handed over to the ICTY Prosecutor. In 
doing so, this project complemented the work of the ICTY prosecution investigators, 
but not of the defence investigators.  
UN and NGO human rights investigations have, however, a number of deficiencies. 
There is, for instance, no standard procedure for fact-finding missions conducted by 
the UN or NGOs.761 This lack of standardized methods precludes any way to test the 
validity of the research and conclusions. UN Missions rely heavily on NGOs, 
government reports, and the media. Reports on human rights violations, for instance, 
in South Africa, Iran, Iraq and Israel have been made by people who have never set 
foot in the country.762
 
 
According to M. Cherif Bassiouni, given this close link between the UN and other 
bodies, including governments and NGOs, UN reports are often “designed to please 
the influential Geneva-based non-governmental organization (NGO) community and 
certain governments, particularly the three Western permanent members and a 
number of Western European countries that champion human rights.”763
 
 
Bassiouni further points out that the UN is not a politically independent body. Rather, 
it was established “as a political organization, and, as such, it is largely governed by 
political considerations [...] the Security Council is unbridled in its determination of 
peace and security issues. These considerations are elevated above judicial or other 
forms of review, although always subject to self-review whenever considerations of 
power and interest require it.”764
                                                 
760 The project is described in International Crisis Group, Reality Demands: Documenting Violations 
of International Humanitarian Law in Kosovo 1999, 27 June 2000, available at 
<http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/europe/balkans/kosovo/reality-demands-documenting-
violations-of-international-humanitarian-law-in-kosovo-1999.aspx>, last accessed January 2012. 
 He also considers it problematic that accountability 
of those involved in fact-finding missions “has yet to be clearly established as one of 
761 M. Cherif Bassiouni, The UN and Protection of Human Rights: Appraising UN Justice-Related 
Fact-Finding Missions, 5 Washington University Journal of Law & Policy (2001) 35, 37. 
762 M. Cherif Bassiouni, The UN and Protection of Human Rights: Appraising UN Justice-Related 
Fact-Finding Missions, 5 Washington University Journal of Law & Policy (2001) 35, 37. 
763 Ibid. 
764 Ibid. 
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the goals of fact-finding missions. Indeed, to date the UN has not promulgated 
guidelines for accountability.”765
 
  
UN and NGO fact-finding missions also frequently rely on second hand hearsay or 
other dubious sources whose identities are often not disclosed.766 Reports produced 
by NGOs or the UN are, therefore, generally viewed with scepticism.767 For instance, 
in ICC case of Bemba, the Chamber decided with regard to the admissibility of NGO 
reports or portions thereof, that their provenance and reliability is entirely 
uninvestigated and untested. Therefore, these materials carry little, if any, evidential 
weight.768 Similarly, the Chamber in Katanga & Ngudjolo treated UN and NGO 
reports with caution.769 On a case-by-case basis, it determined whether such a report 
was relevant to a live issue in the case. If so, the Chamber then determined whether it 
had sufficient reliability and significance, and whether its admission would cause 
unfair prejudice to the opposing party.770 On the basis of these criteria, the Chamber 
excluded a large part of the proposed UN and NGO reports. It particularly declined to 
admit reports whose methodology was unknown, and/or which were largely based on 
anonymous sources or hearsay information.771
 
 
In the Special Court for Sierra Leone, Justice Robertson Q.C. said the following, 
which is rightly on point: 
Courts must guard against allowing prosecutions to present evidence which amounts 
to no more than hearsay demonisation of defendants by human rights groups and the 
                                                 
765 Ibid. 
766 The ICJ in DRC v Uganda declined to rely on a MONUC report tendered by DRC government, 
because of its use of second hand hearsay. See Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo 
(Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Uganda), Judgment of 19 December 2005, 2005 ICJ Rep. 116, 
para. 159. 
767 Partial Award, Civilian Claims – Eritrea’s Claims 15, 16, 23 & 27-32 (Eth. V. Eri), p. 34, Eritrea 
Ethiopia Claims Commission, 17 December 2004 (“[…] the Parties also noted the potential pitfalls and 
limitations of uncritical reliance on such materials, which were not prepared as evidence in legal 
proceedings . . . Third-party reports may indeed be based on incomplete or inaccurate information that 
the reporting entity cannot test or verify, including information provided by one or the other of the 
Parties. Such reports may reflect the interests or agendas of the reporters or those who provided them 
with information”). 
768 Prosecutor v. Bemba, ICC-01/05-01/08-802, Decision on the Admissibility and Abuse of Process 
Challenges, 24 June 2010, paras. 235, 254-255. 
769 ICC-01/04-01/07-3184 21-10-2011, Decision on the Bar Table Motion of the Defence of Germain 
Katanga. 
770 Ibid, paras. 8, 16, 17; ICC-01/04-01/07-2635, Decision on the Prosecutor's Bar Table Motions of 17 
December 2010, para.14.  
771 ICC-01/04-01/07-2635 17-12-2010, Decision on the Prosecutor's Bar Table Motions, para.28-31. 
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media. The right of sources to protection is not a charter for lazy prosecutors to make 
a case based on second-hand media reports and human rights publications.772
 
 
Even at the confirmation stage, anonymous hearsay can only be used for the purpose 
of corroborating other evidence. In Mbarushimana, the Pre-Trial Chamber 
highlighted that anonymous hearsay contained in human rights reports must be given 
a low probative value “in view of the inherent difficulties in ascertaining the 
truthfulness and authenticity of such information”.773
 
 
The ability to cross-examine the person who compiled the report does not necessarily 
cure the fact that the defence is deprived of the opportunity to cross-examine the 
persons whom the investigator interviewed whilst compiling the report.774 This will 
principally depend on the reliability of the methodology applied.775
 
  
In addition, the impartiality from members of international organizations cannot be 
verified. Also, their knowledge of events is often limited and sometimes contradictory 
in nature. They frequently rely on information from representatives of warring 
factions. Since they are denied access to the relevant headquarters or camps, they are 
                                                 
772 Prosecutor v. Brima, Kamara, Kanu, SCSL-04-16-AR73-506, Separate and Concurring Opinion of 
Hon. Justice Geoffrey Robertson, QC, to the Decision on Prosecution Appeal Against Decision on Oral 
Application for Witness TF1-150 to Testify without Being Compelled to Answer Questions on 
Grounds of Confidentiality, 26 May 2006, para. 35. This quote was cited in: See ICC-01/09-01/11-354 
24-10-2011, Joshua Arap Sang Defence Brief following the Confirmation of Charges Hearing, para. 
25. 
773 Prosecutor v. Mbarushimana, Decision on the confirmation of charges, ICC-01/04-01/10-465-Red, 
16 December 2011, para. 78. See also ICC-02/05-02/09-243-Red 08-02-2010, paras. 50-52. 
774 Prosecutor v. Milutinovic et al., Case No. IT-05-87, Decision on Evidence Tendered Through 
Sandra Mitchell and Frederick Abrahams, 1 September 2006, para. 20, referring to Prosecutor v. 
Milosevic, Case No. IT-02-54-AR73.2, Appeal Chamber Decision on Admissibility of Prosecution 
Investigator’s Evidence, 30 September 2002, para. 22 
775 Prosecutor v. Milutinovic et al., Case No. IT-05-87, Decision Denying Prosecution’s Second 
Motion for Admission of Evidence Pursuant to Rule 92Bis, 13 September 2006, para. 14 (“The 
Chamber has found that reports contained no explanation of the conditions of interviews, duration of 
interview, number of interviewed persons and similar details, and that they constituted second hand 
hearsay which weakens any probative value they might have”). The admission of OSCE reports were 
eventually excluded on the grounds that (at para. 21): (a) the methods of these organizations can at best 
assure the accuracy of the process for recording the information, not the reliability of material; (b) the 
reports do not identify the persons interviewed, leaving the sources of the critical information largely 
anonymous; (c) the witness to testify on these reports was in supervisory role with respect to collection 
and analysis of information, but she never took any of these information herself; (d) the other witness 
to testify on the report, although personally interviewed some of the persons, it was not possible to 
determine, which portions of the report were based on his interviews; (e) most of the tendered excerpts 
of the reports set forth allegations of criminal conduct made by persons who claimed to be the victims 
of, or witnesses to these crime, and the court had no opportunity of hearing any of these persons upon 
whose statements these entries were based; and the Chamber was not in position to assess the reliability 
of factual connections contained therein). 
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not able to observe personally the warring parties’ combat operations at close 
proximity.776
 
  
Accordingly, the heavy reliance of investigators of international criminal courts and 
tribunals on UN or NGO investigations may diminish the quality of the investigations. 
In addition, their moral and political independence may be compromised.777
 
  
Practice at the international tribunals and court 
 
Particularly at the ICC, excessive use is made of the assistance of the UN and NGOs. 
The ICC Prosecution appears to rely on such bodies more than their own 
investigations.778 Off-the-record, members of NGOs even complain about this. Their 
reports were never meant to replace the Prosecutor’s own investigations, but rather to 
invite him to investigate certain crimes identified by the UN or NGOs.779
 
 
This was one of the factors that led the Pre-Trial Chamber not to confirm the case 
against Mbarushimana. In this case, for many of the alleged attacks, the Prosecution 
solely relied on a single UN Report or a single Human Rights Watch Report. The 
sources contained in these reports were anonymous.780 Some of the attacks were only 
incidentally referred to without any reference to the circumstances in which they 
would have occurred.781
                                                 
776 These were factors why the ICTY Chamber in Prosecutor v. Hadzihasanovic, Case No. IT-01-47, 
Trial Chamber Judgment, 15 March 2006, paras 303, 578-579, held UN reports should be treated with 
caution. The lack of neutrality of some NGOs is also apparent from their joint letter to the ICC 
Prosecutor, 31 July 2006, at: http://www.iccnow.org/documents/DRC_joint_letter_eng.PDF.  
 In light of “(i) the paucity of the information provided in 
these UN reports, (ii) the identified inconsistencies between the information provided 
in these UN reports, (ii) the identified inconsistencies between the information 
777 At the Geneva Conference, supra note 173, Getti, who has been involved in initial investigations in 
ICTY and ICTR, gave examples where undue pressure was put on prosecutors by UN and/or NGOs. 
778 See for instance, the Prosecution’s report before the UN Security Council on 2 November 2011, 
affirming that its “first assessment mission to Libya to prepare for the collection of further evidence on 
the territory where the alleged crimes took place” had occurred during the last weekend. See website: 
http://www.icc-cpi.int/Menus/ICC/Structure+of+the+Court/Office+of+the+Prosecutor/ 
779 Off-the-record conversations with a member of HRW (6 June 2010, The Hague) and a member of 
Medecins Sans Frontieres (13 August 2010, Bunia, DRC). See also: Public Obsevations of the United 
Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights invited in Application of Rule 103 of the Rules of 
Procedure and Evidence, ICC-02/05-19, 10-10-2006, criticizing the Prosecutor for failing to conduct 
on-site investigations in Darfur. 
780 Prosecutor v. Mbarushimana, Decision on the confirmation of charges, ICC-01/04-01/10-465-Red, 
16 December 2011, para. 117. 
781 Ibid, para. 120. 
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provided and the Prosecution's allegations, and (iii) the lack of any corroborating 
evidence”, the Pre-Trial Chamber found that the evidence submitted by the 
Prosecution “is not sufficient to establish substantial grounds to believe that the 
alleged attacks occurred in Ruvundi, Mutakato, or Kahole”.782
 
  
The Kenyan investigations have so far been primarily focused on the WAKA and 
HRW report.783 In the press release of Ocampo on 24 January 2012 following the 
confirmation of the charges of four out of six Kenyan suspects, he explicitly specified 
that, until now, they had no witness in Kenya and that their investigations were 
mainly carried out outside Kenya. He indicated that, now the charges were confirmed, 
the Prosecution would need to move into Kenya to investigate the crime base and 
engage with the victims.784 Similarly, no investigative mission had been carried out in 
Libya before the beginning of November 2011, long after charging three Libyan 
suspects.785
 
 
Similarly, the ICC Prosecution seemingly has not conducted any onsite investigations 
in Sudan. The Prosecution appears not to have conducted any onsite investigations 
even before the arrest warrants against al-Bashir, Haroun and Kushayb were issued 
and Sudan closed its borders for anyone connected with the ICC. Instead, in its factual 
analysis, the Prosecution has relied on information gathered by intermediaries as well 
as UN reports. The Prosecution maintained that it was important to keep a low profile 
in Sudan because, otherwise, it would have put its potential witnesses and informants 
in serious danger. However, both the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, 
                                                 
782 Ibid, para. 120. The Pre-Trial Chamber similarly found that numerous other attacks were not proven 
on the “sufficient grounds to believe” standard because they were not substantiated at all other than by 
assumptions or information from third parties. See paras. 121-136. 
783 See for instance ICC-01/09-01/11-355 24-10-2011, paras. 28-29. 
784 Press Conference held by Ocampo on 24 January 2012 relating to the Pre-Trial Chamber’s decision 
on the confirmation of the charges in Kenya I and II, issued on 23 January 2012. See also: Statement 
by the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court on Kenya ruling, at: http://www.icc-
cpi.int/NR/exeres/54E6388D-4DD0-4E85-8FA9-90DA95A2AFB3.htm 
785 Indeed, the Prosecution issued a report before the UN Security Council on 2 November 2011, 
affirming that it had not done onsite investigations other than an assessment mission during the 
weekend before; and affirming its cooperation with local civil society groups and various local 
committees, mandated to investigate crimes committed by all parties in Libya. This report also states 
that the Prosecutor’s Office’s analysis “will benefit from the work of the UN Commission of Enquiry, 
which should present a report in March 2012”. Finally, it announces that “[t]he investigation will 
benefit from a  reporting system  that  has been set up by the NTC, through the Ministry of Women and 
Social Affairs, with the purpose of affording rape victims the opportunity to come forward” (para. 15). 
See website: http://www.icc-cpi.int/Menus/ICC/Structure+of+the+Court/Office+of+the+Prosecutor/. 
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Louise Arbour, and the Chairman of the UN Commission of Inquiry on Darfur, 
Cassese, strongly recommended that the Prosecution enter Sudan and conduct onsite 
investigations. Arbour argued that the ICC presence in Sudan could be effective and 
have a positive impact on the human rights situation. Based on her own experience in 
investigating human rights violations in Sudan, she maintained that it should be 
possible for the Prosecutor to conduct investigations in Sudan without increasing the 
risk for witnesses. Arbour acknowledged that “[r]isks can never be eliminated 
absolutely” but added that security threats were caused more by the ongoing conflict 
in Sudan than by their interaction with human rights investigators, which would be 
the same for the ICC.786 She added that, in any event, “security challenges particular 
to investigation of international crimes while an armed conflict is ongoing should not 
per se prevent the Court from acting in pursuance of its international mandate towards 
timely and effective individual criminal accountability.”787 Cassese warned that 
valuable testimonial evidence, as well as documents, such as minutes of security 
meetings, flight records and orders issued by the military authorities in Khartoum to 
the military authorities in Darfur would perish if investigations were not carried out 
immediately.788
 
 However the Prosecution chose not to follow this advice. 
A comparable approach was adopted in the Lubanga and Katanga & Ngudjolo cases. 
In these cases, the ICC Prosecution so far has barely investigated in the local 
territories. In the Katanga & Ngudjolo case, only one investigative mission was made 
to the village of Bogoro before issuing an arrest warrant against Katanga for crimes 
committed in Bogoro.789
 
  
After that first mission to Bogoro, which took place in February or March 2007, it 
took the Prosecution two years to return. Meanwhile, the defence had visited Bogoro 
                                                 
786 Observations of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights invited in Application of 
Rule 103 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, ICC-02/05-19, 10-10-2006, paras. 62, 64, 68. See 
also: Observations on Issues Concerning the Protection of Victims and the Preservation of Evidence in 
the Proceedings on Darfur pending before the ICC, ICC-02/05-14, 1 September 2006; A. Cassese, Is 
the ICC Still Having Teething Problems? A. Cassese, 4 Journal of International Criminal Justice 434 
(2006). 
787 ICC-02/05-19, 10-10-2006, para. 76. 
788 Observations on Issues Concerning the Protection of Victims and the Preservation of Evidence in 
the Proceedings on Darfur pending before the ICC, ICC-02/05-14, 1 September 2006.  
789 ICC-01/04-01/07-T-81-Red-ENG WT 25-11-2009, pages 21, 40. 
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on multiple occasions.790 The Prosecution never visited any other village of import. 
Until the judicial site visit which took place between 16 and 20 January 2012 after the 
presentation of all evidence,791 nobody from the Prosecutor’s office ever visited 
Aveba and Zumbe.792
 
 These locations are of particular importance to the case as they 
were the home fronts of the two accused in the period relevant to the charges. 
Allegedly, they prepared the crimes charged from these localities. Presumably 
therefore, many villagers in Aveba and Zumbe were witnesses to the events and could 
have provided information to the Prosecutor. The Prosecutor may thus have lost good 
opportunities to obtain both incriminating and exonerating evidence. 
The purported reason for keeping onsite investigations to an absolute minimum is 
security of the Prosecution’s personnel and safety of anyone assisting the Court. The 
chief of investigations in Ituri explained to the Court that, in conducting onsite 
investigations, the Prosecution faces security risks and health risks, including cholera, 
Ebola and Malaria. These risks had delayed the investigations.793 The same risks, 
however, did not delay defence missions.794
 
  
It is further alleged that it is too dangerous to travel around the Eastern Congo 
because there are still active militia groups around. The defence, however, managed 
to reach all relevant villages on numerous occasions without great difficulties.795 If 
need be, the UN is prepared to offer security items, such as radios, protective outfits, 
tanks and escorts. This may, however, have an impact on the willingness of 
prospective witnesses to cooperate. Even without the assistance of the UN, most of 
the time, it is possible to travel safely between different locations.796
 
 
                                                 
790 Between 2008 and 2012, the author participated in multiple defence missions to Bogoro, Aveba, 
Zumbe and other villages in Ituri. 
791 Press release: ICC judges in case against Katanga and Ngudjolo Chui visit Ituri, ICC-CPI-
20120127-PR765. The author participated personally in this judicial site visit. 
792 As was confirmed by the chief investigator in Ituri: ICC-01/04-01/07-T-81-Red-ENG WT 25-11-
2009, pages 65-66. 
793 ICC-01/04-01/07-T-81-Red-ENG WT 25-11-2009, pages 8-10. See also ICC-01/04-01/06-2690-
Red2, 8 March 2011, paras. 123-124. 
794 The defence conducted onsite investigations at the beginning of 2008 despite an Ebola epidemic in 
the region. The ICC medical unit explicitly informed the defence that the Ebola epidemic in no way 
endangered the ICC personnel. The information is based on the author’s personal experience. 
795 At times, it is difficult to visit any place outside Bogoro, and particularly Aveba. At such times, 
missions are not approved. However, most of the times it was considered safe enough to travel around 
in Ituri. 
796 The author has personal experience. See ibid. 
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On 10 July 2009, the chief Prosecutor succeeded in visiting Zumbe without any 
difficulty. He was transported by a UN helicopter. The purpose of his visit was to 
listen to the views and sufferings of the Zumbe local communities.797 The local 
authorities were content that he had made the effort to arrive at Zumbe.798 On 18 
January 2012, in the course of the first judicial site visit of the Court, representatives 
of the defence, victims, prosecution and the judges all visited Zumbe, Aveba and 
Bogoro.799
 
 It is thus surprising that the Prosecution never attempted to visit any place 
other than Bogoro, and even then on significantly fewer occasions than the defence 
and victim representatives.  
Mention has already been made of the fact that witnesses are often interviewed in safe 
and comfortable locations. It is impossible to hide when conducting investigations in 
small villages. The international personnel of the Court clearly stand out in such an 
environment. Everyone knows immediately when an international investigator of the 
Court has passed through. This can put the safety of prospective witnesses and their 
family members at risk. In light of prevailing insecurity in most of the ICC situations 
and the lack of a police force necessary to protect witnesses, the Prosecution 
considered it safer for the witnesses to interview them elsewhere.800 The ICC has not 
employed local investigators in any of their situations. Instead, they rely on 
intermediaries to identify and contact potential witnesses, as well as to collect security 
information regarding the region.801 The Prosecution considers this the “best practice” 
during investigations.802 Reliance of intermediaries has, however, been the source of 
many problems, which will be addressed below.803
 
 
                                                 
797 DRC-OTP-1063-0002, EVD-D03-00101, EVD-D03-00102 (Prosecution Video about Ocampo visit 
to Zumbe on the 10th of July 2009). 
798 Personal interviews in the field with the representatives of the communities who had attended the 
meeting with Ocampo. They produced a document listing the concerns they had addressed with the 
Prosecution (document on file with the author). In general, the people were content that he had come to 
listen to their views and observations. 
799 Press release: ICC judges in case against Katanga and Ngudjolo Chui visit Ituri, ICC-CPI-
20120127-PR765. The author participated personally in this judicial site visit. 
800 ICC-01/04-01/06-2690-Red2, 8 March 2011; citing Prosecution confidential filing ICC-01/04-
01/06-2678. 
801 ICC-01/04-01/06-2690-Red2, 8 March 2011, para. 126; citing Prosecution confidential filing ICC-
01/04-01/06-2678, para. 18. 
802 ICC-01/04-01/06-2690-Red2, 8 March 2011, para. 124; citing Prosecution confidential filing ICC-
01/04-01/06-2678, para. 14. 
803 See section ‘false testimony’. 
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Forensic Evidence 
 
In the ICC, little forensic evidence has been introduced in the trials thus far. In 
Katanga & Ngudjolo, the Prosecutor conducted a number of forensic examinations of 
the ‘Institut de Bogoro’ where allegedly a significant number of people were killed. 
However, this exercise was undertaken several months after the deadline for 
disclosure of all Prosecution incriminating and exonerating evidence. In addition, it 
added very little value because “the expert was unable to provide even a rough 
estimation of the date when the bullets were fired or match them to a particular 
weapon; nor does it, as the Prosecution admits, bring to light previously unknown 
facts which have a significant bearing upon the case”.804 The four expert reports were 
not admitted because the defence had not been involved in the process.805 Thus, the 
forensic examinations were conducted too late to be meaningful. No forensic 
examination had been conducted on the bodies. Thus, the Prosecutor’s determination 
of the number of victims, the manner in which they were killed, as well as their status 
as civilians belonging the targeted ethnic group was made solely on the basis of eye-
witness testimony.806
 
  
At the ICTY and ICTR, Prosecution investigators similarly faced issues of safety. 
Nonetheless, they managed to conduct onsite investigations. UN and NGO reports are 
relied on for context only. For the assessment of who is responsible for what, the 
ICTY and ICTR Prosecution have largely relied on their own investigations. At the 
ICTR, they were perhaps not as efficient as would be expected, but at least local and 
international investigators were actively involved in searching for witnesses and 
documents. Often, there is little to no forensic evidence. In few cases, some forensic 
evidence was introduced, demonstrating that large-scale massacres had occurred and 
that many of the victims were Tutsi.807
                                                 
804 ICC-01/04-01/07-1515-Corr 09-10-2009, Decision on the disclosure of evidentiary material relating 
to the Prosecutor's site visit to Bogoro on 28,29 and 31 March 2009, para. 34. 
 Yet, to the dismay of Alison DesForges and 
805 Ibid, paras. 74-76.  
806 As was confirmed by the chief Prosecution investigator in Ituri: ICC-01/04-01/07-T-81-Red-ENG 
WT 25-11-2009, 22. She conceded that their information was not precise. When the judges enquired 
why no forensic examination had been conducted, she informed them that it was too late to do so 
meaningfully (page 25). 
807 Kayishema & Ruzindana Judgement, paras. 325-326. 
 
 
200 
Timothy Longman, no serious effort was made to collect documentary or forensic 
evidence to link identified suspects to particular crimes.808
 
  
The ICTY investigations have been most efficient. ICTY investigators have managed 
to gather forensic evidence in almost every case.809 They have also interviewed many 
prospective witnesses and have gathered volumes of documentary and tangible 
material. They often use methods such as telephone taps to obtain direct evidence of 
conversations.810 The ICTY has some advantages over the ICTR. First, the war was 
still going on as the bulk of the investigations were carried out. Second, the armies in 
the former Yugoslavia were much more organised than the Rwandan army and 
militia. Consequently, more orders were issued in writing.811
 
 Third, the numbers of 
victims in the Yugoslav conflict were significantly lower than those in Rwanda. This 
facilitated the ICTY investigators in obtaining forensic evidence.  
Nonetheless, even if investigators are conducting onsite investigations, they may 
encounter numerous difficulties, which are discussed below. 
 
Uncooperative Witnesses 
 
As a result of witness intimidation 
The environment in which the parties must conduct their investigations is often 
hostile. This is equally a problem for the prosecution as for the defence. Most of the 
times, there is a highly politicised climate in a post-war society. Many on the side of 
those being prosecuted are adverse to the tribunal or court and, therefore, unwilling to 
                                                 
808 Alison DesForges & Timothy Longman, Legal Responses to Genocide in Rwanda, in My 
Neighbour, My Enemy: Justice and Community in the Aftermath of Mass Atrocity, 49, 53. 
809 See, for instance, Prosecutor v. Gotovina et al, Trial Judgement of 15 April 2011, IT-05-87/1-T, 
paras. 454, 456, 465, 509-520, ; Prosecutor v. Popovic et al, Trial Judgement of 10 June 2010, IT-05-
88-T, paras. 411, 412, 502, 523, 544, 550, 598, 607. 
810 See, for instance: Prosecutor v. Haraqija and Morina, Judgement on Allegations of Contempt, 17 
December 2008; Prosecutor v. Beqaj, Judgement on Contempt Allegations, 27 May 2005. Both cases 
could be brought because the telephones including mobile phones of the suspects had been tapped. 
811 See, for instance, Prosecutor v. Gotovina et al, Trial Judgement of 15 April 2011, IT-05-87/1-T, 
paras. 45, 74-84, 94-100, 1399, 1465 (included many military documents; for instance: HV orders 
(P1125 and D281); Červenko’s order D559 (para 99); Prosecutor v. Popovic et al, Trial Judgement of 
10 June 2010, IT-05-88-T, paras. 237, 367, 372, 375, 565, 566 (included many documents including a 
report on the reassignment of a unit from the 1st Krajina Corps; Zvornik Brigade Duty Officer 
Notebook; A report from the ABiH to the Zepa Municipality, diary of Mirko Trivić, Commander of the 
Romanija Brigade). 
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cooperate with the Prosecution. They may be more welcoming to the defence, 
particularly where the defence represents a local hero. In such a situation, they may 
give all their assistance to the defence and none to the prosecution.812 When, on the 
other hand, the defence represents someone who is hugely unpopular in the region 
where investigations take place, it will be very difficult for the defence to conduct any 
investigations.813
 
  
ICTR 
Potential witnesses may also fear retaliation if they cooperate with either party. It 
often occurs that, initially, potential witnesses are open and ready to talk, but on a 
subsequent occasion, they have either amended their story or they are no longer 
willing to cooperate. This could be due to the fact that they may have been interfered 
with in the meantime. This is particularly a problem in Rwanda where many potential 
witnesses refuse to cooperate with the defence for fear of retaliation from the 
government.814
 
 This seriously frustrates the work of defence, particularly in the 
context of the ICTR.  
Many ICTR defence witnesses allege that they have been harassed as a result of their 
cooperation with the defence.815 A number of them appear to have been arrested or re-
arrested after testifying for the defence.816
                                                 
812 In Kosovo, for instance, people were much more willing to cooperate with the defence than the 
prosecution in the two cases against members of the Kosovo Liberation Army (“KLA”). The author has 
personal experience in conducting investigations there. 
 Others were never freed from prison 
813 See M. Wladimiroff, Position of the Defence: The Role of Defence Counsel before the ICTY and 
the ICTR’, in H. Bevers & C. Joubert, An Independent Defence before the International Criminal Court 
(Intersentia 2002) 35. 
814 Nzabonimana Motion for Stay of the Proceedings, Reconsideration, and/or Certification (n 835 
above), Annex A, pages 5-11. Also see: Chris Mahony: The justice sector afterthought: Witness 
protection in Africa (South Africa: Institute for Security Studies 2010), 58-76. 
815 See, for instance, Prosecutor v. Bizimungu et al, Prosper Mugiraneza’s First Amended Emergency 
Motion to Institute Proceedings Pursuant to Rule 77, 6 June 2008; Prosecutor v. Bizimungu Casimir et 
al, Case No. ICTR-99-50-T, Judgement and Sentence, September 2011, para. 108; Prosecutor v. 
Gatete, Decision on Defence and Prosecution Motions for Admission of Written Statements and 
Defence Motion to Postpone Filing of Closing Briefs, 24 June 2010, para 6. 
816 See, for instance, Uwizeye, who testified for the defence in Akayesu in March 1998. Within two 
months of his return in Rwanda, he was arrested and remained in detention until 28 January 2000. Both 
Amnesty International and the International Crisis Group have stated that reliable information 
suggested he was imprisoned as retaliation for testifying in Akayesa. Similarly, witness GKJ was 
arrested after he testified in the Akayesu trial. He was a witness for the prosecution who provided 
exculpatory evidence in relation to the allegations against the accused. In 2004, he was still in prison. 
See further, The Prosecutor v. Casimir Bizimungu et al., Judgement and Sentence, September 2011, 
Case No. ICTR-99-50-T, 940, 941, 942, 1138-1140. 
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despite being acquitted. Some of them suspect that there is a correlation with the fact 
that they gave testimony for one of the defendants at the ICTR.817 Many of them live 
in constant fear of being accused by the Gacaca Courts.818 Threats also come from 
the population or civil society groups. In particular ‘IBUKA’ has a reputation for 
putting pressure on Rwandans not to testify for defendants before the ICTR.819
 
  
As a result, a large number of potential defence witnesses are reluctant to speak to the 
defence or to testify.820 The refusal to cooperate for reasons of fear has now also 
extended to Rwandan potential witnesses living in other countries including European 
countries.821
 
  
Numerous defence teams have addressed their Trial Chamber in relation to the 
problem of alleged threats or intimidation of their witnesses by State authorities. 
Chambers have acknowledged that, if proven, such conduct would be a serious 
violation of Rwanda’s duty to cooperate with the ICTR.822 In Simba, the Chamber 
found that it was improper for a State official to warn a prospective witness that he 
will be viewed as opposing the government if he testifies in ongoing criminal 
proceedings, particularly if the witness is detained and dependent on the State for his 
welfare.823
 
  
In the view of the Appeals Chamber, a fair trial may not be possible if crucial 
witnesses refuse to testify for the defence as a result of State interference. It is, 
                                                 
817 The author has spoken to a two prisoners who had testified for defendants before the ICTR. One of 
them was acquitted but never released. The other was released for a day and then re-arrested. Both 
were of the firm view that this was the result of their testimony for the defence. 
818 HRW, Justice Compromised, supra note 573; C. Tertsakian, Le Château, The Lives of Prisoners in 
Rwanda (Arves Books, 2008), 363-373 
819 See, for instance, Prosecutor v. Bizimungu et al, Prosper Mugiraneza’s First Amended Emergency 
Motion to Institute Proceedings Pursuant to Rule 77, 6 June 2008, para. 12; Prosecutor v. Nahimana et 
al, Transcripts 20 January 2003, pages 15-19; Prosecutor v. Nyiramasuhuko, ICTR-98-42-T, 
Judgement and Sentence, 24 June 2011, paras. 334-338. See also Combs, Fact-Finding Without Facts, 
supra note 6, pages 155-157. 
820 Prosecutor v. Renzaho, T. 17 May 2007 (F) pp. 12 and 13; Prosecutor v. Renzaho, T. 6 March 2007 
(E) p. 45. 
821 Nzabonimana Motion for Stay of the Proceedings, Reconsideration, and/or Certification (n 835 
above), Annex A, pages 5-11. 
822 Prosecutor v Bagosora et al, No. ICTR-98-41-T, Decision on Motion Concerning Alleged Witness 
Intimidation , (28 December 2004) at paras. 7, 9; Simba v Prosecutor, No. ICTR-01-76-A, Judgement 
(28 November 2007) at para. 50; Prosecutor v Simba, No. ICTR-2001-76-T, Judgement (13 December 
2005) at para. 50-52. 
823 Prosecutor v Simba, No. ICTR-2001-76-T, Judgement (13 December 2005) at para. 50. 
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however, incumbent on the defence to (1) demonstrate that such interference has 
taken place; and (2) exhaust all available means to secure taking the witness’ 
testimony.824 Trial Chambers usually find that the defence has failed to establish on 
the balance of probabilities that such intimidation or interference with its witnesses 
occurred.825 In cases where the defence succeeds in so establishing, it must then 
request for a stay of proceedings if the evidence was essential to a fair trial. Failure to 
do so cannot be remedied on appeal.826
  
 Thus, in reality, little has been done about 
such allegations. 
 ICTY 
In the ICTY, the defence rarely encounters similar problems.827 The Prosecution, on 
the other hand, often alleges witness interference on the part of the accused, people 
related to the accused, members of the defence team or others in the local 
communities.828 This appears to be particularly a problem in Kosovo where many 
prospective witnesses refuse to cooperate with the Prosecution. The Prosecution 
claims that this refusal is the result of threats and intimidation. The defence, on the 
other hand, claims that these allegations are exaggerated and serve merely to put the 
defendants in a bad light.829
 
 
Three Kosovar Albanians have been charged with contempt of court on the basis of 
                                                 
824 Simba v Prosecutor, No. ICTR-01-76-A, Judgement (28 November 2007) at para. 41. 
825 Prosecutor v Bagosora et al, No. ICTR-98-41-T, Decision on Motion Concerning Alleged Witness 
Intimidation , (28 December 2004) at paras. 7, 9. 
826 Simba v Prosecutor, No. ICTR-01-76-A, Judgement (28 November 2007) at para. 50; Prosecutor v 
Simba, No. ICTR-2001-76-T, Judgement (13 December 2005) at para. 50-52; Rutaganda v Prosecutor, 
No. ICTR-96-03-R, Decision on Requests for Reconsideration, Review, Assignment of Counsel, 
Disclosure, and Clarification (8 December 2006) at para. 19. 
827 In the first ICTY case, however, the defendant complained against his counsel who acted on 
instructions of the government to protect certain people. According to the Institute of War and Peace 
reporting, “Vujin's principal aim, Tadic said, was to prevent the appearance before the Tribunal of 
witnesses or evidence that could implicate "important personalities" in the Republika Srpska or the FR 
Yugoslavia” (see http://iwpr.net/report-news/tadic-testifies-against-his-former-counsel). The tribunal 
found that he worked against its client’s interest since he (i) put forward a case in relation to a witness’ 
statement he knows to be false and (ii) since he had manipulated two witnesses by seeking avoiding 
identification by them in statements of their evidence of the persons who may have been responsible 
for the crimes for which Tadic was convicted. See further: Prosecutor v. Tadic, Judgment on 
Allegations of Contempt Against Prior Counsel, Milan Vujin, January 31, 2000 paras 134, 138, 150, 
160. 
828 See, for instance, Prosecutor v. Seselj, IT-03-67-R77.3, Second Contempt Case. 
829 Interview with Gregor Guy Smith, lead counsel for Idriz Balaj (Interview in The Hague, 12 April 
2011). 
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allegations of witness interference.830 One was found guilty for having interfered with 
a witness in the first Kosovo Liberation Army case of Limaj et al831 by requesting him 
to repudiate his earlier statements.832 The two others were jointly charged with the 
interference of a witness. The Minister of Culture of Kosovo, Astrit Haraqija, was 
found to have instructed his co-defendant Morina to travel to a third country to 
dissuade a witness from testifying against Ramush Haradinaj. They were both found 
guilty of contempt.833 However, Haraqija was acquitted on appeal because the totality 
of the evidence against him stemmed from his co-defendant.834
 
 
The issue of witness interference was key in the case of the former Prime Minister of 
Kosovo, Ramush Haradinaj, and two co-defendants, Idriz Balaj and Lahi Brahimaj.835 
Haradinaj and Balaj were acquitted, and Brahimaj received a low sentence. The 
Prosecution blamed this result on witness intimidation, which had frustrated the 
Prosecution’s investigations.836 The refusal of two witnesses to cooperate with the 
Prosecution has led to the re-trial of the three of them. The Prosecutor had 
unsuccessfully tried to persuade a key witness to testify. He refused even after being 
subpoenaed.837 The Prosecutor had asked the Chamber for additional time to attempt 
a final time to secure his testimony. The Chamber refused the request because the 
Prosecutor had exceeded the hours allotted to him and his case was deemed closed.838 
The judges also refused to hear two additional witnesses, who could have testified to 
the same events as the unwilling witness. Their principal grounds for refusal were the 
“orderly and timely case management” and “the proximity of the close of the 
Prosecution’s case”.839
 
  
                                                 
830 Also persons from other parts of the former Yugoslavia have been charged with witness 
interference. See, for instance: Prosecutor v. Margetic, Judgement on Allegations of Contempt, 7 
February, 2007; Prosecutor v. Radoslav Brdjanin Concerning Allegations Against Milka Maglov, 
Decision on Motion for Acquittal Pursuant to Rule 98 bis, 19 March, 2004. 
831 Prosecutor v Limaj et al, IT-03-66-T. 
832 Prosecutor v. Beqaj, Judgement on Contempt Allegations, 27 May 2005. 
833 Prosecutor v. Haraqija and Morina, Judgement on Allegations of Contempt, 17 December 2008. 
834 Prosecutor v Haraqija & Morina Appeals Chamber Judgment (23 July 2009). 
835 Prosecutor v. Haradinaj et al, IT-04-84-T. 
836 Carla Del Ponte & Chuck Sudetic: Madame Prosecutor: Confrontations with Humanity’s Worst 
Criminals and the Culture of Impunity, Other Press 2009 (original version in Italian 2008). 
837 Prosecutor v. Kabashi, IT-04-84-R77.1. 
838 Prosecutor v. Haradinaj et al, IT-04-84-A, Appeals Judgement, 19 July 2010, para. 41. 
839 Ibid, para. 46. 
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The Appeals Chamber criticised the Trial Chamber for these interventions saying it 
had “manifestly prioritised logistical considerations and the specific number of hours 
assigned to the Prosecution case over the much more significant consideration of 
securing the testimony of a potentially important witness who was finally available to 
testify.”840 Accordingly, by majority, the Appeals Chamber quashed the Trial 
Chamber’s acquittal of the three accused in respect of specific counts and ordered a 
re-trial on these counts. The re-trial is still pending. However, whilst the Prosecution 
has been allowed to call additional witnesses, the two witnesses whose refusal to 
testify had led to the re-trial still refuse to testify. The trial is adjourned until February 
to offer a final opportunity to the Prosecution to secure their testimonies.841
 
 
These alleged problems of witness intimidation eventually led to the introduction of 
new rule 92quinquies. This rule allows the admission of testimonial evidence by 
written statement in lieu of oral testimony if the maker of the statement was scheduled 
to testify but failed to attend as a result of improper interference through threats, 
intimidation, injury, bribes or coercion.842
 
  
 ICC 
In the ICC, witness intimidation is alleged in every case.843
 
 It has, however, not yet 
been established whether these allegations are sound. No findings have yet been made 
in this regard.  
Insider Witnesses 
 
In addition, insider witnesses are usually reluctant to cooperate unless they receive 
                                                 
840 Ibid, para. 43; also see paras. 40 and 46. It should be noted that a number of observers, including 
defence counsel representing the accused, fundamentally disagreed with the Appeals Chamber’s 
decision and are of the view that the facts are distorted. In their view, ample opportunities were offered 
to the Prosecutor to bring the witnesses in question within the time set. 
841 Information from Gregor Guy-Smith, defence counsel for Balaj (Interview in The Hague, 12 April 
2011). 
842 This rule was introduced on 10 December 2009, after the acquittal of Ramush Haradinaj and Balaj. 
Pursuant to Rule 92quinquies(B)(iii), written testimonial evidence is admissible even if it goes to proof 
of the acts and conduct of the accused, provided that reasonable efforts have been made to secure the 
attendance of the maker of the statement as a witness (Rule 92quinquies(A)(iii)) and that it is in the 
interests of justice to admit the statement (Rule 92quinquies(A)(iv). 
843 For instance, in Kenya I, the victim representative claimed that some of her clients were threatened 
by Ruto or his associates. She did so in her closing arguments, thereby depriving Ruto of an 
opportunity to respond. See further ICC-01/09-01/11-T-12-ENG ET WT 08-09-2011, pages 15-34. 
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something in return, for instance, a guarantee that they will not be prosecuted. Where 
they are willing to cooperate, their credibility is often in doubt given that they may be 
seeking to cover up or diminish their own involvement and shift the blame onto the 
accused. This is so particularly where they are charged with similar crimes as the 
accused in whose case they are testifying.844
 
 Nonetheless, international justice heavily 
relies on the testimonies of insiders. Only insider witnesses can establish the link 
between the crime and the accused who is often charged under an indirect, rather than 
a direct mode of liability.  
Subpoena 
 
At the ICTY and ICTR, unwilling insiders, as well as other unwilling witnesses can 
be compelled to participate in a pre-trial interview,845 or subpoenaed to testify at 
trial.846 There is, however, a general risk that they then turn hostile to the party that 
called them.847 A Chamber may issue a subpoena when it is necessary for the 
purposes of an investigation or for the preparation or conduct of the trial.848 Subpoena 
is, however, the last resort. It should not be issued lightly for it involves the use of 
coercive powers and may lead to the imposition of a criminal sanction.849 If the 
necessary information in the possession of the prospective witness is obtainable by 
other means, a Chamber will not order a subpoena.850
 
 
                                                 
844 Many Rwandan prisoners are at least of the impression that they be better off if they provide 
testimony against the accused before the ICTR. See, for instance, the testimony of a recanting witness 
in Prosecutor v. Karemera et al, ICTR-98-44-T, T 10, 14, 15, 16, 17 April 2008. See further Combs, 
Fact-Finding Without Facts, supra note 6, pages 136-137. 
845 Prosecutor v Mrksic et al, No. IT-95-13/1-AR73, Decision on Defence Interlocutory Appeal on 
Communication with Potential Witnesses of the Other Party (30 July 2003) at para. 15. 
846 Prosecutor v Krstic, No. IT-98-33-A, Decision on Application for Subpoenas (1 July 2003) at para. 
19. 
847 For instance: Prosecutor v. Limaj et al, T. 2104 – T. 3164; Prosecutor v. Katanga & Ngudjolo, T. 8 
Feb 2010, 64-68. See also: K.A.A. Khan & R. Dixon: Archbold International Criminal Courts, 
Practice, Procedure & Evidence (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 3rd ed 2009) § 9-125 [hereinafter ‘Khan 
& Dixon, Archbold International Criminal Court’].  
848Prosecutor v Halilovic, No. IT-01-48-AR73, Decision on the Issuance of Subpoenas (21 June 2004) 
at paras. 5-6; Prosecutor v. Krstić, IT-98-33-A, Decision on Application for Subpoenas, (1 July 2003) 
at para. 10. The application of Milosevic to subpoena Tony Blair and Gerhard Schroeder was rejected 
as the prospective relevance of their testimonies was insufficiently specified: Prosecutor v Milosevic, 
No. IT-02-54-T, Decision on Assigned Counsel Application for Interview and Testimony of Tony Blair 
and Gerhard Schroeder (9 December 2005) at para. 48. 
849 Prosecutor v Natelic & Martinovic, No. IT-98-34-A, Judgement (3 May 2006) at para. 399. 
850 Prosecutor v Milosevic, No. IT-02-54-T, Decision on Assigned Counsel Application for Interview 
and Testimony of Tony Blair and Gerhard Schroeder (9 December 2005) at para. 36 
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Unlike the tribunals, the ICC has no explicit power to subpoena witnesses. This 
indicates that it has no means to compel witnesses to testify. As a result, many 
important witnesses may not be brought to the court if they do not wish to appear 
voluntarily. In addition, the ICC cannot issue other binding orders on States. 
According to Kress and Prost, this absence of direct enforcement power “constitutes a 
serious weakness” of the ICC.851
 
 
Even with powers of subpoena, it has proved difficult to ensure the appearance of 
witnesses. Witnesses may prefer to spend time in prison for their refusal to testify 
than to testify.852
 
 
Factors affecting the credibility of witnesses 
 
Different cultural norms 
The assessment of the truthfulness of a witness can be difficult, given that one is 
dealing with an unfamiliar culture and its own customs. International investigators are 
often not acquainted with the local customs.853 Even if both parties are genuinely 
looking for truthful witnesses, they may mistakenly take a convincing liar for a 
truthful witness.854
                                                 
851 C. Kress & K. Prost, Article 93, in O. Triffterer (Ed.), Commentary on the Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court: Observer’s Notes, Article by Article (2nd Ed) (Beck, Hart, and Nomos, 
2008) 1576. This was one of the arguments raised by the Defence for Germain Katanga in support of 
its submission that the ICC may not be able to offer the accused a fair trial. See Prosecutor v. Katanga 
& Ngudjolo, Motion Challenging the Admissibility of the Case by the Defence of Germain Katanga, 
pursuant to Article 19(2)(a) of the Statute, ICC-01/04-01/07-949, 11 March 2009, para. 24; see further: 
See G. Bitti, Article 64, in O. Triffterer (Ed.), Commentary on the Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Court: Observer’s Notes, Article by Article (2nd Ed) (Beck, Hart, and Nomos, 2008) 1213. It 
has already had an adverse effect in cooperation requests in the Katanga & Ngudjolo case. 
 To fully comprehend the answers of a witness during an interview, 
852 See, for instance, Kabashi who refused to answer questions in the case of Haradinaj because he had 
security concerns and was then prosecuted for contempt. Prosecutor v. Kabashi, IT-04-84-R77.1. His 
refusal has led to a re-trial of Haradinaj et al. However, he still refuses to testify. 
853 That investigators do not know the historical, sociological and political context in which they will 
carry out investigations, and that this complicates the work of the prosecutor was confirmed by Cécile 
Aptel, former spokesperson of former chief prosecutor, Carla Del Ponte, as well as Getti, who assisted 
the OtP investigations at ICTY and ICTR in early stages (See Geneva Conference, supra note 173). 
The Registrar of the ICC, Ms. Arbia, has recognized the importance of investigators being experienced 
and properly trained. As she said at the first day of the Geneva Conference, “[t]he investigation 
determines the success of a trial”. In this light, the ICC has included a list of experienced investigators 
the Defence can employ for its investigations. However, whilst these investigators may have 
experience in investigating, they lack the requisite cultural knowledge. In addition, their salary is too 
high to be paid by the defence budget. Therefore, until now, no defence team has employed anyone 
from the list. Instead, they rely on local investigators.  
854 This was confirmed by an interpreter, Mr. Alphonse Mpatsenumugabo, at Geneva Conference, 
supra note 173, who says that the work of interpreters is complicated because sometimes they realise 
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knowledge of the cultural barriers and the cultural codes is essential. For instance, in 
the context of Rwanda, it is often alleged that witnesses speak about events as if they 
have witnessed them personally. In reality, they may have only heard about them 
through others. Awareness of such culturally accepted manners of speaking would 
help in distinguishing that which the witness personally observed, from that which he 
heard from others.855
 
  
In her research, Combs points out a number of cultural obstacles. She has observed 
that many of the witnesses appearing before the ICTR are uneducated and cannot 
write and read.856 They are often unable to read maps, and estimate distance, dates or 
duration.857 She gives ample examples of witnesses’ estimations of time or distance 
that are very far from reality, or inconsistent to what they stated previously.858
 
 Yet 
they may be truthful witnesses. Whilst agreeing that these are serious and genuine 
concerns, it is suggested that these are not insurmountable problems. To some extent, 
domestic jurisdictions are also regularly confronted with witnesses from a very 
different cultural and educational background than the assessors. It is important to be 
aware of such differences and of the fact that people in sub-societies or different 
societies may not share the same basic assumptions and general knowledge. The 
questions posed to witnesses should be adjusted accordingly. Similarly, investigative 
techniques must be amendable to ensure that the interviewer and interviewee clearly 
understand each other.  
Many years after the events, precise dates are difficult to remember for anyone 
irrespective of a witness’s cultural or educational background. Thus, it may be useful 
to provide a witness with a time frame based on well-known dates of memorable 
                                                                                                                                           
that a witness is lying but they have to use neutral language because they have to exercise neutrality. 
During a personal interview on 8 October 2004 with James Stewart, former chief of the ICTR appeals 
section of the prosecution, Stewart said that the prosecution needs to be convinced of the credibility of 
a witness for such a witness to be called. It would be unethical to call a witness despite serious doubts 
about his credibility. To assess the credibility, the prosecution looks at inherent inconsistency. Once, 
properly investigated, it assumes someone is telling the truth. The prosecution may, however, be 
mistaken, given that it relies heavily on investigators who took statements from witnesses years before 
they are called to testify. 
855 James Stewart confirms that witnesses often mix up the things they saw or they heard. This is not a 
lie but a different concept of the terms. In Stewart’s own experience, with some patience and accuracy 
in questioning one can determine what the witness actually experienced and what he heard from others 
(personal interview conducted in Arusha, Tanzania, 8 October 2004). 
856 Combs, Fact-Finding Without Facts, supra note 6, pages 63-66. 
857 Ibid, pages 21-43. 
858 Ibid, pages 22-44.  
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events. A witness can then estimate dates by referring to events rather than precise 
dates. Distances can be estimated by identifying locations well known to a witness. 
Rather than calculating the distance in (kilo)metres a witness can calculate it by 
reference to a distance between point a and b. Accordingly, there are many 
possibilities to overcome difficulties caused by diversity in understanding issues. To 
use such possibilities, it is however important that investigators are aware of this 
diversity. Otherwise, it will be difficult to assess the reliability of the witnesses’ 
answers. 
 
Suggestive Questions 
The manner in which questions are being asked of a potential witness is of crucial 
importance.859 Consciously or subconsciously, prospective witnesses may provide the 
answers they think the interviewer would like to hear. In order to get information 
based on the witnesses’ own recollection of events, interviewers should therefore 
avoid expressing any hint of what they expect to find. Questions must be value-
neutral and open so that the witness is free to answer in the manner he is most 
comfortable with. Suggestive questions must be avoided. This accords with the advice 
of Anthony Forde who conducts trainings in investigation techniques.860
 
   
If no audio or video record exists of pre-trial interviews conducted with prospective 
witnesses, it is difficult to establish how answers came about. At the ICTR, the 
defence is rarely provided with a full transcript including the questions and answers 
provided in such interviews. Mostly, the Prosecution merely discloses a statement 
from the witness without including the questions asked. As Combs’ research clearly 
confirms, at the ICTR, there are usually significant differences between prior 
                                                 
859 In a personal interview with James Stewart conducted in Arusha, Tanzania, 8 October 2004, he 
expressed the view that leading questions during in an interview should be avoided by both parties. The 
manner of questioning may lead to different answers. Investigators may not have asked certain 
pertinent questions which are asked on a later occasion resulting in inconsistencies. Judge Arrey 
confirms that there are often gaps between different statements some of which may be caused by the 
fact that they were taken by different investigators with different styles of questioning. Some questions 
may not have been asked and, according to Mr. Kwende, Rwandan interpreter, Rwandans do not 
volunteer information unless they are specifically asked. Thus, there may be gaps simply because a 
certain question was not asked. Yet, the Defence will use it to try to impeach a witness, which is time 
consuming and easily avoidable by asking all the relevant questions. See Geneva Conference, supra 
note 173. 
860 ICC Defence Investigative Interview Course 2011, The Institute for International Criminal 
Investigations (IICI), on file with the author. 
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statements of witnesses and their testimonies in court.861
 
 Various factors could 
explain such differences. One of them is that, during pre-trial interviews, witnesses 
were prompted to answer in conformity with the Prosecution’s theory of the case.  
In the ICTY, the defence is usually provided with a full transcript of pre-trial 
interviews, as well as an audio and video record thereof. This offers a much better 
opportunity both to the defence and the Chamber to verify the reliability of the 
answers given. In some situations, this has led the defence to suggest that the 
Prosecution leads the witnesses in answering one way or another.862 This debate then 
becomes part of the public record and the Chamber is made aware of it. In the ICC, 
the Prosecution tends to provide a full transcript and audio or video tape of prior 
recorded testimony, which is one of the conditions for its admission under Rule 68. 
This is a significant improvement for the establishment of the truth as it makes the 
investigative methods more transparent to the judges. It helps judges verify whether 
inconsistencies between prior statements and viva voce testimonies of witnesses can 
be explained by misunderstandings by the investigators.863
 
 
The Prosecution states that its investigators refrain from asking leading questions and 
are open to any answers, incriminating or exonerating alike. They seek to duly report 
the witness’s account as he has experienced the events and take good care not to 
manipulate the answers. Investigators have no pre-conceived notion as to what they 
want, or expect to hear.864
 
  
This, however, does not always correspond with the reality. In Mbarushimana, the 
Pre-Trial Chamber raised concern about the Prosecution’s investigation technique of 
putting leading questions to witnesses during interviews and being impatient with 
their answers if incompatible with their theory of the case. The Pre-Trial Chamber 
qualified this technique as “utterly inappropriate” and contrary to the Prosecution’s 
duty under Article 54(1) to establish the truth by investigating incriminating and 
                                                 
861 Combs, Fact-Finding Without Facts, supra note 6, pages 106-122. 
862 For instance: Prosecutor v. Limaj et al, T. 2104 – T. 3164. 
863 As was claimed, for instance, by Witness P-0280, ICC-01/04-01/07-T-161-Red-ENG WT 28-06-
2010, pages 52-53; and: Witness P-0250, ICC-01/04-01/07-T-103-Red-ENG WT 16-02-2010, page 14-
15. 
864 ICC-01/04-01/07-T-81-Red-ENG WT 25-11-2009, pages 11-20, 26.  
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exonerating evidence equally. In the Mbarushimana confirmation decision numerous 
examples are cited of the Prosecuting investigators “showing resentment, impatience 
or disappointment whenever the witness replies in terms which are not entirely in line 
with his or her expectations.”865
 
  
The Pre-Trial Chamber referred specifically to suggestions made by the Prosecution 
investigators that the witness may not be “really remembering exactly what was said”; 
that he does not “really understand what is important” to the investigators of the case; 
or that he may be “trying to cover” for the suspect.866
 
  
By majority, the Pre-Trial Chamber observed that “none of the FDLR insider 
witnesses directly and spontaneously confirm the existence of an order emanating 
from the FDLR leadership” to launch attacks against the civilian population and to 
create a “humanitarian catastrophe” in the manner alleged by the Prosecution.867 
Some witnesses deny having heard of such an order. Others state the opposite, that is 
that there were specific instructions to protect the civilians from the consequences of 
the fighting.868 Many of those who remember that such an order was issued by the 
FDLR leadership remember it only after the investigator persistently spelt out the 
existence of the order, its timing and specific content.869
 
  
Being repeatedly left with the impression that the Prosecution investigators are so 
attached to their theory that they lost their impartiality in questioning witnesses, the 
Pre-Trial Chamber assigned significantly less weight to any answers prompted in such 
a manner.870
 
 
Language Barriers 
Language barriers may increase the difficulties in interviewing witnesses. If the 
investigator is unfamiliar with the language of the interviewee, he must rely on an 
interpreter and thus receives the information through the interpretation of a third 
                                                 
865 Prosecutor v. Mbarushimana, Decision on the confirmation of charges, ICC-01/04-01/10-465-Red, 
16 December 2011, para. 51. 
866 Ibid. 
867 Ibid, para. 255. 
868 Ibid, para. 255. 
869 Ibid, paras. 248 and 257. 
870 Ibid, para. 51. 
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party. Interpretation is difficult because it is not only a question of interpreting words, 
but also of particular cultural understandings of such words.871 For instance, in the 
Eastern part of DRC, people often use the term “les enfants” to refer to persons of a 
lesser status. They do not necessarily mean to say “children” in the sense this term is 
understood in the West. When they speak of the militiamen still active today in Ituri, 
they use the term “les enfants” notwithstanding that they are all adults. This is 
significant, given that the three Congolese accused are charged with the recruitment 
of child soldiers. It is then important to be sure that when witnesses refer to “les 
enfants”, they refer to young people under the age of 15.872 There is also an issue with 
the word “makubwa” in Swahili, which refers to someone significant. Depending on 
the context, this word is used simultaneously for the chief and for someone who is 
respected. The distinction is important if one seeks to establish the position of a 
person charged with international crimes.873
 
 
It is particularly difficult to speak with witnesses about sexual crimes. Such matters 
can be extremely sensitive and are dealt with differently in different cultures. In some 
cultures, it is completely taboo to speak about any sexual experiences. In other 
cultures the word rape does not even exist. This is, for instance, the case in local 
eastern Congolese languages, such as Lendu and Ngiti.874 In Kinyarwanda, the same 
word is used for sexual violence as for marriage.875
                                                 
871 Combs, Fact-Finding Without Facts, supra note 6, pages 66-79. This was confirmed by an 
interpreter, Mr. Alphonse Mpatsenumugabo, at Geneva Conference, supra note 173, who says that the 
work of interpreters is complicated because they find it hard to bring out any nuance and have been 
criticised for not replicating the ideas a witness was expressing. However, this is not an easy task. Mr. 
Mpatswenmugabo and Ms Vidal also expressed difficulties in translating accurately what a witness 
says. At the same Conference, Mr. Kwende, one of the prosecutors before the ICTR, also expressed 
concern about the reliance on interpretation. He affirmed that most of their investigators do not speak 
Kinyarwanda, the language spoken in Rwanda, and thus rely on interpreters. The job of interpretation 
is beyond interpreting words. It is also interpreting the culture into the statements that are being 
recorded by witnesses. He affirms that, in interviewing witnesses, most of the sense is lost, and they are 
spending more time trying to get into the frame of mind of the witness to understand what he is saying. 
In addition, some interpreters filter out some important information that is being communicated by the 
witness. These are serious challenges. Often, there are great disparities between prior statements and 
viva voce testimony. Many times, witnesses claim that the investigators must have misunderstood their 
previous answers.    
 It is essential to understand the 
872 The author noted that everyone she spoke to in Ituri, Eastern DRC, referred to the active militia as 
“les enfants”. During conversation, it appeared that they were not referring to their ages, but rather to 
their position in life. This information was given in interviews in Ituri in the period of February 2011.  
873 See ICC-01/04-01/07-T (W-30/373), on 31.03.10-01.04.10, T-127-128; (W-2/268) on 23-25.02.10, 
T-106-108. 
874 This was confirmed by many Congolese in Ituri, Eastern DRC in interviews with the author in the 
period of February 2011.  
875 See the submissions of Ms. Ngendahayo at the Geneva Conference, supra note 173. 
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specific cultural codes relating to sexual crimes when approaching alleged victims of 
such crimes. This is important not only as a matter of respect for the interviewee, but 
also to be able to assess whether the person is credible. 
 
Trauma 
Witnesses may further be reluctant to speak because of severe trauma. An interview 
may re-traumatise them.876 Those witnesses who decided to testify despite their fear 
to relive their trauma are often confused.877 They may need counselling in the course 
of an interview, a service the Prosecution can offer but not the defence.878 According 
to Professor Wagenaar, time lapse between testimony and events combined with 
trauma significantly undermine the reliability of the testimony.879
 
  
Fabrication of Evidence 
 
 Documents 
Given the often highly politicised climate in the country of investigations, there is 
also more risk that documents are fabricated or witnesses unreliable. In a post-conflict 
society, there tends to be more fabrication of documents for the purposes of 
propaganda or for shifting blame onto the other side.880
                                                 
876 This was confirmed by the ICC chief of investigations in DRC. See ICC-01/04-01/07-T-81-Red-
ENG WT 25-11-2009 6/79 NB T, pages 10-12. 
 The extent to which 
documents are fabricated is more difficult to assess due to unfamiliarity with the 
culture. For instance, if one is familiar with the culture, one can better assess whether 
a particular stamp on a document gives the document more authenticity or whether it 
is easy to get an official certificate providing incorrect information. In corrupt 
systems, officials may be prepared to forge official documents as long as the receiver 
is willing to pay a sufficient amount of money for it. 
877 According to James Stewart, it is a delicate issue to deal with traumatised witnesses. Casualties of 
war clearly have an impact on the psychology of affected witnesses. These witnesses should be treated 
with caution and one should not be cruel to witnesses. It is a balancing process to establish whether a 
witness is telling the truth and test the evidence and treating the witness with respect (personal 
interview conducted in Arusha, Tanzania, 8 October 2004). 
878 ICC-01/04-01/07-T-81-Red-ENG WT 25-11-2009 6/79 NB T, pages 10-12. 
879 W.A. Wagenaar, Identifying Ivan: A Case Study in Legal Psychology (Harvard University Press, 
1988). See also H. Arendt, Eichmann in Jerusalem, A Report on the Banality of Evil (Penguin Books, 
1994) (first published in the US by the Viking Press 1963), 220-233; G. Wolters, Herinneringen door 
getuigen, in: P.J. van Koppen a.o. (eds), Het recht van binnen. Psychologie van het recht, (Kluwer 
2002), 397-415; E. Loftus, Eyewitness Testimony (Harvard University Press 1979). 
880 P. Murphy, Excluding Justice or Facilitating Justice? International Criminal Law would Benefit 
from Rules of Evidence, 12 International Journal of Evidence & Proof 2 (2008), 16-21, 30. 
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For instance, in DRC, anyone who is willing to pay money can at any time obtain an 
identity card. The personal information of the person requesting a card is rarely 
verified. Some people appear to have multiple identity cards each with a different date 
of birth. The date of birth that appears on the identity card also frequently differs from 
the date indicated on other official papers, such as school bulletins or birth 
certificates. Accordingly, whilst such documents are not forged, the contents may be 
based on erroneous or false information. Many people in DRC are not certain of their 
date of birth. Others have ulterior motives to lie about their age.  
 
This has become a real issue both in the Lubanga and in the Katanga & Ngudjolo 
cases. Numerous alleged child soldiers appeared to have lied about their age to make 
themselves younger than they were in order to qualify as child soldiers. At least, their 
age differed drastically from document to document. The ultimate findings in both 
cases are still pending, but both Chambers have expressed concern about this and 
allowed the defence significant time to explore the issue of genuine ages.881
 
  
 False Testimony ICTY 
Witnesses may fabricate evidence for solidarity or financial reasons. In the context of 
the former Yugoslavia, ethnic loyalties can go very deep and override any sense of 
                                                 
881 ICC-01/04-01/06-2690-Red2 08-03-2011, Redacted Decision on the "Defence Application Seeking 
a Permanent Stay of the Proceedings"; Redacted Decision on Intermediaries, ICC-01/04-01/06-2434-
Red2 31-05-2010. For Katanga & Ngudjolo, see for instance, Witness DRC‐OTP‐P‐0028, ICC-01/04-
01/07-T-220-Red-ENG WT 22-11-2010, pages 27-28: “Q. Let me put a simpler question to you. Do 
you agree that the two reports you produced in the course of this interview, or prior to this interview, 
had been forged, were false, false documents? Do you agree? 
A. You talk about forgery. What are you talking about? Do you mean that I falsified or forged some of 
the information in this report card, or I have forged the entire report card? 
Q. Do you agree that these two documents are false documents? 
A. Well, this is what I’m telling you: I would say yes, because I have never attended the Songolo school 
as indicated here. I never attended that school. This is to say that these reports were prepared simply 
to help me to attend school in the locality where I was living, but it does not mean that I attended 
school in Songolo. Does that answer your question? Q. Now, we can recall from last week that you told 
us that you graduated from your second year secondary in Bunia in July.“  
See also: ICC-01/04-01/07-T-221-Red-ENG WT 23-11-2010 WT 24-11-2010, Witness 
DRC‐OTP‐P‐0028, page 6: “Can you remember being registered at that school with a birthday of the 
8th of August, 1988? Why does that birthday appear in that form and not the birth date that so far 
you’ve provided us with? Can you account for the difference?” See also: Witness DRC‐OTP‐P‐0028, 
ICC-01/04-01/07-T-220-Red-ENG WT 22-11-2010, see pages 27-28. 
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duty to tell the truth to a foreign court in a foreign country.882
 
 However, this has never 
become an overwhelming issue, as in the ICTR. 
 False Testimony ICTR 
In the context of Rwanda, it has been suggested that lying is a common phenomenon 
acceptable in the culture.883 Numerous Rwandans, sometimes rather proudly, agree 
with this thesis.884 According to Professor Ndengejeho who testified as a defence 
expert in the Semanza trial, lying is a sign of intelligence, and is therefore not only 
accepted but also encouraged in the Rwandan culture.885 Combs cites a number of 
scholars who reached similar conclusions about the Rwandan culture.886
 
 
James Stewart, former head of the Prosecution’s Appeal section at the ICTR, does not 
believe in the theories that Rwandans have a tendency to lie. According to him, there 
are other issues, which explain the misunderstanding of the Rwandan witnesses, such 
as the regimented functional placement of people in their society, mechanisms to 
survive and behaviour in a social context.887
 
 
Whether such theories are sound or not, there is a real suspicion that false witness 
testimonies are frequently being manufactured for use in the trials. Witnesses have 
testified to that extent. In particular at the ICTR, there are allegations of concoction 
not of the evidence of one witness only, but of several in one trial, on the instigation 
of public authorities.888 Other witnesses claim that civil society groups instigated 
them to give false testimony and threatened them when they refused to do so.889
                                                 
882 Prosecutor v. Limaj et al, T. 2104 – T. 3164. 
 
883 See J. De Lange, Rwandan Realities – 10 Years After the Genocide, GTI Conference 29-30 October 
2004. Professor Reyntjens did not use those words but has pointed out the dangers of evidence 
concoction. He also pointed out the fact that the oath does not have the same meaning for Rwandan 
witnesses as it has for European and American witnesses. See personal interview with F. Reyntjens, 
conducted in Antwerp, Belgium, 20 December 2004. 
884 This is confirmed by interviews with Rwandan defendants before the ICTR, as well as their family 
members and Rwandans living in The Netherlands. 
885 Prosecutor v. Semanza, ICTR-97-20-T, T. 31 January 2002, page 116; Prosecutor v. Semanza, 
ICTR-97-20-T, Trial Judgement, 15 May 2003, para. 572. 
886 Combs, Fact-Finding Without Facts, supra note 6, pages 131-135. 
887 Personal interview conducted in Arusha, Tanzania, 8 October 2004. 
888 In Prosector v Akayesu ICTR-96-4-A, 16 May 2001 Arret (Requete Aux Fins de Renvoi De 
L’affaire Devant La Chambre de Premiere Instance I), the Defence was unsuccessful in reopening the 
trial, or having fresh evidence admitted on appeal, from a Tutsi witness, BBB, who came forward after 
trial to provide a detailed, notarized statement to the effect that evidence against Akayesu was 
systematically manufactured with the intervention of government agents.  In Prosecutor v 
Ntakirutimana, ICTR No-96-10, ICTR-96-17-T, defence witnesses provided similar testimony 
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In particular prisoners appear to be under the assumption that they will be rewarded if 
they testify against one of the ICTR defendants.890 In light of Tertsakian’s research in 
Rwandan prisons, it is not surprising that the prisoners are rather desperate to get out 
of their situation. Some of them have been imprisoned for many years without ever 
having seen a case file.891 They have very limited liberties or time with their families. 
Apparently, there was a strong encouragement from the authorities for prisoners to 
confess and incriminate others.892
 
 Thus, it is not necessary to come from a society 
where lying is regarded as acceptable behaviour. Many people would be inclined to 
concoct stories if they found themselves in an equally desperate situation. 
It cannot be said with certainty that these allegations are true, but they are so serious 
that they should not be rejected out of hand. There are so many allegations of this 
kind that, prima facie, they appear to have at least some foundation. If it is true that 
witnesses are manipulated into making up stories, particularly if this is done in a 
structured and systematic way under auspices of the government, the tribunal may 
have to re-open most of its cases. It would have to doubt the credibility of many, if 
not all, of the witnesses who have appeared before it.893
 
  
                                                                                                                                           
(Witness 9 and Witness 31). The same thing happened in Prosecutor v Rutaganda ICTR-96-3 (Witness 
DD), (see False Witnesses Testified to Genocide Court” inews@habari.co.tz, March 17, 1999) and in 
the “Media Trial,” Prosecutor v. Nahimana, Barayagwiza and Ngeze ICTR-99-52-T, (Witness RM 14) 
(see “Genocide Survivors Coerced me to Lie, Says Defence Witness,” Foundation Hirondelle - 
Hirondelle Press Agency in Arusha International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, 16 January 2003.)  In 
Prosecutor v Kajelijeli ICTR-98-44-T, a death row inmate testified that he and his family were 
threatened by a Rwandan prosecutor if he testified in the defence of the former Rwandan mayor. He 
claimed that he was promised his death sentence would be commuted if he did not testify (see “State 
Prosecutor Threatened Me Against Testifying, Says Defence Witnesses,” Foundation Hirondelle - 
Hirondelle Press Agency in Arusha International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, 21 November 2002. 
889 See, for instance, Prosecutor v. Nahimana et al, ICTR-99-52-T, 13 March 2003, page 61; 
Prosecutor v. Niyitegeka, TR-96-14-T, 16 May 2003,  Judgment, para. 222; Prosecutor v. 
Nyiramasuhuko, ICTR-98-42-T, Judgement and Sentence, 24 June 2011, paras. 334-338.  
889 For instance, Prosecutor v. Seromba, ICTR-2001-66- I, 13 December 2006 , Judgement,  para. 73.  
890 Ibid, para. 73. 
891 C. Tertsakian, Le Château, The Lives of Prisoners in Rwanda (Arves Books, 2008). 
892 Ibid. 
893 It is indeed the view of many defence counsel that all cases must be reviewed. See views expressed 
at two conferences organised by ICTR defence counsel in The Hague and Brussels in November 2009 
and May 2010 respectively; The ICTR, Law and International Politics: A Defence Perspective, held in 
The Hague, Netherlands, 14-16 November 2009; The ICTR Legacy from the Defence Perspective, 
Conference held in Brussels, Belgium, 24 May 2010; See 
http://www.ictrlegacydefenseperspective.org/Hague_14_16_November_2009/ICTR-Law-
Politics_Hague_conference_14_16_ November_2009.pdf; 
http://www.ictrlegacydefenseperspective.org/En.html). 
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Until now, most of the claims of fabrication at the ICTR have not been properly 
investigated.894 Some judges appear to have a preconceived view that such claims 
themselves are fabricated.895 Cases where a prosecution witness has been 
demonstrated to be lying extensively on significant issues have gone without sanction 
or disapproval.896 In this regard, it is interesting to note that the only prosecution that 
has taken place of a witness who allegedly gave false testimony under oath was one 
who recanted in favour of the accused.897 This led to the arrest and conviction of a 
defence investigator who allegedly incited the witness in question to give false 
evidence before the tribunal which was favourable to the accused.898
 
  
 False Testimony ICC 
                                                 
894 For a critical note, see A. Zahar, The Problem of False Testimony at the International Criminal 
Tribunal for Rwanda, in A. Klip and G. Sluiter, (Eds.), Annotated Leading Cases of International 
Criminal Tribunals, Vol. 25: International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, 2006-2007 (Intersentia, 
2010). At the Geneva Conference, supra note 173, ICTR judge Arrey justified the non-action in this 
regard because she feared it would discourage witnesses from testifying. 
895 In Prosecutor v. Augustin Ngirabatware, ICTR-99-54-T, a number of witnesses (DWAN-13 and 
DWAN-9) testified that they had received offers of payment from one of the Prosecution witnesses. In 
response, one of the judges routinely suggested that the witnesses were not honest. For instance, he 
said: “Please, be honest, be frank, and and be concise in your answers to my questions. And so, please, 
do not beat about the bush. Please, Witness.” See: T. 22 August 2011, pages 3-15.  
896 In one case, however, a Trial Chamber ordered the prosecution of a prosecution witness for perjury. 
Prosecution witness GFA testified in multiple trials and then recanted while saying that many other 
witnesses had equally lied. Having been informed by the witness that he had lied under oath about 
Bicamumpaka’s liability in the presence of a Prosecution representative (Exhibit 2D118 (Kampala 
Interview of Witness GFA, 8 February 2008), the defence for Bicamumpaka asked to call him back. 
This request was granted. Meanwhile, in the Karemera et al trial, he confirmed under oath that he had 
lied under oath when he incriminated several accused (The Prosecutor v. Édouard Karemera et al., 
Case No ICTR-98-44-T, T. 10 April 2008 pp. 47-48, pp. 50-51). However, in the course of his 
testimony in the Bicamumpaka proceedings, Witness GFA indicated that he was not prepared to testify 
and subsequently absconded (Prosecutor v. Bizimungu et al, T. 5 May 2008, pages 52-53, 58; T. 6 May 
2008, pages 35, 37-40). The Chamber in Bizimungu et al then issued a subpoena compelling his 
attendance (T. 21 May 2008, pages 28-30). Both the Chambers in Karemera et al and Bizimungu et al 
ordered that an amicus curiae be appointed to investigate whether reasonable grounds existed to 
prosecute Witness GFA for perjury. The investigator found that he had knowingly and wilfully given 
false testimony “during all or at least some of the occasions on which he had testified before the 
Tribunal”. Nonetheless, the Chamber in Bizimungu et al declined to order his prosecution as he had 
only appeared once before it and the amicus curiae was unable to establish if he lied while testifying in 
the Bizimungu et al. proceeding, or only during the Karemera et al. trial or both. The Karemera et al. 
Trial Chamber, on the other hand, has ordered that the witness be prosecuted for false testimony (The 
Prosecutor v. Édouard Karemera et al., Case No. ICTR-98-44-T, Decision on Motion to Prosecute 
BTH for Providing False Testimony (TC), 10 September 2009, paras. 1, 6). The Appeals Chamber, 
however, overturned this decision based on an erroneous application of the law (Édouard Karemera et 
al. v. The Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR-98-44-T, Decision on Joseph Nzirorera’s and Prosecutor’s 
Appeals of Decision Not to Prosecute Witness BTH for False Testimony (AC), 16 February 2010, 
paras. 19, 21; The Prosecutor v. Édouard Karemera et al., Case No. ICTR-98-44-T, Decision on 
Remand Following Appeal Chamber’s Decision of 16 February 2010, 18 May 2010, paras. 5-6, p. 7 
(order)).  
897 Prosecutor v. GAA, ICTR-07-90-R77, Judgement. 
898  Prosecutor v. Leonidas Nshogoza, ICTR-2007-91-T, 7 July 2009, Judgement.  
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In places like DRC, where people live in extreme poverty, money can be a 
stimulant.899 In the first ICC trial of Lubanga, the issue of false testimony has been 
the key subject of several filings. The reliability and credibility of the intermediary 
was contested. The defense argued that four intermediaries gave instructions to 
witnesses and even provided them with false letters and other documents to support 
their stories. Two witnesses followed their instructions and lied about their age and 
experience as child soldiers.900 One of them testified that he was a child soldier in the 
UPC. Yet, he did not know the name of his brigade, commander, or even what ‘UPC’ 
stood for.901
 
  
During cross-examination, some of them declared that they had received money or 
that they had been trained for days by those intermediaries in order to build their story 
as a child soldier.902 The Chamber considered that those accusations were grounded 
and made several orders for the Prosecution to recall those witnesses and 
intermediaries.903 When the Prosecution refused to disclose the identity of one of the 
intermediaries concerned to the defence,904 the Chamber even stayed the procedure, 
stating that it could not offer a fair trial if the Prosecutor failed to follow court 
orders.905 The Appeals Chamber, however, overturned this decision. While severely 
criticizing the Prosecutor for failing to abide by the Chamber’s order to disclose, the 
Appeals Chamber held that alternative, less drastic measures were open to the 
Chamber. Instead of staying the procedure, the Chamber could have imposed 
sanctions on the Prosecution.906
                                                 
899 See Combs who drew similar conclusions on Sierra Leone and Rwanda: Combs, Fact-Finding 
Without Facts, supra note 6, pages 138-142. 
 
900 ICC-01/04-01/06-2690-Red2 08-03-2011, Redacted Decision on the "Defence Application Seeking 
a Permanent Stay of the Proceedings"; pages 13-14. 
901 Ibid, page 16 of the decision, citing: ICC-01/04-01/06-2657-Conf-tENG, para. 44. 
902 ICC-01/04-01/06-2690-Red2 08-03-2011, Redacted Decision on the "Defence Application Seeking 
a Permanent Stay of the Proceedings", page 24, citing: ICC-01/04-01/06-2657-Conf-tENG, paragraphs 
82 – 85. 
903 Redacted Decision on Intermediaries, ICC-01/04-01/06-2434-Red2 31-05-2010. 
904 In Katanga & Ngudjolo, where some of the same intermediaries had been employed to search for 
witnesses. The defence in that case repeatedly requested for the disclosure of the identity of the same 
intermediary 143. Ironically, both defence teams had learned his identity while conducting 
investigations. 
905 Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Public Redacted Decision on the Prosecution's Urgent Request for 
Variation of the Time-Limit to Disclose the Identity of Intermediary 143 or Alternatively to Stay 
Proceedings Pending Further Consultations with the VWU, ICC-01/04-01/06-2517-Red, issued on 8 
July 2010, para. 31. 
906 ICC-01/04-01/06-2582 08-10-2010, Judgment on the appeal of the Prosecutor against the decision 
of Trial Chamber I of 8 July 2010 entitled "Decision on the Prosecution's Urgent Request for Variation 
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Eventually, the defence asked for a permanent stay on the ground that the evidence 
was so unreliable that a fair trial could no longer be guaranteed.907 The Chamber 
dismissed the request, but not the arguments underlying it. The Chamber did not 
consider it necessary to stay the procedure because it would be able, despite those 
abuses, to reach a final conclusion on the alleged impact of the involvement of the 
intermediaries on the evidence in this case, as well as on the alleged prosecutorial 
misconduct or negligence.908
 
 The judgement is still pending. 
Similar issues arose in the Katanga & Ngudjolo trial. As said earlier, some witnesses 
appeared to be older than they had initially claimed they were.909
                                                                                                                                           
of the Time-Limit to Disclose the Identity of Intermediary 143 or Alternatively to Stay Proceedings 
Pending Further Consultations with the VWU", paras. 45-61. 
 One witness had 
907 See ICC-01/04-01/06-2657-tENG-Red 12-08-2011, Defence Application Seeking a Permanent Stay 
of the Proceedings (Public Redacted Version – with confidential annexes). See also: ICC-01/04-01/06-
2678-Red 29-03-2011, Prosecution’s Response to the Defence’s « Requête de la Défense aux fins 
d’arrêt définitif des procédures ». 
908 ICC-01/04-01/06-2690-Red2 08-03-2011, Redacted Decision on the "Defence Application Seeking 
a Permanent Stay of the Proceedings", pages 74-92. 
909 See, for instance, Witness P-0279 ICC-01/04-01/07-T-151-Red-ENG WT 08-06-2010, pages 22-
25: “Q. So which date is your correct date of birth, do you say? Is it the date you gave the investigators, 
a date in 1991; or is it the date you gave in your evidence, at the beginning of your evidence, a date in 
1990; or neither of those dates? What do you say? Is it 1990? 1991? 1984, as shown on the card? Or 
another date? Don't give us the full date, just the year. 
A. It's in 1990. 
Q. And just remind us how old you are today. How old are you today? Have you forgotten again? How 
old are you today? 
A. With regard to my age, given the date that I gave you, in that case I would be 20 years old. 
Q. No, I think you're 19, actually. But I accept it's probably difficult to remember in your situation. 
You, I suggest, were born in 1984. That's right, isn't it? Let me ask you this: Tell us how you got this 
card and tell us why the date on it is August -- sorry, is 1984. Why is the date on this card 1984?”  
See also page 24-25:  “Q. But according to you, at that time you were only 15. What advantage was it 
to you to say you were 20?  
A. I didn't fully understand your question. 
Q. According to you and your correct date of birth, you were just 15. So what advantage was it to you 
to show a card to soldiers that stated you were 20, that you were older than you were? How does that or 
would that help your safety? 
A. (No verbal response) 
Q. Well, again that's a long pause. Do you have an answer to it, to the question? 
A. I do not have any answer to that question. 
Q. Now, when you went along to the Electoral Commission to get a card that clearly was regarded as 
very important by everybody, what document did you produce to show that you were born on the year 
that appears on that card? 
A. I didn't have any other documents. What I showed them there --well, it was my big brother who had 
written something on a bit of paper, it was written by my older brother, and that is what I presented 
where you had to register. 
Q. And you went along yourself, did you? 
A. Yes. 
Q. As a 14-year-old and you said, "I'm 20"; is that right?” 
See also Witness DRC‐OTP‐P‐0028, ICC-01/04-01/07-T-220-Red-ENG WT 22-11-2010, pages 25-28; 
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invented an entire detailed story about being kidnapped with four other boys by 36 
militiamen and forced to join the militia. He claimed he had done so on instructions of 
his intermediary. During trial, this witness stated:910
 
 
“I have already said that this is a statement which does not reflect the truth. I say this 
because at that time I was never attending school in Aveba. May I add that I have 
never attended school in Aveba. And even during that period, I did not know the 
Walendu‐Bindi collectivity well. Well, to answer your question, therefore, I will tell 
you the following: That is an untruth. Someone asked me to say that, and the person 
who asked me to say that is still alive.” 
 
The testimony of one witness who alleged to have been kidnapped and joined the 
militia by force was so contradictory that one of the defence teams requested the 
Chamber to order the Prosecution to initiate proceedings for perjury against this 
witness.911 This request was rejected.912 However, recently, the Chamber asked the 
Prosecution whether it intended to initiate proceedings against a victim witness who 
had pretended to be at Bogoro when it was attacked, while in fact, he was in Bunia.913 
Upon discovery of this lie after completion of his testimony, the Prosecution had 
sought and received permission to withdraw this witness as a witness of truth.914
 
 
Absence of Documentary and Tangible Evidence 
                                                                                                                                           
Witness P-0280, ICC-01/04-01/07-T-160-Red-ENG CT WT 23-06-2010, see pages 74-75. 
910 Witness DRC‐OTP‐P‐0028, ICC-01/04-01/07-T-220-Red-ENG WT 22-11-2010, pages 55-59. 
911 ICC-01/04-01/07-2243-Red 22-09-2010 “Requête  de  la  Défense  de  Mathieu  Ngudjolo  aux  fins 
 de  solliciter  le  déclenchement  des  poursuites  judiciaires  à  charge  du  Témoin P‐279  de 
 l’Accusation  pour  atteintes  à  l’administration  de  la  justice  ‐ Article  70  (1)  (a)  (b)  du  Statut  de 
 Rome ».  
912 ICC-01/04-01/07-T-190-Red-ENG WT 22-09-2010. 
913 ICC-01/04-01/07-3223 13-01-2012, Order to the Prosecutor regarding the alleged false testimony 
of witness P-159, see para 4: “considering that more than a year has passed since the Prosecution 
informed the Chamber of its renunciation of the testimony of witness P-159, the Chamber is of the 
view that the Prosecution has had sufficient time to determine its position in relation to this issue. As 
perjury is a very serious matter, the Chamber hopes that the Prosecution has meanwhile taken the 
necessary steps to investigate the issue and has decided on the appropriate course of action.” In its 
response, the Prosecution however claimed good faith on the part of the victim: ICC-01/04-01/07-3225 
31-01-2012, Prosecution’s response regarding its investigations into the alleged false testimony of 
witness P-159, see para. 4: “It bears reminding that the Prosecution withdrew witness P-159’s evidence 
because, after the witness had already testified, it received contrary information that raised credibility 
questions.4 In that circumstance, the remedy the Prosecution undertook, notifying the parties and 
Chamber of its intent to not rely on witness P-159’s in-court testimony, immediately and completely 
protected the rights of the accused. The Prosecution’s Notice ensured that the evidence of witness P-
159, the credibility of which was called into question by other information that the Prosecution deemed 
to have been given in good faith, would not have the potential to mislead the Chamber in its finding of 
guilt or innocence.” 
914 "Prosecution's Notice that it will not rely on the testimony of Prosecution Witness P-159 to prove its 
case", 14 December 2010, ICC-01/04-01/07-2631-Conf; Public Decision on the Prosecution's 
renunciation of the testimony of witness P-159, ICC-01/04-01/07-2731, 24-02-2011. 
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Thus, there are serious obstacles in finding credible witness who are willing to testify. 
This is particularly problematic because the main reliance is on eyewitness testimony. 
Unlike the Nazis who left a trail of documentary evidence behind,915 as well as the 
Yugoslav perpetrators, who left behind significant volumes of written orders, video 
and other tangible evidence, the Congolese and other African perpetrators left behind 
very little on paper.916
 
 There was no structural organisation in any of those countries. 
If orders were given, they were usually given orally. Most of the defendants were 
high up in the hierarchy and were therefore acting behind the scenes, if at all. This 
makes it more difficult to find eyewitnesses who are in a position to confirm that 
these defendants gave orders to commit crimes under the jurisdiction of the 
international criminal court or tribunal or facilitated the commission of these crimes 
in any other way.  
However, the non-existence of documentary and other tangible evidence is often 
exaggerated. Rwanda, for instance, has a well-deserved reputation of being an 
organised society. There is ample documentation. There are diaries, media broadcasts, 
speeches of politicians, army and intelligence documents. Unfortunately, the best use 
has not always been made out of these documents. For instance, although not strictly 
necessary for the admissibility of such documents, their weight would be increased if 
introduced through a witness who could make useful comments on them. This is often 
not done. 
 
Even in DRC, documents such as school bulletins and birth certificates have proven 
essential to establish the correct age of certain witnesses. It was the defence, rather 
than the Prosecution, that obtained these documents. Presumably, there are volumes 
of intelligence documents in the possession of the Government. So far, it has refused 
to allow the parties access to these documents, relying on the protection of State 
security. The Prosecution has never made a serious effort to persuade it to disclose at 
least some of these documents. The defence sought to receive such documents from 
the DRC government. When the government was non-responsive, it requested the 
                                                 
915 In many ways, the circumstances in which the Nuremberg Tribunal was operating were ideal. The 
war had finished, the Germans had surrendered completely with the result that Germany was freely 
accessible to conduct any kind of investigations. In addition, the archives were available to the court. 
This is an ideal situation but a-typical. It is more common that it is a struggle to get access to any 
material. See further M. Garapon, at the Geneva Conference, supra note 173.  
916 Combs, Fact-Finding Without Facts, supra note 6, at 6-7.  
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Chamber’s intervention in obtaining them. However, the Chamber rejected this 
request since the actual existence of these documents was based on speculation.917
 
  
In Kenya, it should not be too difficult to obtain tangible and documentary evidence. 
“Kenya is not Somalia” as counsel for Ruto, one of the Kenyan suspects, affirmed 
during the confirmation hearing.918 Kenya is a well-structured society with lots of 
traceable paperwork. Among the six Kenyan suspects were very senior politicians, 
including two (Ruto and Kenyatta) who intend to run for the presidential elections in 
2012. Their paths were permanently followed by the active Kenyan media. 
Contemporaneous videos, press clips, radio broadcasts and newspaper articles exist 
which can show a pattern of their conduct and the public statements they made.919 
Contemporaneous documents may also demonstrate that the suspects were occupied 
elsewhere at specific dates that witnesses allege they were at meetings.920
 
 
The Prosecution left most of such materials untouched although they are in the public 
domain and thus easily obtainable. In addition, when the Prosecution alleged that the 
suspects purchased weapons, it relied solely on anonymous witnesses. It had not made 
any efforts to obtain purchase receipts, bank transfers or other tangible evidence. In a 
society like Kenya, if it exists, it should have been possible for the Prosecution to 
obtain it.921
 
  
One witness told the Prosecution that Citizen TV had recorded a rally at which Ruto 
allegedly addressed a crowd of youths and told them to prepare to barricade roads, 
destroy property and kill the Kikuyus.922
                                                 
917 See ICC-01/04-01/07-2019-Conf-Exp-Red 23-04-2010, Order on the 'Urgent Defence Motion for 
Cooperation of the DRC’, and ICC-01/04-01/07- 2619-Red 17-08-2011, Décision relative à la seconde 
requête de la Défense de Germain Katanga visant à obtenir la coopération de la République 
démocratique du Congo.  
 Another witness stated that he had read in 
918 ICC-01/09-01/11-T-6-Red-ENG WT 02-09-2011, p. 116. 
919 This point was made by the Ruto defence: ICC-01/09-01/11-T-5-ENG ET WT 01-09-2011, 91. 
920 The Ruto defence argued that evidence of Ruto’s absence at alleged meetings because he was 
elsewhere, was readily available. See: Ruto Defence Brief, ICC-01/09-01/11-355 24-10-2011, para. 7; 
ICC-01/09-01/11-T-6-Red-ENG WT 02-09-2011, 62-72. 
921 This was one of the arguments of the defence – failure to investigate properly. See, for instance, 
ICC-01/09-01/11-T-12-ENG, 8 September 2011, pages 41-45. See also: Muthaura Confirmation Brief, 
ICC-01/09-02/11-374-Red, 2 December 2011, paras 71-72. The defence relied on the following 
examples: EVD-PT-D12-00063 at para. 2; EVD-PT-D12-00062 at para. 13; EVD-PT-D12-00088 at 
para. 2; EVD-PT-D12-00054 at para. 6; EVD-PT-D12-00053 at para. 5. 
922 Ruto Defence Brief, ICC-01/09-01/11-355 24-10-2011, para. 22. 
 
 
223 
the newspaper that grenades were found at the house of Ruto’s accomplice 
Cherambos.923
 
 The Prosecution failed to search for these recordings and newspaper 
article and thus missed an opportunity to verify the accuracy of the stories of 
witnesses it relied on as witnesses of truth.  
More significantly, the Prosecution should have been able to obtain the broadcasts of 
the radio station KASS FM, broadcasted from Nairobi. Its radio operator, Sang, was 
one of the Kenyan suspects before the ICC. The Prosecution relied on anonymous 
witnesses to establish that he incited people to attack the Kikuyu civilian population, 
and that he allowed other people to use his radio program to organise the attacks. The 
Prosecution produced abstracts from KASS FM broadcasts, published by BBC. It 
never sought to obtain the full transcripts of KASS FM broadcasts even though they 
are readily available in Nairobi. The BBC abstracts did not include a single inciting 
broadcast. Rather, they called for peace.924 The defence produced broadcasts of the 
relevant time period which all referred to peace rather than war. These broadcasts 
were ultimately rejected because they were not translated into an official language of 
the Court.925 The Pre-Trial Chamber, Judge Kaul dissenting, nonetheless found that 
there were substantial grounds to believe that Sang had contributed to a network 
which had as its purpose the attacking of Kikuyu civilians.926
 
  
Difficulties in finding credible and willing witness can also be exaggerated. ICTR 
defence teams have generally managed to present to the Court both Hutu and Tutsi 
Rwandan witnesses living in Rwanda including survivors of the genocide. Thus, a 
                                                 
923 Ruto Defence Brief, ICC-01/09-01/11-355 24-10-2011, para. 23. 
924 These points were raised by the Sang and Ruto defence: ICC-01/09-01/11-T-6-Red-ENG WT 01-
09-2011, 104; ICC‐01/09‐01/11, 05 September 2011, pages 51-57; ICC-01/09-01/11-T-6-Red-ENG 
WT 02-09-2011 109/162 NB PT, pages 114-116, 141-143. 
925 ICC-01/09-01/11-300-Red, Decision on the "Prosecutor's Request for an Order Excluding the 
Evidence Intended to be Relied Upon at the Confirmation of Charges Hearing by the Defence for Ruto 
and Sang, and the Defence for Kosgey" 29-08-2011. 
926 ICC-01/09-02/11-382-Red 23-01-2012, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges Pursuant to 
Article 61(7)(a) and (b) of the Rome Statute, see paras. 49-53. This confirms with the reasoning of the 
Pre-Trial Chamber in Abu Garda, see: ICC-02/05-02/09-243-Red 08-02-2010, para.48: “As the 
Chamber has already made clear, at this stage of the proceedings, the Defence's objections to the 
manner in which the investigations were conducted can only be viewed in the context of the purpose of 
the confirmation hearing, and should thus be regarded as a means of seeking a decision declining to 
confirm the charges. It follows, therefore, that the Defence's objection raised, in this instance cannot in 
itself cause the Chamber to decline to confirm the charges on the basis of an alleged investigative 
failure on the part of the Prosecution. Rather, this objection may have an impact on the Chamber's 
assessment of whether the Prosecutor's evidence as a whole has met the "substantial grounds to 
believe" threshold.” 
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sufficient number of witnesses continue to be willing to testify despite the serious 
pressure put on them. Also, whilst cultural differences between investigators and 
potential witnesses makes the investigations significantly more challenging, it does 
not make them impossible.  
 
It is important to be aware of such differences in order to distinguish lying witnesses 
from honest witnesses who have difficulty expressing themselves in a, for the 
investigators, comprehensible manner. It may not be advisable to call honest but 
forgetful, or entirely incomprehensible witnesses. Such witnesses risk having their 
credibility destroyed in cross-examination. To that extent, Combs is right. It is 
difficult to conduct a trial with witnesses who are completely disconnected from the 
world, culture and language in which the trial is conducted. However, in most 
situations, a means of communication can be found. It simply takes more time and 
effort.  
 
Moreover, if investigations are conducted thoroughly, ample credible and 
comprehensible witnesses can be found. In light of the high number of victims in 
most international cases, there are also many potential witnesses. Sufficient time and 
effort must be devoted to finding them, communicating with them, testing their 
consistency and verifying their stories with other potential witnesses. The ICTY 
investigators have done a diligent job and found a great deal of the evidence there was 
to be found.927
 
 However, both at the ICTR and ICC, much more effort could and 
should be made in order to ensure that the judges are presented with the fullest and 
most reliable picture of events. 
ICTR prosecutors rely heavily on witness statements taken by investigators several 
years before the witnesses are brought. There are many discrepancies between these 
statements and the in-court testimonies. This could be avoided by keeping in closer 
contact with the witnesses by interviewing them more regularly.928
                                                 
927 See, for instance, Prosecutor v. Gotovina, Cermak and Markac, IT-05-87/1-T, Trial Judgement of 
15 April 2011, where a total of 145 factual and expert witnesses were called and 4825 exhibits 
including exhumation reports, orders, photographs, and maps. See paras. 10-59. The findings of fact 
were to a large extent based on orders, presidential decrees and military documents (paras. 70-94).  
 
928 In an interview in Arusha on 8 October 2004, J. Stewart, former chief of prosecutions at the ICTR, 
conceded that a serious concern is that there is insufficient collaboration between the Prosecution 
counsel and the investigators and that years pass by without being in contact with the witnesses. The 
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Furthermore, when a witness testifies, for instance, about a meeting which was 
attended by various other people, investigators should try to find these other 
attendants and verify whether the meeting took place and what was discussed. Also 
personal information about a witness relating to his age or family members who were 
allegedly killed, can easily be verified. The necessity of doing so has become apparent 
in many trials where the defence dug up the relevant information and used in its cross-
examination.929 Regularly, the defence calls as defence witnesses, persons mentioned 
in statements and testimony from prosecution witnesses. Such witnesses often 
contradict the prosecution witnesses accounts.930
 
  
Regrettably, the ICTR and ICC investigators do not tend to verify any of the 
information given by witnesses. Rather, they take the veracity of the information for 
granted.931 It of course does not help that the ICC investigators hardly visit the 
locations but rely on intermediaries instead. It is rather surprising that the Prosecution 
does not find it necessary to recruit local investigators. Most defence teams, on the 
other hand, consider the recruitment of a reliable local investigator of the utmost 
importance.932
 
 The Lubanga situation where witness credibility has become a pivotal 
issue could have been avoided if the Prosecution had taken this basic measure.  
Protective Measures 
 
Protection of persons – non-disclosure of identity 
                                                                                                                                           
first contact between the witness and Prosecution counsel is often in Arusha upon the witness’s arrival 
for testimony.   
929 This was for instance the case in the Lubanga and Katanga trials where the defence presented the 
Chamber with birth certificates and school bulletins to demonstrate that some witnesses lied about their 
age. In the ICTR, the defence often produces criminal dossiers from witnesses prosecuted in Rwanda to 
demonstrate contradictions. See also, for instance, Prosecutor v. Nsengiyumva and Bagosora, T. 12 
October 2004, pp. 11-12, 48-49; Kabiligi Defence Exhibit 85 (Judgment of 16 August 2001, Military 
Court Rwanda) p. 201. See also: Judgement and Sentence 18 December 2008, ICTR-98-41-T, paras. 
1558-1567. 
930 For instance, Prosecutor v. Nsengiyumva and Bagosora, Judgement and Sentence 18 December 
2008, ICTR-98-41-T, paras. 275, 290, 298, 299, 1558-1567 
931 Contrary to what the Prosecutor alleges: ICC-01/04-01/07-T-81-Red-ENG WT 25-11-2009, pages 
37-38. 
932 David Hooper Q.C. (Interview in The Hague, 3 June 2010), and Peter Robinson (Interview in The 
Hague, 21 November 2009). Defence teams before the ICC have all recruited local investigators 
instead of the more expensive well-trained international investigators. Local investigators are essential 
to open doors in the field. 
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In order to ensure cooperation from witnesses without putting them at risk, 
international courts and tribunals can take protective measures. The main protective 
measure is confidentiality. The identities of victims, witnesses, members of their 
families or other persons who assist the court or tribunal can be withheld from the 
public and defence. The identities of many prosecution witnesses in international 
criminal justice systems are disclosed to the defence shortly before the proceedings 
begin, and sometimes even later. At the confirmation stage of the ICC, the identities 
of prosecution witnesses are rarely disclosed either to the defence or to the public.933 
The defence has, however, the right to know their identities a significant period prior 
to their testimonies at trial. This is similar in the ICTY and ICTR. It only happened 
once in the ICTY Tadic case that the identities of witnesses were not disclosed at all 
to the defence. Sources, however, can be protected for longer, and in some situations 
permanently.934
 
 
In each of the three international tribunals and court, non-disclosure to the defence of 
identifying details of sources and witnesses is a measure of last resort and must be 
balanced with the rights of the defendant. The “overriding principle is that full 
disclosure should be made”.935 The ability to investigate can be seriously infringed if 
the identities of important information providers are redacted. Indeed, an efficient 
investigation commences with enquiries about such persons, which cannot be done 
unless their identities are known.936
                                                 
933 The Statute explicitly authorises the prosecution to rely on summaries of anonymous witnesses 
(articles 61(5) ICC and 68(5) ICC Statute). However, the weight is significantly less. See, for instance, 
Public Redacted Version of the URGENT Decision on Evidentiary Scope of the Confirmation Hearing, 
Preventive Relocation and Disclosure under Article 67(2) of the Statute and Rule 77 of the Rules, ICC-
01/04-01/07-428, 21-04-2008, para. 14; citing confidential filing: ICC-OI/04-01/07-374-Conf-Exp, 
para. 18; ICC-01/04-01/06-517. pp. 4 and 6; Prosecutor v. Abu Garda, Public Redacted Version of the 
Decision on Confirmation of Charges, ICC-02/05-02/09-243-Red, 8 February 2010, paras.173 and 177; 
Prosecutor v. Muthaura, Ali and Kenyatta, ICC-01/09-02/11-382-Red 23-01-2012, paras. 89-90. 
  
934 See, for instance, ICC-01/04-01/07-1395-Corr-tENG 13-01-2010, para. 27. 
935 Judgment on the appeal of the Prosecutor against the decision of Pre-Trial Chamber I entitled “First 
Decision on the Prosecution Request for Authorisation to Redact Witness Statements”, ICC-01/04-
01/07-475, 13 May 2008, para. 63. 
936 This is the case for prospective witnesses, or other informants. See Judgment on the appeal of the 
Prosecutor against the decision of Pre-Trial Chamber I entitled “First Decision on the Prosecution 
Request for Authorisation to Redact Witness Statements”, ICC-01/04-01/07-475, 13 May 2008, para. 
62: “The Appeals Chamber agrees with the appellant that, in principle, the Defence is entitled to 
contact persons who the Prosecutor either has interviewed or is about to interview prior to their 
becoming prosecution witnesses and recognises that such persons may have information which is 
potentially relevant to the Defence. In such circumstances, the assessment carried out by the Pre-Trial 
Chamber in deciding whether or not to authorise any particular redaction will necessary take this factor 
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Non-disclosure of the identities of their family members can also affect the rights of 
the defence, most notably the right to have adequate time and facilities to prepare a 
defence. To verify the veracity of the testimony of witnesses, speaking to members of 
their families or persons in their close proximity has proved essential. It is particularly 
through such persons that the discovery can be made that certain parts of the 
testimony are not truthful.937
 
 As addressed above, it frequently occurs that the 
Prosecution does not make these necessary enquiries. It is then even more important 
that the defence be offered an opportunity to do so. On the ground, defence 
investigators can usually find the identities of family members of witnesses through 
their own sources. However, this requires time and efforts that the defence could have 
used for other purposes. Moreover, the fact that such information can be found by the 
defence itself demonstrates that there is no legitimate reason to withhold it from the 
defence.  
Judges are aware that non-disclosure of relevant information may impinge on the 
defence’s ability to adequately investigate and prepare a defence. At the same time, in 
some situations, judges consider that such measures are the only way to properly 
protect persons who assist the court or tribunal. As one ICTY Chamber put it:938
 
  
If witnesses will not come forward or if witnesses refuse or are otherwise unwilling to 
testify, there is little evidence to present. Threats, harassment, violence, bribery and 
other intimidation, interference and obstruction of justice are serious problems, for 
both the individual witnesses and the Tribunal’s ability to accomplish its mission.  
 
                                                                                                                                           
into account”. See also: Prosecutor v. Lubanga, “Decision on Third Defence Motion for Leave to 
Appeal”, ICC-01/04-01/06-514, 4 October 2006. 
937 ICC-01/04-01/07-3223 13-01-2012, Order to the Prosecutor regarding the alleged false testimony 
of witness P-159. Many family members have been called by the defence to testify. See, for instance, 
D147 testimony from 17 to 19 may 2011; ICC-01/04-01/07-T-263-Red-ENG CT WT 19-05-2011, 
page 52 (D147 = D03-P026); D146 D03-P340, 20-24 May 2011; D145, D03-P0100, see ICC-01/04-
01/07-T-310-Red-ENG CT WT 13-09-2011, pages 56, 67-68. 
938 Prosecutor v. Brdjanin and Talic, Decision on Motion by Prosecution for Protective Measures, 3 
July 2010, para. 29. See also: See also Waters, [Redacted]: Writing and Reconciling in the Shadow of 
Secrecy, supra note 169, PART IV. 
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Nonetheless, the rights of the accused remain “the first consideration”.939 
Accordingly, such protective measures can be granted, but only on an exceptional 
basis, after exhausting the possibility of employing less extreme measures (principle 
of necessity). Protective measures must also be strictly limited to the exigencies of the 
situation (principle of proportionality), and not infringe the right of the defence.940 
More concretely, the Chamber must determine on a case-to-case basis whether the 
disclosure of the person’s identity generates an objectively justified security risk; 
whether less restrictive protective measures are reasonably available; and whether 
non-disclosure gravely prejudices the defence.941 General security problems in the 
region alone do not justify redactions from the defence.942 For this, it must be shown 
that such security problems are prompted by the defendant.943
 
  
In practice, however, this exceptional measure is routinely applied. Particularly the 
ICC has gone far in allowing redactions from the public and defence, not infrequently 
                                                 
939 Prosecutor v. Brdjanin and Talic, Decision on Motion by Prosecution for Protective Measures, 3 
July 2010, para. 30: “Whilst the Tribunal must make it clear to prospective victims and witnesses in 
other cases that it will exercise its powers to protect them from, inter alia, interference or intimidation 
where it is possible to do so, the rights of the accused in the case in which the order is sought remain 
the first consideration. It is not easy to see how those rights can properly be reduced to any significant 
extent because of a fear that the prosecution may have difficulties in finding witnesses who are willing 
to testify in other cases”. 
940 ICC-01/04-01/06-108, Decision Establishing General Principles Governing Applications to Restrict 
Disclosure pursuant to Rule 81(2) and (4) of the Statute, 19 May 2006; ICC-01/04-01/06-102, Decision 
on the final system of disclosure and the establishment of a time table, 15 May 2006.  
941 Judgment on the appeal of the Prosecutor against the decision of Pre-Trial Chamber I entitled “First 
Decision on the Prosecution Request for Authorisation to Redact Witness Statements”, ICC-01/04-
01/07-475, 13 May 2008, paras. 59, 60, 71-72; ICC-01/04-01/07-3122 22-08-2011, page 9. See also: 
Prosecutor v. Lubanga, ICC-01/04-01/06-568, 13 October 2006, “Judgment on the Prosecutor’s appeal 
against the decision of Pre-Trial Chamber I entitled “Decision Establishing General Principles 
Governing Applications to Restrict Disclosure pursuant to Rule 81(2) and (4) of the Rules of Procedure 
and Evidence”, paras. 36-37; Prosecutor v Lukic & Lukic, Order on Milan Lukic’s Request for 
Protective Measures, 23 July, 2008, pp. 3-4; Prosecutor v Simba, Decision on Defence Request for 
Protection of Witnesses, 25 August, 2004, para. 5; Prosecutor v Nzirorera, Decision on the 
Prosecutor’s Motion for Protective Measures for Witnesses, July 12, 2000, para. 9; Prosecutor v 
Bizimungu et al, Decision on Justin Mugenzi’s Confidential Motion for Protection of Defence 
Witnesses, June 27, 2005, para. 9.  
942 Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Judgement on the appeal of Mr. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo against the 
decision of Pre-Trial Chamber I entitled First Decision on the Prosecution Requests and Amended 
Requests for Redactions under Rule 81, 14 December 2006, para. 21; Prosecutor v. Blaskic, Decision 
of Trial Chamber I on the applications of the prosecutor dated 24 June and 30 August 1996 in respect 
of the protection of witnesses’ 2 October 1996; Prosecutor v. Brdjanin and Talic, Decision on motion 
by prosecution for protective measures, 3 July 2000, para. 11. 
943 Judgment on the appeal of the Prosecutor against the decision of Pre-Trial Chamber I entitled “First 
Decision on the Prosecution Request for Authorisation to Redact Witness Statements”, ICC-01/04-
01/07-475, 13 May 2008, para. 71; Prosecutor v. Milosevic, Decision on Prosecution Motion for 
Provisional Protective Measures Pursuant to Rule 69, 19 February 2003, para. 29; Prosecutor v. 
Brdjanin and Talic, Decision on Third Motion By Prosecution for Protective Measures, 8 November 
2002, paras. 14-18. 
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on a permanent basis.944 Such redactions can include sources, as well as the names of 
persons and organisations who act as intermediaries between the Court and potential 
witnesses.945 The names of staff members of the Prosecution, NGOs or other 
intermediaries are regularly redacted at least until the start of the trial.946
 
  
Arguably, the protection of NGOs and Prosecution personnel is excessive. Given the 
nature of their work, they should be prepared to take more risks than ordinary 
citizens.947 The fact that several NGOs cooperate with the ICC is not in itself a 
confidential matter, and can easily be ascertained from the respective internet sites of 
these NGOs. As well, in an amicus brief, submitted in the DRC situation, the 
Womens’ Institute for Gender Justice broadcasted to the entire world the fact that it 
had conducted interviews in the DRC, and transmitted its findings to the ICC 
Prosecutor.948
 
 
In the ICTY and ICTR, with the exception of the International Committee for Red 
Cross (“ICRC”), these types of redactions have generally been rejected. The defence 
is usually entitled to receive the identities of anyone involved in taking witness 
information, be it investigators, interpreters, Prosecution staff members and/or NGO 
                                                 
944 See, for instance, ICC-01/04-01/07-1395-Corr-tENG 13-01-2010, para. 27; ICC-01/04-01/07-1096-
tENG 18-11-2009, paras.26-27; ICC-01/04-01/07-1097-tENG 18-11-2009, para. 21. See also ICC-
01/04-01/07-3122 22-08-2011, page 9 where the permanent redaction of a defence source was 
authorized for the first time in international justice. The Appeals Chamber nonetheless held that “non-
disclosure must be kept under review and altered should changed circumstances make that appropriate” 
(Judgment on the appeal of the Prosecutor against the decision of Pre-Trial Chamber I entitled “First 
Decision on the Prosecution Request for Authorisation to Redact Witness Statements”, ICC-01/04-
01/07-475, 13 May 2008, para. 63). Chambers have followed this instruction. Examples of Decisions 
which rejected permanent redactions sought and only allowed temporary ones, are: ICC-01/04-01/07-
1098-tENG 30-12-2009, para.13-18, and ICC-01/04-01/07-1101-tENG 21-06-2010, para.19-28, and 
ICC-01/04-01/07-1096-tENG 18-11-2009, paras. 27-31. 
945 ICC-01/04-01/07-1101-tENG 21-06-2010, see para 25-26. 
946 See also ICC-01/04-01/07-1034-tENG 18-11-2009, see paras. 50-51. The supervisor of 
investigations in Ituri testified under pseudonym: ICC-01/04-01/07-T-81-Red-ENG WT 25-11-2009. 
By contrast, particularly the ICTY has been strict on disclosure of the identities of sources: Prosecutor 
v. Haradinaj, Decision on Motions on Behalf of Idriz Balaj and Lahi Brahimaj to Receive Ten 
Unredacted Witness Statements, 3 May 2006; Prosecutor v. Kordic, Order on Motion to Compel 
Compliance by the Prosecutor with Rules 66(A) and 68, 26 February 1999; Prosecutor v. Brdjanin and 
Talic, Decision on Fifth Motion by Prosecution for Protective Measures, 15 November 2000; 
Prosecutor v. Brdjanin and Talic, Decision on Prosecution’s Request for Variation of Third Protective 
Measures Decision, 29 November 2000, para. 14. 
947 On similar grounds, the European Court of Human Rights has held that the protection of the 
identities of police officers was excessive. See Kostovski v. The Netherlands, Judgment of 20 
November 1989, 1989 ECHR (Ser. A.) 166. 
948 See: ICC-01/04-373, 20 August 2007. 
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members.949 If not, the defence would be deprived of an opportunity to contest the 
methodology of the collection of witness statements.950
 
 Given how often witnesses 
allege that interpreters or investigators have misunderstood them in cases of 
inconsistencies with their viva voce testimonies, it is imperative for the defence to 
receive disclosure of their names. 
If the redactions pertain to the name of an organisation or a person who has 
transmitted a document to the Prosecution, or referred a victim or witness to 
Prosecution investigators, then their identity is crucial to the ability of the defence to 
analyse and challenge chain of custody issues, possible collusion, undue influence, as 
well as the existence of prior statements.   
 
Accordingly, the defence is genuinely prejudiced by excessive redactions. Often, such 
redactions are not even necessary. For instance, it has been suggested that the need for 
protection in the ICTR is exaggerated. Indeed, many of the protected witnesses have 
testified publicly before Gacaca courts in Rwanda.951 Similarly, in the DRC, very few 
people feel genuinely threatened.952 This is confirmed by the fact that a person who 
testified in the case of Katanga & Ngudjolo returned to his community after being 
relocated for security concerns. He has not faced any difficulties since he is back 
although it is generally known in the community that he testified as a witness for the 
Prosecution.953
                                                 
949 That this applies equally to humanitarian organisations is clear from: Prosecutor v. Milutinovic et al, 
Decision on Ojdanic Motion for Disclosure of Witness Statements and for Finding of Violation of Rule 
66(A)(ii), para. 14; and Prosecutor v. Milosevic, Decision on Prosecution Motion for Protective 
Measures (Concerning a Humanitarian Organisation). 
 
950 Prosecutor v. Pauline Nyiramasuhuko et al, ICTR-97-21-T, ‘Décision relative à la Requête de la 
Défense en extreme urgence tenant au respect, par le Procureur, de la “Décision relative à la Requête 
de la Défense en Communication de preuves” rendue le 1er novembre 2000”, 8 June 2001; Prosecutor 
v. Nyiramasuhuko et al, Decision on the Prosecutor’s Motion for, inter alia, Modification of the 
Decision of 8 June 2001, 25 September 2001, para. 19; Prosecutor v. Nzirorera Decision on the 
Defence Motion for Disclosure of Exculpatory Evidence, Rule 68 of the Rules of Procedure and 
Evidence, 7 October 2003, para. 20 (the name of a prosecution investigator can be exculpatory 
information). 
951 See the intervention of D. Webster, one of the prosecutors at the ICTR, at the Geneva Conference, 
supra note 173, where he agreed that there is no reason to protect witnesses before the ICTR who can 
testify without protection in Rwanda.  
952 Personal interviews with local Congolese in the period of February 2011, the author has been 
informed that one witness who has been relocated is still frequently in the region for business purposes 
and has been boosting about his new house paid by the ICC Prosecution. He then obviously shows little 
fear for repercussions.  
953 Public Version publique expurgée de la Décision relative à la requête du Bureau du Procureur aux 
fins de communiquer avec le témoin P-250 (ICC-01/04-01/07-2711-Conf, 18 février 2011), ICC-01/04-
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Accordingly, claims of security concerns should not be accepted on face value. Many 
allegations of threats from the defendant or an associate turn out to be false.954 
Caution is particularly appropriate when defendants have lost their stronghold, as in 
Rwanda. Allegations of security issues can simply be made to put the defendant in a 
bad light, or render him eligible for relocation. It often seems that confidentiality is 
invoked not genuinely to protect the safety of a witness, but for strategic reasons.955 
Protection may also be an incentive to give false testimony because there will be no 
consequences.956
 
 Witnesses can comfortably invent anything they like without being 
subjected to public scrutiny. 
Even where the fear is genuine, threats often do not come from the defendant, but 
from society members. They frequently act on their own initiatives rather than on 
instructions from the defendant. In such a situation, non-disclosure to the defendant 
will not increase the safety of the witness concerned. The main fear is that the 
defendant will inform others within his community of the identities of witnesses. It 
should however be noted that, very often, they are already known in the communities 
before the accused is even aware of their identity. It may be the witness himself who 
speaks about his involvement with the tribunal or court, or his family. It may also be 
an officer of the court or tribunal who accidentally provides such information to 
people on the ground.957
 
   
Thus, in reality, the identities of potential witnesses are not hidden locally for very 
long. Witnesses often come from very small communities where everyone knows 
everything about everyone else. If investigators arrive at a village to speak to 
someone, everyone will immediately know that the person in question is cooperating 
with the tribunal or court. If a witness fears retaliation from the government, it is even 
                                                                                                                                           
01/07-2711-Red, 10 mars 2011. In conducting fieldwork the author has observed that most people were 
aware of the identities of most, if not all, Prosecution witnesses in the Katanga & Ngudjolo case. 
954 For instance, in Kenya I, the victim representative claimed that some of her clients were threatened 
by Ruto or his associates. She did so in her closing arguments, thereby depriving Ruto of an 
opportunity to respond. See further ICC-01/09-01/11-T-12-ENG ET WT 08-09-2011, 15-34. 
955 See also Waters, [Redacted]: Writing and Reconciling in the Shadow of Secrecy, supra note 169, 
PART V.  
956 See the intervention of Mr. Haguma, lawyer based in Kigali, at Geneva Conference, supra note 173.  
957 For instance, the Katanga defence team had discovered the identity of intermediary W-143 in the 
field long before the name was officially disclosed to it. 
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more difficult to keep his identity confidential. The authorities need to grant witnesses 
visas and passports. Thus, at least some public officials will know that a witness 
intends to travel.  
 
In the ICTR, the protected witness identifying information is provided to the 
Rwandan Prosecutor-General, the Minister of Justice, the Department of Immigration 
and copied to the Rwandan Special Representative to the ICTR based in Arusha. The 
reason proffered for providing all this confidential information to the most senior 
government officials is to obtain travel documents.958 This defence has alleged that 
this practice puts defence witnesses unnecessarily at risk, and that there is a way of 
obtaining travel documents without informing the highest authorities.959 This 
arguments were, however, rejected.960 In the case of Nshogoza, witnesses had not 
been informed that their information would be submitted to the highest Rwandan 
officials. Upon hearing this, a significant number of defence witnesses decided to 
testify publicly. While on the stand, one such witness testified that the ICTR witness 
protection programme was “a total farce”.961
 
   
                                                 
958 In the Prosecutor v. Nshogoza, T. 9 March 2009, pages 4-6 (E), the Registry explained this as 
follows: “[...] I would like to -- furthermore, with regard to the procedure that has been used regarding 
the movement of witnesses, either those who are free in Rwanda or who are already in  
custody -- under our custody, as you know, Your Honour, we cannot issue a travel document without 
notifying the country of residence, notifying them of their identity.  So you cannot issue this document 
using a pseudonym.  And so the country's authorities have to be aware of the identity for the issuance 
of travel documents.  The procedure in Rwanda, and which has been simplified through an agreement 
with -- between the Tribunal and the Rwandan authorities, consists in officially notifying the 
prosecutor's office in Kigali regarding the movement of all witnesses from Kigali, whether they are in 
detention or not. So an official letter is sent to them via the registrar of the Tribunal, including all the 
detail -- the particulars of the witness. It is the prosecutor's office in Kigali which cross-checks the 
availability of these witnesses and to see if they are ready to come and testify or not.  Once this phase 
has been passed, then the document is forwarded to the minister of justice, which then does what it has 
to do with the file.  And when the minister -- minister of justice approves it, then the file is forwarded 
to the department of immigration for the issuance of travel documents.” 
959 The motion argued that interference by the Rwandan Deputy Prosecutor-General rendered it 
impossible for Mr Nshogoza to obtain the attendance of witnesses on his behalf under the same 
conditions as those of the witnesses who testified against him in violation of Article 20(4)(e). 
Prosecutor v. Nshogoza, Urgent Motion for Stay of Proceedings Due to Interference with Defence 
Witnesses, 4 March 2009. 
960 Prosecutor v. Nshogoza, Decision on Defence Motion to Make Public the Confidential Decision on 
Defence Motion for Stay of Proceedings; and Annexure Comprising Redacted Version of Said 
Decision for Public Consumption, 26 June 2009: “[T]he Defence failed to demonstrate how the contact 
between the Rwandan Prosecutor General’s office and the witnesses adversely impacted the Accused’s 
right under Article 20(4)(e) to obtain attendant of and examination of witnesses on his behalf, under the 
same conditions as those who have testified against him”. 
961 See, e.g., witness Straton Nyarwaya, T. 20 March 2009, p. 5 “[F]or me, all this issue of a protected 
witness is a farce.”).  The other three witnesses were Augustin Nyagatare, Fulgence Seminega, and 
Cyprien Hakizimana. 
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Arguably, hiding the identities of the potential witnesses from the defence and public 
increases, rather than decreases security issues. If it is not public information that the 
person is a potential witness for the tribunal or court, it is much easier to make 
someone disappear, take revenge or put pressure on the witness in other ways. 
Someone may die from natural causes. If, on the other hand, it is known publicly that 
the person is a potential witness for the tribunals or court, there is public scrutiny 
concerning his fate. 
 
Disclosure of the identity of a witness to the local communities in itself may serve as 
a protection because it is easier to keep control over the situation. Given the lack of 
police or another independent force, the international tribunals and court have no way 
of protecting a witness if he stays in his community. Thus, in offering protection, they 
make a promise that cannot, in reality, be fulfilled. The tribunals and court must rely 
on the community for his protection. If the community is excluded from knowing who 
is a potential witness and, accordingly, who is in danger, the witness is rather 
defenceless.962
 
  
In light of this reality, the protective scheme should be applied as intended, that is, as 
an exception to the rule that the proceedings are public and all relevant information is 
disclosed to the defence. It should stop being applied as the rule, as it currently is in 
the ICC.963
 
 Many witnesses ask for protection even if not strictly required. Testifying 
publicly means that everyone in the world can follow the testimony. In addition, the 
public gallery can fill up with unfamiliar and familiar faces to the witness. That can 
be frightening for anyone. However, the test is not, nor should it be, whether the 
witness is comfortable testifying publicly. Rather, he must have an objectively 
justifiable fear for his security.  
                                                 
962 A counter-argument, as ICTR judge Arrey pointed out, is that witnesses may refuse to testify unless 
they are protected. See Geneva Conference, supra note 173.  
963 The Prosecution is of the view that the ICC protection program does not go far enough. In its view, 
“the starting point for protective measures should be the elimination of all foreseeable risks … because 
any lower standard of risk would not permit the Court, or the Prosecution, to discharge its obligations 
to protect victims and witnesses as mandated by article 68(1) of the Statute” (Public Redacted Version 
of the URGENT Decision on Evidentiary Scope of the Confirmation Hearing, Preventive Relocation 
and Disclosure under Article 67(2) of the Statute and Rule 77 of the Rules, ICC-01/04-01/07-428, 21-
04-2008, para. 14; citing confidential filing: ICC-OI/04-01/07-374-Conf-Exp, para. 13, citing the 
confidential filing: ICC-01/04-01/07-374-Conf-Exp, p 10).  
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Even the disclosure of his identity to the defence only may involve a level of risk of 
which he should be made aware. The situation should be adequately discussed with 
the witness. As the Katanga & Ngudjolo Pre-Trial Chamber held:964
(i) The first and foremost protective measure is to give the witnesses a clear idea of 
what they can expect from the Court in terms of protection, which requires that it be 
explained to the witness upfront and in detail the type of operational and procedural 
measures that may be available to them, as well as the basic features of the 
procedure for the granting of such measures; 
 
 
Accordingly, the witness should not be under the false impression that he has the final 
say in whether his identity is to be disclosed to the defence. His consent for the use of 
his statement is valid only after he is made to understand that his identity might have 
to be disclosed to the defence. The Prosecution cannot give any witness a guarantee of 
anonymity.965
 
 It should also be explained to him that it is not his preference for public 
or private testimony that counts.  
In these proposed conditions, there is a risk that the Prosecution loses witnesses, but 
at least it will be a more honest approach. As long as the situation is clear to the 
witnesses, they may still be willing to cooperate. In the ICTY, where protection 
measures have been kept to a minimum, the Prosecution succeeded in obtaining the 
cooperation from most witnesses it relied on. The only real exception has been 
Kosovo. Between 1996 and 2001, less than a quarter of the total number of witnesses 
had some type of protective measure. Less than 20 % had a pseudonym and most 
witnesses testified in public sessions. This stands in stark contrast with the ICC where 
almost all Prosecution witnesses have a pseudonym and large parts of their 
testimonies are listened to in closed or private sessions.966
 
 Yet, this lower level of 
protection at the ICTY has not prevented witnesses from testifying. 
Relocation 
The only way in which the tribunals and court can effectively protect someone is by 
relocating him to another area. It is, however, very expensive for the tribunals and 
                                                 
964 Ibid, para. 17(i). 
965 Ibid, para. 17(ii). 
966 71% of the witnesses had no protection; 1,5% had a pseudonym; 1,1 % testified in closed session; 
5,9% testified in closed session and had a pseudonym; 1,2% testified with face distortion; 11,3% 
testified with face distortion and pseudonym; 7,5 % testified with face and voice distortion, as well as a 
pseudonym; 0,2% testified with face and voice distortion. See: http://www.icty.org/sid/10175. 
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court to relocate a person. If a witness is relocated for his safety, everything is being 
paid for, e.g. his house, education and living expenses. For these reasons it is intended 
to be used only as an absolute last resort. However, given that it is the only way to 
protect witnesses properly, this resort is used much more often than perhaps desired 
by the tribunals and court.  
 
In the ICC, the Victims and Witness Unit (“VWU”) decides on requests from both 
parties for relocation of their witnesses. In the ICTR and ICTY, the defence does not 
have any option of requesting for relocation of its witnesses. The Prosecution, on the 
other hand, can decide to relocate its witnesses. The ICTR Prosecution has, for 
instance, done so with regard to a number of insider witnesses with their entire 
families. The Prosecution has conceded that the costs for doing so are excessive. 
Relocation is therefore applied only in highly exceptional circumstances.967 In the 
ICTY, “[l]ess than a fraction of one per cent of witnesses have been granted long-term 
protection such as relocation to third countries”.968
 
 
In the ICC, a high percentage of Prosecution witnesses have been relocated. In Kenya, 
it appears from the Prosecutor’s observations that all of the witnesses have been 
relocated to a third country.969 Also in the Katanga & Ngudjolo case, many of the 
Prosecution witnesses have been relocated. The number of applications for relocation 
of Prosecution witnesses in this case was “unprecedented”.970 In a number of 
situations, the Prosecution preventively relocated its witnesses while waiting for a 
decision of the VWU, or where the VWU had denied its request for relocation. The 
measure of ‘preventive relocation’ is a provisional measure. It means that witnesses 
are temporarily relocated by the Prosecution, pending the provision of protection by 
the VWU.971
                                                 
967 Cited in Combs, Fact-Finding Without Facts, supra note 6, page 141. 
 The Prosecution had sought no prior authorisation from the Chamber to 
968 http://www.icty.org/sid/10175. 
969 Press Conference held by Ocampo on 24 January 2012 relating to the Pre-Trial Chamber’s decision 
on the confirmation of the charges in Kenya I and II, issued on 23 January 2012. See also: Statement 
by the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court on Kenya ruling, at: http://www.icc-
cpi.int/NR/exeres/54E6388D-4DD0-4E85-8FA9-90DA95A2AFB3.htm. 
970 Public Redacted Version of the URGENT Decision on Evidentiary Scope of the Confirmation 
Hearing, Preventive Relocation and Disclosure under Article 67(2) of the Statute and Rule 77 of the 
Rules, ICC-01/04-01/07-428, 21-04-2008, para. 14; citing confidential filing: ICC-OI/04-01/07-374-
Conf-Exp, para. 20. 
971 Ibid, paras. 9, 15, 18, 19. 
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implement this measure; nor any statutory mandate to do so.972 Accordingly, this 
practice of unilateral preventive relocation was severely criticised and disallowed by 
the Pre-Trial Chamber and Appeals Chamber.973 In cases of disagreement between 
the assessment of the VWU and the Prosecutor, “the ultimate arbiter of whether the 
serious measure of relocation be undertaken is the Chamber”.974
 
 
Preventive relocation forces the issue of relocation and thus effectively shifts the 
power to decide whether relocation is necessary from a neutral organ of the Registry 
to the Prosecution. Indeed, as was held by the Pre-Trial Chamber, “once a witness is 
taken to a new location (alone or with members of his or her family) where he or she 
remains for a certain period of time in this new environment, returning the witness to 
their former place of residence as a result of the Registrar’s decision not to include the 
witness in the ICCPP would be disruptive for the witness and his or her family and 
would also most likely put them at risk”.975  The Prosecution also relocated witnesses 
whose request for relocation was rejected. The Pre-Trial Chamber called this 
“reactive relocation”, rather than “preventive relocation” and criticised it for 
infringing the decision of the competent organ of the Court to decide upon the 
relocation of a witness.976
 
 
The excessive use of relocation is both regrettable and unnecessary. Apart from the 
expenses, relocation has many other undesired effects. The consequence of relocation 
is that witnesses are cut off from their communities for an indefinite period of time. 
They cannot easily return to their community, at least not for a significant period of 
time. This can cause significant problems for the witness, his friends, family and other 
members of the community.977
                                                 
972 Ibid, paras. 21-31. 
 It has already occurred that a witness felt too lonely 
973 Ibid, paras 20-37; See ICC-01/04-01/07-776 26-11-2008, Judgment on the appeal of the Prosecutor 
against the "Decision on Evidentiary Scope of the Confirmation Hearing, Preventive Relocation and 
Disclosure under Article 67(2) of the Statute and Rule 77 of the Rules" of Pre-Trial Chamber I, 
paras.1-2 and 64-104. 
974 See ICC-01/04-01/07-776 26-11-2008, para. 2. 
975 Ibid, para. 25. 
976 Ibid, para. 25. See also ICC-01/04-01/07-776 26-11-2008, paras. 91-92. 
977 This was also pointed out at length by the Appeals Chamber: See ICC-01/04-01/07-776 26-11-2008, 
paras. 64-104. 
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and decided to return to his community.978
 
 He has not had any security issues since 
his return, which suggests that his relocation was not necessary from the outset. 
Relocation can equally be upsetting for the family that is left behind. Three fathers of 
Prosecution witnesses appeared on behalf of the defence. They were all extremely 
upset that their children were taken away from them and asked the Court to return 
them. As D-147 put it:  
 
Without lying to you, the departure of Pierre who left the family and who is at the 
root of the tension between the members of the family is a problem, and the fact that 
the ‐‐ and also the fact that Pierre doesn’t do what he’s supposed to do and the fact 
that Pierre lied. All of this is not worthy of the family. …. Pierre should be left 
alone. I would like to know where he is and I would like to have Pierre returned to 
me and I would like to be able to go (Expunged) with Pierre. Everything that has 
been said here stems from lies.979
 
 
Another problem with relocation is that it is an incentive for anyone to come and 
testify irrespective of whether a person was, in reality, a witness to events. Relocation, 
especially to a western country, in many people’s minds equals a better life with more 
economic opportunities. This is particularly true in societies where the standard of 
living is significantly lower than in western countries. Some of these people are 
keenly looking to flee their poor economic situation. There is a shared perception that 
cooperating with the court may lead to certain benefits. Whilst it is unethical for either 
party to offer money to a witness, paying for someone’s food and transport may 
already be an incentive for someone to cooperate. In DRC for instance, the reality is 
that many of the potential witnesses have a salary at the most of 30 USD per month. 
Many of them are waiting for payment for three months on average. The best way to 
benefit from testifying is relocation. When relocated, health care, insurance and 
education for the entire family are paid for. This may have an adverse impact on the 
                                                 
978 Public Version publique expurgée de la Décision relative à la requête du Bureau du Procureur aux 
fins de communiquer avec le témoin P-250 (ICC-01/04-01/07-2711-Conf, 18 février 2011), ICC-01/04-
01/07-2711-Red, 10 mars 2011. 
979 D147 testimony from 17 to 19 may 2011; ICC-01/04-01/07-T-263-Red-ENG CT WT 19-05-2011, 
page 52 (D147 = D03-P026). See also the testimonies of D146 D03-P340, 20-24 May 2011, who said 
similar things in private session (ICC-01/04-01/07-T-265-CONF-ENG ET 23-05-2011); D145, D03-
P0100, see ICC-01/04-01/07-T-310-Red-ENG CT WT 13-09-2011, pages 56, 67-68 (I should like to 
thank you for giving me these short moments to express myself. I should like to know, as I said not 
long ago, something in respect of the life of my child which is now being wasted away. What can you 
tell me about this? Is there going to be reparation?). 
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credibility of such witnesses.980
 
  
For example, in the ICTY case of Martic, witness MM-079 testified that after his 
lawyer had suggested that he contact the Tribunal to seek assistance with his asylum, 
he was interviewed by the Prosecution on this issue. The witness was subsequently 
informed that the Prosecution had written a letter to the authorities of the State where 
he currently lives to ask that he be allowed to stay there until he finishes testifying at 
the Tribunal”. The Prosecution “acknowledged that the evidence of Witness MM-079 
should be “scrutinised with care” since “he said that he hoped to receive the 
assistance of the OTP to remain in the country where he is relocated.”” The Chamber 
ultimately concluded that in light of the assistance provided to witness MM-079 and 
another Prosecution witness, “there is significant doubt as to the credibility of both 
witnesses”. The Chamber therefore gave “weight only to the parts of their respective 
evidence which are corroborated by other evidence”.981
 
 
However, as was rightly pointed out by the Trial Chamber in the ICTY case of 
Naletilic & Martinovic, the fact that a witness has ulterior motives for testifying does 
not necessary mean he is not telling the truth.982
 
 
A final issue of concern is that relocation undermines the equality of arms between 
the parties. Defence witnesses have never been relocated. At the ICTY and ICTR this 
option does not exist for the defence. In particular at the ICTR, the lack of the 
relocation option for the defence has led to the refusal of numerous crucial witnesses 
from Rwanda to testify. In certain situations, relocation can be the only way to 
persuade witnesses to testify. It is thus unfair that this tool is available to the 
                                                 
980 J. de Lange, who used to work for the Dutch ministry of foreign affairs and was positioned at the 
Royal Dutch embassy in Rwanda until September 2003 and was responsible for the programme on 
justice, good governance and human rights, said in a conference “Genocide whose responsibility? 
Rwanda and beyond” that, in his experience, the story of Rwandans varied depending on what they 
would receive in exchange for their story. See J. De Lange, Rwandan Realities – 10 Years After the 
Genocide, GTI Conference 29-30 October 2004.  
981 Prosecutor v. Martic, Trial Judgement of 12 June 2007, paras. 37-38. See also: Prosecutor v. 
Zigiranyirazo, Scheduling Order – In Camera Hearing on Prosecutor’s Motion to Permit Limited 
Disclosure of Information Regarding Payments and Benefits Provided to Witness Ade and His Family 
Rules 66(C) and 68(D) of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, 19 January 2006; Prosecutor v. 
Bizimungu, Decision on Prosper Mugiraneza’s Motion for Records of all Payments made directly or 
indirectly to Witness D, 28 September 2006; Prosecutor v. Karemera, ICTR- 98-44-PT, Decision on 
Defence Motion for Full Disclosure of Payments to Witnesses, 23 August 2005, para. 7. 
982 Prosecutor v. Naletilic & Martinovic, IT-98-34-A, 3 May 2006, para. 506. 
 
 
239 
Prosecution only. This is better organised at the ICC, where in principle defence 
witnesses have an equal chance to be relocated as Prosecution witnesses. This was 
emphasised by the Single Judge of Pre-Trial Chamber I:983
 
 
The Single Judge would like to highlight that the Defence should also benefit, on 
the same conditions, from the above-mentioned system to be set up by the Registrar. 
Furthermore, in the view of Single Judge, the Court can only adequately address 
these types of exceptional situations if the Prosecution and the Defence do not abuse 
the system and only resort to it when exceptional circumstances make it absolutely 
necessary.  
 
It remains to be seen whether, in reality, a defence application would be treated 
equally to a Prosecution application. In the author’s knowledge, no defence team has 
yet requested for relocation of any of its witnesses. However, the Registry’s reaction 
to the request of four detained defence witnesses to seek asylum in The Netherlands, 
is concerning. Through the lawyer assigned to them, the witnesses addressed the 
Court in respect to their security concerns in the event that they would be sent back to 
the DRC where they had been held in prison in Kinshasa since early 2005 without 
charge. They had implicated members of the DRC government in crimes committed 
in Ituri for which Katanga and Ngudjolo were charged. As a result, they feared 
repercussion back in the Kinshasa central prison.984
 
 
The Registry vehemently opposed any possibility for any witness to seek asylum in 
The Netherlands. It insisted that the witnesses remained within the power of the DRC 
authorities even when on Dutch soil and in the ICC premises.985 It stressed that, if the 
witnesses were not returned to the DRC, the DRC authorities might discontinue their 
cooperation with the Court. In addition, it would prevent governments in the future 
from cooperating.986
                                                 
983 ICC-01/04-01/07-428, 21-04-2008, para. 37. 
 It also stated that the witnesses’ claim that their security would 
984 Prosecutor v. Katanga & Ngudjolo, ICC-01/04-01/07-T-258-FR, 12-05-2011. 
985 See ICC-01/04-01/07-T-258-ENG ET WT 12-05-2011. 
986 Ibid, See also ICC-01/04-01/07-3003 09-06-2011, Registry’s observations, paras, 40-48, especially 
para. 45: « 45. Par ailleurs, le Greffe a tenu à faire part à la Chambre de son inquiétude sur les 
conséquences que pourraient avoir, sur la volonté des autorités congolaises de poursuivre leur 
coopération avec la Cour, le non-respect, par cette dernière, de son engagement ! d'assurer le retour des 
témoins détenus conformément à l'article 93(7)(b) du Statut. Il a en outre regretté que ces mêmes 
autorités n'aient pas été consultées sur le statut juridique des trois témoins et sur la Requête du Conseil 
de permanence. » See also ICC-01/04-01/07-T-258-ENG ET WT 12-05-2011, pages 51-64 : “for the 
transcript it is important to note that the Court is perfectly aware of what could ‐‐ what the 
consequences of the decision that it would give would be on co‐operation between itself and the state’s 
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be at risk was baseless, as their allegations against the government were not new. The 
witnesses had raised similar arguments when they were still in prison and underwent 
no repercussions.987 The Netherlands was equally opposed to opening the asylum 
route to any ICC witness or accused. The Netherlands suggested that the Court deal 
with the request as a request for protective measures.988 Notwithstanding these 
arguments, the Chamber held that the witnesses should have a right to seek asylum.989 
Recently, a Dutch Court confirmed that they were entitled to go through each step of 
the asylum procedure.990
 
 This issue was unprecedented. 
In light of the number of relocated Prosecution witnesses, one of whom returned to 
his community, the Registry’s position towards these defence witnesses appears 
inconsistent. Prisoners who have been imprisoned for almost seven years without a 
charge are by nature in a vulnerable position. Their future fate in DRC is very 
uncertain. They, therefore, appear to have reasons to be genuinely concerned for their 
safety. No other protective measures are available, given that they could not hide from 
the authorities that they would be testifying before the ICC. The Chamber took it 
seriously enough to allow them to seek asylum. The Registry clearly did not. 
 
Organisations 
Many entities and States that provide information to the Prosecution at international 
tribunals make confidentiality a condition of their cooperation. NGOs, TRCs or the 
UN may be concerned about the safety of their sources and may have promised these 
                                                                                                                                           
parties. But once again, the Court did not call for the submissions which were put to it; it has to answer 
them with all the consequences that that might have.”  
987 ICC-01/04-01/07-3003 09-06-2011, Registry’s observations, para. 5. 
988 ICC-01/04-01/07-T-258-ENG ET WT 12-05-2011, pages 69-74 : « The Court can do so with 
reference to the specific situation on the ground and it can determine and implement appropriate and 
specifically tailored protective measures and security arrangements. The Netherlands expresses its 
confidence that the Trial Chamber will carefully consider and decide whether, and if so, under what 
protective measures and security arrangements the detained witnesses are to be returned.  … 
In so far as other applicable international law obligations of the Netherlands are concerned, in terms of 
substance, the Netherlands will defer to the decision of the ICC as regards the safety of the return of the 
witnesses; that is to say, if the Court determines that it is safe for a witness to be relocated, possibly 
under protective measures and security arrangements, the Netherlands will assume the same position 
and transport the person to the point of departure.” 
989 ICC-01/04-01/07-3003, « Décision sur une requête en amicus curiae et sur la « requête tendant à 
obtenir présentations des témoins DRC-D02-P-0350, DRC-D02-P-0236, DRC-D02-P-0228 aux 
autorités néerlandaises aux fins d'asile » (articles 68 et 93-7 du Statut) » en date du 9 juin 2011 rendue 
par la Chambre de première instance II (la « Chambre »). 
990 LJN: BU9492, Rechtbank 's-Gravenhage , AWB 11/25891, 11/25904, 11/25907, 11/36660, 
11/36662, 11/36664, 11/39010, 11/39011, 11/39012, Rechtspraak.nl – LJN:BU9492, 28 December 
2011.  
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sources that their identity will not be disclosed to the defence or the public at large. 
States often invoke State security. Such demands are often granted because, 
otherwise, States may stop cooperating and refuse to open their archives whenever 
their interests are at stake.991
 
   
Rules 70(B) of the ICTR and ICTY Rules, and article 54(3)(e) of the ICC Statute 
permit the Prosecution to enter into agreements with NGOs, the UN, States or other 
entities, thereby promising confidentiality of any document or information unless the 
provider of the information consents to disclosure. Such agreements are limited to 
documents or information which has been obtained “solely for the purpose of 
generating new evidence”.  
 
Whilst pragmatically such agreements may be the only way to obtain information, it 
can be problematic when this power is used excessively. This is particularly so where 
the information includes exculpatory information. The Prosecutor is under an 
obligation to disclose to the defence any exculpatory information. Thus, there may be 
a conflict between the Prosecutor’s right to enter into confidentiality agreements and 
his simultaneous obligation to disclose exonerating evidence.  
 
The excessive use by the ICC Prosecutor of his power to enter into confidentiality 
agreements has led to a stay in the Lubanga case and severe criticism in the Katanga 
and Ngudjolo case.992
                                                 
991 See also Waters, [Redacted]: Writing and Reconciling in the Shadow of Secrecy, supra note 169, 
Part II, PART IV. 
 In Lubanga the Prosecutor identified several hundreds of 
992 See Prosecutor v Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, Decision on Article 54(3)(e) 
Documents Identified as Potentially Exculpatory or Otherwise Material to the Defence's Preparation for 
the Confirmation Hearing, ICC-01/04-01/07-621, 20 June, 2008. In this decision, the Single Judge 
criticized the prosecution for generating the disclosure problems which were identified as early as 
October 2006 although the prosecution did not act upon it until the very last minute by proposing one 
alternative measure after another, as opposed to proposing a coherent and comprehensive approach. 
The Single Judge considered that “this dynamic evinces a demonstrable lack of foresight”, and 
“continuing bringing additional alternative measures even after the deadlines for actual disclosure have 
expired, is not, in the Single Judge’s view, up to the standards required by an International Criminal 
Court” (para. 17). The current situation “demonstrates that the Prosecution has wholly disregarded its 
duty to act with due care in accepting documents pursuant to article 54(3)(e) of the Statute. Instead, the 
Prosecution has recklessly accepted, as a matter of course, thousands of documents from numerous 
providers pursuant to the said provision” (para. 46). Nonetheless, the Single Judge made a distinction 
between confirmation and trial on the grounds of their specific goals and features (see paras. 66 & 70). 
Given that the Pre-Trial Chamber does not yet make an ultimate determination on the guilt or 
innocence of the accused in respect of the charges, the disclosure of analogous information was 
considered to be a measure that would sufficiently compensate the unfairness to the accused at this 
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documents received mainly from the UN and some NGOs pursuant to article 54(3)(e) 
as potentially exculpatory material. The UN refused to permit the defence or even the 
Chamber to receive any of the information given to the Prosecutor. Plainly this refusal 
prevented the Chamber from exercising its ultimate duty to assess whether the trial 
could still be fair if this material was not disclosed to the defence and whether 
alternative measures were available to compensate the unfairness to the defence 
caused by the non-disclosure. Following refusal by the Prosecution to comply with a 
court order that the material be provided to the Chamber, a conditional stay of the 
proceedings was ordered.993
 
   
The Appeals Chamber agreed with the Trial Chamber that reliance on Article 54(3)(e) 
of the Statute should be “exceptional” and not excessive as it had been in the instant 
case.994
                                                                                                                                           
stage of the proceedings (paras. 65-66, 77-85, 93-94, 108). The use of summaries was, however, 
rejected even for the purpose of the confirmation hearing (paras. 75-76). In light of all circumstances, 
the Single Judge held that the Prosecution had satisfied the bulk rule for the purposes of the 
confirmation hearing and, accordingly, rejected the applications of both Defences for an order to stay 
the proceedings (paras. 124-125). The Single Judge, however, urged the Prosecution to find a more 
permanent solution to what could no longer be regarded as a “Prosecution’s problem” but rather as an 
“institutional” problem. Unless a solution is found, “the Prosecution may be prevented from 
discharging its article 67(2) and rule 77 disclosure obligations for the purposes of the trial in all DRC-
related cases at a minimum” (paras. 102-103). Then, four days before the confirmation hearing the 
Single Judge was presented by the Prosecutor with 1172 previously undisclosed items, most coming 
from the United Nations.  The Single Judge noted that these had ‘been within the Office of the 
Prosecutor for years’ (Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, ICC-01/04/01/07, Decision on 
the 19 June 2008 Prosecution Information and other Matters concerning Articles 54 (3)(e) and 67 (2) of 
the Statute and rule 77 of the Rules, 25 June 2008, para. 7). However, she still declined to order a stay 
of the proceedings. 
 It therefore found that the Trial Chamber rightly came to the conclusion that 
“in the circumstances of the case, where a large number of potentially exculpatory 
information or information material to the preparation of the defence had neither been 
disclosed to the accused person nor to the Chamber, there was no prospect of a fair 
993 Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Decision on the consequences of non-disclosure of exculpatory materials 
covered by Article 54(3)(e) agreements and the application to stay the prosecution of the accused, 
together with certain other issues raised at the Status Conference on 10 June 2008, 13 June 2008, ICC-
01704-01/06-140 [hereinafter ‘Lubanga Decision on the consequences of non-disclosure’]. This 
decision was confirmed on appeal: Judgment on the appeal of the Prosecutor against the decision of 
Trial Chamber I entitled "Decision on the consequences of non-disclosure of exculpatory materials 
covered by Article 54(3)(e) agreements and the application to stay the prosecution of the accused, 
together with certain other issues raised at the Status Conference on 10 June 2008", ICC-01/04-01/06-
1486, 21 October 2008 [hereinafter ‘Lubanga Appeals Chamber Decision on the consequences of non-
disclosure’]. 
994 Lubanga Appeals Chamber Decision on the consequences of non-disclosure, ibid, para. 55. See 
also: Katanga & Ngudjolo, hearing of 17 Nov 2009, pages 4-18 (“in the establishment of the truth, the 
relevant division of the Court says that Article 54(3)(e) is exceptional”). 
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trial”. Accordingly, it correctly conditionally stayed the proceedings.995
 
  
The Appeals Chamber held that the Prosecutor needed to concentrate its 
investigations on generating evidence which could be given in court rather than 
amassing material with which it could do nothing because of confidentiality 
agreements. The Appeals Chamber held that “[it]t follows from article 54 (1) of the 
Statute that the investigatory activities of the Prosecutor must be directed towards the 
identification of evidence that can eventually be presented in open court. This is in 
order to establish the truth and to assess whether there is criminal responsibility under 
the Statute”.996
 
 
The Appeals Chamber also underscored that “whenever the Prosecutor relies on 
article 54 (3) (e) of the Statute he must bear in mind his obligations under the Statute.  
He must apply that provision in a manner that will allow the Court to resolve the 
potential tension between the confidentiality to which the Prosecutor has agreed and 
the requirements of a fair trial”.997 It was particularly the Prosecutor’s failure to do so 
which raised the Appeals Chamber’s concern. In accepting large amounts of UN 
material under a confidentiality agreement which prevented even the judges seeing it, 
“the Prosecutor effectively prevented the Chambers from assessing whether a fair trial 
could be held in spite of the non-disclosure to the defence of certain documents, a role 
that the Chamber has to fulfil pursuant to the last sentence of article 67 (2) of the 
Statute”.998
 
 
The stay of proceedings in Lubanga was lifted after the UN agreed that the 
information could be disclosed to the Chamber. It could then make a determination on 
the exonerating nature of the document and the potential need for its disclosure to the 
defence. The Appeals Chamber also contemplated the position should the Trial 
Chamber determine that the defence were entitled to see material which was the 
subject of a confidentiality agreement. It ruled that the Trial Chamber “while 
prohibited from ordering the disclosure of the material to the defence, will then have 
                                                 
995 Lubanga Appeals Chamber Decision on the consequences of non-disclosure, ibid, paras. 75-76, also 
see paras 4-5, 80-84, 97, Judge Pikis dissenting. 
996 ibid, para. 41. 
997 ibid, para. 44; also see para. 42. 
998 Ibid, para. 45. 
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to determine whether and, if so, which counter-balancing measures can be taken to 
ensure that the rights of the accused are protected and that the trial is fair, in spite of 
the non-disclosure of the information”.999
 
 After the Lubanga and Katanga fiascos the 
number of documents obtained under article 54(3)(e) has significantly reduced.  
Exonerating Evidence 
 
ICTY and ICTR 
In light of the foregoing, it is clear that the equality of arms is undermined in 
international justice. The parties start off unequally, which is also the case in domestic 
adversarial systems. The principle of equality of arms is further affected by the 
imbalance of means to tackle the problems unique to international justice. For 
instance, it has been mentioned that the Prosecution has the assistance of NGOs, and 
the UN. It has more abilities to enforce State cooperation and gain access to State 
archives. The Prosecution further regularly applies protective measures, which affects 
the defence ability to investigate.  
 
The duty on the Prosecution in the ICTY and ICTR to disclose all exonerating 
evidence within its possession in a timely fashion is intended to partly compensate the 
imbalance between the parties. This duty has been referred to as equally important as 
the duty to prosecute.1000 Indeed, it has been emphasised that the Prosecutor is like a 
minister of justice “whose object is not simply to secure a conviction but to present 
the case for the Prosecution, which includes not only inculpatory, but also exculpatory 
evidence in order to assist the Chamber to discover the truth in a judicial setting”.1001
                                                 
999 Ibid, para. 48. 
 
Particularly at the ICTR, the defence frequently complains that the Prosecutor failed 
to disclose exculpatory evidence. Unless defence requests for disclosure of 
exculpatory evidence are specific, they are often rejected as amounting to a “fishing 
1000 Prosecutor v. Kordic and Cerkez, Decision on Motions to Extend for Filing Appelant's Briefs, 11 
May, 2001, para. 14; Prosecutor v. Kordić & Čerkez , Appeals Chamber Judgement, 17 December, 2004, 
paras. 183, 242; Prosecutor v. Blaskic, Decision on Production of Discovery Materials, 27 January 27, 
1997, para. 50.1; Prosecutor v. Blaskic, Appeals Chamber Judgment, 29 July, 2004, para. 264; 
Prosecutor v. Karemera et al, Decision on Interlocutory Appeal Regarding the Role of the Prosecutor’s 
Electronic Disclosure Suite in Discharging Disclosure Obligations, 30 June, 2006; Prosecutor v. 
Théoneste Bagosora et al., Decision on Interlocutory Appeals on Witness Protection Orders, 6 
October, 2005. 
1001 Prosecutor v. Kupreškić, Decision on Communication Between the Parties and Their Witnesses, 21 
September, 1998, para. (ii). 
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expedition”.1002 There is an assumption of good faith on the part of the 
Prosecution.1003 It is thus for the defence to establish good cause to believe that the 
Prosecution has failed to abide by its obligation to disclose exculpatory 
information.1004 This is not always straightforward. However, recently, failure to 
disclose exculpatory evidence in a timely manner led to the acquittal of the Rwandan 
minister of foreign affairs and cooperation.1005
 
 
ICC 
The ICC Statute goes a step further. Not only does it require that the Prosecution 
disclose all exculpatory evidence within its possession, it also mandates the 
Prosecution to search incriminating and exonerating circumstances equally. This 
obligation is set out in article 54(1)(a) of the Rome Statute, which ascribes the role of 
independent and neutral truth-finder to the Prosecutor.1006
 
  
Civil law practitioners regarded the adoption of article 54(1)(a) as an improvement on 
the situation at the ad hoc tribunals. There, the Prosecutor was under the sole duty to 
disclose exonerating evidence if it happened to come into his possession, and the 
burden of collecting exonerating evidence was otherwise left to the Defence. The 
drafting of Article 54(1)(a), in fact, is based on a German proposal that was widely 
                                                 
1002 Prosecutor v. Casimir Bizimungu et al., Decision on Prosper Mugiraneza's Motion Pursuant to 
Rule 68 for Exculpatory Evidence Related to Witness GKI, 14 September, 2004, para 10; Prosecutor v. 
Casimir Bizimungu et al., Decision on Bicamumpaka's Motion for Disclosure of Exculpatory Evidence 
(MDR Files), 17 November, 2004, para. 14; Prosecutor v. Nahimana et al, Public Redacted Version of 
the Decision on Motions Relating to the Appellant Hassan Ngeze’s and the Prosecution’s Request for 
Leave to Present Additional Evidence of Witnesses ABC1 and EB, 27 November, 2006, para. 11; 
Prosecutor v. Ndindiliyimana et al (Military II), Decision on Defence Motions Alleging Violation of 
the Prosecutor’s Disclosure Obligations Pursuant to Rule 68, 22 September, 2008, paras. 28-29, 34, 37; 
also see: Prosecutor v. Bagosora et al, Decision on the Ntakabuze Motion for Disclosure of Various 
Categories of Documents Pursuant to Rule 68, 6 October, 2006, para. 2. 
1003 Prosecutor v. Miroslav Bralo, Decision on Motions for Access to Ex Parte Portions of the Record 
on Appeal and for Disclosure of Mitigating Material, 30 August, 2006, para. 31; Prosecutor v. 
Miroslav Kvočka et al., Appeals Chamber Decision, 22 March, 2004, page 3; Prosecutor v. Kajelijeli, 
Appeal Judgement, 23 May, 2005, para. 262. 
1004 Ibid; Prosecutor v. Karemera et al., Decision on Defence Motion for Disclosure, 15 January, 2004, 
para. 8; Prosecutor v. Kordić & Čerkez, Appeals Judgment, paras. 39, 182; Prosecutor v. Brdanin, 
Decision on Appellant’s Motion for Disclosure Pursuant to Rule 68 and Motion for an Order to the 
Registrar to Disclose Certain Materials, December 7, 2004, page 3; Prosecutor v. Ndindiliyimana et al 
(Military II), Decision on Defence Motions Alleging Violation of the Prosecutor’s Disclosure 
Obligations Pursuant to Rule 68, 22 September, 2008, paras. 13, 32; Prosecutor v. Casimir Bizimungu 
et al., Decision on Prosper Mugiraneza's Motion to Compel Disclosure of Exculpatory Evidence 
Pursuant to Rule 68, 10 December, 2003, para. 20. 
1005 Prosecutor v. Casimir Bizimungu et al., Judgement and Sentence, ICTR-99-50-T, 30 September 
2011), paras. 119-177. 
1006 See also Judge Kaul Dissenting Opinion to: ICC-01/09-02/11-373-Red, paras. 45-47. 
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supported by civil law jurisdictions.1007 It can thus be said to reflect the influence of 
civil law criminal proceedings where a Prosecutor has a similar obligation.1008
 
  
According to Antonio Cassese, “[t]he Prosecutor is not simply, or not only, an 
instrument of executive justice, a party to the proceedings whose exclusive interest is 
to present the facts and evidence as seen by him or her in order to accuse and to 
secure the indictee’s conviction. The Prosecutor is rather conceived of as both a party 
to the proceedings and also an impartial truth-seeker or organ of justice”.1009  Article 
54(1)(a) attempts to strike the balance between common law and civil law traditions, 
and “build a bridge between the adversarial common law approach to the role of the 
Prosecutor and the role of the investigating judge in certain civil law systems”.1010
 
  
Given the difficulties that the defence faces in seeking to obtain evidence, in theory, 
this is a significant improvement to the position at the ICTY and ICTR. The 
Prosecutor with easier access to relevant information must obtain evidence on behalf 
of the defence. This remedies, at least in part, the deficiencies in the defence 
investigations and the inequality of arms. In reality, however, it is highly doubtful that 
the Prosecutor fulfils this role. In light of the aforementioned inadequacies in the 
Prosecutor’s investigations of incriminating circumstances, it does perhaps not come 
as a surprise that his investigations for exonerating circumstances are thus far wholly 
unsatisfactory. 
 
In every case before the ICC, the defence has raised the concern that the Prosecutor 
failed to genuinely investigate even the most basic exonerating circumstances. 
Prosecutorial violations of article 54(1)(a) of the ICC Statute were pleaded. 
 
Mention has already been made of the fact that the Prosecutor never visited the 
localities of the accused Katanga and Ngudjolo. This is a significant omission in 
searching for exonerating evidence. The starting point of such a search is the locality 
                                                 
1007 Vol. I of the Report of the Preparatory Commission on the Establishment of an International 
Criminal Court, U.N. Doc. A/51/22, Proposal II.B.5 & 6 pages 113-114.  
1008 See supra note 321. 
1009 Antonio Cassese: “The Statute of the International Criminal Court: Some Preliminary Reflections” 
(1999) 10 EJIL 168. 
1010 Morten Bergsmo and Pieter Kruger: “Article 54”, in O. Triffterer, Commentary on the Rome 
Statute of the ICC, Observers’ notes, Article by Article, 2nd ed. C.H.Bech.Hart.Nomos, pp. 1077-1087. 
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of the accused where the Prosecutor can discover what the accused did or did not do. 
He should further reach out to the family and friends of the accused, if nothing else, to 
obtain mitigating evidence relating to his good character. The Prosecutor has taken no 
such initiatives. Until today, in no case did he interview anyone close to the accused 
other than insider witnesses. In interviewing these insiders, the Prosecutor does not 
always appear neutral as has become clear in the line of questioning adopted in the 
Mbarushimana case.1011
 
  
In addition, the Prosecution never follows up any leaks presented to it that could 
potentially lead to exonerating evidence. For instance, in Abu Garda, the defence 
complained that, contrary to its investigative duties under article 54, the Prosecution 
never requested the exonerating evidence mentioned by one Prosecution witness 
despite his expressed willingness to provide it.1012 Similar complaints were made in 
Kenya I, where the Prosecution failed to follow up the issue of “coaching witnesses, 
being paid 60,000 and being … rented mansions” mentioned by one of its witnesses. 
During his interview, Prosecution investigators told this witness that, for now, all it 
was interested in is the facts, and they would come back to this issue on another 
occasion. They, however, never followed it up.1013
 
 
Also in Kenya I, the Prosecution disclosed a handful of newspaper articles and video 
clips of two persons, who say there were coached and induced to implicate Ruto and 
recruited others to do the same.1014 They were allegedly asked to co-operate and 
change their statements, so they could be systematic and consistent, in exchange for 
upkeep, paid apartments, and relocation outside of Africa.1015 These persons worked 
for organisations whose reports the Prosecution relied on. Yet, it had not investigated 
the allegations of impropriety, which was a particularly serious omission because at 
least one Prosecution witness for the confirmation hearing appeared to be among 
those recruited by these persons.1016 The Prosecution did not even ask the witness in 
question or any other witness, about these inducements.1017
                                                 
1011 See above, section ‘suggestive questions’. 
 
1012 ICC-02/05-02/09-243-Red 08-02-2010, paras. 46-47. 
1013 Ruto Defence Brief, ICC-01/09-01/11-355 24-10-2011, para. 20. 
1014 EVD-PT-OTP-00464; -00433; -00434; -00463; -00464. 
1015 EVD-PT-D09-00048. 
1016 EVD-PT-D09-00048. 
1017 ICC-01/09-01/11-355 24-10-2011, paras.19-21; ICC-01/09-01/11-354 24-10-2011, paras. 34-35. 
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In Kenya II, similar complaints were made. The defence for Muthaura submitted that 
the Prosecution did not even make an attempt to conduct “the necessary and most 
basic investigations” and never interviewed anyone from the inner circles of the 
suspect.1018 General Ali’s defence complained that the Prosecution had completely 
failed to exploit Ali’s efforts to combat the Mungiki because these efforts undermined 
the Prosecution’s “theory of “inaction” designed to create a “free zone” for 
violence”.1019 The defence also claimed that the Prosecution “consistently downplays 
evidence that many Kenya Police officers regularly received actionable intelligence 
from General Ali”.1020 The defence referred to the police raid on the Stem Hotel in 
Nakuru on 10 January 2008 to illustrate that General Ali had conveyed vital 
intelligence to his officers, which made this raid possible.1021 According to the 
defence, police orders were issued and patrols intensified in the affected areas in an 
attempt to get the security situation under control. Notwithstanding that this 
information is well documented and known to the Prosecution, it failed to incorporate 
it in the story it presented to the Pre-Trial Chamber.1022
 
  
The Pre-Trial Chambers in Abu Garda, and Kenya I and II have taken the position 
that the alleged Prosecution failure to comply with its article 54 obligations “does not 
fall within the scope of the Chamber's determination pursuant to article 61(7) of the 
Statute”.1023
                                                 
1018 Muthaura Confirmation Brief, ICC-01/09-02/11-374-Red, 2 December 2011, paras 71-72. The 
defence submitted evidence in support of this allegation: EVD-PT-D12-00063 at para. 2; EVD-PT-
D12-00062 at para. 13; EVD-PT-D12-00088 at para. 2; EVD-PT-D12-00054 at para. 6; EVD-PT-D12-
00053 at para. 5. 
 Accordingly, defence arguments to this effect “can only be viewed in the 
context of the purpose of the confirmation hearing, and should thus be regarded as a 
means of seeking a decision declining to confirm the charges. It follows, therefore, 
that the Defence's objection raised, in this instance cannot in itself cause the Chamber 
to decline to confirm the charges on the basis of an alleged investigative failure on the 
1019 Ali Confirmation Brief, ICC-01/09-02/11-373-Red, 2 December 2011, para. 23 citing: ICC-01/09-
02/11-T-5-CONF-ENG, p. 41:1-4 and ICC-01/09-02/11-T-6-ENG, p.42:3-22 (all 3 NSIS reports 
referenced had corresponding Situation Reports sent from General Ali to his PPOs).  
1020 Ali Confirmation Brief, ICC-01/09-02/11-373-Red, 2 December 2011, para. 27. 
1021 Ibid. 
1022 Ibid, paras. 27-30, 46. 
1023 ICC-01/09-02/11-373-Red 23-01-2012 (Kenya I), Decision on the Confirmation of Charges 
Pursuant to Article 61(7)(a) and (b) of the Rome Statute (Kenya I), para. 51; ICC-01/09-02/11-382-Red 
23-01-2012, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges Pursuant to Article 67(7)(a) and (b) of the Rome 
Statute (Kenya II), para. 63. 
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part of the Prosecution. Rather, this objection may have an impact on the Chamber's 
assessment of whether the Prosecutor's evidence as a whole has met the "substantial 
grounds to believe" threshold.”1024
 
 
Thus, the Prosecutor’s duty to search for incriminating and exonerating evidence 
equally was not looked at as a distinct issue at the confirmation stage. In Kenya I and 
II, dissenting Judge Kaul expressed his disagreement with the majority ruling that this 
issue does not fall within the scope of the confirmation hearing. He pointed out article 
54 required of the Prosecution investigations to cover all incriminating and 
exonerating facts and evidence. In his view, these requirements are fundamental and 
must be respected at the confirmation stage. The dissenting judge acknowledged that 
the Appeals Chamber authorized the Prosecution to continue its investigations after 
confirmation. However, he pointed out that this is only permitted “in certain 
circumstances”, and in particular "in situations where the ongoing nature of the 
conflict results in more compelling evidence becoming available for the first time 
after the confirmation hearing[...]".1025 Thus, the bulk of the investigations must be 
carried out in advance of the confirmation hearing. Given this situation, Judge Kaul 
stated the following:1026
 
 
I underline once again the absolute necessity for the Prosecutor to exhaust all ways 
and means to make the investigation ab initio as comprehensive, expeditious and 
thus as effective as possible, as required by article 54(1) of the Statute. I hold that it 
is not only desirable, but necessary that the investigation is complete, if at all 
possible, at the time of the Hearing, unless the Prosecutor justifies further 
investigations after confirmation with compelling reasons, such as those mentioned 
above in paragraph 50. In case a Pre-Trial Chamber is not convinced that the 
investigation is complete, it may use its powers under articles 61(7)(c) and 69(3) of 
the Statute in order to compel the Prosecutor to complete his investigation before 
considering committing any suspect to trial. I consider this issue to be of utmost 
importance for the success of this Court.” 
 
Accordingly, in the opinion of Judge Kaul, “the Chamber cannot satisfy itself solely 
with the evidence, which the Prosecutor claims to be relevant and reliable, in order to 
                                                 
1024 See ICC-02/05-02/09-243-Red 08-02-2010, para. 48; ICC-01/09-02/11-373-Red 23-01-2012, 
paras. 51-52; ICC-01/09-02/11-382-Red 23-01-2012 (Kenya II), paras. 63-64. 
1025 Judge Kaul Dissenting Opinion to: ICC-01/09-02/11-373-Red, paras. 50-51, citing: Appeals 
Chamber, Judgment on the Prosecutor's appeal against the decision of Pre-Trial Chamber I entitled 
'Decision Establishing General Principles Governing Applications to Restrict Disclosure pursuant to 
Rule 81(2) and (4) of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence', ICC-01/04- 01/06-568, para. 54. 
1026 Judge Kaul Dissenting Opinion to: ICC-01/09-02/11-373-Red, para. 52. 
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effectively and genuinely exercise its filtering function. Such a general approach 
would have, in my view, the untenable consequence that Prosecution evidence would 
be considered as credible almost by default through the formal act of its presentation. 
Likewise, it would have the equally untenable consequence that the role and rights of 
the Defence would be dramatically and unfairly curtailed.”1027
 
 
Arguably, the dissenting Judge is correct on this point. The Prosecution has a duty to 
investigate incriminating and exonerating circumstances equally from the outset of its 
investigations, the major part of which must be conducted prior to the confirmation. If 
the full picture is not presented to the Pre-Trial Chamber, the latter risks confirming 
charges that should not have been confirmed. It is precisely the task of the Pre-Trial 
Chamber to ensure that only those cases are confirmed that should proceed to trial.  
 
Nonetheless, the Prosecutor’s investigative failures were seemingly important factors 
in finding that the Prosecutor failed to prove to the requisite “sufficient grounds to 
believe” confirmation standard that Abu Garda, as well as four out of the six Kenyan 
suspects were guilty as charged. 
 
Article 54 Obligations: Overly idealistic or realistic? 
 
It is debatable whether the notion of a truly independent Prosecutor searching for 
evidence that undermines his own case is a workable concept in international criminal 
justice systems. Practitioners often come from common law backgrounds where the 
notion of prosecutors doing the work of the defence is foreign. Most prosecutors in 
international justice are not trained as magistrates or the like. In addition, the 
proceedings bear the mark of the typical adversarial model. It is not a joint search for 
the truth, duly reported in a dossier, in which the defence is an active participant and 
engages with the Prosecution to suggest certain investigative steps. Rather, it is a 
party-based gathering exercise. 
 
In this context, it is perhaps not realistic to expect from the Prosecutor to search too 
enthusiastically for information that may destroy the credibility of his cases. 
                                                 
1027 Judge Kaul Dissenting Opinion to: ICC-01/09-02/11-382-Red 23-01-2012, Decision on the 
Confirmation of Charges Pursuant to Article 67(7)(a) and (b) of the Rome Statute (Kenya II), para. 62. 
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Understandably, the Prosecutor, typically persuaded of the guilt of the accused whose 
case he has brought before an international criminal justice system, seeks to secure his 
conviction. This is especially true, given the difficulty of bringing cases before 
international criminal courts and tribunals, the small percentage of cases that are 
brought before an international jurisdiction and the high pressure from NGOs, victim 
groups and other observers to succeed. The perceived success of an international 
criminal court or tribunal largely depends on the Prosecutor’s conviction figures.1028
 
 
The pressure is enormous and this is likely to impact upon the enthusiasm with which 
he Prosecutor will provide the defence with tools to challenge aspects of his case.  
Common law practitioners before the ICC are sceptical about the compatibility of 
neutrality and the task of prosecuting in an adversarial procedure.1029 One of the 
senior ICC Prosecutors even mentioned in passing and off the record that the 
Prosecution’s office does not consider the active search for exonerating evidence as 
part of its mandate. Instead, its objective is to disclose all exonerating evidence within 
its possession in a timely manner.1030  This is similar to the viewpoint expressed in the 
Prosecution’s Confirmation Brief in Kenya I.1031
 
 This suggestion is also fully in line 
with the Prosecution’s practice until today.  
Suggested Solutions 
 
Thus, to comply fully with its obligations under article 54(1)(a) of the ICC Statute, 
the Prosecution must drastically change its attitude with regard to the collection of all 
evidence rather than only that evidence which supports its theory of the case. Until 
now, the Prosecution failed to demonstrate a sufficient level of neutrality in its search 
for evidence. 
                                                 
1028 See Scott Johnson, On the Road to disaster: The rights of the accused and the International 
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, in 10(1) International Legal Perspectives 111 (1998) at 
page 116; Statement of Larry A. Hammond Before the [United States] House [of Representatives] 
International Relations Committee, 28 February 2002. 
1029 See, for instance, the observations made by David Hooper QC, Defense Counsel at the ICC, at SCL 
Lecture on 14 December 2001, held at T.M.C. Asser Institute, The Hague.   
1030 Informal consultation with the chief Prosecutor in Katanga in January 2008.  
1031 Prosecution Closing Brief in Ruto et al Confirmation, para. 72. The Ruto defence commented as 
follows: “The Prosecutor has a statutory duty to investigate exculpatory matters. Contrary to 
prosecution claims at para 72 of its Brief, the Defence submits that the disclosure of potentially 
exculpatory material without further, reasonable investigation of the same is not sufficient to fulfil this 
duty” (ICC-01/09-01/11-355, 24 October 2011, para. 19). 
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The Prosecutor’s failure to abide by its investigative obligations renders problematic 
the fact that State Parties rely on Article 54 to limit the already tight investigation 
budgets of defence teams. If the Prosecutor truly searched for exonerating and 
incriminating evidence equally, it may be legitimate to reduce funds for independent 
defence investigations. This is, however, not done in reality. 
 
It is perhaps better that the obligation to search for exonerating evidence be left in the 
hands of a neutral body not subject to these pressures. The adoption of a neutral 
investigative body for the ICC might also prevent political considerations from 
prevailing over legal considerations in selecting and charging defendants. As a result 
of the dependence of the Prosecutor on the cooperation of States and other entities, 
there is a risk that these States or other entities dictate to him who should be 
charged.1032
 
  
A neutral investigative body for the ICC may further ensure equality of arms between 
the parties. It may not experience similar difficulties as the defence in obtaining the 
cooperation of States, NGOs or the UN.1033 Such a body could then more easily 
ensure that all relevant information obtained is presented to the Chamber. Also, if the 
parties are in charge of selecting the evidence that is presented to the judges, they may 
both present only those portions which support their case. In reality, many documents 
simultaneously support and undermine the case of a party and may therefore be 
suppressed by both, to the detriment of the truth-ascertaining function of the court. 
Neutral and independent investigators may ensure that all relevant evidence in respect 
of the charges would reach the triers of fact and, therefore, enhance the truth-
ascertaining function of the court.1034
                                                 
1032 See above, section ‘selection of suspects’. See also: J. de Hemptinne, Plaidoyer en faveur de 
l’institution de chambres d’instructions à la Cour pénale internationale, in Revue de Droit Pénal et de 
Criminologie 608-625, at 614-618. 
 This is particularly appropriate where a court is 
charged with the determination of historical facts and where allowing the evidence to 
1033 See also Olivier Dubois, ‘Rwanda’s national criminal courts and the International Tribunal’, in the 
23 International Review of the Red Cross 717 (1997), at 722, where the author argues that the lack of 
any investigative body responsible for gathering evidence for the defence makes the task of defence 
attorneys more active and more delicate, in particular when they have to conduct investigative acts in 
hostile environments. 
1034 J. de Hemptinne, Plaidoyer en faveur de l’institution de chambres d’instructions à la Cour pénale 
internationale, in Revue de Droit Pénal et de Criminologie 608-625, 612-614. 
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be confined to the evidence presented by the parties may present a partial view of 
historical interpretations.   
 
Leaving the investigations in the hands of experienced and neutral investigators who 
look for evidence for both sides may result in a perception of greater fairness and 
objectivity.1035
 
 Given their perceived neutrality, witnesses may be more inclined to 
co-operate, as they would not feel they were making any declaration of partisanship.  
There may also be a cost benefit in employing independent investigators. Independent 
investigators can ensure that the limited resources are spent carefully and for relevant 
purposes and that the investigations come to an end within a reasonable time.1036
 
 
Given the importance of conducting thorough investigations, it is, however, 
questionable whether economic considerations should trump all others. What is vital 
is that the evidence presented by the Prosecutor is capable of being properly verified 
and contextualised. The role of the defence and accused in establishing an unbiased 
and complete truth are of the utmost importance. Budgetary and time restraints must 
be considered secondary to this.  
As has already been indicated there is a price to pay for giving the defence a full 
participatory role and voice in the proceedings. Sometimes judges have to listen to 
irrelevant, lengthy political arguments. The difficulty is that, hidden within such 
diatribes may lie factual nuggets of considerable importance. The careful 
consideration of the position of the defence is essential in order to achieve the 
objectives of international criminal justice and to ensure that the proceedings cannot 
be dismissed as show trials.1037
 
 
One of the perceived advantages of a neutral investigative body is that the accused is 
less dependent on the quality of his counsel. On the other hand, he is then fully 
dependent on the quality and diligence of the neutral investigators to be employed. In 
                                                 
1035 Ibid; see also O. Dubois, Rwanda’s National Courts and the International Tribunal, 37 
International Review of the Red Cross 717 (1997), at 722, where he argues that the defence may be 
better off with the assistance of a neutral investigative body. 
1036 J. de Hemptinne, Plaidoyer en faveur de l’institution de chambres d’instructions à la Cour pénale 
internationale, in Revue de Droit Pénal et de Criminologie 608-625, 610-612. 
1037 See M. Koskenniemi, Between Impunity and Show Trials, 6 Max Planck Yearbook of United 
Nations Law 1 (2002), 32-35. 
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either system, the quality of justice will depend on the quality and diligence of the 
personnel concerned and the resources afforded to them.  
 
In Part I, it has been suggested that assessors of facts should engage with the 
information and information providers while keeping an appropriate distance from 
them. It would be an asset if independent investigators, were they to be employed, had 
knowledge of, and experience with the culture in which they carry out their 
investigations. Too much familiarity with the culture may lead to a loss of objectivity 
and choosing sides. On the other hand a lack of familiarity with the situation in 
question can lead to uninformed decisions. Interpreters from the region, who may 
deliberately or unintentionally distort information, must still be employed. 
 
It would be vital for independent investigators to keep an open mind about the guilt or 
innocence of the suspect. The risk that, otherwise, they become additional prosecutors 
is particularly great where investigative judges play a significant role in charging 
individuals, as they do in certain civil law countries.1038 This is one of the reasons 
why common law jurists are wary of employing investigative judges. They prefer a 
system where both the prosecutor and defence have sufficient means to conduct their 
own investigations.1039
 
  
If investigative judges do not keep a sufficient distance to the incriminating 
information they are receiving, the fear is that, once they have identified a certain 
individual as potentially criminally liable for certain identified crimes, they may lose 
sight of evidentiary traces that would put his liability in question. They may draw 
certain conclusions too fast, particularly when they truly believe in the merits of their 
case. Victim witnesses may be believed without further inquiry and sight can be lost 
of the necessity to verify the background and identifying details of all witnesses, 
including seemingly credible witnesses. This is particularly important in light of the 
high risk of manipulation, fabrication and unreliability of the evidence collected in 
politicised post-conflict environments.1040
 
  
                                                 
1038 See above, section ‘civil law’. 
1039 See: David Hooper Q.C. (Interview in The Hague, 3 June 2010), and Gregor Guy-Smith (Interview 
in The Hague, 12 April 2011. 
1040 See further section ‘fabrication of evidence’ 
 
 
255 
Thus, it comes down to the quality of individual investigative judges whether their 
recruitment would enhance the ascertainment of the truth. However, even if the fairest 
and most competent investigative judges are employed, it is still debatable whether 
they are in the best position to collect the available exonerating evidence. An 
adequate defence inquiry requires significant time, patience and effort. Often, 
exonerating material is not found overnight. It is necessary for a defence investigator 
to familiarise himself with the communities concerned and gain their trust. It is only 
after some time that people begin to open up and provide information. Relevant 
information usually comes from unexpected sources and may require the travelling to 
remote locations. It may be necessary to open doors that appear firmly closed. 
 
In addition, while neutral investigators may be more effective to deal with reluctant 
States and other international entities, the community, family and allies of the accused 
would in most circumstances not open up as easily to a neutral investigator than the 
defence counsel for the person they side with. In many occasions, the perceived lack 
of neutrality on the part of the defence is an asset in gaining trust of those on the side 
of the person he represents.  
 
Thus, in order to conduct such investigations thoroughly and efficiently, it is best to 
leave it to investigators who are exclusively concerned with the interests of the 
accused, rather than investigators who must be perceived as neutral at all times and 
divide their time, focus and resources among serving the often conflicting interests of 
the community at large, the victims and the accused. Alternatively, both can play a 
role in investigations. Independent investigators could focus on the context and the 
defence on the exonerating circumstances surrounding the defendant. The problem 
with this proposition is that it will increase rather than reduce costs. There may then 
be a tendency to further reduce the defence investigation budget.  
 
In light of these considerations, instead of changing the structural elements of 
international justice, a solution should better be found within the existing structure. It 
is suggested that the best solution would be to follow Judge Kaul’s proposition and 
create a real incentive to the Prosecutor to do his job properly, failure of which would 
result in him losing his cases. 
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Role of Victims and Witnesses in International Trials 
Expert Evidence 
 
To explain the context in which the alleged crimes were committed, it is necessary to 
establish an historical record of events. International courts and tribunals often rely on 
historians, social scientists, anthropologists or human rights activists as expert 
witnesses.1041 Such experts have not personally observed the events but analyse 
information received from sources in the field. Whether they produce reliable 
opinions on the events in question depends on the quality of the researchers involved.   
This directly relates to their neutrality and expertise, the quality and quantity of the 
information available to them and the quality of the methodology applied in terms of 
its transparency and reliability. Low quality in any of those areas may lead to 
exclusion of the evidence although more often it simply undermines the weight given 
to the evidence at the end of the day.1042
 
 
Particularly at the ICTR, many historians and human rights researchers have been 
allowed to testify in respect to contextual matters. This includes the socio-economic 
and political situation leading up to the 1994 massacres. In addition, it includes the 
reasons for the genocide and human rights abuses in 1994, the role of the media in 
Rwandan society, the role of the military in 1994 Rwanda and the civil defence 
structure.1043
 
 
                                                 
1041 The judges in international criminal courts and tribunals can only rely on expert testimony to 
explain the context in which the crimes charged were allegedly committed, but not to establish the guilt 
or innocence of an accused.  
1042 If the judges find that the proposed expert is not competent in his proposed field or fields of 
expertise, or possesses no specialized knowledge acquired through education, experience or training in 
a field that may assist the judges in determining the issue at hand, they may exclude the proposed 
testimony. See, for instance, Bagosora Oral Decisions on Defence Objections and Motions to Exclude 
the Testimony and Report of the Prosecution’s proposed Expert Witness, Dr Alison DesForges, or to 
Postpone her Testimony at Trial (4 Sep 2002), para 5; see also Bagosora  Decision on Motion for 
Exclusion of Expert Witness Statement of Filip Reyntjens (28 Sep 2004), para 8; Nahimana Oral 
Decision (20 May 2002) 122–26; Martic Decision on Prosecution’s Motions for Admission of 
Transcripts Pursuant to Rule 92 bis and of Expert Reports Pursuant to Rule 94 bis (13 Jan 2006), para 
22; Bizimungu  Oral Decision on Qualification of Prosecution Expert Sebahire Deo Mbonyikebe (2 
May 2005); Nyiramasuhuko Oral Decision on the Qualification of Mr. Edmond Babin as Defence 
Expert Witness, para 5. 
1043 Bagosora Decision on Motion for Exclusion of Expert Witness Statement of Filip Reyntjens (28 
Sep 2004), para 8. 
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Their job does not vary significantly from the job of the adjudicators in court. This is 
due to the fact that they equally assess the reliability and credibility of the information 
they have collected and draw certain conclusions on the basis of that evidence. Expert 
testimony is admissible only if it assists the adjudicators in that it enlightens them “on 
specific issues of a technical nature, requiring special knowledge in a specific 
field”,1044 and it is relevant and useful for the Chamber’s deliberation.1045 If the 
evidence relates to legal issues, rather than issues of a technical nature, it will not be 
admitted unless such legal issues fall outside the knowledge and expertise of 
professional judges. An example is where they fall under domestic law.1046 In any 
other situations legal expertise does not assist the professional judges who are highly 
capable of drawing their own conclusions on legal matters.1047
 
  
In collecting evidence, expert witnesses suffer from similar problems as the parties in 
an international criminal trial. The international criminal courts and tribunals deal 
with cases of particular complexity. The crimes under their jurisdiction such as war 
crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide must be committed on a large scale.   
                                                 
1044 Akayesu Decision on a Defence Motion for the appearance of an Accused as an Expert Witness (9 
March 1998); reiterated in Nahimana Decision on the Expert Witnesses for the Defence (24 Jan 2003), 
para 2. In the case of Prosecutor v Delic, Decision on Paul Cornish’s Status as an Expert, (20 March 
2008), para. 12, a proposed military expert because he lacked specialised knowledge of the Bosnian 
conflict, particularly central Bosnia. Similarly, in Popovic Second Decision Regarding the Evidence of 
General Rupert Smith (11 Oct 2007) 4, a British general did not qualify as an expert in respect of the 
function and operation of the General Staff of the Bosnian Serb Army. He was, however, allowed to 
testify as a factual witness as per his personal observations with members of that army.  
1045  Nahimana Decision on the Expert Witnesses for the Defence (24 Jan 2003), paras 6 and 11; 
Bizimungu Decision on Casimir Bizimungu’s Urgent Motion for the Exclusion of the Report and 
Testimony of Deo Sebahire Mbonyinkebe (2 Sept 2005), para 12; Nyiramasuhuko Oral Decision on the 
Qualification of Mr Edmond Babin as Defence Expert Witness (13 April 2005), para 5; Karemera 
Order Relating to Defence Witness Bernard Lugan (5 May 2008), para 7;  Milosevic Decision on 
Admission of Expert Report of Robert Donia (15 Feb 2007), para 10; ICTY Prosecutor v Stanisic and 
Simatovic, Decision on Prosecution’s Submission of the Expert Report of Nina Tromp and Christian 
Nielsen Pursuant to Rule 94 bis (18 March 2008), para 11; Milosevic Decision on Admissibility of 
Expert Report of Vasilije Krestic (7 Dec 2005), para 6. 
1046 For instance, in ICTY Prosecutor v Boskovski & Tarculovski, Decision on Prosecution’s 94 bis 
Notice re Expert Witness Slagjana Taseva (8 Feb 2008), a former employee of the Ministry of Interior 
of FYROM, who was also a Professor of criminal law, was allowed to provide expert opinion on the 
regulations and laws governing criminal investigations in FYROM. See also Stakic Appeal Judgement 
(22 March 22 2006), para 164. 
1047 Sesay Decision on Admissibility of Certain Parts of Expert Report of Johan Hederstedt (29 July 
2008), paras 23-24; Nahimana Decision on the Expert Witnesses for the Defence (24 Jan 2003), paras 
16 and 22; Nahimana  Decision to Reconsider the Trial Chamber’s Decision of 24 January 2003 on the 
Defence Expert Witnesses (25 Feb 2003), para 4; Stakic Appeal Judgment, para 164; Popovic Decision 
on the Admissibility of the Expert Report and Proposed Expert Testimony of Professor Schabas (1 July 
2008). However, in the Nahimana Appeal Judgment, para 71, an expert was permitted to draw the legal 
conclusion that widespread attacks against the Tutsi population across Rwanda began after the plane 
crash on 6 April 1994. 
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Inevitably, these crimes involve public authorities, rebel groups or other entities 
capable of perpetrating crimes in a systematic or widespread manner. Such entities are 
often involved in destroying evidence and concealing the identities of the 
perpetrators. In addition, documentation of crimes perpetrated during an armed 
conflict is difficult because of the circumstances in which they have occurred. It is 
much easier to establish globally the nature and level of violence that occurred during 
a conflict in a particular region than to establish “who committed what, where, when, 
why and how ».1048
 
  
Professor Sunga acknowledges that facts do not speak for themselves but are open to 
an indefinite number of interpretations concerning their actual meaning. Therefore, 
“great care must be taken to ensure that the particular facts actually represent the real 
situation as a whole. Accurate reporting of ‘facts’ might be highly misleading, even 
prejudicial, if presented out of context. Even more fundamental, preconceptions about 
what one is looking for, conditions one’s view even about what counts as ‘a fact’, and 
what does not. People, including investigators, tend to recognize as ‘fact’, 
representations about reality that support rather than contradict their own background 
views, suppositions, presumptions and prejudices.”1049
 
 
Human rights reporters must be cautious of this. They often share certain objectives 
of international criminal justice, such as the fight against impunity for serious 
violations of international human rights and humanitarian law. With a view to prevent 
such violations from continuing, human rights reporters seek to uncover them and 
focus the world’s attention on them. In this process, they often call for accountability 
of the perpetrators of serious human rights abuses and welcome the efforts made by 
international criminal courts and tribunals in this respect. Whilst human rights 
reporters do not all have similar mandates, some of them – for instance, those 
working for the NGO Human Rights Watch (‘HRW’) – have a tendency to call for 
prosecutions of certain individuals and identify alleged perpetrators. 
 
                                                 
1048 Professor Lyal S. Sunga, Raoul Wallenberg Institute of Human Rights and Humanitarian Law, 
Lund, Sweden: The Role of NGOs in UN Human Rights Special Procedures, Treaty Bodies and Field 
Presences in Relation to ICC Fact-Finding [hereinafter ‘Sunga, The Role of NGO’], 2. 
1049 Ibid, 3. 
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Whilst HRW and similar NGOs pride themselves in being objective and providing 
accurate information,1050 their mandate is to report on human rights abuses. 
Accordingly, their natural tendency is to associate themselves with the victims of such 
abuses and to identify with their side of the story. In siding with the party of the 
conflict which suffered the most, they may unintentionally and perhaps even 
unconsciously lose their neutrality. They do not always seek to discover the views of 
those they have identified as the perpetrators.1051 Nor are they looking for nuance in 
the story of the conflict. On the contrary, it is usually part of their mandate to reveal in 
detail to the public at large all crimes they have uncovered. This emphasises the 
serious nature of those crimes in an attempt to encourage States, the UN, NATO or 
any other decisive political entity to act.1052
 
  
Accordingly, there is a risk that the official story they record is one-sided and does 
not reflect the other side of the story. In the context of Rwanda, human rights activists 
face the additional difficulty that the story of events is heavily influenced, directly or 
indirectly, by the government of Rwanda.1053 Any expert who criticises the 
government may be refused entrance or be thrown in prison. This would seriously 
obstruct the work of a researcher on Rwanda.1054 In addition, the vast majority of 
people in Rwanda are scared to openly criticise the government. Doing so may lead to 
their arrest as ‘genocidaire’ or ‘genocide negationist’.1055
 
 Researchers must, therefore, 
be vigilant in ensuring that their sources are speaking freely and do not present a 
narrative dictated by the Rwandan regime. 
Experts are also dependent on factual witnesses. As aforementioned, it is not an easy 
task to find reliable factual witnesses. The sources used by expert witnesses 
                                                 
1050 See HRW website which states: “The hallmark and pride of Human Rights Watch is the even-
handedness and accuracy of our reporting” (http://www.hrw.org/about/whoweare.html.).   
1051 Sunga, The Role of NGO, supra note 1048, 3, 5, 6. See also Alison DesForges who admitted in 
cross-examination by counsel for Bagosora that she had not spoken to anyone linked to the accused. 
1052 Ibid, 3, 5, 6, 8, 9. 
1053 Jeroen de Lange held that the current government in Rwanda was responsible for a very distorted 
and biased truth about Rwanda. See Jeroen De Lange: Rwandan Realities – 10 Years After the 
Genocide, GTI Conference 29 and 30 October 2004. See also ibid, 6 where it is acknowledged that 
NGOs are not always able to operate freely and are often vulnerable to interference in their work from 
official and non-official agencies.  
1054 See, for instance, Professor Reyntjens, who has been declared persona non grata since 1995 
because he criticised the current Rwandan regime. Defence counsel Peter Erlinder was also arrested. 
See above, section ‘lack of cooperation with the defence’.  
1055 See above, section ‘lack of cooperation with the defence’. 
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frequently condition their cooperation on the non-disclosure of their identities. These 
sources may be persons who personally witnessed the events that are subject to the 
research conducted by the experts. They may also be persons who have information 
about the events in question without having personal and direct knowledge. The 
research upon which historians, social scientists, anthropologists or human rights 
activists draw their conclusion is often based on anonymous hearsay evidence. They 
prefer to rely on direct witnesses whose identity can be disclosed to the wider public, 
but often such evidence is not available. Unlike courts, they do not have to reach any 
conclusion based on the minimum standard of proof. Provided that they explain 
adequately the methodology they have used in their analysis, human rights reporters 
do not need to follow strict rules in collecting and analysing evidence. As 
acknowledged by Professor Sunga, “human rights fact-finding is usually more general 
and less rigorous than fact-finding required for criminal prosecutions.”1056 Thus, they 
can and often have no choice but to rely on multiple hearsay which is anonymous, and 
other dubious material.1057
 
  
Scholars have raised concerns about the use of social scientists, historians or human 
rights researchers as experts in criminal trials. This is due to the impossibility of 
forming certain opinions in this field, that are required and expected from an expert 
witness.1058 Some expert witnesses themselves are uncomfortable with their role as 
expert in criminal proceedings and share at least some of the criticism expressed. For 
instance, Henry Rousso, Director of the Institute for Contemporary History, who 
testified as an expert in the French case against Papon, one of the famous WWII 
cases, stated: “In my soul and conscience, I believe that an historian cannot serve as a 
“witness” and that his expertise is poorly suited to the rules and objectives of a 
judicial proceedings. … The discourse and argumentation of the trial … are certainly 
not of the same nature as those of the university.”1059
 
 
                                                 
1056 Sunga, The Role of NGO, supra note 1048, 3-4, at page 4. 
1057 Ibid, 14.15. 
1058 L Rosen, ‘The Anthropologist as Expert Witness’ (1977) 79 American Anthropologist: New Series 
555. 
1059 Letter to the President of the Bordeaux Assizes Court, in The Papon Affair (Golsan ed). Cited in: 
Wilson, Judging History (n 6 above), 193-194. 
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In addition, the testimony of social scientists, historians or human rights researchers, 
which is not of a technical nature, frequently touches upon issues that are closely 
intertwined with the ultimate issues for the judges to determine.1060 Their opinions are 
generally formulated upon the narratives of others. Often, they are based on “second, 
third, and even fourth hand testimony of victims and witnesses.”1061 This may be 
acceptable within the context of research into human rights abuses. However, in a 
court of law, this raises difficulties given that the credibility of the witnesses whose 
stories are being told cannot be tested in cross-examination.1062
 
  
Objections have been raised in relation to non-disclosure of the identity of persons or 
sources that form the basis of the expert opinion. In one such case, the Trial Chamber 
stated that there was no danger of a deprivation of the right to know the expert’s 
sources, as the defence teams had ample opportunity to ask questions relating to the 
sources during cross-examination.1063 Yet, the use of anonymous sources may lead to 
unfairness against the accused. This is particularly true given that in their reports 
experts often reproduce hearsay evidence from other sources. This means that they 
themselves have not even tested these sources. It is true that the defence can ask 
expert witnesses how they selected their sources and in what manner they assessed the 
truthfulness of their sources, as well as other questions on their methodology. The 
defence and the Chamber are nonetheless deprived of an opportunity to assess the 
demeanour and credibility of the sources and the reliability of their stories. In 
addition, given that the identities of the sources are unknown, the defence is also 
hampered in conducting investigations into their credibility. The effectiveness of the 
cross-examination of the expert is, therefore, clearly undermined.1064
 
  
                                                 
1060 See, for instance, the testimony of Professor Reyntjens, given in the ICTR trial of Bagosora.  
Bagosora, Transcripts (22 Sep 2004) 4-9 (Reyntjens oral testimony). 
1061 KL Fabian, ‘Proof and Consequences: An Analysis of the Tadic & Akayesu Trials’ (2000) 49 
DePaul Law Review 981, citing MP Scharf, Balkan Justice: The Story behind the First International 
War Crimes Trials since Nuremberg (Durham, Carolina Academic Press, 1997) 128 [hereinafter 
‘Fabian, Proof and Consequences’]. 
1062 This was conceded by Professor Reyntjens, an expert on Rwanda, who testified in a number of 
trials before the ICTR. He stated that his methodology was good and in his own view scientifically 
justified, but did not meet the standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt. See personal interview with 
Professor Reyntjens in Antwerpen, 20 December 2004. 
1063 Bagosora Oral Decisions on Objections to Exclude Testimony (4 Sep 2002), para 11. 
1064 Fabian, Proof and Consequences, 981. 
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For these reasons non-disclosure of the sources of the information on which the expert 
opinion is based may affect the reliability of the expert report or testimony. However, 
as long as the expert opinion is not exclusively based on unidentified sources, this is a 
matter of weight, not of admissibility.1065
 
 Indeed, notwithstanding these issues of 
reliability, the testimony or a report of a proposed expert, provided he will testify to 
the contents of his report, is rarely excluded. 
Rights of Victims to Truth and Justice 
 
As addressed in Part I, a core objective of international justice is to do justice to the 
victims. It has been suggested that the victims have the right to truth and justice. 
These rights have been explicitly recognised by one of the ICC Pre-Trial 
Chambers.1066 They also provide the basis for the right of victims to participate in 
trials before the ICC. The ICTY and ICTR have not incorporated victim participation. 
Notwithstanding this, the ICTY and ICTR equally appear to have a high regard for 
victims. Employees of the ICTY and ICTR, most notably Carla Del Ponte, former 
chief Prosecutor of both, has affirmed that she sees her role as doing justice for 
victims.1067
 
  
However, the ICC clearly goes a step further. The Chief Prosecutor at Nuremberg, 
Justice Robert Jackson acted on behalf of Civilization.1068 ICTR Prosecutor Pierre-
Richard Prosper and ICTY Chief Prosecutor Carla Del Ponte acted on behalf of the 
international community.1069
                                                 
1065 Bizimungu Decision on Defence Motion for Exclusion of Portions of Testimony of Expert Witness 
Dr. Alison Des Forges (2 Sep 2005), paras 5, 17 & 25; Bagilishema Trial Judgment (7 June 2001), para 
139. 
 In the ICC, Chief Prosecutor Ocampo made a switch to 
1066 Prosecutor v. Katanga and Ngudjolo, Public Urgent Decision on the Set of Procedural Rights 
Attached to Procedural Status of Victim at the Pre-Trial Stage of the Case, 13 May 2008, paras. 32-36. 
No other Chamber has affirmed this. However, recently, a legal representative in the Kenyan I case 
relied on this authority in seeking the expansion of the Prosecution’s investigations.  
1067 Submissions from Muna, Carla Del Ponte at Geneva Conference, supra note 173. 
1068 Justice Robert H. Jackson’s opening speech at Nuremberg, 21 November 1945. Reprinted in: Trial 
of the Major War Criminals before the International Military Tribunal, Nuremberg, 14 November 
1945-1 October 1946, 42 vols. (Nuremberg: International Military Tribunal, 1947), 2:98-103, 104-05, 
153-54; published in: Michael R. Marrus: The Nuremberg War Crimes Trial 1945-46. A Documentary 
History, Bedford Series in History and Culture (Bedford Books) 1997).  
1069 Opening statement of Chief Prosecutor Carla Del Ponte in the ICTY Milosevic trial, 12 February 
2002; Closing statement of Pierre-Richard Prosper in the ICTR Akayesu case, 19-23 March 1998.  
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the victims and emphasised that he had a “mandate to pay particular attention to the 
suffering of the victims”.1070
 
 
It is obvious that international justice must pay significant attention to the interests of 
victims. International criminal courts and tribunals were established in the name of 
the victims. Without victims, there would be no need for international justice. 
International justice does not, however, solely concern the victims. Rather, as was 
acknowledged by the prosecutors at Nuremberg, ICTY and ICTR, it concerns the 
international community as a whole. Given that the international community 
encompasses the victims, arguably there is no need to circle out the victims as a 
specific group international justice is to focus on. 
 
It is difficult to identify the victims in a conflict. Victims are often contrasted with 
perpetrators, but the line between these two categories is not always clear. Some 
persons qualify as both or neither.1071
 
  
On this issue, May and Hoskins state as follows:1072
When one can recognize, in contexts of conflict and strife, a clear victim and a clear 
victimizer, one can then insist on protection of the victim as a universal value. 
Although this may appear to be taking sides (politically or otherwise), taking the side 
of the victim is a universal stance, a clear expression of justice, global or otherwise. 
Also, spotlighting the victim is an aid – both practically and theoretically – for the 
issue of identity: Who are we, and for whom do we stand up? The victim – even if he 
belongs to the enemy. 
 
 
Even if victims can be identified clearly, it is still debatable whether international 
justice should grant them a right to truth and justice. This is an ambiguous phrase. A 
violation of a right warrants a remedy. Does it then follow that a victim is entitled to a 
remedy if his right to truth and justice has been violated in a particular case? For 
instance, a guilty accused may be acquitted due to insufficient evidence or 
irregularities of the procedure. It is also possible that an alleged perpetrator is not 
                                                 
1070 Opening statement of Chief Prosecutor Ocampo in the Lubanga case, 26 January 2009, at: 
http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc623638.pdf. 
1071 M. Drumbl, Atrocity, Punishment and International Law, (Cambridge University Press, 2007), 44.  
1072 A. Biletzki, Politicizing Human Rights (Using International Law), in L. May & Z. Hoskins, 
International Criminal Law and Philosophy (Cambridge University Press, 2010) 180 at 194. See also: 
D. Golash, The Justification of Punishment in the International Context, in L. May & Z. Hoskins, 
International Criminal Law and Philosophy (Cambridge University Press, 2010) 201; R. Meister, 
Human Rights and the Politics of Victimhood, 16(2) Ethics & International Affairs 91 (2002), 91-108. 
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brought to justice because he is untraceable or the Prosecutor did not select him to be 
brought. Such situations surely do not, nor should they, lead to a remedy for the 
victims. 
 
The right to truth and justice was first introduced in the particular context of human 
rights abuses in central and South America. In the brutal civil wars in places like 
Guatemala, Peru, Colombia, Honduras, Argentina and Chile, many people 
disappeared and never returned. Family members had no idea where they were, what 
happened to them, whether they were dead or alive and would ever return. Their 
bodies were never found. In this situation, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights 
held that the families of the disappeared persons had a right to know the truth of what 
had happened to their beloved ones.1073 The European Court of Human Rights 
adopted similar terminology.1074 It was increasingly acknowledged as a general right 
of victims in the context of seeking remedies from the State. This cannot, however, be 
simply transformed into a general right of victims to truth and justice in the context of 
international criminal trials. Different concepts of truth and justice exist in different 
contexts.1075
 
 As well, international criminal trials should primarily focus on 
determining the guilt or innocence of the accused, rather than on granting victims a 
right to truth and justice.  
It can also not be assumed that all victims want truth and justice. Victims are often 
spoken about as if they were one homogeneous group of people with the same 
                                                 
1073 See, inter alia, Bàmaca- Velasquez v Guatemala, Judgement of 25 November 2000, Series C, No 
70, para 201, Barrios Altos v Peru, Judgement of 14 March 2001, Series C, No 75, para 48, Masacre de 
Mapmpân v Colombia, Judgement of 15 September 2005, Series C, No 134, para 297; Almohacid-
Arellano et al v Chile, Judgement of 26 September 2006, Series C, No 154, paras 148 et seq; 
Velasquez-Rodriguez v. Honduras, Judgement of 29 July 1988, Series C, No 7, paras 162-166 and 174; 
Comumd ad Monvana v Suriname, Judgement of 15 June 2005, Series C, No 124, paras 204, Masacre 
de Mapiripàn v. Colombia, Judgement of 15 September 2005, Almohacid-Arellano et al vs Chile, 
Judgement of 26 September 2006, Series C, No 154, para 148; Vargas-Areco v. Paraguay, Judgement 
of 26 September 2006, Series C, No 155, paras 153 et seq , and La Cantuta v. Peru, Judgement of 29 
November 2006, Series C, No 162, para 222. See also General Comment 31 of the Human Rights 
Committee.  
1074 Hugh Jordan v UK, Judgement of 4 May 2001, Application No 24746/1994, [2001] ECHR 327, 
paras, 16, 23, 93, 157 and 160; Aksoy v. Turkey, Judgement of 18 December 1996, Application No 
21987/93, 1996 ECHR 68, para 98, Aydm v Turkey, Judgement of 25 September 1997, Application No 
21178/94, 1997 ECHR 75, para. 103, Selcuk and Asker v Turkey, Judgement of 24 April 1998, 
Application No 23184/94, 1998 ECHR 36, para 96, Kurt v Turkey, Judgement of 25 May 1998, 
Application No. 24276/1994, 1998 ECHR 44, para 140, Selmoum v. France, Judgement of 28 July 
1999, Application No 25803/94, 1999 ECHR 66, para 79. 
1075 A. Rubin, Challenging the Conventional Wisdom: Another View of the International Criminal 
Court, 52 Journal of International Affairs 783 (1999). See further Part I.  
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emotions, needs, and urge for justice. In reality, however, victims are like any other 
human beings and differ significantly from each other. The only thing that binds them 
universally is that they have suffered from an internationally recognised crime. They 
do not speak with one voice, but multiple voices with different expectations from 
justice.1076 Many NGOs speak for victims, but it is questionable whether they truly 
represent each single one, or even a high percentage of them. Victims are often 
spoken of in a patronising way and represented as passive creatures. It is not 
necessarily their own choice to be called ‘victims’. Many of them prefer to be called 
‘survivors’ or ‘freedom fighters’.1077
 
  
The empirical research conducted by various researchers and institutes suggests that 
most victims want truth and justice, but may have a different perception of how this 
should be achieved. Many of them want punishment, but some prefer forgiveness, a 
combination of the two, or simply to move on and forget about it.1078 Truth can re-
open old wounds, which is not desired by all victims.1079 Even if victims generally 
desire truth and justice, they may be disappointed with the process put in place to 
achieve this, as it will not always bring the desired result. It may also not necessarily 
bring relief or emotional repair.1080
 
  
Doak suggests that energy should be invested “in acquiring a greater degree of 
understanding of the diverse needs and experiences in order to provide clearer 
answers to the problems that confront them.”1081 This may indeed be the only way to 
evaluate what significance international justice can have for victims.1082
                                                 
1076 Doak, The Therapeutic Dimension of Transitional Justice, supra note 59, 290. 
 
1077 Personal interviews with Rwandan survivors of the genocide who prefer the term ‘survivor’ over 
victim. See also M. Parlevliet, Considering Truth. Dealing with a Legacy of Gross Human Rights 
Violations, 16(2) Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights 141 (1998) 28. 
1078 Ernesto Kiza, Corene Rathgeber and Holger-C Rohne: “Victims of War – An Empirical Study on 
War-Victimization, and Victims’ Attitudes Towards Addressing Atrocities (Hamburger Institut fur 
Socialforschung (2006); International Center for Transitional Justice and the Human Rights Center 
(Berkeley), Forgotten Voices: A Population-Based Survey on Attitudes about Peace and Justice in 
Northern Uganda (2005), available at <http://ictj.org/sites/default/files/ICTJ-HRC-Uganda-Voices-
2005-English.pdf>, last accessed December 2011; M. Drumbl, Atrocity, Punishment and International 
Law, (Cambridge University Press, 2007), 43-44.  
1079 B. Hamber, Transforming Societies after Political Violence: Truth, Reconciliation and Mental 
Health (Springer, 2009), 66. 
1080 Doak, The Therapeutic Dimension of Transitional Justice, supra note 59, 291. 
1081 Doak, The Therapeutic Dimension of Transitional Justice, supra note 59, 297. 
1082 Ibid, 265; P. Hazan, Measuring the impact of punishment and forgiveness: a framework for 
evaluating transitional justice, 88 International Review of the Red Cross (2006) 19-47. 
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The rights of victims must further bend when in conflict with the rights of the 
accused.1083 First and foremost, the accused has a right to truth and justice. He is the 
one standing trial and facing a long prison sentence, if found guilty. If his guilt is not 
established, he must be acquitted irrespective of whether a not-guilty verdict 
corresponds with the actual truth. Thus, the rights of the victim to truth and justice are 
not always easily reconcilable with the rights of the accused.1084 International 
criminal tribunals and courts are sometimes reluctant to acknowledge that the rights 
of the accused have first priority. They regularly state that a fair balance must be 
struck between the rights of the accused and the rights of the victims.1085
 
  
Some observers even suggest that, in case of a conflict, the rights of the victim to 
truth and justice should prevail.1086 Other observers have criticised the balancing 
exercise. They firmly state that the rights of the accused should prevail over the rights 
of the victims.1087 Given that it puts human beings on trial, international justice first 
has a retributive nature. Its primary purpose is to investigate and prosecute individuals 
for internationally recognised crimes in fair and efficient proceedings.1088
 
 The 
restorative objectives come second. It is, therefore, indeed inappropriate to give the 
accused and victims equal status.  
Accordingly, it is suggested that truth and justice should be viewed as aspirations 
rather than rights of the victims. Truth and justice are not solely the victims’ 
                                                 
1083 The Chamber has an obligation to “ensure that a trial is fair and expeditious and that proceedings 
are conducted in accordance with the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, with full respect for the rights 
of the accused and due regard for the protection of victims and witnesses”. See Articles 20(1), 22 ICTY 
Statute; Articles 19(1), 20(1) ICTR Statute; Article 64(2) ICC Statute. See also: Prosecutor v. Brdanin 
and Talic, Decision on Motion by Prosecution for Protected Measures, 3 July 2000, para. 31. 
1084 J. Llewellyn, Restorative Justice in Transitions and Beyond, The Justice Potential of Truth-Telling 
Mechanisms for Post-Peace Accord Societies, in T. Borer (Ed), Telling the Truths: Truth Telling and 
Peace Building in Post-Conflict Societies, (University of Notre Dame Press, 2006), at 85-87. 
1085 For instance: Prosecutor v. Haradinaj et al., Decision on Prosecution's Application for Pre-Trial 
Protective Measures for Witnesses, May 20, 2005, p. 4. 
1086 L. May & Z. Hoskins, International Criminal Law and Philosophy (Cambridge University Press, 
2010), 243. 
1087 B. McGonigle Leyh, Procedural Justice? Victim Participation in International Criminal 
Proceedings (Intersentia, 2011), 360-362. 
1088 M. Dembour & E. Haslam, Silencing Hearings? Victim-Witnesses at War Crimes Trials, 15 
European Journal of International Law 151 (2004). 
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prerogatives, but are of interest to everyone including the affected communities, 
victims, accused and society at large.1089
 
  
Victim Participation 
 
At the ICC, whenever the interests of victims are concerned and with leave of the 
Court, victims may make written or oral submissions. In giving victims a voice, the 
ICC has prioritised their rights and needs and explicitly acknowledged the right of 
victims to the truth and justice. This has an impact on the entire process. 
 
This is a novelty in international criminal justice. It is generally viewed as a positive 
development.1090 If testifying does not have a therapeutic effect, then at least victim 
participation can have such an effect.1091 Indeed, it is suggested that victim 
participation contributes to the healing process and, thus, defeats secondary 
victimisation, if any, caused by testifying.1092 Therefore, many scholars consider 
victim participation as a victory of international justice.1093
 
 
As one victim representative said, “the participation of victims in a judicial process is 
wholly relevant. Before all else, the aim is to allow those who are at the very centre, 
who are the people who have suffered from the crime to participate in the judicial 
process to establish the truth about the crimes.”1094 Other victim representatives have 
made similar submissions emphasizing the right of victims to truth and justice.1095
 
 
                                                 
1089 Doak would disagree. In his view, the trials should promote legal rights for victims, rather than 
moral objectives: “Victims ought to be afforded the respect and dignity of being treated as individuals 
with their own specific needs and rights which need to be safeguarded by legal and political 
processes”, Doak, The Therapeutic Dimension of Transitional Justice, supra note 59, 297.  
1090 See, for instance, E. Baumgartner, Aspects of Victim Participation in the Proceedings of the 
International Criminal Court, 90 International Review of the Red Cross 870 (2008), 409-440, at 409-
410. 
1091 E. Haslam, Victim Participation at the International Criminal Court: A Triumph of Hope over 
Experience? in D. McGoldrick, P. Rowe & E. Donnelly (Eds.), The Permanent International Criminal 
Court: Legal and Policy Issues (Hart Publishing, 2004), 315-316. 
1092 Ibid.   
1093 Ibid; C. Jorda & J. de Hemptinne, The Status and Role of the Victim, in the Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court: A Commentary, in A. Cassese, P. Gaeta & J. Jones (Eds.), The Rome 
Statute of the International Criminal Court: A Commentary, Vol II (Oxford University Press, 2002). 
1094 Prosecutor v. Katanga and Ngudjolo, ICC-01/04-01/07-T-38-ENG ET, Confirmation of Charges 
Hearing - Open Session, Opening Statement by Mr. Gilissen, page 42, lines 2-6.  
1095 Ibid, Opening Statement by Mr. Diakiese, page 56, lines 1-12; Opening Statement by Mr. 
Mulamba, page 62 lines 1-4; page 64 lines 21-25. 
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Reservations about this development have also been expressed.1096 This is an area of 
law where one has to be particularly careful not to transplant “wholeheartedly” the 
domestic system of victim participation and its underlying rationale.1097 For instance, 
a significant difference between victim participation in domestic jurisdictions and that 
in international jurisdictions is the large number of victims who participate in each 
trial. In part, this is the result of the wide definition of a victim that has been 
applied.1098 In larger part, this has to do with the fact that the international court 
barely deals with crimes other than massive crimes committed on large scale. Unless 
a charge is confined to, for instance, torture of a handful of prisoners of war as a war 
crime, the number of victims caused by the crimes charged can be extremely high. 
Currently, 127 victims participate in the Lubanga trial; 366 in the Katanga trial; and 
1889 in the Bemba trial.1099 Approximately 1500 more victims are in the process of 
applying to participate in the Bemba trial, notwithstanding that the Prosecutor only 
alleges the existence of about 200 victims of the crimes charged.1100
                                                 
1096 H. Friman, The International Criminal Court and Participation of Victims: A Third Party to the 
Proceedings? 22 Leiden Journal of International Law 485 (2009); C. Van Der Wijngaert, lecture on 
victim participation, supra note 539. 
 In domestic 
jurisdictions, there are usually only a number, or just one. 
1097 B. McGonigle Leyh, Procedural Justice? Victim Participation in International Criminal 
Proceedings (Intersentia, 2011), page 342. 
1098 Indirect victims from any crime under the jurisdiction of the Court, not necessarily the crimes 
contained in the charges are also allowed to participate as victims in a situation (Prosecutor v. 
Lubanga, Decision on Victims' Participation, 18 January 2008, ICC-01/04-01/06-1119, para. 93 
[hereinafter ‘Lubanga Decision on Victim’s Participation’; confirmed by the Appeals Chamber in: 
Judgment on the appeals of The Prosecutor and The Defence against Trial Chamber I's Decision on 
Victims' Participation of 18 January 2008, ICC-01/04-01/06-1432, 11 July 2008, para. 32 [hereinafter 
‘Lubanga Appeals Chamber Decision on Victim’s Participation’]). However, in order to participate in a 
particular trial, a victim must have suffered personal harm related to the charges (Appeals Chamber 
Judgment on Victims' Participation, paras 63-64). The Appeals Chamber held that, in light of the fact 
that ‘the purpose of the trial proceedings is the determination of guilt or innocence of the accused 
person of the crimes charged”, “only victims of these crimes will be able to demonstrate that the trial, 
as such, affects their personal interests” (para. 62). See also H. Friman, The International Criminal 
Court and Participation of Victims: A Third Party to the Proceedings? 22 Leiden Journal of 
International Law 485 (2009). 
1099 C. Van Der Wijngaert, lecture on victim participation, supra note 539, at 6. 
1100 ICC-01/05-01/08-424, 15-06-2009 Decision Pursuant to Article 61(7)(a) and (b) of the Rome 
Statute on the Charges of the Prosecutor Against Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, see para. 134. The 
Chamber rejected the need to establish a specific number of victims and relied thereby on the following 
ICTY and ICTR jurisprudence: ICTY, Prosecutor v. Stokte, Case No. IT-97-24-T, Judgment, 31  July 
2003, para. 201, and ICTR, The Prosecutor v Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-40-T, Judgment, 2 
September 1998, para. 282: Pursuant to a question from the Chamber as to the killing of teachers, 
witness K stated she was unsure how many were killed, but that she knew the names of some of them; 
ICTR, The Prosecutor v Kamuhanda, Case No. ICTR-95-54A-T, "Judgment", 22 January 2004, para. 
345: "Prosecution Witness GEA testified that he could not say how many people had died at that 
location, because "that day there were very many." (...)"; ICTR, The Prosecutor v Ntakirutimana, Case 
No. ICTR-96-10 & TCTR-96-17-T, "Judgment and Sentence", 21 February 2003, para. 631: the 
witness specified that "many people were killed as a result of this attack". 
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Having to deal with such high numbers of victim participants has significant adverse 
consequences both for the fairness of the proceedings and for the ascertainment of the 
truth. In addition, the hopes of victims may have been raised too highly. This could 
then also undermine the healing and therapeutic effects, which are considered to be 
the principle objectives of victim participation. These points will be discussed more 
thoroughly while analysing how the victim participatory system operates in reality. 
 
Victim Participants: Who Are They? 
Victims who wish to participate must put in an application at each stage of the 
proceedings.1101 They can apply to be a participant in a situation, or in a case. Victims 
who want to be eligible for reparations must be acknowledged as victims in a 
particular case. For each application, the Chamber has to consider whether there are 
grounds to believe that the victim is who he claims to be; and that he suffered direct 
or indirect harm from the commission of one or more crimes within the jurisdiction of 
the Court.1102 An institution or organisation can also apply for victim status. This will 
be granted if it can show that the property it owned suffered direct harm from a crime 
committed within the jurisdiction of the Court. This property must further have been 
dedicated to religion, education, art or science or other charitable purpose.1103 To 
participate in a specific case, it must be established that the applicant is a victim of 
one or more of the crimes charged.1104
 
 
Until now, the ICC has received almost ten thousand applications, one third of which 
have been granted.1105 The parties have a right to respond before the Chamber rules 
on the veracity of these applications. This is an incredibly burdensome exercise both 
for the parties and for the Chamber. One Judge in the Katanga case reported that 
easily one third of their supporting staff was working on victim applications for 
several months.1106
                                                 
1101 Rule 89 ICC Rules.  
 On the side of the defence, the Office of Public Counsel for 
1102 Rule 85 ICC Rules; Situation in DRC, ICC-01/04-177-tENG, 31 July 2006; Situation in DRC, 
ICC-01/04-101-tEN-Corr, 17 Jan 2006, paras 66 and 79. 
1103 Situation in DRC, ICC-01/04-423-Corr-tENG, 31 January 2008, paras 139-143. 
1104 Prosecutor v. Lubanga, ICC-01/04-01/06-601-tEN, 20 October 2006, page 9; Prosecutor v. 
Katanga and Ngudjolo, ICC-01/04-01/07-357, 2 April 2008, page 8. 
1105 C. Van Der Wijngaert, lecture on victim participation, supra note 539, 6. 
1106 C. Van Der Wijngaert, lecture on victim participation, supra note 539, 14-15, Judge Van Der 
Wijngaert particularly stresses the difficulties in respect of an individual application procedure that 
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Defence (“OPCD”) deals with applications submitted in the situations. A large 
percentage of their staff work on these applications on a nearly full-time basis.1107 
Defence teams deal with victim applications in their specific case, which easily 
amount to hundreds. In light of the many other tasks they need to focus on, this is a 
heavy burden on their shoulders. Presumably, this is the same on the Prosecutor’s 
side. Accordingly, dealing with victim applications is a serious strain on the system. It 
can take a very long time.1108
 
 
In addition, from their seven-page application form, it is difficult to determine 
whether they are genuine victims. The identity of the applicants, as well as any 
information that could potentially lead to their identification, is redacted in most of 
the applications. Often, the identity of the person who assisted them is also 
redacted.1109
                                                                                                                                           
needs to be applied at each stage of the proceedings. Under the current prevailing interpretation, the 
assessment of personal interest  in the proceedings must be made anew each time a victim applies to 
participate  at a different procedural stage. For example, the Appeals Chamber has held that  if a victim 
wants to intervene in an interlocutory appeal, that victim must  demonstrate how his interests are 
affected by the appeal, even if this person already has victim status in the proceedings that gave rise to 
the appeal. Such applications are made by written submission, on which the parties have the possibility 
to comment. This process inevitably delays the appeals proceedings.  Some Chambers have also taken 
the approach that even within the same procedural phase, e.g. a confirmation hearing or trial hearing, 
victims must justify each intervention they want to make, by explaining how the intervention relates to 
their interests. For example, under Rule 91(3) if a victim wishes to question a particular witness, the 
legal representative must submit a written request, explaining which questions they want to a request, 
explaining which questions they want to ask and how these questions further their interests. This was in 
part meant to rein in questioning by victims sense of article 68.3 of the Statute. The side effect, 
however, is a steady stream  Prosecution and the Defence have the right to make observations on each 
such request, and the Chamber must rule on them separately. This individualised approach to victim 
participation may work in a national proceeding, where there are only a few victims in each case. At 
the ICC, however, the number of victims is becoming overwhelming. The judges had to go through this 
entire process for each of the nearly 10.000 applications received, and more applications continue to 
arrive, now that the Court is investigating the Libya and Ivory Coast situations. The Court may soon 
reach the point where this individual case by case approach becomes unsustainable. It may well have to 
consider replacing individual applications with collective applications. This would, of course, require 
amendments to the applicable texts. (page 6). 
 As a protective measure in respect to the victim applicants, the defence 
is not entitled to review the redacted information. To give due consideration to the 
1107 Personal Interview with an OPCD member, 11 November 2011. They are currently also dealing 
with the 1500 new applications in the Bemba trial. 
1108 B. McGonigle Leyh, Procedural Justice? Victim Participation in International Criminal 
Proceedings (Intersentia, 2011), pages 243-257. 
1109 The requests of the victims to participate at the proceedings are disclosed ex parte only to the 
defense, Prosecution, legal representatives, the Registry, and Chambers. The name of the 
intermediaries who helped the applicant to fill the form are redacted for the defence, and also probably 
for the prosecution, but not for the Chamber and for legal representatives of the victims (these latter 
have only access to those of the victims they represent). See ICC-01/04-01/07-1347 31-07-2009, 
Dispositif de la décision relative aux 345 demandes de participation de victimes à la procédure; ICC-
01/04-01/07-1491-Red-tENG 10-03-2010, paras. 42-43. 
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principle of equality of arms, the redacted information is equally withheld from the 
Prosecution.1110
 
  
Apart from one or two paragraphs containing the victim’s allegations of harm 
suffered, practically all information is blackened out. As a result, the parties are 
prevented from conducting any investigations into the veracity of the allegations, or 
the identity of the victims. The judges do not have any investigative function.1111 In 
addition, given the voluminous applications, the judges do not have the capacity to 
thoroughly scrutinise each application. In this regard, it does not help that they are 
geographically and culturally far removed from the victims. Reasonable grounds that 
applicants qualify as victims do not need to be established.1112
 
 
Consequently, it is impossible to be sure that all victim participants are in fact genuine 
victims. It is, of course, hoped that the lawyers and NGOs who assist victims in filling 
out the forms and putting in their application to the Court carefully verify whether the 
victims are who they say they are – and scrutinise the story. The close resemblance of 
different applications does not inspire confidence. They are clearly written with the 
same pen, and it is highly questionable whether these are the words of the applicant or 
the reporter. 
 
When the issue of close resemblance was raised in the case of Katanga & Ngudjolo, 
the Chamber held that “the fact that one statement is similar to others is not in itself 
sufficient to affect its credibility, but means that the statement needs to be scrutinized 
in light of the other information contained in the application for participation.”1113
                                                 
1110 B. McGonigle Leyh, Procedural Justice? Victim Participation in International Criminal 
Proceedings (Intersentia, 2011), 253-255. 
 To 
give due weight to the defence observations, the Chamber called on the Registry “to 
remind intermediaries that their role is restricted to explaining to applicants any terms 
which they may not understand and assisting them in drafting their application. They 
should not, however, exert any influence whatsoever on the actual content of 
statements, in particular in respect of anything relating to the nature of the alleged 
1111 Apart from unique investigative opportunities. See further Part II. 
1112 Situation in DRC, ICC-01/04-101-tEN-Corr, 17 January 2006, paras. 99-100. 
1113 ICC-01/04-01/07-1347 31-07-2009, Dispositif de la décision relative aux 345 demandes de 
participation de victimes à la procédure; ICC-01/04-01/07-1491-Red-tENG 10-03-2010, para. 42. 
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crimes or the harm suffered.”1114
 
 
In Lubanga, the judges were much less careful. They held that the similarities in 
applications were unsurprising given the “broad context of the systematic 
conscription of children under the age of 15 into the military forces of the UPC”.1115 
This observation raises question marks about the presumption of innocence. It also 
undermines the principle that “a decision to grant an applicant a procedural status in 
the proceedings in no way predetermines any factual findings that could be made by a 
Chamber in any judgment on the merits”.1116
 
  
That the presumption of innocence is affected by victim participation is a general 
concern. Judges frequently feel the urge to apologise to the victims if they do not 
decide in their favour. This is an indicator of how important the rights of the victims 
are considered. For instance, dissenting Judge Kaul, who found that the post election 
violence in Kenya did not amount to crimes against humanity, started off with an 
apology to the victims:1117
“I wish to confess that I have taken this position with a heavy heart. I am profoundly 
aware of the crimes and atrocities described in the Application for summonses to 
appear for the three suspects William Ruto, Henry Kosgey and Joshua Sang 
pursuant to article 58(7) of the Statute. I understand and sympathise with the hopes 
and expectations of the victims of the crimes committed in different locations, 
including Turbo town, the greater Eldoret area (Huruma, Kyambaa, Kimumu, 
Langas and Yamumbi), Kapsabet town and Nandi Hills town in the Uasin Gishu 
and Nandi Districts. I am aware of the victims' expectation that those responsible for 
these crimes should be brought to justice. I am also painfully aware that there are 
currently many citizens in the Republic of Kenya who hope for and support the 
intervention of the Court in this country because they do not have confidence in 
their own criminal justice system.” 
 
 
This orientation on victim participants is all the more troublesome in light of the fact 
that it is very unclear whether they are genuine. Yet, their allegations are taken for 
granted. It cannot be assumed that all victim applicants are honest. The assumed 
financial interest in participating should not be underestimated. Persons who were 
victim of an attack not subject to investigations may feel legitimate in pretending they 
were victims of the attack under investigation. It has already happened that, in the 
                                                 
1114 Ibid, para. 43. 
1115 Prosecutor v. Lubanga, ICC-01/04-01/06-2509, 29 June 2010. 
1116 Situation in DRC, ICC-01/04-505, 3 July 2008, para. 30. 
1117 ICC-01/09-01/11-2 15-03-2011, para. 3. 
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course of the proceedings against Katanga and Ngudjolo, it became apparent that 
participating victims were not present at Bogoro, the crime base. Rather, they were 
victims of an attack on Kasenyi, not subject to any investigations.1118
 
  
It is difficult for the Court to establish whether the victim applicants are who they 
claim they are. Searching for someone’s identity is in reality a difficult exercise. The 
correctness as stated in their identity cards cannot be assumed. Often, there are no 
official papers. A large number of the birth certificates and registration cards have 
been destroyed in the war. Victims and witnesses have given different birthdates at 
different times. For instance, in Bogoro, it is difficult to be sure who was in Bogoro 
on 24 February 2003. No register of Bogoro inhabitants of that time exists.  
 
If granted victim status, they are represented by counsel. One victim representative 
can easily represent hundreds of victims. In Kenya, for instance, one victim 
representative has been assigned for 327 victims. In Katanga, two representatives 
represent a total of 388 victims. Many of them keep their anonymity throughout the 
proceedings. This diminishes their right to review confidential material and their right 
to present and challenge evidence.1119
 
 The extent to which their identities are 
disclosed to the defence varies from case to case. They rarely are disclosed to the 
public.  
Even if the names are known to the defence, they are always referred to by their 
numbers. There are so many of them that one tends to forget that they have names and 
individual stories. Their legal representatives barely know the names of their clients. 
In light of the geographical distance, their contact with their clients is sporadic. Most 
                                                 
1118 See: Notification du retrait de la victime a/0363/09 de la liste des temoins du representant legal, 
ICC-01/04-01/07-2695, 16 August 2011, Pursuant to Trial Chamber II’s Decision ICC-01/04-01/07-
3064, 7 July 2011; Confidential Urgent Décision relative à la Notification du retrait de la victime 
a/0363/09 de la liste des témoins du représentant légal ICC-01/04-01/07-2699, 16-08-2011, Pursuant to 
Trial Chamber II's Decision ICC-01/04-01/07-3064, dated 7 July 2011, this document is reclassified as 
"Public"; Public document Decision on the notification of the removal of Victim a/0381/09 from the 
Legal Representative’s list of witnesses, ICC-01/04-01/07-2674-tENG  08-08-2011; Confidentiel  
Rapport du représentant légal conformément à la décision ICC-01/04-01/07-2699- Conf et demande 
depouvoir mettre fin à son mandat concernant deux victimes (article 18 du Code de conduite 
professionnel), ICC-01/04-01/07-2782-Conf 18-03-2011, ICC-01/04-01/07-2782 16-08-2011 Pursuant 
to Trial Chamber II's Decision ICC-01/04-01/07-3064, dated 7 July 2011, this document is reclassified 
as "Public". 
1119 B. McGonigle Leyh, Procedural Justice? Victim Participation in International Criminal 
Proceedings (Intersentia, 2011), 253-255. 
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of them do not have a mobile phone. The legal representatives visit their clients from 
time to time. However, when in the field, they must divide their attention between 
their multiple clients. They may not even find their clients at home when they arrive. 
One legal representative confirmed how difficult it is to keep in regular contact with 
the victims and give them information on the proceedings in which they participate. 
Months pass by without any contact.1120 Thus, victim participation is rather fictitious. 
It does not bring the victims any closer to the courtroom. It only brings additional 
lawyers into the courtroom.1121
 
 
Victim Participation in Practice 
 
Investigations 
During investigations, the participation of victims is limited. If the Prosecutor seeks to 
open an investigation proprio motu, he needs the authorisation of the Pre-Trial 
Chamber. In such a situation, pursuant to Article 15(3) of the Statute, the victims have 
a right to present their views and concerns to the Pre-Trial Chamber. Also, if the 
Prosecutor decides in the interests of justice not to initiate an investigation which was 
referred to him by a State or the Security Council, he needs the Pre-Trial Chamber’s 
authorisation for that decision. In reviewing the Prosecutor’s decision not to 
investigate, the Pre-Trial Chamber must take the concerns of the victims into 
consideration.1122
 
 However, victims cannot initiate investigations.  
Until now, all attempts to broaden the investigations in respect to particular 
individuals have been rejected. For instance, in the cases of Lubanga and Bemba, 
various attempts have been made by victims and NGOs to be heard on the scope of 
the charges. In the case of Lubanga, their purpose was that investigations be 
broadened to include sexual offences. In Bemba, it was to include crimes committed 
in DRC. These requests were initially rejected because the Prosecutor’s investigations 
were still ongoing.1123
                                                 
1120 Personal interview with Gillisen, legal representative in Katanga trial who confessed that he was 
unsure who he was still representing as many had disappeared (interview in Bunia in the course of 
judicial site visit, 19 January 2012). 
 In Bemba, no further attempts have been made in this regard. 
1121 This was also pointed out by Judge Van Der Wijngaert: C. Van Der Wijngaert, lecture on victim 
participation, supra note 539. 
1122 Article 53(3)(b) of the ICC Statute. 
1123 Decision on the Request submitted pursuant to rule 103(1) of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, 
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In Lubanga, once the case was confined to the allegation of enlistment, conscription 
and active use of child soldiers, any request to add additional allegations was 
considered to have no link with the case itself.1124
 
  
Towards the end of the prosecution’s case, victim representatives made another 
attempt to add charges on the basis of the evidence that had been presented. They 
submitted a request to the judges to consider a legal re-characterisation of the facts as 
sexual slavery, and inhuman and / or cruel treatment involving rape,1125
 
 which, had it 
been accepted, would have significantly altered and broadened the scope of the 
charges against him. 
The initial decision was favourable. In the particular context of the case at hand, the 
majority of the Trial Chamber was persuaded by the submissions of the victim 
representatives and the evidence heard so far during the course of the trial that the 
evidence presented may allow for a modification of the legal characterization and put 
the parties on notice that the legal characterisation of facts may be subject to 
change.1126 There was a strong dissent, given that the proposed modifications would 
involve additional, and arguably more serious, offences, which in the dissenting view 
is in violation of the Rome Statute and the Regulation it was based on.1127
                                                                                                                                           
ICC-01/04-373, 20-08-2007; Public Decision on the Requests of the Legal Representative for Victims 
VPRS 1 to VPRS 6 regarding "Prosecutor's Information on further Investigation", ICC-01/04-399 26-
09-2007; Public Decision on the request of the legal representative of victims VPRS 3 and 
VPRS 6 to review an alleged decision of the Prosecutor not to proceed, ICC-01/04-582 26-10-
2010. 
 Meanwhile, 
1124 Public Decision on Request pursuant to Rule 103 (1) of the Statute, ICC-01/04-01/06-480, 26-09-
2006; Décision sur les demandes de participation à la procédure présentées par les Demandeurs VPRS 
1 à VPRS 6 dans l'affaire Le Procureur c. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo ICC-01/04-01/06-172, 29-06-2006. 
1125 Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Demande conjointe des représentants légaux des victimes aux fins de mise 
en œuvre de la procédure en vertu de la norme 55 du Règlement de la Cour, 22 May 2009, ICC-01/04-
01/06-1891.  
1126 Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Public - Urgent Decision giving notice to the parties and participants that 
the legal characterisation of the facts may be subject to change in accordance with Regulation 55(2) of 
the Regulations of the Court, 14 July 2009, ICC-01/04-01/06-2049, paras. 27-30, 33-35. The majority 
came to that conclusion by separating Regulation 55(1) limiting any modification to the legal 
characterization to those not exceeding the facts and circumstances described in the charges, from 
Regulation 55(2) which does not include any limitation save for those set out in Regulation 55(3) 
(allowing the Defence adequate time and prepare a defence against the modified charges and to bring 
back witnesses previously heard and/or call additional witnesses and/or present other additional 
evidence).  
1127 Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Public Minority opinion on the "Decision giving notice to the parties and 
participants that the legal characterisation of facts may be subject to change in accordance with 
Regulation 55(2) of the Regulations of the Court", 17 July 2009, ICC-01/04-01/06-2054, para. 44. The 
minority of the judges submits the view that Regulations 55(2) and (3) cannot be relied upon to 
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the decision has been overturned on appeal.1128
 
 Thus, Mr. Lubanga is left with the 
charge of child soldiers. 
The role of the victims during investigations is still evolving. However, until now, it 
has been severely restricted. In light of earlier observations on the Prosecutor’s 
politicised selection of suspects, it would have served the ascertainment of the truth in 
a wider sense had the victims been given an opportunity to challenge the Prosecutor’s 
choices. In addition, victims are principally affected by the Prosecutor’s choices of 
suspects and charges. Indeed, they can only participate and seek reparation if the 
Prosecutor decides to charge the particular crimes of which they are victims.  
 
Trial 
At trial, victim participants may, with leave of the Court, ask questions of witnesses to 
ascertain the truth and where the personal interests of the victims are concerned.1129 
The right to ask questions to witnesses is not limited to reparation issues but extends 
to questions pertaining to the guilt or innocence of the accused.1130
 
 In addition, they 
may call their own witnesses. 
                                                                                                                                           
circumvent the stricter requirements under Regulation 55(1) limiting re-characterisation of facts to 
those not exceeding the charges. Pursuant to Article 61(9) of the Rome Statute, the charges can no 
longer be amended once the trial has begun to provide an accused ‘with a high degree of certainty as to 
charges that he or she will face once the trial has commenced’, and Regulation 55 has to be read in that 
light (paras. 15-17). If it were allowed for modifications to exceed the facts and circumstances 
described in the charges, such modifications would amount to amendments of the charges in violation 
of Article 61(9) and, in the view of the minority, “would markedly undermine the rights of the accused 
under Article 67(1)(a) "[t]o be informed promptly and in detail of the nature, cause and content of the 
charge [...]", set against the general restrictions on changes to the charges as reflected in governing 
provision, Article 61(9)”. The facts of a criminal case frequently - in reality, invariably - change and 
develop as the trial unfolds, and under the approach preferred by the majority, the accused could be 
confronted, at any stage, with a re-characterization based on the new facts and circumstances that have 
emerged during the trial. Even allowing for the safeguards under sub-regulations 2 and 3, this would be 
inimical to the statutory provisions just set out, which strongly tend towards finality and certainty as 
regards the charges, rather than to flexibility, particularly if this leads to a significant change” (para. 
28). 
1128 Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Judgment on the appeals of Mr Lubanga Dyilo and the Prosecutor against 
the Decision of Trial Chamber I of 14 July 2009 entitled "Decision giving notice to the parties and 
participants that the legal characterisation of the facts may be subject to change in accordance with 
Regulation 55(2) of the Regulations of the Court", 8 December 2009, ICC-01/04-01/06-2205. 
1129 Lubanga Decision on Victim’s Participation (n 1036 above), paras. 108-109. 
1130 Ibid, paras. 119-120; see also: Lubanga Appeals Chamber Decision on Victim’s Participation (n 
1036 above), para. 102. Appeals Chamber Judges Pikis and Kirsch submitted strong dissenting 
opinions to this ruling. See further H. Friman, The International Criminal Court and Participation of 
Victims: A Third Party to the Proceedings? 22 Leiden Journal of International Law 485 (2009), 493. 
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Thus victim participants have a potentially powerful role as a third party in 
conducting investigations and presenting evidence to the Court. The Appeals 
Chamber has addressed the distinction between parties and participants in ICC 
proceedings, emphasising that victims have the latter status with much more limited 
rights and obligations. However, as Friman has pointed out, “[t]he determination that 
victims may lead and challenge evidence pertaining to guilt or innocence at trial 
pushes the role of the ‘participant’ very far, indeed so far that it is difficult to avoid 
the notion of their in fact being ‘parties’.1131
 
  
The active participation of independent victims may assist the truth-ascertaining 
process. They may present evidence to the Court that the parties do not have in their 
possession or prefer to ignore for tactical reasons. In the case against Ngudjolo and 
Katanga a victim representative informed the Court of his intention to demonstrate 
that the responsibility which the Prosecution attributed solely to the two defendants 
extended to many others, including the political leaders of their own and neighbouring 
States.1132
 
  
If the trend is for victims to seek to depict the fuller picture surrounding the crimes 
charged, going beyond the determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused, but 
not interfering with that determination then the ICC can be truly said to be a Court 
where the ascertainment of the truth is being given its proper significance. However, 
if the victim participants effectively act as additional prosecutors, whose primary 
interest lies in securing a conviction skewed in their own interest then the fairness, 
and efficiency of the proceedings will have been severely impaired for little gain. 
 
It is to be expected that, in most cases, the victims will be hostile to the accused. It 
will be in their direct interest to act like semi-prosecutors and produce evidence or ask 
questions demonstrating that guilt. A particular difficulty will arise where it is the 
case that the accused is an alleged indirect rather than direct perpetrator. The victims 
                                                 
1131 H. Friman, The International Criminal Court and Participation of Victims: A Third Party to the 
Proceedings? 22 Leiden Journal of International Law 485 (2009), 500. 
1132 Prosecutor v. Katanga and Ngudjolo, ICC-01/04-01/07-T-38-ENG ET, Confirmation of Charges 
Hearing - Open Session, Opening Statement by Mr. Diakiese, pages 56-62. Also see S. Maupas, La 
Chronique d’Amnesty International Mai 2010, Premier check-up pour la Cour pénale international, 
noting Gillison’s opening statement in the case of Katanga and Ngudjolo where he made similar 
submissions.  
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may not even know who is responsible for their suffering, but will have been told by 
others that it was the accused. Their submissions and questions, inevitably hostile to 
the interests of the accused, will be unlikely to bear upon the real issues to be decided 
by the bench and may simply muddle and lengthen proceedings. In addition, their 
submissions prolong the proceedings and place a heavy additional workload on the 
Chamber and the defence. If the defence is not allocated sufficient additional funds to 
deal with this workload, the equality of arms will be further distorted.1133
 
 
The first cases before the ICC are instructive as to the roles played by victim 
representatives, who may often represent hundreds of victims, with the difficulties 
that this brings with it. They have tended to ask questions seeking to implicate the 
accused, and to take the side of the Prosecutor in each legal argument. In the case of 
Katanga and Ngudjolo, a victim representative suggested to a witness who had not 
yet implicated the group allegedly led by one of the accused in the abduction of 
women and children that that group had in fact been involved. In response to an 
objection from the defence, the victim representative said: “I do understand that this is 
rather embarrassing for the Defence. I can put myself in their shoes, but I think truth 
is worth the price, regardless of how embarrassing it may be.”1134
 
 
The interventions of the victim representatives in Katanga & Ngudjolo have still been 
rather limited. Frequently the Chamber has reminded them of their neutral role and 
that they are not Prosecutors bis.1135 On the other hand, the Chambers in the Lubanga, 
Bemba and Kenya cases allowed far reaching interventions going directly to the guilt 
of the defendant. In Lubanga, for instance, victim representatives were allowed to ask 
questions about Lubanga’s link to the financial support to the UPC in order to help 
establish his role in the UPC leadership structure.1136
                                                 
1133 C. Safferling, The Role of the Victim in the Criminal Process – A Paradigm Shift in National 
German and International Law?, supra note 61, at 211; G.S. Gordon, “Toward an International 
Criminal Procedure: Due Process Aspiration and Limitations” 45 Columbia Journal for Transnational 
Law (2007) 635, at 699 – may dilute basic structural due process protections of ICC defendants; C. 
Van Der Wijngaert, lecture on victim participation, supra note 539, 11. 
 In Kenya, the legal 
1134 Prosecutor v. Katanga & Ngudjolo, hearing of 27 May 2010, ICC-01/04-01/07-T-148, pp 8-9, 
lines 23-25. 
1135 Prosecutor v. Katanga & Ngudjolo, hearing of 12 July 2010, page 15; 14 May 2010, 28-34; 23 
June 2010, 20. 
1136 Prosecutor v. Lubanga, T. 12 Feb 2009, 73; 02 July 2009, 2. See also: 9 July 2009, pages 24-25 
where the judges allowed questions about specific contact between the witness and the accused, as well 
as his knowledge of the use of child soldiers. In Bemba, questions to clarify facts or elicit additional 
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representative was allowed to read out personal emails she received from her clients 
alleging threats and intimidation from the suspects. This was part of her closing 
submission at the confirmation. Thus, the defence did not even have an opportunity to 
respond to these new allegations based on anonymous hearsay. The defence objected 
a number of times until the judge firmly stated: ‘Interruption will not be granted.’1137
  
 
These examples demonstrate that victim participants are not neutral. They have a 
direct monetary interest in establishing that the accused has committed crimes 
charged of which the victim participants are directly or indirectly a victim. The court, 
while making appropriate acknowledgment of the severe suffering endured by some 
of the victim participants and many other victims, must not place undue emphasis on 
it when deciding whether it is sure that the accused is guilty as charged.  
 
Another problem for the accused is that victim participants do not have the same 
disclosure obligations as the Prosecutor. The Appeals Chamber has held that ‘[i]f the 
Trial Chamber decides that the evidence [from victims] should be presented then it 
could rule on the modalities for the proper disclosure of such evidence before 
allowing it to be adduced . . . .’1138
 
 Thus, it is for the Chamber to determine on an ad 
hoc basis the extent of disclosure obligations on victim participants. 
Unlike the Prosecutor, victim representatives do not need to disclose the evidence 
before the start of the trial, but at a later point to be determined on a case-to-case basis 
by the Chamber. This will put the accused under time pressure in terms of seeking 
cross-examination material and rebuttal evidence. Victim representatives have no 
obligation to disclose exonerating evidence,1139 and may fail to do so for dubious 
tactical reasons, potentially depriving the Chamber of relevant information and the 
accused of a fair trial.1140
                                                                                                                                           
facts are allowed. They can include direct allegations against the accused (Bemba ICC-01/05-01/08-
807-Corr, 12 July 2010, paras 38-40). 
  
1137 ICC-01/09-01/11-T-12-ENG, 08-09-2011, 15-34 (quote at page 25). 
1138 Lubanga Appeals Chamber Decision on Victim’s Participation (n 1036 above), para. 100.  
1139 This was confirmed recently by the Appeals Chamber in the case against Mr. Katanga and 
Ngudjolo: Judgment on the Appeal of Mr Katanga Against the Decision of Trial Chamber II of 22 
January 2010 Entitled "Decision on the Modalities of Victim Participation at Trial" ICC-01/04-01/07-
2288, 16 July 2010, para. 71. 
1140 In the Katanga trial, one of the legal representatives had exonerating information which he declined 
to provide to the defence. Family members of a Prosecution witness who was simultaneously a victim 
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What can Victims Expect at the End of the Day? 
Victim participation may raise unrealistic hopes both as to the righting of individual 
wrongs and as to the issue of compensation since no price is high enough to remedy 
the injuries suffered. It is also unclear how victim participants will be remedied. 
Given their increasing number, whatever they will receive in compensation will 
probably be below expectations. This may then result in “tertiary victimisation” as 
Judge Van Der Wijngaert calls it.1141
 
 
Whatever may be its merits in principle, victim participation is one of the greatest 
challenges for the ICC and potentially delays and complicates already lengthy and 
complex trials. The ICC is still in the process of sorting out the modalities of victim 
participation in a manner consistent with its truth-ascertaining mandate and principles 
of due process. 
 
The proposed budget for 2012 for victim-related issues exceeds seven million 
Euros.1142
 
 This stands in stark contrast to the envisaged budget reductions for defence 
related issues. While the budget for victims and witnesses increases each year, the 
defence budget decreases this year by 15 percent. Drastic measures are being 
proposed including significant cuts of salaries and investigation budget. Thus, victim 
participation clearly undermines the position of the defence. On balance, it is 
debatable whether this sharp focus on victims is worth the price.  
Victims as Witnesses 
 
Victims can play a role as witnesses in the trials held in international courts and 
tribunals. This is a very crucial role. Trials cannot be held without victim witnesses 
who give testimony about their victimisation. However, empirical researchers suggest 
that many victims at the ICTY were disappointed with the experience of testifying. 
They found the court testimony stressful and felt let down and humiliated by defence 
                                                                                                                                           
had informed the legal representative that, contrary to his claim in court, he was not at Bogoro when it 
was attacked. The representative gave this information to the Prosecutor who subsequently investigated 
it. This eventually led to the withdrawal of one Prosecution witness who was simultaneously a victim. 
See: Public Decision on the Prosecution's renunciation of the testimony of witness P-159, ICC-01/04-
01/07-2731, 24-02-2011. 
1141 C. Van Der Wijngaert, lecture on victim participation, supra note 539, 14-15. 
1142 Ibid, pages 4, 14-15. 
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counsel. They also complained because they received no information about the case 
after their testimony. Accordingly, Stover concludes that testimony invokes “intrusive 
post-traumatic symptoms in victims of war crimes”.1143 ICTR victim witnesses have 
made similar complaints.1144
 
 
If victim witnesses perceive the experience of testifying as a traumatising event, other 
victim witnesses may be put off from testifying. This would have a consequent 
negative impact on the availability of evidence and on the ascertainment of the truth. 
This may also be unfortunate for the purpose of reconciliation, which some observers 
consider to be served by giving victims an opportunity to tell their story about what 
happened to them.1145
 
 
The veracity and causes of these complaints, as well as potential improvements, will 
be addressed below. 
 
Treatment of Witnesses Outside the Courtroom 
 
Victim witnesses are treated similarly to other witnesses. Sometimes, witnesses who 
are not qualified as victims equally express dissatisfaction with the experience of 
testifying. Witnesses have to come from far to an unfamiliar court whose language 
they barely speak or not at all. Many of them have never in their entire life left their 
region or been on a plane. They are also unsure what is to be expected from them. It is 
thus not surprising that witnesses feel uncomfortable about testifying.1146
 
 
A Victim and Witness Unit (“VWU”) is in charge of organising the visas, journey, 
accommodation and food.1147
                                                 
1143 E. Stover The Witness: War Crimes and the Promise of Justice in The Hague (University of 
Pennsylvania Press, 2005), 81; see also Doak, The Therapeutic Dimension of Transitional Justice, 
supra note 59, 281-283. 
 If requested, the VWU sends an escort to accompany 
1144 See for instance the submissions of Florida MS. Mukeshimana at Geneva Conference, supra note 
173, speaking about her traumatising experience as a witness before the ICTR. Ms. Conde, defence 
counsel explained to her that this is the function of the Court. 
1145 See the submissions of Xavier Nsanzuwera at the Geneva Conference, supra note 173. See also 
Doak, The Therapeutic Dimension of Transitional Justice, supra note 59. However, as aformentioned 
above (Part I), trials cannot be considered as therapeutic centres.  
1146 See also D. Chuter, War Crimes, Confronting Atrocity in the Modern World, (Lynne Rienner 
Publishers Inc, Ministry of Defence, Colorado 2003), 205-206. 
1147 In the ICTY, this unit is called the Victim and Witness Section (“VWS”). In the ICTR, it is called 
Witness and Victims Support Section (“WVSS”).  
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the witness. They arrange for pocket money, accommodation and food. In the ICC, 
the witnesses are also provided with a suit to wear in court, as well as comfortable 
winter clothes, if required. Urgent medical or dental problems can also be sorted out 
while witnesses are present at the seat of the Court. The VWU can further 
accommodate additional individual demands, provided they are reasonable and 
connected with the witnesses’ testimonies.1148
 
 Dependent on their availability, VWU 
staff members regularly take witnesses out for day-tours to cities or the beach during 
weekends or other breaks during their testimonies.   
Women with babies can come accompanied by an accompanying person who will 
look after the babies during the course of the women’s testimonies. Vulnerable 
witnesses can also be accompanied. Alternatively, a contact person from the VWU 
will pay particular attention to such witnesses and be available at any time they are in 
need. Psychological assistance is also available.1149
 
 
Upon request, witnesses who face a potential risk of self-incrimination may receive a 
guarantee that they will not be prosecuted for what they say in court, apart from 
perjury. The protection against self-incrimination offered at the ICC is more elaborate 
than at the ICTY and ICTR.1150 The ICC legal provisions explicitly allow witnesses to 
give incriminating parts of their testimony in closed session. In addition, they are 
entitled to counsel.1151
 
 
The period of absence can be long. Many witnesses spend several weeks at the seat of 
the Court even if the testimony itself is shorter. The period is particularly long at the 
ICC. The VWU at the ICC has created a lengthy familiarisation program to prepare 
witnesses for their testimony. This program starts a few days prior to the witness’s 
                                                 
1148 Personal experience with the VWU in ICTR, ICTY and ICC. 
1149 Personal experience in ICC with regard to a female defence witness with two very young children 
who was accompanied by a family member from the DRC to The Hague. Another witness was offered 
psychological assistance after the sudden and tragic death of a close family member. 
1150 The ICTY and ICTR Rules do not refer to a guarantee as such, but state as follows (Rule 90(E)): 
“A witness may object to making any statement which might tend to incriminate the witness. The 
Chamber may, however, compel the witness to answer the question. Testimony compelled in this way 
shall not be used as evidence in a subsequent prosecution against the witness for any offence other than 
false testimony.”  
1151 Article 93(2) ICC Statute; Rule 74 ICC Rules. See, for instance: Version publique expurgée de « 
Ordonnance relative à la mise en œuvre de l'article 93-2 du Statut et des règles 191 et 74 du Règlement 
de procédure et de preuve au profit de témoins de la Défense de Germain Katanga » (ICC-01/04-01/07-
2748-Conf) ICC-01/04-01/07-2748-Red, 3 May 2011. 
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testimony, and ends a number of days after his testimony. In the course of his 
familiarisation program, the parties and participants have an opportunity to greet the 
witness. The witness is further shown the courtroom and explained who sits where 
and the order in which the parties and participants will ask him questions.1152
 
  
The length of absence often causes difficulties to witnesses with jobs. Employers do 
not always act reasonably when a witness requests for leave of absence for a month or 
longer. This is particularly problematic if the employer is not informed of the real 
reason for the witness’s departure, which is the case when a witness testifies 
anonymously. The VWU can act as an intermediary and, for instance, write a letter to 
the employer, or assist the witness in inventing a credible story to explain his absence. 
The VWU reimburses witnesses for any lost income.1153
 
 In addition, if a witness is a 
student when he is called to testify, the VWU is prepared to assist him financially in 
re-taking any missed courses. 
There is no specific program to inform each individual witness of the continuation 
and outcome of the case in which they testified. There is, however, a very extensive 
outreach program at the ICTY, ICTR and ICC. The purpose of this program is to 
reach out to the affected communities and keep them informed about the 
developments at the international tribunals and court. Thus, witnesses are not 
forgotten after the completion of their testimony. They are clearly more than mere 
instruments of the international tribunals and court, as Judge Jorda put it.1154
 
 
Accordingly, witnesses for the Prosecution, defence and victim representatives are 
treated very well. This is particularly the case at the ICC, which is characterised by its 
“victim-friendliness”.1155
                                                 
1152 Personal experience in the ICC Katanga trial. 
 However, even at the ICTY and ICTR, the VWU is 
extremely helpful and generous to witnesses. In general, witnesses are satisfied with 
1153 The VWU has assisted a number of defence witnesses in their interactions with their employers. 
Where necessary, the VWU wrote official invitations stressing the importance of their testimonies. 
Consequently, employers authorised the witnesses leave of absence without great difficulty. 
1154 C. Jorda & J. de Hemptinne, The Status and Role of the Victim, in the Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court: A Commentary, in Cassese et al (2002), 1387, 1388. 
1155 C. Van Der Wijngaert, lecture on victim participation, supra note 539. 
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their treatment at the tribunals and court.1156 This undermines the viewpoint that the 
ICTY and ICTR are not sufficiently victim-centred.1157
 
 
However, despite the best efforts on the part of the VWU, some witnesses still 
complain. Sometimes, the logistical arrangements are not implemented as smoothly as 
intended.1158 On other occasions, witnesses demand more money for lost income or 
other issues. Witnesses from poor countries with very sparse resources do not always 
realise that the international courts and tribunals have budgetary limits. They can be 
under the erroneous belief that testifying is a financially profitable business. These 
witnesses undoubtedly find themselves disappointed.1159
 
  
There is also a genuine belief shared by many defence witnesses in the DRC that they 
are not treated equally to prosecution witnesses. This belief is based mainly on the 
fact that many prosecution witnesses are relocated and funded for housing and 
education. Relocated witnesses, however, fall in a different category from other 
witnesses. There is no reason to believe that defence witnesses receive a differential 
treatment from non-relocated prosecution or victim witnesses. All witnesses are in the 
very gentle and capable hands of the VWU. 
 
However, such a system comes at an extremely high price at the expense of other 
important issues, such as the investigation budget of the parties. The financial side of 
the witness program will be discussed below.  
 
Prohibition of Contact with the Parties 
 
The prohibition of contact at the ICC and its adverse impact on the defence ability to 
adequately investigate has already been discussed. This prohibition also has 
consequences for the well being of witnesses while in The Hague. Witnesses 
                                                 
1156 Personal interviews with witnesses from ICTY, ICTR and ICC after completion of their 
testimonies.  
1157 Doak, The Therapeutic Dimension of Transitional Justice, supra note 59, 297. 
1158 Things have gone particularly wrong with airport arrangements and visa. A number of witnesses 
have been kept by customs or had to pay airport tax although they were penniless. It has also occurred 
that witnesses had been left entirely deserted for weeks without proper information while waiting in a 
hotel in Kinshasa, a big city they had never been before, for their visa.  
1159 Personal experience of the author; confirmed by the experience of colleagues from the defence, 
prosecution and victims. 
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generally build up a relationship of confidence with members of the party they have 
been in contact with in their home country. Such relationships cannot easily be 
replaced by the VWU. In light of the cultural differences, it can take some time for 
witnesses to confide in a person. It can therefore be discomforting for witnesses to 
have no contact at all with the person they trust while in a foreign country. Often they 
do not know anyone there.  
 
Many of them have never left their area and have never been on a plane before. This 
can be either exciting, or frightening, or both at the same time. In the ICTY and 
ICTR, a party can welcome its witnesses at the airport or meet them at their hotels. It 
can have both casual and professional contact with them before and after their 
testimony, which generally reassures witnesses to the extent necessary. In the ICC, on 
the other hand, they are exclusively under charge of the VWU. The parties only have 
the right to greet them during a courtesy meeting lasting ten minutes when they arrive 
and five minutes after their testimony to say thank you.  
 
Some witnesses find this really difficult, even if the VWU treats them very well.1160 
The prohibition of contact extends to the presentation of all evidence in the case.1161 
Thus, even after their departure from The Hague, the parties cannot be in contact with 
the witnesses until the very end of the trial. This can be particularly unnatural for 
local investigators who live in the same area and who are used to having frequent 
contact with the witnesses up until their departure.1162
 
  
To avoid that parties willingly or unwillingly influence the witnesses’ testimonies, it 
may be considered necessary to disallow contact between them prior to these 
testimonies. Elsewhere, it has, however, been argued that appropriate and succinct 
contact should be allowed prior to the familiarisation program, and where necessary, 
                                                 
1160 Interviews with DRC defence witnesses after their testimonies. 
1161 Public Version publique expurgée de la Décision relative à la requête du Bureau du Procureur aux 
fins de communiquer avec le témoin P-250 (ICC-01/04-01/07-2711-Conf, 18 février 2011), ICC-01/04-
01/07-2711-Red, 10 mars 2011. 
1162 For instance, the investigator in the Katanga case resides in Bunia, the main town in Ituri, the 
eastern part of DRC. He lives in the close proximity of many defence witnesses and regularly meets 
them accidentally in the streets. His obligation not to engage in any conversation with them when that 
happens can be misunderstood and considered rude. This is all the more problematic given that he is 
from the enemy tribe. It has taken him significant time and effort to build up relations with the 
community of the accused, which was necessary to conduct investigations.  
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to take an additional statement from the witness.1163 Not everyone agrees with that 
proposition.1164 Nevertheless, there are no compelling reasons to prohibit contact after 
the completion of the witnesses’ testimonies. It would be too late for a witness to 
change his testimony even in the event that a party makes it apparent that parts of the 
testimony were not helpful. If the concern is that the party passes on a message for 
another witness, the party can simply contact the other witness directly. In theory, a 
witness can be recalled to clarify an issue that came up after his testimony. However, 
in practice this rarely happens.1165 This is, therefore, arguably an insufficient ground 
to prohibit all contact. In a party-system, the judges have no choice but to trust that 
the parties conduct themselves ethically. Indeed, unless proven otherwise, the good 
faith of the parties is assumed.1166
 
 
The prohibition of contact also extends to the accused. In the ICTY and ICTR, 
witnesses have the right to visit the accused in prison after the completion of their 
testimonies. The defence in Katanga & Ngudjolo asked that all defence witnesses be 
permitted to meet with the accused in prison after their testimony.1167 The Prosecution 
and victim representatives objected on the ground that the Chamber had already ruled 
that contact between the parties and the witnesses was prohibited until the end of the 
presentation of all evidence. Such contact was allowed on an exceptional basis 
only.1168
                                                 
1163 See further ‘Investigations’. 
 The Prosecution submitted that, were the Chamber to allow such meetings to 
1164 For instance, Andreas O’Shea, associate defence counsel in the Katanga case, as well as the 
defence counsel in Lubanga have informed the author that they are against such contact. 
1165 This has nonetheless already occurred in the Katanga & Ngudjolo case where Prosecution witness 
323 was called back because he had referred to a person with the same name as another witness in the 
case as a member of the UPC. The witness in question, however, had informed the court that he was a 
civilian. Therefore, the Chamber was of the view that “in order to establish the truth, it needs to be 
furnished with more evidence on the identification of the UPC soldier in question pursuant to Articles 
64(6)(d) and 69(3) of the Statute. In the view of the Chamber, the most effective and efficient way to 
achieve this is to re-call Witness P-323, either in person or via video-link” (ICC-01/04-01/07-2325-
Red, para. 23; ICC-01/04-01/07-T-185-Red-ENG, pages 1 – 5.  
1166 Prosecutor v. Tadic, Judgment on allegations of contempt against prior counsel, Milan Vujin, 
January 31, 2000, paras 166-168. 
1167 Defence Request for Defence Witnesses to Visit Germain Katanga in Prison after Completion of 
their Testimony (ICC-01/04-01/07-2773, 14 March 2011. 
1168 ICC-01/04-01/07-2780, Réponse conjointe des représentants légaux à la reqête de la Défense de G. 
Katanga intitulée “Defence Request for Defence Witnesses to Visit Germain Katanga in Prison after 
Completion of their Testimony”, 18 mars 2011; ICC-01/04-01/07-2779, Réponse de l’Accusation à la 
Defence Request for Defence Witnesses to Visit Germain Katanga in Prison after Completion of their 
Testimony (ICC-01/04-01/07-2773, 14 mars 2011), 18 mars 2011. 
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take place, it should be brief and in the presence of someone from the Registry. 
Discussing the testimony or using unknown languages should not be permitted.1169
 
  
The Registry also submitted observations holding that such meetings should not be 
allowed. It held that this could be a motive for witnesses to testify, as frequently 
occurred in the ICTY and ICTR. It also said it would delay the witnesses’ departure 
back to their home country and that the visit to prison could have a traumatising effect 
on the witnesses as they would have to go through the prison security. Instead, it 
suggested allowing the accused to greet the witnesses briefly in the Court 
immediately after their testimony.1170
 
  
Arguably, these are unconvincing grounds not to allow meetings between an accused 
and his witnesses. The defence cannot call an unlimited number of witnesses. It has to 
demonstrate their relevance; otherwise the Chamber may not authorise their 
appearance. Thus, it is extremely unlikely that anyone would be called on the sole 
basis that they can visit the accused. The traumatising effect of the prison security 
would surely be outweighed by the trauma of travelling thousands of miles to testify 
and not be able to meet with the accused. Since the accused is facing a potentially 
lengthy prison sentence, it could be the last opportunity to see him for a long time, or 
even for good. Some of them have close links with the accused. In the specific case of 
Katanga, the accused had not seen his family and friends since January 2005, when he 
left the eastern part of Congo for Kinshasa, thousands of miles away. Shortly after, he 
was arrested and remained in the Kinshasa central prison until his transfer to The 
Hague in October 2007.1171
                                                 
1169 ICC-01/04-01/07-2779, para. 6. 
 Nobody from his home area, including his family, could 
afford coming to visit him in Kinshasa or The Hague. Like any other prisoner, Mr. 
Katanga is entitled to receive visitors. To then not allow him to receive visits from the 
witnesses who he has not seen for years and have come all the way to testify in his 
1170 ICC-01/04-01/07-2784-Red, Observations du Greffe s’agissant de la “Defence Request for Defence 
Witnesses to visit Germain Katanga in Prison after Completion of their Testimony (ICC-01/04-01/07-
2773)”, 18 mars 2011. 
1171 ICC-01/04-01/07-T-39-ENG, David Hooper’s statement page 14:« He's been in prison now since 
February of 2005. Three and a half years already.” See also ICC-01/04-01/07-717, para. 42 page 17: 
“On 17 October 2007, Germain Katanga was surrendered by the Congolese authorities and 
transferred to the seat of the Court in The Hague”. 
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defence, is rather inhuman. Such visits can be subject to monitoring and do therefore 
not raise difficulties for the Court. 
 
The Chamber nonetheless rejected the request and reiterated that it would authorise 
contact on an exceptional basis only. It authorised a monitored meeting between the 
accused and his brother for half an hour immediately after his testimony.1172 All other 
witnesses were allowed a five-minute monitored meeting in a little cell behind the 
courtroom. Further requests for longer meetings with close allies were rejected.1173
 
 
The prohibition of contact has become a serious problem when three detained 
witnesses sought asylum and were thus not sent back to DRC immediately after their 
testimony as anticipated.1174 They were detained in the same prison as the accused, 
but were not allowed to speak to him until all evidence had been presented. This has 
led to great logistical difficulties. They could not simultaneously take fresh air, 
participate in sport activities or use the common facilities such as the kitchen and 
dining room. If the witnesses were outside of their cell, the accused had to stay in his 
cell, and vice versa. As a result, both the witnesses and the accused were locked up in 
their cell for a significantly longer period than prisoners normally are. This situation 
lasted for over five months. It was particularly difficult in the summer break when the 
accused did not leave the prison to attend trial. For five consecutive weeks, both 
accused were locked up for twenty hours a day.1175
                                                 
1172 ICC-01/04-01/07-T-238-ENG ET WT 23-03-2011 pages 1-7. 
  
1173 See Defence Request for Leave to Meet Four Defence Witnesses in The Hague Prior to Their 
Testimony, ICC-01/04-01/07-2709-Red 17-02-2011, and Décision sur la requête de la Défense de 
Germain Katanga aux fins d'être autorisée à rencontrer des témoins à La Haye (article 64-6-f du 
Statut), ICC-01/04-01/07-2755 23-03-2011 (pursuant to Trial Chamber II's instruction, dated 22-03-
2011, this document was reclassified as "Public"). 
1174 See further section ‘protective measures’. 
1175 See oral submissions from Lead Counsel for Germain Katanga, ICC-01/04-01/07-T-291-Red-ENG 
CT WT 15-08-2011, pages 52-55: “… What has happened is that they’ve been subject to a regime 
where they have been let out of their cells between the hours of 1300 and 1700; that is a period of four 
hours a day. For all the rest of the time, Germain Katanga, and I think I must therefore include also 
Mathieu Ngudjolo, have spent in their locked cell with no opportunity of leaving it. They have been let 
out just four hours a day; less on weekends. They, therefore, have been locked in their cells for 20 
consecutive hours, and these are cells that have no opening window at all. So, normally, with a week of 
168 hours in it, 71‐and‐a‐half hours, under a normal regime, would allow these men to spend those 
hours, 71‐and‐a‐half hours, outside their cell. At present, they’ve been reduced to 27.5 hours. That is a 
loss of 44 hours a week. That means that out of 168 hours in a week, 141 hours would have been spent 
in a locked cell. Bizarrely, the Kinshasa detainees, as opposed to the 27.5 hours spent outside the cell 
by the two accused, they have the opportunity of 44.5 hours outside the cell. So, really, the burden of 
accommodating the Kinshasa detainees has fallen full and square on the shoulders of the two accused. 
….” 
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Counsel for the detained witnesses, as well as the defence for Katanga have made 
multiple requests to the Chamber that the witnesses and accused be allowed contact in 
this exceptional situation; or that an alternative solution be found.1176
 
  
The Prosecution and victim representatives objected because they said there was a 
possibility that the witnesses would be called back.1177 They had given lengthy 
testimonies, so there was no apparent reason for them to be called back. Indeed, in 
reality, there were not called back. The Chamber declined to review its decision that 
contact was prohibited. Instead, it ordered the Registry to make all efforts to allow the 
witnesses and accused sufficient time out of their cell, even if it required the 
employment of more security guards.1178 The Registry, however, informed the 
Chamber that the logistical arrangements in the prison did not allow for a more 
humane solution.1179
                                                 
1176 ICC-01/04-01/07-2988 14-06-2011, Defence Observations on the Conditions of Detention of Three 
Detained Witnesses, 7 June 2011 (pursuant to Trial Chamber II's Oral Decision, dated 14 June 2011, 
this document was reclassified as "PUBLIC"); ICC-01/04-01/07-T-273-Red-ENG, 01-06-2011, page 
39 and following. See also ibid. 
 
1177 ICC-01/04-01/07-T-273-Red-ENG WT 01-06-2011, pages 46, 49. 
1178 ICC-01/04-01/07-T-281-Red-ENG WT 14-06-2011, 4-7, in particular 6-7: “Regarding the interest 
to act by the Katanga Defence, the Chamber considers that it is legitimate for the Defence to be 
concerned with the detention conditions of the witnesses that they called and that they are justified in 
asking for this lifting of restrictions. Now, regarding the merits of the issue itself, the Chamber would 
like to point out that the restriction measures were ordered in accordance with the jurisprudence 
relating to contacts between a witness and a party that called that witness, and this is to avoid any 
future challenge regarding the integrity of the proceedings. To this end, the Chamber is of the opinion 
that the implementation of the restrictions by the Registry means that it is necessary to avoid any 
contact between the two groups of detained persons given the objective sought, that is, to prevent the 
exchange of information. That said, the Chamber would like to point out that it is not necessary to take 
measures to lock the witnesses up just in order to prevent visual contact or to prevent the groups from 
meeting and from seeing each other in the detention centre. Furthermore, as already indicated, during 
a hearing of the 1st of June, 2011, the Chamber is sensitive to the humanitarian considerations raised. 
To that end, the Chamber intends to ensure that the detention of persons under the responsibility of the 
Court should take place under the best possible conditions, particularly in the instant case when this 
detention concerns a case of witnesses who have filed for asylum and which may lead to an extension 
of the stay of those witnesses in the detention centre of the Court. Under these exceptional conditions, 
the Court is of the opinion that the implementation of less restrictive measures authorising contacts 
with the co-detained persons of the two accused while the accused are in the hearings would be the 
most acceptable decision. The Chamber would like to ask Mr. Mabanga, who is the counsel of the 
detained witnesses, to remind the detained witnesses that they should not in any way whatever the 
circumstances discuss the case with the detained persons who, from now on, will be authorised to meet 
them. The Chamber, however, will not come back on its decision on the restrictions relating to direct 
contacts between the accused and the detained witnesses. The Chamber is of the opinion that the 
detention conditions described by the Registry do not involve total isolation and they had been initially 
announced and are not in any way and should not in any way be used as justification to order a 
waiver.” 
1179 ICC-01/04-01/07-2983-Conf-Red, Version confidentielle expurgée du Rapport du Greffe sur les 
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Thus, the prohibition of contact has done more damage than good and should 
arguably be reviewed. It has contributed to the discomfort of witnesses and has served 
little purpose.  
 
In addition, there is no good reason to treat victims differently from other witnesses. 
If the well being of victims is important to international justice, then the well being of 
non-victim witnesses should be considered equally important. Testifying can be 
traumatising for all witnesses, including victims, insider witnesses and any other 
defence or prosecution witnesses. Doak rightly observed that international courts and 
tribunals “can only function with the full assistance of victims”.1180 However, they 
equally need the full assistance of insider and other witnesses. Therefore, Doak’s 
suggestion that this need for victim witnesses creates obligations towards them should 
be extended to all witnesses.1181
 
 The needs of each witness should be looked at 
individually, rather than categorically. This has been the approach of the VWU at the 
ICTY, ICTR and ICC and has generally worked well. 
Testimony 
 
It is the testimony itself, more than the treatment outside the courtroom that causes 
witnesses to complain. Both educated and uneducated witnesses find testifying a 
difficult and exhausting exercise.1182 The bulk of testimonies last at least a few days 
each counting four to five hours. Some may even take a few weeks. The testimony is 
frequently interrupted by objections from the parties. Most of the objections pertain to 
the suggestive nature or irrelevance of a question posed. Procedural discussions can 
take days sometimes.1183
 
 
                                                                                                                                           
conditions de détention actuelles des trois témoins détenus, 6 June 2011. Pursuant to Trial Chamber II's 
Oral Decision, dated 14 June 2011, this document is reclassified as "PUBLIC"; Rapport du Greffier sur 
les conditions de détention des témoins détenus depuis le 14 juin 2011 ICC-01/04-01/07-3058, 05-07-
2011. 
1180 Doak, The Therapeutic Dimension of Transitional Justice, supra note 59, 291. 
1181 Ibid, 291. 
1182 After completion of their testimonies, defence witnesses have informed the author of the 
difficulties they encountered in the course of their testimonies. 
1183 For instance, in Military I the testimony of Allison Des Forges lasted two months (Sept and Oct 
2002). Many days, however, were devoted to procedural matters only without even calling in the 
witness to continue her testimony.  
 
 
291 
Witnesses have to answer questions from both parties as well as the judges. In the 
ICC, they also have to answer questions from the victim representatives. These 
questions tend to be challenging, as they seek to undermine the credibility of the 
witnesses. The witnesses are well aware that their credibility is not taken for granted 
and often feel trapped by questions from the other side. This can be unpleasant and 
stressful.1184
 
  
It can also be frustrating for witnesses that they cannot tell their story uninterruptedly 
in their own style. The lawyers, rather than the witnesses are the storytellers. Lawyers 
lead them through the evidence and elicit only those elements helpful to their case. 
Witnesses have to give succinct answers to precise questions asked. Consequently, 
their accounts are often suppressed, distorted or taken out of context.1185 According to 
Doak, this manner of presenting the evidence leads victims to feel let down. It also 
has anti-therapeutic effects.1186
 
 
Accordingly, scholars have suggested that testimony in an adversarial setting leads to 
second victimisation. In their view, subjecting victims to cross-examination at all 
dehumanises them and makes them re-live their trauma.1187 An adversarial system is 
confrontational and hostile to the witness even if efforts are made to control the 
questioning.1188
 
  
Some observers opine that this is even more the case in international trials than in 
common law adversarial trials. Particularly victims of rape are said to suffer from a 
second victimisation in the courtroom. Doak, for instance, states that rape victims 
often have to answer questions from defence counsel that are extremely aggressive 
                                                 
1184 Doak, The Therapeutic Dimension of Transitional Justice, supra note 59; N. Combs, Fact-Finding 
Without Facts, The Uncertain Evidentiary Foundations of International Criminal Convictions 
(Cambridge University Press, 2010); E. Stover The Witness: War Crimes and the Promise of Justice in 
The Hague (University of Pennsylvania Press, 2005). 
1185 Doak, The Therapeutic Dimension of Transitional Justice, supra note 59, 271-274; E. Stover The 
Witness: War Crimes and the Promise of Justice in The Hague (University of Pennsylvania Press, 
2005) (above). 
1186 Doak, The Therapeutic Dimension of Transitional Justice, supra note 59, 273-274.  
1187 M. Dembour & E. Haslam, Silencing Hearings? Victim-Witnesses at War Crimes Trials, 15 
European Journal of International Law 151 (2004); R. Dixon, Rape as a Crime in International 
Humanitarian Law: Where to from Here, 13 European Journal of International Law 697 (2002). 
1188 DeLaet, Gender Justice, supra note 59, at 165. 
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and humiliating in an attempt to destroy their credibility.1189 In reaching this 
conclusion, he relies on empirical researchers including Amanda Beltz who have 
personally observed some of the international trials. Beltz witnessed a trial where a 
woman testified that she was not selected to be raped, while other women with her 
were. Defence counsel then asked her whether she was jealous of the women who 
were chosen to be raped.1190
 
  
On the basis of this example, Doak concludes:1191
Although this type of questioning is now widely frowned upon and is restricted in 
many common law jurisdictions, victims of rape can still expect a raw deal in the type 
of questioning they might experience at international courts. Rules prohibiting use of 
previous sexual history evidence have been bypassed on occasions at both the ICTY 
and SCSL severely damaging any prospect of emotional repair. We can only hope 
that the ICC adopts a more robust approach to the exclusion of such evidence. 
 
 
It is questionable how Doak reaches this conclusion on the basis of such limited 
empirical research conducted by others than himself. The given example indisputably 
constitutes an unacceptable and irrelevant question. Such a question does not serve 
any purpose other than humiliating the witness. For a competent counsel, it should not 
be necessary to humiliate a witness to such an extent in order to undermine her 
credibility. Strategically, this is very unwise. By humiliating a traumatised victim, the 
defence looses the sympathy of the judges and audience, and the victim’s credibility 
is boosted rather than undermined.1192 Thus, defence counsel rarely choose such a 
strategy. In many cases, the defence does not even challenge the victimhood of a 
witness.1193
                                                 
1189 Doak, The Therapeutic Dimension of Transitional Justice, supra note 59, 283-284. See also M. 
Dembour & E. Haslam, Silencing Hearings? Victim-Witnesses at War Crimes Trials, 15 European 
Journal of International Law 151 (2004); R. Dixon, Rape as a Crime in International Humanitarian 
Law: Where to from Here, 13 European Journal of International Law 697 (2002), 705. 
  
1190 A. Beltz, Persecuting rape in international criminal tribunals: the need to balance victims’ rights 
with the due process rights of the accused, 23 St. John’s Journal of Legal Commentary 167 (2008), 
cited by Doak, Doak, The Therapeutic Dimension of Transitional Justice, supra note 59, 284. 
1191 Doak, The Therapeutic Dimension of Transitional Justice, supra note 59, 284. 
1192 Personal experience of the author; interviews with defence counsel: Ben Gumpert (August 2006); 
David Hooper Q.C. (Interview in The Hague, 3 June 2010), Peter Robinson (Interview in The Hague, 
21 November 2009). 
1193 See for instance, Defence Counsel for Katanga in respect of Witness P-0132, ICC-01/04-01/07-T-
139-Red-ENG WT 11-05-2010, page 14:  
“A. Some of them raped me. 
 Q. Before we continue on this aspect, I know that it is extremely difficult for you to talk about this to 
us today, but for us to be clear, when you say that you were raped -- 
 
 
293 
 
Most of the accused at the ICTY and ICTR are not charged with direct participation in 
any of the alleged atrocities, but rather with indirect forms of liability such as 
ordering, instigating, planning, aiding and abetting, participating in a joint criminal 
enterprise or commanding. The link of the accused to any of the alleged crimes is 
more often in dispute than the actual commission of the crimes.1194 It is then not 
necessary to challenge crime-base evidence. It can even be more advantageous for an 
accused to accept the credibility of a victim witness and use him or her to confirm 
contested elements favourable to the accused.1195 Therefore, unless victims 
incriminate the accused directly,1196 they generally have a much easier time in cross-
examination than insider witnesses whose evidence is mostly more vigorously 
contested.1197
 
  
It can be trickier when a victim is questioned by the accused himself. The advantage, 
however, is that the accused and accusers have an opportunity to confront each other 
directly. By some, a direct confrontation is preferred over a confrontation through 
lawyers.1198
                                                                                                                                           
MR. HOOPER: (Previous translation continues) ... for my part, I'm sure for my colleagues as well, 
when this witness asserts "rape," we understand it to mean penile penetration per vagina, and that's not 
disputed. 
 For instance, one witness who was cross-examined by Slobodan 
Milosevic himself, seemed to appreciate the opportunity to direct his anger to the man 
THE WITNESS: (Interpretation) Yes, that is how it happened. 
PRESIDING JUDGE COTTE: (Interpretation) Madam Witness, take some time to rest. 
 MR. GARCIA: (Interpretation) Mr. President, I think it would be necessary to suspend, given the state 
of the witness. 
PRESIDING JUDGE COTTE: (Interpretation) Madam Witness, we are going to break for 15 minutes. 
We will resume at 10.00 a.m. This should give you time to recover. 
1194 See, for instance, the opening observations of counsel for Katanga, ICC-01/04-01/07-T-80-ENG 
ET WT 24-11-2009, page 51: “And all Ituri, all its inhabitants became victims. Nobody was left 
untouched. In this trial, we hear the voices mainly of Hema victims. And I don't detract from their 
miseries one iota, but it is, we must remember, a selective voice. And we will not hear from the mass of 
Ngiti victims, of which there were a great number. » 
See also the opening observations of Mr. Musau, counsel for Ruto in Kenya I: ICC-01/09-01/11-T-5-
ENG ET WT 01-09-2011, p. 87: “The violence that broke out in Kenya had never been witnessed 
before. We think the devil must have made a short journey to the republic but not at the invitation of 
William Ruto.” 
1195 See for instance, cross-examination of Witness DRC‐OTP‐P‐0166, where the defence sought to 
have the witness confirm elements favourable to the accused: ICC-01/04-01/07-T-225-Red-ENG CT 
WT 30-11-2010, ICC-01/04-01/07-T-226-Red-ENG WT 01-12-2010 and ICC-01/04-01/07-T-227-
Red-ENG WT 02-12-2010. 
1196 For instance: Witness DRC‐V19‐P‐0002, ICC-01/04-01/07-T-231-Red-ENG WT 21-02-2011, p. 
57; DRC‐V19‐P‐0004, ICC-01/04-01/07-T-234-Red-ENG CT WT 24-02-2011, page 26. 
1197 See for instance, ICC-01/04-01/07-T-221-Red-ENG WT 23-11-2010 WT 24-11-2010, Witness 
DRC‐OTP‐P‐0028, page 6. 
1198 Doak, The Therapeutic Dimension of Transitional Justice, supra note 59. 
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he held responsible for his victimisation.1199 Witnesses who were cross-examined by 
Karadzic spoke to him on equal foot and generally did not appear intimidated. This is 
apparent from the following dialogue between Karadzic and prosecution witness 
Fatima Zaimovic, who was the chief of the nursery department in a hospital in 
Sarajevo during the war:1200
Q.   All right.  We'll come to that.  But you didn't know, you say,that all the 
offensives that were launched in Sarajevo were launched by the BH Army.  Is that 
what you said? 
 
A.   Yes, that's right.  I didn't know. 
Q.   How is that possible when it was on television, the information was broadcast 
over television?  The people were told what positions they had taken control of and 
where they broke through, and so on. 
 A.   Mr. Karadzic, I was at the clinic.  There was no electricity or water.  The 
children were wounded.  We didn't know where to turn first, we had so much work to 
do.  We worked from morning to night.  And when I went home, I was so tired and I 
didn't even have any food to cook for the children.  My life during the war was very 
difficult, and I don't know about anything of the things you're asking me about, and 
I'm not interested in them.  I have to be quite sincere there.  You're asking me about 
military matters, something that you should ask military experts and not me.  I have 
come here to testify about the difficulties that the children were facing, children who 
were wounded and who were killed, whose parents were crying, whose lives were 
disrupted and were targeted like pigeons in town.  Of that's what I want to say.  Do 
you have any conscience?  Do you have a conscience, because you destroyed the 
Muslim children and the Croatian children and the Serbian children.  That's what you 
did.  You destroyed them all.  That's what I've come here to talk about and not to 
speak about military strategy that I know nothing whatsoever about. 
Q.   Thank you, madam, but as soon as you say that somebody shot, you provide the 
basis for me to ask you why and how.  As soon as you're saying that Breka was 
shelled, I had to put it to you that your son was a member of the 105th Brigade which 
numbered 6.000 men and that the whole place was teeming with soldiers, that there 
were more soldiers than the inhabitants of Breka. 
 A.   Leave my son alone.  That's not true and leave my son alone.  I'm not talking 
about your children.  I don't want us to talk about our children.  We're discussing 
                                                 
1199 See the testimony of a survivor from Glogova in the ICTY case of Milosevic, T. 15 April 2003 
B1701:  
 3    Q (Milosevic).   Let us just try and clear up one thing.  You say that those people 
 4    had socks over their heads. 
 5    A.   Yes, socks. 
 6    Q.   And you can't recognise them.  And do you know that the JNA did 
 7    not wear socks on their heads? 
 8    A.   They didn't, but I -- we lived as brothers in the old days when we 
 9    used to say, "Comrade Milosevic."  Everything changed when you came to 
10   power. You knew about everything. And don't ask me too many questions. 
See also the cross-examination of protected witness VS 033, a former subordinate of Seselj, conducted 
by Seselj himself, T. 2 April 2008, (ICTY case of Seselj) at: 
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/seselj/trans/en/080402ED.htm. 
1200 T. 5 May 2010, page 1865 at: http://www.icty.org/x/cases/karadzic/trans/en/100505ED.htm. See 
also Karadzic’s cross-examination of a witness to whom he put it that he did not believe his story. The 
witness answered as follows: “Karadzic, when you are saying that as if that is the truth, may you look 
at your own children dead.  When you see them dead, the way mothers did when their children were 
killed, and this is going to be confirmed to you by a witness who found clothing by the grave” (T. 22 
April 2010, page 1449 at: http://www.icty.org/x/cases/karadzic/trans/en/100422ED.htm).   
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something quite different here. 
Q.   Madam, I have every respect for your husband who was a friend of mine and 
your child, and it was his duty to -- 
JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Karadzic.  Mr. Karadzic. 
THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes. 
JUDGE KWON:  Come to your questions.  You haven't cross-examined yet the 
evidence which was given by this witness.  Let's move on to your real topic, please. 
 
In cases where an accused or his counsel go too far in asking embarrassing questions, 
judges will almost certainly intervene. Typically in international courts, the 
examination of witnesses is subject to greater control by the judges than in domestic 
common law proceedings. Questions that are considered to humiliate or embarrass the 
victim are generally not permitted.1201 Judges barely tolerate suggestions being put to 
witnesses that they are lying.1202
 
 
Indeed, in the course of twelve years as participant in, and observer of international 
trials in the ICTY, ICTR, SCSL and ICC, this author has not observed a single line of 
questioning of a similar nature as the above example. On the contrary, judges are 
generally very courteous to witnesses and try to make them feel comfortable. They 
frequently ask witnesses on the stand about their well-being and willingness to 
proceed.1203
                                                 
1201 Personal observation from the author. See also ICTR Judge Khan’s submissions at the Geneva 
Conference, supra note 173, explaining how much care her Chamber takes to make a witness feel 
comfortable. See also: ICC-01/04-01/07-T-270-Red-ENG CT WT 27-05-2011, female defence witness 
DRC‐D02‐P‐0161 questioned by the Prosecution, page 23 : “JUDGE DIARRA: (Interpretation) Your 
Honour, I don’t understand this. He asked were you demobilized. She said yes. He said you weren’t a 
soldier. She said yes. And now she’s asked if she was lying. Does she have to insult herself to continue 
this?” 
  
1202 Ibid. See further, for instance, Judge Mose in Military I who routinely repeated to the parties that 
“people do not lie in this courtroom”. See, for instance, T. 15 June 2004 pages 87-89. Although judges 
have the ability to prosecute witnesses who have lied under oath but are reluctant to do so, even if there 
is ample evidence to show this to be the case. For a critical comment on this reality, see A. Zahar, The 
Problem of False Testimony at the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, supra note 890.   
1203 See, for instance, Judge Schomburg in: 
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/dragan_nikolic/trans/en/031103ED.htm, page 227: “Should you have any 
problems, please tell the Bench immediately that we can take the necessary measures”, also page 258: 
“Please take into account the state of the witness, and I -- I ask you on purpose: Do you have 
inevitable, mandatory, additional questions?”; See also Judge Cotte in the Katanga & Ngudjolo case, 
Witness DRC‐OTP‐P‐0353, ICC-01/04-01/07-T-213-Red-ENG WT 04-11-2010, page 63: “Q. Did they 
do anything else other than sing? A. What I saw was that they would sing. One day they brought a 
young man, and they slit his throat. That disgusted me.  
MS. DARQUES‐LANE: (Interpretation) Your Honour, perhaps we could suspend for a few moments. 
PRESIDING JUDGE COTTE: (Interpretation) Madam Witness, we will stop for a few moments so 
you can regain your composure. Please take some time. Witness, do you think you can go on? 
THE WITNESS: (Interpretation) Yes. 
PRESIDING JUDGE COTTE: (Interpretation) We will go on, madam, but you must realize that it is 
entirely legitimate to cry. If you need to cry from time to time because you cast your mind back to 
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Judges further tend to protect victim witnesses, particularly victims of rape. A 
provision has been adopted which deals specifically with the evidence of victims of 
sexual assault. Pursuant to Rule 96 of the ICTY and ICTR Rules and Rules 70 to 72 
ICC Rules, evidence relating to prior sexual conduct is not admissible; and relating to 
consent only upon a Chamber’s predetermination of its credibility and relevance.1204 
Protective measures, as well as special measures to comfort a witness are also 
available. Special measures may include the allowance of the presence in the 
courtroom of a counsel, legal representative, psychologist or family member during 
the testimony of the victim or witness.1205 In addition, Chambers are under an 
obligation to be “vigilant in controlling the manner of questioning a witness or victim 
so as to avoid any harassment or intimidation, paying particular attention to attacks on 
victims of crimes of sexual violence.”1206
 
  
The extent to which these principles have been applied in practice varies from 
Chamber to Chamber. However, contrary to the suggestion of Doak and other 
observers, these rules have been applied with rigor by almost all ICTY, ICTR and 
ICC Chambers. Beltz’s example is really the exception rather than the rule. The 
author’s experience in this respect concords with Judge Van Der Wijngaert’s 
experience at the ICTY. During a lecture, she informed her audience that she saw 
“many courageous victims who were very keen to come and testify and tell their 
stories, and the cross-examination process, although difficult at times, was practiced 
with restraint and caution by counsel appearing before the tribunal and, if necessary, 
was controlled by presiding judges.”1207
 
  
This does not take away the fact that some witnesses are not happy witnesses. Both in 
the ICTY, ICTR and ICC, judges intervene frequently to calm down a witness. 
Emotions can be very heated and tears are often shed. This is particularly the case 
                                                                                                                                           
things that are difficult for you, the Court and everyone here certainly understands that. So if it happens 
again, we will stop for a moment so that you can take some time and then feel better.” 
1204 ICTY/ICTR Rule 96(ii) and (iii) respectively; Rules 70-72 ICC Rules. Rule 72(2) refers to 
relevance and admissibility, rather than credibility as under the ICTY/ICTR Rules. 
1205 Rule 88 ICC Rules; ICTY/ICTR Rules 34 and 75(B)(iii). 
1206 Rule 88(5) ICC Rules. See also ICTY/ICTR Rule 75(D) pursuant to which “A Chamber shall 
control the manner of questioning to avoid any harassment or intimidation.” 
1207 C. Van Der Wijngaert, lecture on victim participation, supra note 539. 
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when victim witnesses testify to traumatising events.1208 However, also insider 
witnesses regularly burst out in tears.1209 Most of these strong reactions from 
witnesses are, however, not caused by improper questioning from the parties. Being 
reminded of unpleasant memories mixed with stress can stir up such emotions. 
Frequently, witnesses react in a very rude and angry manner to normal and 
appropriate questions, so much so that judges must intervene and insist that they 
answer the question.1210 One accused had a very strong and tearful reaction to a 
completely neutral question from the judge.1211
                                                 
1208 See, for instance, Witness P-0132, ICC-01/04-01/07-T-138-Red-ENG WT 10-05-2010, page 76:  
 
“PRESIDING JUDGE COTTE: (Interpretation) Please stop for a moment, ma'am. 
(Trial Chamber confers) 
 PRESIDING JUDGE COTTE: (Interpretation) Ma'am, it is very painful for you to tell us what you 
experienced at that time, and at the same time, Witness, it is very important, it is very important for the 
Court, it is very important for all those who are taking part in this trial and who are here to shed light 
on matters for the Court, the Defence teams, the Legal Representatives, and it's important for you as 
well even though it is very difficult to talk about all that. And it is also very important for all the people 
who died, and you -- people who died and you're telling us how they died before an International 
Criminal Court, and these people deserve to have their stories told before an International Criminal 
Court. So it is very difficult but very important.” 
See also Witness DRC‐OTP‐P‐0353, ICC-01/04-01/07-T-213-Red-ENG WT 04-11-2010, page 63. 
1209 See for instance DRC‐OTP‐P‐0028, ICC-01/04-01/07-T-216-Red-ENG WT 15-11-2010, page 52-
53. 
1210 See Witness DRC‐OTP‐P‐0028, ICC-01/04-01/07-T-220-Red-ENG WT 22-11-2010, page 25-26: 
“Q. So what it comes down to, Mr. Witness, is this: In order to give or provide some proof of your date 
of birth being as it appears on these documents, you produced forged documents. That’s right, isn’t it? 
 A. Your Honour, I am ashamed. I am really ashamed, Mr. Presiding Judge. I wanted to ask you the 
following question: What is the ICC’s work? What is the aim of this court? What motivates the court? 
Because I do not know what the objective of the ICC is. The only thing that I do know is that the 
International Criminal Court does exist, but I don’t know what the objective of it is. I don’t know what 
its aims are. If you could please tell me, your Honour, what the ICC does. 
 PRESIDING JUDGE COTTE: (Interpretation) Witness, in the very first hearing, I think I recalled that 
it’s normally not up to the witness to ask questions, but the witness, rather, has questions put to him or 
her. Having said this, I shall now answer some of your questions. I am now going to answer the 
question you are asking now. We are here, and you know, to try two accused persons who have been 
accused of a certain number of crimes. And as I told you some time ago, that is important, and I think 
you understood me. But let me remind you. These two accused persons have a right to a legal defence. 
That is the situation in which all accused persons should be before all criminal courts in the world 
when we are in a democratic country, and within the framework of the legal defence of an accused 
person, the counsel for that accused person can ask a certain number of questions. Those questions1 are 
asked not to persecute the witness, but, rather, to ensure that a certain number of statements made by 
the witness in the course of his interviews before the OTP are correct. What Counsel Hooper is trying 
to do now is ‐‐ he’s trying to understand why different dates of birth appear in documents which 
purport to be your documents. He’s trying to clarify this, because he feels that this is important for the 
defence of his client. He has just asked you whether or not you falsified certain identity documents, and 
apparently you are shocked by these questions, because you probably feel that you are being accused of 
committing an offence. The only thing that is requested of you, Mr. Witness, is to answer. If you feel 
that falsification did not take place, say so. You should simply tell us what you deem to be the truth. 
However, this counsel or the counsel from the other Defence team do not intend to deliberately put you 
in difficulty. They are doing their job, and you have to understand that. They are doing their job, and 
you should answer the questions spontaneously, and you should say things to the best of your 
knowledge. We have already gone over this territory, but I have to repeat these things to you, because I 
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Thus, it is apparent that testifying may be the cause of frustration, anger and tears. 
This is the case for all witnesses, not only for victim witnesses. Regrettably, scholars 
have mainly focused on the experience of victim witnesses despite the fact that many 
other witnesses testifying for either side are also vulnerable and traumatised.1212 In 
light of their incredible experiences, it is not surprising that witnesses react 
emotionally. Testifying cannot remove their initial victimisation.1213
 
  
However, accepting that testifying can be a painful process does not justify the 
conclusion that such witnesses experience a second victimisation. The expression of 
emotions is not necessarily evidence of a feeling of victimisation. On the contrary, it 
                                                                                                                                           
see that you are shocked. You should answer. You should tell the truth. That’s what you promised to 
do. You should speak the truth. That’s the only thing we request of you.” 
See also Witness DRC‐OTP‐P‐0028, ICC-01/04-01/07-T-221-Red-ENG WT 23-11-2010, page 8-9: 
“Q. Wait for a moment. Please wait for a moment. Just look at the document that’s coming now with 
the underlined ‐‐ there it is. 
A. We’re not joking around here. We’re not joking around. I ‐‐ I can stand up if you want. I could stand 
up and answer you, if you want. We’re not joking around here. 
PRESIDING JUDGE COTTE: (Interpretation) Witness. Witness. It is not easy, as Mr. Hooper pointed 
out, to work on the basis of rather full documents with a lot of information. The Court Usher will stay 
with you for a moment, if you will, so that we will be sure that you’re looking at the correct line, which 
is the line upon which Mr. Hooper is basing his questions. So, Court Usher, please make sure that you 
are on the page 0319 with the reference 832/01, and from thereon, on that very line, Mr. Hooper will be 
basing his questions. 
THE WITNESS: (Interpretation) Yes. 
JUDGE DIARRA: (Interpretation) Mr. Witness. 
THE WITNESS: (Interpretation) This is completely separate. It has got nothing to do with me. 
JUDGE DIARRA: (Interpretation) You do not have to stand up to answer this question. Everybody is 
sitting around this room, and we are here to hear you. If you were to stand up, it would be looked upon 
badly. Getting angry solves nothing. Please, I beg you, remain calm and answer the question for respect 
for the Chamber. I beseech you, do not go thinking that standing up would be a good idea. This would 
be seen very negatively. 
THE WITNESS: (Interpretation) He’s making a mockery of me. 
JUDGE DIARRA: (Interpretation) He’s doing his job. This is the way that it goes. Please do not stand 
up. 
PRESIDING JUDGE COTTE: (Interpretation) Mr. Witness, we shall now continue calmly, as Judge 
Diarra has just said. Counsel Hooper is going to ask his questions. Perhaps it will not always be 
obvious to you why he’s asking those questions, but he has a strategy in his head that is his strategy, 
and your job is just to answer to the best of your knowledge.” 
1211 See the testimony of Mr. Ngudjolo (Witness DRC‐D03‐P‐0707, ICC-01/04-01/07-T-331-Red-
ENG ET 09-11-2011), page 63; ICC-01/04-01/07-T-332-Red-ENG ET 10-11-2011, page 1-2: 
“Q.(Interpretation) Good morning, Mr. Ngudjolo.  
1212 See, for instance, Protected Witness K 41, who testified that, every night, he dreamt about a child 
who was hit by three bullets in the massacre in which he participated. He indicated that he had come to 
tell the truth in the hope that it would feel easier in his soul. See: examination by the Prosecution, 6 
September 2002, available at: 
<http://www.icty.org/x/cases/slobodan_milosevic/trans/en/020906ED.htm>; It is noteworthy that many 
Tutsi genocide survivors have testified for the defence before the ICTR.  
1213 This is acknowledged by Doak, The Therapeutic Dimension of Transitional Justice, supra note 59, 
297.  
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may have a therapeutic effect.1214 Showing anger, frustration and tears may well be 
the best way of getting rid of them.1215
 
  
There are many other witnesses before the ICTY, ICTR and ICC who, with or without 
showing emotions, have found the experience of testifying rewarding. They 
appreciated the opportunity to tell their story to a wider audience and to be listened 
to.1216 For some witnesses, testifying can even help the healing process. For instance, 
a victim witness in the case of Dragan Nikolic was really desperate to find out what 
had happened to her sons who appeared to have been murdered. It was the accused 
himself, who informed her in open court where and when her sons had been 
liquidated, and where the bodies could very likely be found. He told the Court that he 
had wanted to meet her before to inform her about the fate of her sons, knowing how 
anxious she was to find out.1217 As difficult as it must have been for this witness to 
hear about the tragic fate of her sons, it was rewarding to find out what happened to 
them and have hope of retaining their bodies. At the end of her testimony, President 
Judge Schomburg thanked her and said:1218
 
  
I know it was a very difficult period of time for you. We're very grateful that you 
came to The Hague and gave this important testimony. I hope that you will know 
better in the future about the fate and the whereabouts of the remainders of your 
beloved ones. Thank you for your testimony. 
 
Also witnesses who were on the side of the perpetrators may have experienced 
testifying as contributing to their healing process. For instance, in the ICTY case of 
Milosevic, one witness confessed to having participated in massacres of civilians in 
Kosovo. He gave details of an “unbelievably loud” screaming baby being shot with 
                                                 
1214 Even Doak accepts that procedural justice, even if the outcome is below expectations, may have a 
healing effect on victims; and that storytelling, even if painful, can help restore a sense of esteem and 
self-worth. See Doak, ibid, 279-280. 
1215 This was confirmed by a Tutsi genocide survivor who informed the author of her experience as a 
witness before the ICTR. 
1216 E. Stover The Witness: War Crimes and the Promise of Justice in The Hague (University of 
Pennsylvania Press, 2005), 76 – 87; Rebecca Horn, Simon Charters and Saleem Vahidy: ‘Testifying in 
an International War Crimes Tribunal: ‘The Experience of Witnesses in the Special Court for Sierra 
Leone’, 3 International Journal of Transitional Justice (2009) 135-149: 80 percent of witnesses had a 
positive experience and would testify again. This is also confirmed by the author’s own encounters 
with witnesses after their testimony. 
1217 http://www.icty.org/x/cases/dragan_nikolic/trans/en/031103ED.htm 256-258. 
1218 Ibid, 258. 
 
 
300 
three bullets. He informed the Court that the reason he had come forward to give his 
evidence was:1219
  
 
I wanted in this way to express everything that is troubling me, that has been 
troubling me for the past three years since the time I completed my service in the 
army. The thing that I find most troubling is that never a night goes by without my 
dreaming of that child who was hit by that bullet and who was crying. And I thought 
that if I come forward and tell the truth that I will feel easier in my soul. And that is 
the only reason why I am here. 
 
Some witnesses clearly take pleasure out of the challenge of cross-examination.1220
 
 
For some, this may be a terrifying experience; for others a confrontational line of 
questioning can be extremely satisfying. This largely depends on the personality of a 
witness, more than his status as a victim or non-victim. It can thus not be assumed 
that all victims prefer a safer, less confrontational environment where they can tell 
their story without being interrupted.  
Even if this assumption can be proven, it should still not be implemented. TRC 
procedures can allow witnesses to tell their stories without interruption or subjecting 
them to cross-examination. Unlike TRCs, however, international criminal procedures 
focus on determining the guilt or innocence of an accused who potentially faces a 
long prison sentence. The fact that cross-examination may be an unpleasant 
experience for the witnesses should not prevent an accused from having the 
opportunity to challenge the allegations made against him by his accusers. It is also an 
acknowledged right of the accused to confront his accusers.1221
 
  
A trial cannot, nor should it simultaneously serve as a therapeutic centre for 
victims.1222
                                                 
1219 Protected Witness K 41, examination by the examination by the Prosecution, 6 September 2002, 
available at: 
 In the Stakic Judgment, the Chamber acknowledged that it is impossible 
<http://www.icty.org/x/cases/slobodan_milosevic/trans/en/020906ED.htm> 
1220 See for instance, Ndjabu Ngabu, Witness DRC‐D02‐P-0236, ICC-01/04-01/07-T-244-ENG CT 06-
04-2011 - ICC-01/04-01/07-T-248-ENG ET WT 15-04-2011; Pitchu Iribi: Witness DRC‐D02‐P‐0228, 
ICC-01/04-01/07-T-249-Red-ENG CT WT 18-04-2011 - ICC-01/04-01/07-T-253-ENG ET WT 02-05-
2011, Jean Logo: Witness DRC‐D02‐P‐0258 ICC-01/04-01/07-T-286-Red-ENG CT WT 06-07-2011 - 
ICC-01/04-01/07-T-290-Red-ENG WT 12-07-2011, Germain Katanga : Witness DRC‐D02‐P‐0300, 
ICC-01/04-01/07-T-314-ENG CT WT 27-09-2011 - ICC-01/04-01/07-T-325-ENG CT WT 19-10-
2011. 
1221 1950 European Convention on Human Rights, Art. 6(d); 1966 International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights, 999 UNTS 171 Art. 14(3)(e). 
1222 Doak, The Therapeutic Dimension of Transitional Justice, supra note 59, 288.  
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for a trial to do justice to each individual story of each victim. Victims are by 
necessity treated as statistics, but in reality, each of them is a human being with his 
own personality and story. The Chamber in that case restricted itself to elaborating on 
three individual victim accounts.1223 Victims and witnesses can be disappointed if 
their expectations are too high.1224
 
 It is, therefore, important that they are properly 
informed of the procedure in advance. This is a shared responsibility of the parties 
themselves and the VWU. 
Testing the Evidence: in Control of the Judges or Parties? 
 
Thus, the primary purpose of a trial is to test the evidence, rather than offer a forum to 
individual victims to tell their stories. To determine the guilt of the accused 
adequately, the evidence must pass a rigorous test.  
 
The examination of witnesses can be subject to the control of judges or parties. As 
addressed earlier, in civil law jurisdictions, judges take the lead in examining the 
witnesses. They tend to be less confrontational than the parties. Nonetheless, they 
may confront witnesses with contradictions and ask them to explain them. They can 
do so because they have access to the entire case file. In common law jurisdictions 
solely the parties are in charge of examining the witnesses. This feature is linked with 
the fact that trials are run by juries who have no information about the witnesses.  
 
In common law jurisdictions, cross-examination is regarded as the most effective tool 
of testing the credibility of a witness. The efficiency of this tool is also acknowledged 
by the judges in international courts and tribunals.1225
                                                 
1223 Stakic Judgment, 31 July 2003, Stakic Judgment, IT-97-24-T, 31 July 2003, para.18. 
 The scholars who criticise 
cross-examination in international trials do so on the basis of human aspects but rarely 
suggest that it undermines the ascertainment of the truth. DeLaet, for instance, opines 
that putting witnesses to a rigorous test of cross-examination enhances the 
1224 B. Hamber, Transforming Societies after Political Violence: Truth, Reconciliation and Mental 
Health (Springer, 2009), 66. 
1225 See, for instance, Prosecutor v. Martic, Decision on Defence Motion to Exclude the Testimony of 
Milan Babic, Together with Associated Exhibits from Evidence, 9 June 2006; Decision on Appeal 
Against the Trial Chamber Decision on the Evidence of Witness Milan Babic, 14 September 2000.   
 
 
302 
ascertainment of the truth. It may either enhance or diminish a witness’s credibility 
before the Chamber.1226
 
 
This is, however, not always true in reality. An honest and reliable witness can appear 
unreliable after going through a vigorous cross-examination. In his book “Hints on the 
Trial of a Law Suit”, Longenecker sets out how “a skilful advocate by a rapid cross-
examination may ruin the testimony of such a witness”.1227 He refers to a truthful, 
honest, over-cautious witness. The trial tactics described in this book may be 
beneficial to the party’s case, but they may not assist the triers of fact in accurately 
reconstructing the facts. A witness may be so intimidated in cross-examination that, 
due to his high level of stress as a result thereof, he loses the ability to give answers in 
a logical manner and, consequently, his answers may not represent his actual 
knowledge on the subject. As Wigmore pointed out, “questions which in form or 
subject cause embarrassment, shame or anger in the witness may unfairly lead him to 
such demeanor or utterances that the impression produced by his statements does not 
do justice to its real testimonial value”.1228
 
 
A competent trial lawyer will do his utmost to present his case in the best manner he 
can even if that means that the truth be distorted. According to Frank, “the lawyer 
aims at victory, at winning in the fight, not at aiding the court to discover the facts. He 
does not want the trial court to reach a sound educated guess, if it is likely to be 
contrary to his client’s interests. Our present trial method is thus the equivalent of 
throwing pepper in the eyes of a surgeon when he is performing an operation.”1229
 
  
It is therefore not a foregone conclusion that cross-examination is the most efficient 
tool to test the credibility of witnesses. This is particularly questionable when the 
witnesses are uneducated, cannot read maps, do not speak the same language as the 
lawyers and judges, and are from an entirely different culture. International tribunals 
and courts often deal with such witnesses. It is very easy to confuse them and make 
them look incredible even if, in reality, they are truthful and solid witnesses. 
                                                 
1226 DeLaet, Gender Justice, supra note 59, at 165. See also Doak, The Therapeutic Dimension of 
Transitional Justice, supra note 59, 277. 
1227 Frank, Courts on Trial, supra note 38, 81. Frank cites many more examples of guidebooks of how 
to conduct a cross-examination recommending how to make a witness look more hostile than he is. 
This is, however, much more common in US than in UK. 
1228 Quoted by J. Frank, ibid, 82. 
1229 Frank, Courts on Trial, supra note 38, 85. 
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Combs is of the view that, for honest but confused witnesses, it would be better if 
they were examined primarily by the judges. If judges are in control of their 
examination, witness can tell their story in more relaxing, narrative way without being 
interrupted excessively. Psychological research suggests that it is easier to recall and 
relay information accurately and effectively if the observer is comfortable than under 
stress.1230 In addition, the narrative option could also “enrich communication and 
enhance understanding”.1231 Combs also notes that “judges are more apt than lawyers 
to elicit accurate and complete testimony from international witnesses because it is 
the function of the judge, when questioning, to seek accurate and complete 
testimony.”1232
 
 
When dealing with lying witnesses, however, Combs considers cross-examination the 
most efficient tool to test their credibility.1233 Combs points out that many of the 
witnesses who appear before international tribunals lie. She cites different reasons for 
this phenomenon, and suggests that it could be cultural feature.1234 This author’s 
observations correspond with Combs’ observations. However, it is suggested that this 
is not an African problem. People, wherever they are have a potential to lie if there is 
a reason to do so. In the ICTY, people lie mainly for reasons of solidarity to their own 
ethnic group. Insider witnesses may seek to exempt themselves from any culpability 
and blame it all on the accused. Victims can also lie or exaggerate. They may need 
someone to blame. This has become particularly evident in the ICTR, where some 
victims have been demonstrated to incriminate different accused for the same 
deed.1235
 
  
The acknowledgment that witnesses in each category potentially lie leads to the 
conclusion that international justice depends on an effective examination and cross-
examination. Indeed, Combs’ research demonstrates very clearly that the honesty of 
                                                 
1230 Combs, Fact-Finding Without Facts, supra note 6, 304. 
1231 Combs, Fact-Finding Without Facts, supra note 6, 305. 
1232 Combs, Fact-Finding Without Facts, supra note 6, 307. 
1233 Combs, Fact-Finding Without Facts, supra note 6, 312-321. 
1234 Combs, Fact-Finding Without Facts, supra note 6, 131-135. 
1235 Zahar, Problem of False Testimony at the ICTR’ in: ‘Klip & Sluiter, Annotated Leading Cases’ (n 
559 above). Combs, Fact-Finding Without Facts, supra note 6, 149 and further. 
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witnesses cannot be assumed. In general, it is easier to detect lies through a 
confrontational line of questioning. 
 
In addition, in international trials, it would be difficult for judges to lead the 
examination of witnesses effectively. Almost all witnesses are called by the parties. 
Judges have a right to call additional witnesses but rarely do in reality. On the rare 
occasions that judges do, the witnesses have mostly been identified by one of the 
parties. For instance, where a party withdraws a witness it initially intended to call, 
the judges may call this witness if they are of the view that his testimony may assist 
them in ascertaining “the truth in respect of the crimes of which the Accused has been 
charged’.1236
 
  
Thus, the judicial power to call witnesses overrides the right of parties to withdraw 
one or more of their witnesses. Once witnesses are on their list, the parties cannot 
withdraw witnesses without leave of the Chamber, which it will grant only if in the 
interests of justice. Witnesses are not viewed as witnesses of the parties, but rather as 
witnesses of the court, witnesses of justice or witnesses of truth.1237
 
  
When the judges call a witness, it may be more appropriate and logical for them to 
examine the witness first. If, however, a witness is called by one of the parties, judges 
are not the best placed to take the lead in his examination. They do not have access to 
the entire case file and do not have anyone in the field to conduct investigations and 
verify the stories and personal details of witnesses. In such a system, judges have 
insufficient information to take charge. Instead, they must rely on the two parties to 
present them with all relevant information pertaining to the credibility of the 
witnesses.  
 
International justice potentially offers a suitable compromise between the two 
systems. Whilst cross-examination is allowed, judges control the manner in which this 
                                                 
1236 Prosecutor v. Blaskic (Decision of Trial Chamber I in Respect of the Appearance of General Enver 
Hadzihasanovic) IT-95-14 (25 March 1999), second consideration. See also Prosecutor v. Kupreskic 
(Transcript)  IT-95-16 (30 September 1998) 3407.  
1237 Prosecutor v. Jelisić (Decision on Communication between Parties and Witnesses) IT-95-10-T (11 
December 1998), para. 2; Prosecutor v. Kupreškić (Decision on Communication between the Parties 
and their Witnesses) IT-95-16-T (21 September 1998), para. 3; ICC-01/04-01/06-1049, para. 34; 01/04-
01/06-679, para 26; ICC-01/04-01/07-428  21-04-2008, para. 30. 
 
 
305 
is done. In addition, they can ask additional questions to witnesses. In so doing, 
judges can potentially restore the credibility of witnesses if their credibility was 
destroyed unfairly and allow them to complete their story. Relevant information that 
was not elicited by the parties can then still come out. Arguably, such a system is the 
most efficient system to test the evidence in a fair manner. Judges, particularly those 
of a civil law background, are of the firm belief that this enhances the truth-
ascertaining process.1238
 
  
Whether this is the most efficient truth-ascertaining method in reality depends on two 
factors: whether judges exercise their control over the examination of witnesses by 
the parties in appropriate fashion; and whether their own interventions are proper. 
 
Control by the judges 
 
 Time Management 
In line with the completion strategy, ICTY and ICTR Chambers have sought to shorten the trials. To 
this end, Chambers have restricted the time allowed for the presentation of the Prosecution and defence 
cases, as well as for cross-examination of the witnesses presented by the opposite party. It is well 
within the Chamber’s discretion to do so. However, it must be reasonable and flexible in allocating 
time. The allocated time must also be proportional and more or less equal to one another.1239 Both 
parties have complained that the Chamber’s time restrictions have been too drastic.1240 Particularly at 
the ICTY, these restrictions have been excessive for both parties.1241
 
  
                                                 
1238 See, for instance, the observations of ICC Judge Cotte, Presiding Judge in the Katanga & 
Ngudjolo case, hearing of 8 February 2010, ICC-01/04/01/07-T 97, pages 66-67. See also W. 
Schomburg, Truth-Finding in the International Courtroom: The ad-hoc Tribunals for the former 
Yugoslavia (ICTY) and Rwanda (ICTR), Lecture Outline, Utrecht 29 March 2008. 
1239 Prosecutor v. Karemera et al, Scheduling Order, 21 August, 2007, para. 4; Prosecutor v. Oric, 
Interlocuory Decision on Length of Defence Case, 20 July, 2005, paras. 8-10; Prosecutor v. Prlic, 
Decision on Joint Defence Interlocutory Appeal Against the Trial Chamber’s Oral Decision of 8 May 
2006 Relating to Cross Examination by Defence and Association of Defence Counsel’s Request for 
Leave to File an Amicus Curiae Brief, 4 July, 2006; Prosecutor v. Prlic et al, Decision on 
Prosecution Appeal following Trial Chamber’s decision on remand and further certification, 11 May 
2007; Prosecutor v. Milosevic, Decision on Interlocutory Appeal by the Amici Curiae Against the Trial 
Chamber Order Concerning the Presentation and Preparation of the Defence Case, 20 January, 2004. 
1240 Ibid; Prosecutor v. Milosevic, Reasons for refusal of leave to appeal from decision to impose time 
limit, 16 May, 2002, paras.10-13; Prosecutor v. Prlic et al, Decision on Prosecution appeal concerning 
the Trial Chamber’s ruling reducing time for the Prosecution case, 6 February 2007, para. 14. 
1241 See in particular: Prosecutor v. Oric, Interlocuory Decision on Length of Defence Case, 20 July, 
2005; Prosecutor v. Prlic et al, Decision on adoption of new measures to bring the trial to an end 
within a reasonable time, 13 November, 2006; Prosecutor v. Prlic et al, Decision on Prosecution 
appeal concerning the Trial Chamber’s ruling reducing time for the Prosecution case, 6 February 2007. 
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With regard to cross-examination, ICTY Chambers tend to give the parties a particular percentage of 
the time used in examination-in-chief. In a multi-defendant case, the defence is not given equal time in 
cross-examination as in examination-in-chief. Their cross-examination time usually amounts to 
approximately 60% of the examination-in-chief. The defence has regularly complained that this time is 
insufficient to do an adequate job, particularly because each defendant has his own strategy sometimes 
even opposing each other.1242 Such complaints are more frequent in the ICTY than in the ICTR. This 
is not surprising because generally ICTR Chambers allow the parties more time than at the ICTY. 
However, ICTR trials are excessively long and could easily be shortened without being unfair to the 
parties. Time must then be shortened in an equal and fair manner to both parties. This does not always 
appear to be the case. In recent accelerated ICTR cases, the defence sometimes complains that its 
cross-examination time is reduced unfairly and unequally to the Prosecution.1243
 
 
ICC Chambers similarly tend to allocate a specific time to the parties. Oddly, the Chamber in Katanga 
& Ngudjolo allocated 60% to the defence and 100% to the Prosecution for cross-examination. The 
logic behind this unequal treatment was that the Prosecution had the burden of proof beyond 
reasonable doubt.1244 It is unclear why this burden should give the Prosecution a right to cross-
examine each witness of both defendants for significantly longer than the defence had to cross-examine 
the Prosecution witnesses. An additional unfairness on paper is reflected in the fact that the second 
defendant was not entitled to re-visit issues already addressed by the first attendant.1245
 
 However, in 
reality the defence was not prejudiced by these modalities, as the Chamber was flexible enough to 
allow both parties to cross-examine for longer than scheduled, provided the questions were relevant.  
It is suggested that this latter approach is the correct one. It is not disputed that judges should intervene 
where necessary to ensure that no valuable court time is wasted in asking irrelevant questions. 
However, relevance cannot be measured in a percentage. Thus, rather than setting strict time limits, it is 
best if the Chamber intervenes only to the extent that questions are irrelevant. If relevant, the parties 
should be able to explore any issue that will assist the Chamber in assessing the credibility of the 
witnesses. If Chambers wish to set a time line, then at least a level of flexibility in applying it is 
warranted. There is a great disparity between Chambers in how well, equally and fairly they manage 
                                                 
1242 See, for instance, Prosecutor v. Prlic et al, oral ruling, 15 May, 2007, T. 18304-05, 18527-29; 16 
May, 2007, T. 18528-29).  
1243 For instance, in Prosecutor v. Augustin Ngirabatware, ICTR-99-54-T, the bench refused to give 
the defence additional time to make up for the witness’s refusal to answer its questions and the endless 
interventions from the Prosecution and the bench. See, for instance, T 8 Feb 2010, pages 26-35, 53-58, 
94-95. 
1244 See ICC-01/04-01/07-1665-Corr 01-12-2009, Directions for the conduct of the proceedings and 
testimony in accordance with rule 140, para.10. 
T. 14 June 2004 pp. 12-13, 17-20, 26-27; T. 15 June 2004 pages 2, 84-85, 87-89 
1245 ICC-01/04-01/07-1665-Corr 01-12-2009, Directions for the conduct of the proceedings and 
testimony in accordance with rule 140.  
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time. The rushed attitude of some Chambers have not accelerated them.1246
 
 Yet, in general, the parties 
have been granted sufficient time to explore the relevant issues adequately. 
 Control over Types of Questions 
As aforementioned, judges at the ICTY, ICTR and ICC tend to be very protective in 
respect of victim witnesses. Many observers approve of such protective attitude and 
even suggest that judges are not protective enough.1247 However, they ignore that this 
has consequences for the fairness of the proceedings. Victim or not, it is vital for the 
defence to be able to examine vigorously all incriminating witnesses. There is no 
witness whose credibility and reliability can be taken for granted. Victims are equally 
likely to lie or suffer from a faulty memory as anyone else. If anything, their stories 
should be considered with more caution given that the trauma they have experienced 
may have affected their memory.1248 Therefore, the triers of fact must be vigilant to 
assess victim witnesses with the same vigour as any other witness notwithstanding the 
compassion and indignation their testimony may arouse.1249
 
  
There is a thin line between expressing sympathy to the victim, and showing bias in 
favour of him or her. The extent to which sympathy translates into excessive control 
over the questioning by the parties varies significantly from Chamber to Chamber 
across the tribunals and courts.1250
                                                 
1246 For instance the ICTY judgement in the case of Prlic et al is still outstanding. The trial itself lasted 
until the end of 2010. In fairness to the judges, however, this case involved six accused each of whom 
was entitled to participate directly alongside their counsel. In addition, although the bench was 
extremely controlling in an attempt to move the case forward, it was reasonably fair in allocating 
additional time if used for relevant matters. For instance, Mr. Prlic and his counsel were both granted 
additional time in cross-examination (14 and 15 May 2007, page 18527). See also: Prosecutor v. Prlic 
et al, Decision Allocating Additional Time for Completion of Case-in-Chief, 22 August 2007, granting 
additional time to the Prosecution. 
  
1247 See above ‘victims as witnesses’. 
1248 G. Wolters, Herinneringen door getuigen, in: P.J. van Koppen a.o. (Eds.), Het recht van binnen. 
Psychologie van het recht, (Kluwer 2002), 397-415; E. Loftus, Eyewitness Testimony (Harvard 
University Press 1979), 397-415; W. Wagenaar & J. Groeneweg, The Memory of Concentration Camp 
Survivors, 4 Applied Cognitive Psychology 77 (1990); W.A. Wagenaar: Identifying Ivan: A Case Study 
in Legal Psychology (Harvard University Press, 1988); H. Arendt, Eichmann in Jerusalem, A Report on 
the Banality of Evil (Penguin Books, 1994) (first published in the US by the Viking Press 1963), 220-
233. 
1249 P. Levi, Les naufragés et les rescapés, cited in S. Maupas, Juges, bourreaux, victimes, voyage dans 
les pretoires de la Justice internationale (edition Autrement, 2009): « Il est naturel et évident que le 
matériau le plus substantiel pour la reconstruction de la vérité sur les camps soit constitué par les 
souvenirs des survivants. Au-delà de la pitié et de l’indignation qu’ils provoquent, il faut les lire d’un 
œil critique ». 
1250 For instance, the Chamber in Katanga & Ngudjolo appears not to be influenced by the 
overwhelming suffering of the victims. This is clear in the conduct of the judges vis-à-vis the parties. 
They made it clear that it was not for them to handle issues relating to the well-being of the victims. 
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Judges Interventions 
 
In each international tribunal and court many examples can be found of interventions 
of judges that have truly assisted the ascertainment of the truth. This has, for instance, 
been the case where relevant questions were not asked by either party. In the ICC case 
of Katanga & Ngudjolo, Presiding Judge Cotte usually asked more coherent, clear 
and relevant questions than the parties and frequently managed to get an answer out 
of a witness where the parties had failed to do so.1251
                                                                                                                                           
This is rather the task of the VWU. See: T. 11 June 2010, pages 27-30. By contrast, other Chambers 
regularly put the victims’ interests first. See, for instance, the Bemba case.  
 
1251 Own observation, shared by many colleagues in the Katanga & Ngudjolo case. See for example for 
Witness DRC‐D02‐P‐0236, ICC-01/04-01/07-T-246-Red-ENG WT 13-04-2011, pages 19-20: 
PRESIDING JUDGE COTTE: (Interpretation) As far as he knows, is that what you have just said, Mr. 
Floribert Ndjabu? As far as you know were there within the UPC delegation members who were not of 
the Hema ethnic group who had in a certain sense become members to protect themselves or their 
families? Answer the question if you know about this; if not, say so. Is this a reasonable possibility? 
This seems to be the question that the Prosecution is putting to you, and Mr. Hooper is concerned that 
you might fail to understand this question. If you have an answer you will tell us; if not, that doesn’t 
matter”. See also, pages 15, 22, 45. 
See also: Witness DRC‐D02‐P‐0300, ICC-01/04-01/07-T-320-ENG CT WT 11-10-2011, page 65-66: 
“PRESIDING JUDGE COTTE: (Interpretation) Before going to Aveba, I would like to put a question 
to Mr Katanga. Now, you gave us a hierarchy of the persons who were present at the meeting and in 
answering the Prosecutor you mentioned Kakado, Kasaki, Pastor Saradu and so on and so forth. Now, 
on page 77 of the transcript, line 19, you mentioned that Move, Bebi and others may also have been 
there. Now, can you remind us, in relation to the date of 3 March 2003, what the specific status and 
position of Move and Bebi were? You did not mention them in the hierarchy at the beginning, but I 
would like to know from you what their status and their positions were at that time. Maybe you have 
already mentioned this, but please provide us with that clarification. 
THE WITNESS: (Interpretation) To that date, Mr President, Move and Bebi were under the control of 
the APC. They were acting under the orders of the APC. Move on his side was in Nyabiri, whereas 1 
Bebi was in Bukiringi as commander of a platoon or company or what have you, and that is how things 
were. 
 PRESIDING JUDGE COTTE: (Interpretation) And you do remember that there were platoon or 
company commanders? Do you remember? These are not the same positions. Do you know ‐‐ do you 
remember what their ranks were and the positions they had within the sections, platoons and 
companies? You understand this military terminology very well. 
THE WITNESS: (Interpretation) When Bebi left Aveba for Bukiringi, he was still a platoon 
commander. That, I do remember. Now, when he became a company commander, I must say that I am 
not able to tell you whether it was before 3 March or after, so I expressed some reservations on that 
point, but as for Move, while he was in Nyabiri he was a company commander. 
PRESIDING JUDGE COTTE: (Interpretation) Thank you, Mr Katanga. Mr Prosecutor, I return the 
floor to you.” See also ICC-01/04-01/07-T-320-ENG CT WT 11-10-2011, pages 70-71;  
DRC‐D02‐P‐0300, ICC-01/04-01/07-T-321-ENG ET WT 12-10-2011, page 36-37; DRC‐D02‐P‐0300, 
ICC-01/04-01/07-T-322-ENG ET WT 13-10-2011, Page 20: 
“PRESIDING JUDGE COTTE: (Interpretation) Just so that we fully understand, because we have been 
dealing with the same issue for a long time, you said that you did not take part in the meetings, but you 
have said that you had the opportunity to meet with the participants in that meeting, either in the 
morning to have a coffee, or in the evening to have a beer, or perhaps at other times during the day. I 
can see that you are nodding. You have also told us that it was not possible for you to take the initiative 
to have a discussion with Chief Manu, for example, but that on the other hand it could have been 
possible for you to discuss with Chief Manu if he wanted to speak with you. Did he ever want to 
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However, if the judges are not open minded to both sides and engage genuinely with 
all relevant information, their interventions may positively distort the truth. Indeed, if 
judges appear biased against a witness, being already nervous, the witness may get 
even more nervous which may undermine the certainty and thus credibility of his 
answers. As well, if the judges’ questions disclose in any way a preference or 
expectation for one answer over another, the given answer may be unreliable. The 
answer may be that which the witness assumes the judges want to hear rather than an 
attempt at the truth.1252
                                                                                                                                           
discuss with you? Did he ever initiate a discussion with you? That is what we want to understand so 
that we can make some progress, because we are beating about the bush here. Please answer the 
question. 
 Leading questions are not allowed either by the judges or the 
parties. Asking leading questions is particularly inappropriate if in connection with 
matters in dispute, as this could imply that the Chamber is actively seeking to 
THE WITNESS: (Interpretation) Mr President, Chief Manu did not request any discussion with me. He 
did not ask me to speak to him.” See also, pages 34-35, 43, 51-52; DRC‐D02‐P‐0300, ICC-01/04-
01/07-T-323-ENG ET WT 14-10-2011, page 13: “PRESIDING JUDGE COTTE: (Interpretation) Mr 
Prosecutor, I’m going to have to interrupt. Now, Mr Katanga, you said that there’s a distinction to be 
made between a brief absence and going away to go to the front. Now, is this the distinction that 
explains why you were able to leave Aveba despite the risk of Kisoro the day that you went to Tchey 
on the 3rd? Because you said you weren’t in Bogoro, there were too many threats, but on 3 March you 
were in Tchey. So that trip to Tchey, how long was that; this celebration, the ceremony in Tchey?” 
See also: Witness DRC-D02-P-0236: ICC-01/04-01/07-T-245-Red-ENG CT WT 08-04-2011, page 53-
54; 61: “PRESIDING JUDGE COTTE: (Interpretation) I’m not quite sure that you are quite on the 
same wavelength with the witness, Prosecutor. So perhaps one last time you would like to rephrase 
your question, but if you don’t want to do that, let’s go on to something else. The reference to the fact 
that Mr. Augustin Lobbo as being a friend is something that the witness has responded to twice, saying 
that it was not because he was a friend that he was appointed commissioner for external affairs. Mr. 
Witness, actually the Prosecutor simply wants to know whether or not Mr. Augustin Lobbo was a 
friend of yours, which he is entitled to do. But he doesn’t want to infer from that that you appointed 
him as commissioner simply because he was a friend. I hope now that you are onthe same wavelength. 
We need to avoid that because it would take up too much time. 
 THE WITNESS: (Interpretation) Your Honour, I think you have understood everything quite clearly. 
PRESIDING JUDGE COTTE: (Interpretation) So Mr. Lobbo was a friend of yours, but you did not 
appoint him because he was a friend but because of his abilities; is that right? 
THE WITNESS: (Interpretation) Yes, your Honour, that’s precisely what I meant. 
PRESIDING JUDGE COTTE: (Interpretation) Well, in that case, Prosecutor, we can proceed.” 
See also: Witness DRC-D02-P-0228, ICC-01/04-01/07-T-251-ENG CT WT 20-04-2011, pages 28, 34-
35; Witness DRC-D02-P-0258, ICC-01/04-01/07-T-290-Red-ENG, pages 61-62: “PRESIDING 
JUDGE COTTE: (Interpretation) Very well. Mr. Prosecutor, from the beginning of the 
cross‐examination, or should I say from the beginning of today’s hearing, you have put the question at 
least three times to the witness, whether Germain Katanga suggested any names of witnesses for him to 
meet. And on all occasions, the witness briefly from the beginning told you that this was true ‐‐ 
absolutely untrue and then he went on to explain. So please move on ‐‐ move on with the 
cross‐examination under conditions which I insist should not lead us to repeat ‐‐ a constant repetition. 
Mr. Prosecutor, you have the floor.” 
1252 Prosecutor v. Prlic, ‘Decision on Prosecution Motion Concerning Use of Leading Questions, the 
Attribution of Time to the Defence Cases, the Time Allowed for Cross-Examination by the 
Prosecution, and Associated Notice Requirements, 4 July 2008, para 18; Prosecutor v. Oric, Transcript 
11 April 2005, pages 7031-7033, at: http://www.un.org/icty/transe68/050411IT.htm.  
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establish a particular response, or to impugn the credibility of the witness in question. 
Rather than leading questions, the Chamber should ask open questions instead.1253
 
  
The questions of the judges should further be led by the principle of impartiality and 
their truth-ascertaining objective. As the jurisprudence has established, "Judge[s] 
should [. . .] be subjectively free from bias, [and . . .] there should be nothing in the 
surrounding circumstance which objectively gives rise to an appearance of bias; that 
impartiality must be assessed with regard to the perception of a hypothetical fair-
minded observer with sufficient knowledge of the actual circumstance to make a 
reasonable judgement; that this hypothetical fair-minded observer is in a position 
different to that of the parties".1254
 
 
There have, however, been many allegations of judges posing biased or leading 
questions to witnesses, particularly at the ICTR. In various ICTR cases, the defence 
has the impression of dealing with judges who have preconceived views on the guilt 
of the accused. In their perception, there also appears to be a tendency to have more 
patience with Prosecution witnesses than with defence witnesses.1255
 
 
In the ICTR case of Ngirabatware, one judge routinely suggested to defence 
witnesses that they were not honest in answering his questions even if there was no 
apparent contradiction in the witnesses’ answers. When, for instance, a witness 
explained how he had come to confess, the judge asked the following question:  
 
“So you were in prison and ICTR investigators came and questioned you, if I 
understood you correctly. You were in a group in prison and the investigators were 
questioning you, not individually, but collectively, the questions were put to the 
group. So my question is as follows: So when a question was put, you all answered in 
a chorus collectively?” 
 
                                                 
1253 Prosecutor v. Prlic, Transcript of 19 March 2007, at: 
http://www.ictytranscripts.org/TrialTranscripts/HTML/transe74/07-03-19-IT.html 
1254 Prosecutor v. Hadzihasanovic, Decision on Defence Motion Seeking Clarification of the Trial 
Chamber's Objective in its Questions Addressed to Witnesses, February 4, 2005; Prosecutor v. 
Furundzija, Appeals Judgment, July 21, 2000, para. 189; Prosecutor v. Brdjanin and Talic, Decision 
on Application by Momir Talic for the Disqualification and Withdrawal of a Judge, May 18, 2000, para 
15; Prosecutor v. Krajisnic, Decision on the Defence Application for Withdrawal of a Judge from the 
Trial, January 22, 2003, para. 14; Prosecutor v. Rutaganda, Appeals Judgment, May 26, 2003, paras 
36-125; and Prosecutor v. Bagilishema, Grounds for the Appeals Judgment, July 3, 2002, para. 100. 
1255 An example of a cases where bias was alleged are: Nahimana et al v Prosecutor, No. ICTR-99-52-
A, Judgement, 28 November 2007, para. 32. 
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To which the witness answered: 
 
I explained to you that the investigators asked the group and asked what 
Ngirabatware did in our region. And in answer, we said that he did good things and 
did nothing bad. 
 
The judge did not like the answer and said: “Please do not try to avoid my question. It 
is direct and it is as follows: They asked one, two, three questions to the group, and 
my question is as follows: So the group answered in chorus all at the same time in the 
same breadth?”1256
 
 
In the same case, the defence was not allowed to ask questions to the accused about 
the allegations made against the accused. When defence counsel asked the accused 
Ngirabatware to comment on the accusations made against him, she was interrupted. 
The presiding judge said:1257
 
 
“You are not going to take the evidence of a witness and discuss the evidence of the 
witness, you know directly in that way. Raise the issue that arise from the whatever 
either from the testimony of the witness but it will be a question and answer answer 
session, as it were, with the witness, not  situation whereby the witness be invited to 
comment or otherwise give his views on any other evidence has been given. 
 
That is not his function. That’s the function for the for the Trial Chamber. And any 
formulations any position taken will be taken by his by his counsel on both sides. So 
raise the issue that are relevant to a particular aspect that you want to address in the 
normal way and the proper way. 
 
… 
 
When defence counsel sought to suggest that the accused has a fundamental right to 
answer the allegations made against him, the Presiding Judge stated: “No. No. No. It 
can’t go that way.” This is extremely absurd and unprecedented. It is indisputable that 
the accused has a right to answer the allegations made against him. One would 
normally assume that the judges would want to hear what the accused has to say 
before rendering judgment. That is the advantage for a bench if an accused chooses to 
testify. 
 
                                                 
1256 Prosecutor v. Augustin Ngirabatware, ICTR-99-54-T, Transcripts, 22 August 2011, pages 3-15 
(DWAN-9). For similar lines of questioning, see: Transcripts, 16 August 2011, pages 28-32 (DWAN-
45); Transcripts, 20 January 2011, page 38. 
1257 Prosecutor v. Augustin Ngirabatware, ICTR-99-54-T, Transcripts, 30 November 2010, pages 41-
42. 
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Indeed, the Appeals Chamber in Nahimana et al confirmed that “the concept of a fair 
trial includes equal opportunity to present one’s case and the fundamental right that 
criminal proceedings should be adversarial in nature, with both prosecution and 
accused having the opportunity to have knowledge of and comment on the 
observations filed or evidence adduced by either party”.1258
 
 
In the ICTR case of Nizeyimana, the presiding judge had a tendency to ask very 
leading questions. He regularly put a proposition to the witness and asked him if that 
was correct. This is a typical way of questioning a witness in cross-examination. Yet, 
as aforementioned, it is not proper for a judge to adopt such a style, particularly when 
issues are contentious.1259
 
 
At the ICTY, the issue of bias has not been raised as often. Yet, some judges have 
used language that suggests a lack of impartiality. For instance, one judge told one of 
the accused on the stand to “[s]pare us your fantasy”. The accused, Kovacic, reacted 
as follows:1260
I can only say that I understand the statement in the following way.  It actually 
expresses a certain position and a certain conviction on the part of the Judge, the 
position or the conviction that was a put forward during a trial.  This might be an 
indicator of prejudice in terms of the conclusions being made.  Any sensible person 
could have read it this way.  We don't need to talk.  I have arrived at my conclusion, 
everything else is fantasy.  I will give it some serious thought, whether I can perhaps 
ask the Judge to step down from the Chamber.  I do believe that a Judge who is part 
of the Chamber should not be allowed to address the accused in this way before the 
OTP's cross has even begun. Perhaps this was a piece of awkward phrasing by the 
Judge.  Maybe it was too emotional.  I'm not going into that.  Perhaps the Judge can 
explain.  Nevertheless, the way it looks now on the transcript really seems like 
someone is jumping to conclusions there and as if the Judge already had his own 
solution made up in his head.  
 
  
On another occasion, that same judge asked the following questions to another 
accused while on the stand:1261
 
  
Judge: “I'm sorry.  Mr. Bozic, we must assume that you as a lawyer, have a certain 
                                                 
1258 Nahimana et al, Case No. ICTR-99-52-A, Judgement 28 November 2007, para. 181; as raised by 
the defence: Prosecutor v. Augustin Ngirabatware, ICTR-99-54-T, Transcripts, 30 November 2010, 
page 45. 
1259 T. 19 January 2011, pages 75-76. For instance, he asked the witness: “And he was assisted in that 
activity by a minister for defence after he had reached that office himself, correct? 
1260 Prosecutor v. Prlic et al, Transcripts of 9 July 2009. 
1261 Prosecutor v. Prlic et al, 10 February 2009, T. 36652 – 36656, at: 
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/prlic/trans/en/090210IT.htm.  
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intelligence, and if that is so, then you should be aware when you're just repeating 
yourself instead of answering a question. Now, you have told us that the document 
could have – everyone could have heard about it.  That was not the question at all.  It 
is obvious that if there is a press release, everybody could have heard about it.  The 
question was:  Did you personally take -- have knowledge of this?  This is the 
question that you are repeatedly being asked, and you have to answer by yes or no 
finally. ... 
I want this answer.  There has been so much time spent just for such a simple answer. 
… 
Mr. Bozic, yes or no? 
Witness: All I want to say is this, that in the -- in translation, a document means 
something official, something that comes from a certain -- one organ to another 
organ, whereas a press release I see as something quite different. I knew or, rather, 
heard about this press release, and I take cognizance of it. 
Judge: You are really trying our patience.  We do not need lectures about what is a 
document or not, and you are not here to lecture the Chamber. You are here, and I 
quote myself, I said to tell us whether you have taken cognizance of this.  I did not 
use the word "document." 
… 
WITNESS: [Interpretation] First of all, Your Honour, I want to say that it is not my 
intention to avoid answering the question; far from it.  And I said that as far as this 
press release is concerned, I heard about it from the media, not from any official 
sources, and I went on to explain this precisely in response to the question by Judge 
Antonetti.” 
 
Defence counsel intervened and requested that the judge refrain from cross-examining 
the accused and impatiently asking strident and accusatory questions. Counsel 
stressed the importance of the process being fair, detached and objective. He added 
that it would be unfortunate if an independent and impartial judge “would 
inadvertently, no doubt, give the appearance of being other than independent and 
impartial”.1262
 
  
The judge conceded that he “may have been a little bit emotional” and agreed with the 
defence in principle.1263 However, in light of the non-responses to questioning in a 
row, he considered it understandable that one loses patience. The Presiding Judge 
added that it had nothing to do with partiality; rather, that it was part of the search for 
the truth that judges enter into the arena of litigation and ask questions to 
witnesses.1264
                                                 
1262 Ibid, T. 36656 – 36658. 
 Defence counsel clarified that he did not question the right of the bench 
to ask questions: “I accept on many occasions it’s most illuminatory, and it sheds an 
awful lot of light for the Prosecution and for the Defence on questions that are opaque 
or not clarified”. However, he underlined that “[t]he truth can be arrived at 
1263 Ibid, T. 36659. 
1264 Ibid, T. 36660. 
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particularly by the Bench by non-leading, neutral, and rather balanced questions. But 
when one talks about the intelligence of a witness, as the Judge did, and when one 
talks about the Bench losing patience, it is perhaps unnecessary and lends more heat 
to the debate than light”.1265
 
 
The language used in these examples indeed gives the impression that some judges 
have preconceived views. However, it is very difficult to demonstrate bias. There is a 
strong presumption that the judges take their decisions in full independence, and it is 
for the accused to rebut this presumption.1266 The author is only aware of one recuisal 
case based on the appearance of bias;1267
 
 but not of any other granting of a complaint 
of bias.  
Thus, in conclusion, there clearly is a great disparity between different benches when 
it concerns appropriate interventions and trial management. The difference is not 
explained so much by the common law or civil law background of judges; but rather 
whether the judges have significant court experience or not. Professor Bohlander has 
made the correct observation that the degree of control exercised by judges depends 
largely on their individual attitude.1268
 
 The appropriateness of their interventions 
varies depending to a large extent on the level of training and experience judges have. 
Many of the appointed judges in international criminal courts and tribunals have no 
court experience. It is obviously difficult to run a court properly and to make 
appropriate interventions, if and when necessary, without any case management 
experience. Particularly the job of the presiding judge is as much a management job 
as it is a job of judging. It is no easy task to run an international trial lasting for years 
with a significant number of witnesses speaking different languages and from an 
unfamiliar culture. This is challenging for any judge, let alone one without proper 
criminal trial experience. 
To manage a case of such magnitude properly, it would greatly assist the judges to 
                                                 
1265 Ibid, T. 36661 – T. 36662. 
1266 Nahimana et al v Prosecutor, No. ICTR-99-52-A, Judgement (28 November 2007) at para. 28 
1267 Judge Vaz recuised herself upon discovery that she had lived temporarily with a prosecutor in her 
case. This was in the Karemera et al case before it split and Rwamakuba was dealt with separately. 
1268 M. Bohlander, Pride and Prejudice or Sense and Sensibility? A Pragmatic Proposal for the 
Recruitment of Judges at the ICC and other International Criminal Courts, 12 New Criminal Law 
Review 529 (2009), 531. 
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have “the experience of many years of learning to deal with victims and witnesses, 
assessing credibility, sifting through evidence, distinguishing relevant facts from 
irrelevant ones, balancing the interests of prosecution and defense against each other, 
acquiring case management skills, cooperating and deliberating on a collegiate panel 
as well as honing the craft of judgment writing to a fine art”.1269
 
 
Public Trials? 
 
As stated earlier, protective measures can be taken if necessary to guarantee the safety 
of witnesses. These protective measures can apply throughout the investigations as 
well as trial. They must be balanced carefully with the rights of the accused. Thus, 
disclosure of at least the identity of all witnesses must be disclosed to the defence 
adequate time before they commence their testimonies. However, the public at large 
has no acknowledged right to full disclosure. Consequently, the identities of the 
witnesses, as well as any information that could potentially identify them remains 
confidential to the public at large.  
 
This means that it can be very difficult for the public to follow the trials. Many of the 
trials are conducted out of the public view through the excessive use of closed and 
private sessions.1270
 
 Prosecution witnesses testify in private session for large chunks 
of time and documents are usually redacted. The extent of closed and private sessions 
has meant that interested third parties seeking to follow the proceedings are 
confronted with a disrupted and disjointed record. Attempts to monitor the 
proceedings remotely and in the public gallery are significantly hampered by the 
frequent movement into or out of closed sessions.  
This is particularly a problem with regard to ICC proceedings. Most of the time, for 
individuals following remotely via the ICC’s web-link, the message appearing on the 
screen indicates “closed or private session”, or “no broadcast”. The ICTY has sought 
to keep closed sessions to a minimum. Less than 10% of the hearings are conducted in 
closed session. The remainder of the trial sessions are public. In the ICTR, on the 
                                                 
1269 Ibid, 538. The quality of judges will be further discussed below, in section ‘evaluation of the 
evidence’. 
1270 In the ICC, closed session means that the public is completely denied access in that the curtains are 
down, whilst private session means that the sound is switched off, but the public can still see the 
courtroom. In the ICTY and ICTR, no such distinction is made.   
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other hand, confidential hearings are very frequent, but still not as frequent as at the 
ICC. In the ICC, it varies from trial to trial. The Katanga & Ngudjolo proceedings 
have been significantly more accessible to the public than Lubanga or Bemba, which 
are in closed or private session virtually all the time. 
 
The International Bar Association (‘IBA’) expressed concern about this excessive use 
of closed and private sessions.1271 The IBA held that “to many observers, aspects of 
the [case] appear to be shrouded in secrecy.”1272
 
 The IBA further noted with regard to 
many of the closed and private sessions that it was clear from the reclassified 
transcript that there had in fact been no need to resort to closed session.  
The Chamber in the case against Katanga and Ngudjolo acknowledged the 
“superfluous” recourse to private or closed session.1273 On several occasions, the 
presiding judges in the Katanga and Lubanga cases emphasized the importance of a 
public hearing.1274
 
 
The Prosecution, however, routinely asks for confidential or private sessions even if 
the risk of identification is negligible. For instance, in Katanga & Ngudjolo the 
Prosecution requested for a closed session each time an NGO or a person who had 
cooperated with the Court was mentioned. Most of the time, the mere mentioning of 
such a person or NGO does not disclose the fact that the organisation or the person 
had provided assistance to the Court. Their mentioning in public does then not put 
them at any risk. The Chamber agreed that such information can be discussed 
publicly.1275
 
 
Recourse to closed or private session where not strictly necessary, undermines the 
fundamental right of the defence to a public hearing and thus to a fair trial pursuant to 
                                                 
1271 International Bar Association, The ICC Trials: An Examination of Key Judicial Developments at 
the International Criminal Court between November 2009 and April 2010, May 2010, 17 See, e.g., 
ICC-01/04-01/07-T-144, 20 May 2010, 25-29. 
1272 International Bar Association, The ICC Trials: An Examination of Key Judicial Developments at 
the International Criminal Court between November 2009 and April 2010, May 2010, 17, 39.   
1273 ICC-01/04-01/07-T-149, 28 May 2010, 53-54. 
1274 ICC-01/04-01/07-T-147, 26 May 2010, 42; ICC-01/04-01/07-T, 19 April 2010, p. 9 (In asking the 
parties for their observations on the protective measures granted for DRC-OTP-287; ICC-01/04-01/07-
T-144, 20 May 2010, 4-5; ICC-01/04-01/06-T-104, 16 January 2009, 3-4. 
1275 ICC-01/04-01/07-T-240-CONF-ENG CT 24-03-2011, page 33. See also ICC-01/04-01/07-T-144, 
TC Decision on the protective measures for W-11/279, page 4-5. 
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Article 21 ICTY Statute, Article 20 ICTR Statute and Article 67(1) of the ICC 
Statute. Indeed, irrespective of whether confidentiality is justified in a particular 
situation or not, they “deny access to knowledge and indicate its undeniable existence. 
This ‘undeniable denial’ is consequential, as courts sit in judgment and mete out 
penalties according to evidence that cannot be viewed by any but themselves.”1276
 
  
A real advantage of public testimony is that there is a greater possibility that persons 
involved in the event in question will be in a position to identify false testimony. In 
addition, they may be able to offer to testify as a defence witness. This will not 
happen if the public is unable to access key information pertaining to the testimony of 
the witness.1277
 
    
In this regard, the ECtHR has held that the public character of proceedings “protects 
litigants against the administration of justice in secret with no public scrutiny; it is 
also one of the means whereby confidence in the courts can be maintained. By 
rendering the administration of justice transparent, publicity contributes to the 
achievement of the aim of article 6(1), namely a fair trial.”1278 Thus public trials are 
important, not only to protect the fairness of the proceedings, but also to allow the 
public to follow what is going on. The public nature of criminal proceedings “offers 
protection against arbitrary decisions and builds confidence by allowing the public to 
see justice administered”.1279
 
  
Former Vice-President and ICTY Appeals Judge Florence Mumba has underscored 
the point that while there may be a need for limited exception to the right of a public 
trial, public hearings “serve an important educational purpose, by helping people 
understand how the law is applied to facts that constitute crimes, acting as a check on 
                                                 
1276 See also Waters, [Redacted]: Writing and Reconciling in the Shadow of Secrecy, supra note 169, 
Part II, PART IV. 
1277 Ibid, 28. 
1278 ECHR, Werner v. Austria, Judgement of  November 24, 1997, para. 45.  See also UN Human 
Rights Committee (HRC), CCPR General Comment No. 13: Article 14 (Administration of Justice), 
Equality before the Courts and the Right to a Fair and Public Hearing by an Independent Court 
Established by Law, 13 April 1984, §6. 
1279 Prosecutor v. Delalić, Case No. IT-96-21, Decision on the Motions by the Prosecution or 
Protective Measures for the Prosecution Witnesses Pseudonymed “B"”Through To “M”, 28 April 
1997, paras 33- 34. 
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‘framed’ trials, and giving the public a chance to suggest changes to the law or justice 
system.”1280
 
   
Oral testimony aside, almost all documents at the ICC are submitted confidentially. 
This means that only the parties, participants and the Chamber are allowed to review 
their contents. Whilst a redacted version of most confidential filings and transcripts is 
produced at a later stage, considerable quantities of database material remain 
unavailable to the public.1281
 
 Consequently, the trials and evidence on which the 
judgements rely are barely accessible to the communities who were affected by the 
war under investigation of the various international criminal courts and tribunals.  
There is a clear conflict between different interests that need to be balanced carefully 
by the international criminal courts and tribunals. On the one hand, confidentiality 
may encourage witnesses to come forward and States and other entities to disclose 
their documentation. In that way, this may assist the truth-ascertaining exercise of the 
international criminal courts and tribunals. On the other hand confidentiality of the 
proceedings may affect the fairness of the proceedings as well as many of the 
secondary objectives upheld by international criminal courts and tribunals. This most 
notably includes the right of victims to the truth, reconciliation and the creation of an 
accurate and authoritative historical record. 
 
The lack of access to important material and testimony on which the international 
criminal justice systems rely deprives victims of their right to know the truth. It is 
insufficient that the judgements are public because the victims and their communities 
should be able to verify the evidentiary foundation underlying the judgements and 
assess for themselves whether they agree with the conclusions drawn. People are not 
                                                 
1280 F. Mumba, Ensuring a Fair Trial Whilst Protecting Victims and Witnesses: Balancing of Interests, 
in R. May et al (Eds.), Essays on ICTY Procedure and Evidence in Honour of Gabrielle Kirk 
McDonald (2001), 359, 365. See also Al Rawi [2010] EWCA Civ 482, para. 21 (The common law has 
long accepted that there are exceptions to the open justice principle.  In Scott [1913] AC 417, Viscount 
Haldane LC made it clear while affirming and applying the open justice principle, that a court could sit 
in private where “justice could not be done at all if it had to be done in public”, but went on 
immediately to say, that the court considering the issue “must treat it as one of principle, and as 
turning, not on convenience, but on necessity” – [1913] AC 417, 437-438. (see too per Lord Diplock in 
Leveller [1979] AC 440, 450B-F))”. 
1281 This is supposed to change once the tribunals close down, but individual documents in ICTY 
archives will be restricted for years or even indefinitely (R. Donia and E. Becirevic: “ICTY Archive 
must be open to all” IWPR, http://www.iwpr.nt/?p=tri&s=f&o=343812&apc_state=henh). See also: 
Chuter, War Crimes, supra note 75, 209. 
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inclined “to believe by a text they cannot see”.1282
 
 
Reconciliation is also clearly compromised by the excessive use of confidentiality. 
According to Waters, confidentiality “inhibits the reception of the court’s judgments 
and documents as a legitimate source that might displace alternatives; and second, the 
strategic aspects of redaction create incentives to harness arguments about history to 
agendas of prosecution and power that are unresponsive to local sensibilities.” 
Accordingly, confidentiality undermines the court’s ability “to craft authoritative 
reconciliatory narratives”.1283 It is usually presumed that “it is the authoritative truth-
record established by international trials that makes denial impossible and paves the 
way for reconciliation – but essential to that process is undeniable truth.”1284
 
 A non-
transparent truth cannot be undeniable as long as most of the evidence relied on to 
reach that truth, to the exclusion of other truths, is unknown to the public and cannot 
be tested adequately by those affected by the truth that is being established. 
In addition, confidentiality undermines the contribution the court could potentially 
make to the creation of a historical record of the conflict which is shared by the 
different communities involved because “[p]rojects of shared understanding require a 
shared body of reference.”1285 If based largely on confidential material and testimony, 
the narrative created by the international court or tribunal cannot be reflective of “the 
perspectives of those parties most affected and most concerned with generating a 
history”.1286
 
 This prevents them from making any contribution to the creation of an 
authoritative historical narrative of their own conflict situation. The historical 
narrative created by an international court or tribunal may, therefore, be distorted and 
rejected as authoritative by the communities most concerned. 
Thus, more efforts should be made to retain the public nature of international 
proceedings. It is conceded that international courts and tribunals operate in a delicate 
position. They fully rely on cooperation of States and other entities and they cannot 
                                                 
1282 See also Waters, [Redacted]: Writing and Reconciling in the Shadow of Secrecy, supra note 169, 
PART V. 
1283 Ibid. 
1284 Ibid. See also Parlevliet, Considering Truth, supra note 3, 25-26. 
1285 See also Waters, [Redacted]: Writing and Reconciling in the Shadow of Secrecy, supra note 169, 
PART V. 
1286 Ibid. 
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offer adequate protection to victims and witnesses. In exceptional situations, 
confidentiality seems therefore to be a condition for the effective operation of 
international criminal courts and tribunals. However, with due respect for fairness and 
in the light of the ambitious objectives set for international courts and tribunals, any 
decision to withhold information from the public for reasons of confidentiality must 
be exceptional and well reasoned, rather than routine. 
 
 
Admissibility of Evidence 
International criminal justice systems commonly operate an inclusionary policy 
towards evidence, whereby material presented to the Chamber will be admitted in 
evidence unless there is a particular problem with it. In order to be admissible, there 
must only be indicia of reliability, indicia of relevance and indicia of probative value. 
In addition, the probative value must outweigh the prejudicial effect of any evidence. 
Further, where evidence is unlawfully obtained such evidence will be excluded.1287
 
 
The approaches towards the admissibility of evidence vary significantly from 
Chamber to Chamber.1288 For instance, the ICC Chamber in the Katanga & Ngudjolo 
made a case-by-case determination of the relevance, significance, probative value and 
prejudice of a document. On that basis, it excluded reports from independent 
observers where the author’s identity and the sources of the information were not 
revealed with sufficient detail or it relied heavily on hearsay information. Reports of 
NGOs and third States were excluded where insufficient guarantees of non-
partisanship and impartiality were provided. They were also held inadmissible where 
insufficient information was given on the sources and methodology used, or where the 
contents largely relied on hearsay evidence.1289
 
  
                                                 
1287 For further details, see: Caroline Buisman: ‘Evidence before International Criminal Courts and 
Tribunal the Ad Hoc Tribunals’, in: Ilias Bantekas: International Criminal Law (Oxford: Hart 
Publishing Ltd, 4th ed. 2010) Chapter 21, 473. 
1288 For a thorough discussion on the practice at the tribunals in respect of admissibility, see C. 
Gosnell: ‘Admissibility of Evidence’, Ch 8 in: Khan, Principles of Evidence.  
1289 ICC-01/04-01/07-2635 17-12-2010, Decision on the Prosecutor's Bar Table Motions, paras. 14, 
28-31. See also: ICC-01/04-01/07-3184 21-10-2011, Decision on the Bar Table Motion of the Defence 
of Germain Katanga, paras 16-20. 
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This is in stark contrast to the approach taken by the Bemba Trial Chamber. Without 
predetermining their ultimate weight, it made a prima facie determination of 
admissibility as evidence of all of the materials included by the Prosecution in its list 
of evidence.1290 The Chamber justified this decision by referring to its right under the 
Statute to admit non-oral evidence, and held the wholesale admission of evidence 
would save time and serve the search for the truth.1291 The Appeals Chamber, 
however, overturned the decision. It considered that, in admitting all Prosecution 
documents without a cautious item-by-item evaluation and giving reasons, the 
Chamber acted outside the legal framework of the Court and inconsistent with the 
principle of orality under article 69(2) of the Statute.1292
 
  
Thus, some limits to admissibility have been imposed. However, aside from the 
obligation to assess documents on their individual indicia, there are few additional 
requirements. There is, for instance, no ban on hearsay or other dubious evidence. 
Documents of contested authenticity because they are unsigned and undated copies or 
excerpts of exhibits, may still be admitted.1293 Even a written statement made by a 
suspect or accused, incriminating his co-accused, without a requirement for him to 
take the stand and be subject to cross-examination by this co-accused, can be admitted 
in this fashion.1294
                                                 
1290 ICC-01/05-01/08-1022 19-11-2010, Decision on the admission into evidence of materials 
contained in the prosecution's list of evidence, paras. 9 and 35. 
 Given that the co-accused has not had an opportunity to cross-
examine his accuser, such a statement can, however, only be relied upon for a finding 
1291 Ibid, paras. 24-28. 
1292 ICC-01/05-01/08-1386 03-05-2011, Judgment on the appeals of Mr Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo 
and the Prosecutor against the decision of Trial Chamber III entitled “Decision on the admission into 
evidence of materials contained in the prosecution's list of evidence'', paras. 1-3. 
1293 The extent to which such factors prevent the admission of the document varies from Chamber to 
Chamber. See C. Gosnell: ‘Admissibility of Evidence’, Ch 8 in: Khan, Principles of Evidence (n 2 
above). 
1294 The ICTY Appeals Chamber, on the other hand, has held that “it would be wrong to exclude 
evidence solely because of the intrinsic lack of reliability of the contest of a suspect’s questioning in 
relation to persons who later became that suspect’s co-accused.” See Popovic Decision On Appeal 
Against Decision Admitting Material Related to Borovcanin's Questioning (14 Dec 2007), para 49. See 
for further details: Caroline Buisman: ‘Evidence before International Criminal Courts and Tribunal the 
Ad Hoc Tribunals’, in: Ilias Bantekas: International Criminal Law (Oxford: Hart Publishing Ltd, 4th 
ed. 2010) Chapter 21, 473 at 500, 21.4.5. Until now, the ICTR has not taken the same approach. See: 
Karemera Decision on the Prosecution Motion for Admission into Evidence of Post-Arrest Interviews 
with Joseph Nzirorera and Mathieu Ngirumpatse (2 Nov 2007), para 46. In Nyiramasuhuko Decision 
on Arlene Shalom Ntahobali’s Motion to Exclude Certain Evidence from the Expected Testimony of 
Kanyibashi’s Witness D-2-13-O (29 June 2007), such a statement was admitted because the co-accused 
against whom the statement was directed had an opportunity to cross-examine the maker of the 
statement. 
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of guilt if sufficiently corroborated. 1295
 
 
Thus, while there are certain thresholds for admissibility of evidence, many categories 
of evidence that would be excluded or tightly controlled in common law criminal 
justice systems, such as hearsay, are admissible in international criminal justice 
systems. Documents do further not need to be introduced through a witness, but can 
be introduced through the bar.1296
 
 As a result, a large quantity of evidence is admitted 
without any explanation from anyone who is familiar with the document and without 
significant discussion in court.  
The reason for this approach to admissibility is that the evidence is not reviewed by a 
jury who might be distracted or improperly affected by certain evidence, but by a 
bench of professional judges who seek to establish the truth. Truth is not dependent 
on the parties.1297
 
 
As previously discussed, the fundamental norm that witnesses be heard orally in court 
has been undermined, particularly at the ICTY, by the introduction of new rules, e.g. 
rule 92ter, rule 92quater and rule 92quinquies allowing the admission of written 
witness declarations in lieu of oral testimony in specific circumstances. Under these 
rules, directly incriminating statements can be introduced without the judges having 
had an opportunity to assess the demeanour of the witness and without the defence 
having had an opportunity to question the witness.  
 
These provisions were introduced not to advance the ascertainment of the truth, but 
rather for reasons of efficiency. As aforementioned, they were based on a 
misinterpretation of civil law principles of evidence. Whenever civil law proceedings 
are looked at as a better model for international criminal justice, it is because such 
                                                 
1295 Prlić Decision on Appeals against Decision Admitting Transcript of Jadranko Prlić’s Questioning 
into Evidence, para 33; Blagojevic and Jokic Decision on Prosecution’s Motion for Clarification of 
Oral Decision Regarding Admissibility of Accused’s Statement (18 Sep 2003), para 26; Prlic Decision 
on Request for Admission of the Statement of Jadranko Prlic (22 Aug 2007), paras 17, 27-28, 33.  
1296 Ibid, section 21.5. However, usually, documents that were authenticated by a witness will be given 
more probative value than documents that were not introduced by a witness. See, for instance, ICTY 
Prosecutor v Hadzihasanovic & Kubura, Decision on the Admissibility of Documents of the Defence 
of Enver Hadzihasanovic, (22 June 2005), paras 33-35; Oric Trial Judgement (30 June 2006), para 29. 
1297 Donald K. Piragoff: Article 69, in: Triffterer, Commentary on the Rome Statute (n 610 above) 
1321; Olga Kavran, ‘The Sui Generis Rules of Procedure and Evidence’, Ch V in: Haveman, 
Supranational Criminal Law (n 2 above) 133-135. 
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proceedings, without the ‘technicalities’ of common law procedures, are viewed as 
being likely to provide a quicker and easier determination of guilt, if appropriate, 
rather than to enhance truth-finding.  
 
However, the measures adopted go further than the principles of evidence adhered to 
in civil law systems. This is so, particularly in respect of rules 92quater and 
92quinquies allowing the judges to rely on a witness statement directly going to the 
acts and conduct of the accused without having had an opportunity to assess the 
demeanour of the witness and without the defence having been given an opportunity 
to cross-examine. In most civil law systems, particularly under influence of the 
ECHR, this is no longer acceptable. Most witnesses the judges tend to rely on without 
having seen them have previously been questioned by an investigative judge in the 
presence of the parties who were also given an opportunity to ask questions.1298
 
 
This difference between civil law proceedings and international criminal proceedings 
was pointed out by former ICTY Judge Hunt. He pointed out that this new approach 
went further than either common law or civil law proceedings. He emphasised that the 
civil law dossier was prepared by a judicial officer whose mandate it is to look for 
exonerating and incriminating evidence equally and who is expected to be neutral.1299 
International criminal tribunals do not employ an independent judicial officer to take 
statements, but rely on the parties for doing so. The result is that international 
criminal tribunals, whilst readily accepting the use of out-of-court evidence, have not 
incorporated the safeguards inherent in domestic systems which have a tendency to 
rely on paper evidence.1300
 
  
Other practices, such as the admission of an incriminating statement made by one 
accused against his co-accused even where the maker of the statement has not given 
oral evidence would not be permitted at common law nor in some civil law 
jurisdictions.1301
                                                 
1298 See above, Part II ‘methodologies’.  
  
1299 Milošević Dissenting Opinion of Judge David Hunt on Admissibility of Evidence in Chief in the 
Form of Written Statement (Majority Decision given 30 September 2003 (21 Oct 2003), para 6. 
1300 P L Robinson, ‘Rough Edges in the Alignment of Legal Systems in the Proceedings of the ICTY’ 
(2005) 3 Journal of International Criminal Justice 1037, at 1046. 
1301 See, for instance Arts 210, 500, 511, 513 and 514 of the Italian Code of Criminal Procedure and its 
Dutch counterpart (HR 27 mei 1929, NJ 1929, 1329; HR 15 December 1953, NJ 1954, 71). 
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In approving the admissibility of statements from a co-accused the Appeals Chamber of the ICTY 
concluded that the practice was inconsistent with common law principles while, with regard to civil 
law “no discernable general principle may be inferred from domestic practice in this area”.1302 Once 
again the reason for approving the admission of such statements was the fact that international trials are 
conducted by professional judges, as opposed to a lay jury. According to the Appeals Chamber, 
“professional judges are better able to weigh evidence and consider it in its proper context than 
members of a jury. Furthermore, as opposed to a jury’s verdict, professional judges have to write a 
reasoned decision, which is subject to appeal.”1303
 
  
The ease with which evidence is admitted before the tribunals has been subject to 
criticism. Scholars have suggested that such a lenient admission policy removes any 
kind of quality test.1304
 
  
The tendency to admit rather than exclude most of the proposed evidence is arguably 
more problematic in the circumstances in which the tribunals operate. Given the 
complexity of the cases, thousands of documents tend to be admitted per case without 
any explanation by a witness who is familiar with the documents.1305 The quantity is 
so great that it would be useful, simply on pragmatic grounds, to introduce stricter 
admissibility criteria. As Murphy has pointed out, “far from furthering the search for 
truth through free proof, they actually frustrate their objective by making trials longer, 
more complex, and less efficient, and by tending to bury the truly important evidence 
in the midst of an enormous accumulation of evidential debris.”1306 An additional 
reason to introduce a more vigorous admissibility test is the high risk of document 
fabrication in ethnically divided war areas.1307
                                                 
1302 Prlić Decision on Appeals against Decision Admitting Transcript of Jadranko Prlić’s Questioning 
into Evidence, para 50. 
  
1303 Ibid, para 57.  
1304 See Julian Nicholls, ‘Evidence: Hearsay and Anonymous Witnesses’, Ch VII in Haveman, 
Supranational Criminal Law (n 2 above); also Murphy, ‘Excluding justice or facilitating justice? 
International Criminal Law would benefit from rules of evidence’, 12 Int'l J. Evidence & Proof, 2008. 
1305 Murphy, ‘Excluding justice or facilitating justice? International Criminal Law would benefit from 
rules of evidence’, 12 Int'l J. Evidence & Proof 2008, 2. 
1306 See Murphy, ibid, 2, 3. See also pages 25-27, where he cites Sir James Fitzjames Stephen who 
says, inter alia: ‘No judge can possibly be expected, by the mere light of nature, to know how to set 
limits to the inquiries in which he is engaged, yet if he does not, an incalculable waste of time and 
energy, and a great weakening of the authority of his court, is sure to follow.’ See further: His Honour 
Judge Peter Murphy and Lina Baddour, ‘International Criminal Law and Common Law Rules of 
Evidence: Are Exclusionary Rules of Evidence Useful in International Criminal Law?’ In: Khan, 
Principles of Evidence (n 2 above). 
1307 Murphy, ‘Excluding justice or facilitating justice?’ 2, 16-21, 30.  
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The admission of dubious evidence does not necessarily lead to less accurate findings. 
The real issue is whether the oft recited mantra (that the professional judges in 
international criminal proceedings are capable of winnowing out such material in a 
way that juries would not be) is to be relied upon. The question whether the 
judgments handed down over the last fifteen years do indeed show that the judges 
have been able to set aside evidence that is irrelevant, unfairly prejudicial or 
unreliable will be looked at in the next chapter.  
 
 
Assessment of the Evidence 
The evaluation system 
 
The reliability of the outcome depends on two components, the degree of access to the 
information related to the underlying charges and secondly the efficacy of the 
evaluation of this information. The actual evaluation equates to the cognitive 
component of a search for the truth. It is much more difficult to regulate the cognitive, 
than the procedural component, as was addressed above, because that is essentially a 
subjective process of the uncertain human mind. 
 
In the ICTY, ICTR and ICC, the evidence is evaluated by a Trial Chamber consisting 
of three professional judges, a majority of whom must be in agreement with the 
outcome. The Chamber’s verdict is final unless one or both parties lodge an appeal 
against the verdict. In such a case, the enforcement of the judgment is stayed until the 
Appeals Chamber has ruled on it.1308 An acquitted person is released immediately 
upon the pronouncement of the judgment unless the Chamber uses its discretion to 
issue an order for his continued detention. This may occur pending the determination 
of the appeal if the Prosecutor has advised it at the time the judgment is pronounced 
and in open court of his intention to file an appeal.1309 Any appeal against an acquittal 
or conviction is allowed provided it is based on an error of law invalidating the 
decision, or an error of fact which has occasioned a miscarriage of justice.1310
                                                 
1308 Rule 102 ICTY/ICTR Rules. 
 The 
1309 Rule 99 ICTY/ICTR Rules. 
1310 Article 25(1) ICTY Statute; Article 24(1) ICTR Statute. 
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Appeals Chamber may affirm, reverse or revise the Trial Chamber’s judgment.1311
 
 
The ICC includes an extra layer of review of the factual allegations. There is already a 
full assessment of the evidence at the confirmation hearing by a Pre-Trial Chamber. 
The Pre-Trial Chamber’s findings do not, however, constitute findings on the guilt or 
innocence of the defendant. The purpose of the confirmation hearing is to ensure that 
“no case goes to trial unless there is sufficient evidence to establish substantial 
grounds to believe that the person committed the crime with which he or she has been 
charged.”1312 The evidence is tested marginally and few witnesses, if any, will be 
called to testify viva voce.1313 The Prosecution is explicitly allowed to rely on 
anonymous witnesses and summaries, although the weight will be reduced.1314 The 
confirmation hearing has a limited scope and “by no means can it be seen as an end in 
itself, but it must be seen as a means to distinguish those cases that should go to trial 
from those that should not go to trial.”1315
 
  
Despite its limited scope, so far four out of fourteen cases have not been confirmed. 
These cases were not confirmed because of insufficient evidence, or inherent 
contradictions and inconsistencies between the witness statements.1316
                                                 
1311 Article 25(2) ICTY Statute; Article 24(2) ICTR Statute. 
 In the case of 
Mbarushimana, the majority of the Pre-Trial Chamber even held that the evidence 
failed to demonstrate that the suspect made any contribution to the commission of 
crimes under the ICC Statute, let alone a “significant” one, as is required for criminal 
1312 ICC-01/04-01/07-428, 21-04-2008, para. 5. See also: Prosecutor v. Callixte Mbarushimana, 
Decision on the Confirmation of Charges ICC-01/04-01/10-465-Red, 16 December 2011, paras.39-41; 
Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Pre-Trial Chamber I, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, 
ICC-01/04-01/06-803-tEN, 29 January 2007, paras 37-39; Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga, Pre-Trial 
Chamber I, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, ICC-01/04-01/07-717, 1 October 2008, paras 61-
64; Prosecutor v. Bahar Idriss Abu Garda, Pre-Trial Chamber I, Decision on the Confirmation of 
Charges, ICC- 02/05-02/09-243-Red, 8 February 2010, paras 35-40; Prosecutor v. Abdallah Banda 
Abakaer Nourain and Saleh Mohammed Jerbo Jamus, Pre-Trial Chamber I, Corrigendum of the 
Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, ICC-02/05-03/09-121-Corr-Red, 7 March 2011, paras 29-31.   
1313 The confirmation process is somewhat akin to a grand jury proceeding in certain common law 
systems such as the US where jurors make this preliminary finding in terms of what if any charges will 
be brought against an accused. 
1314 Prosecutor v. Mbarushimana, Decision on the confirmation of charges, ICC-01/04-01/10-465-Red, 
16 December 2011, para. 78. See also ICC-02/05-02/09-243-Red 08-02-2010, paras. 50-52. 
1315 ICC-01/04-01/07-428, 21-04-2008, para. 6. 
1316 See further Prosecutor v. Ruto, Kosgey and Sang, ICC-01/09-02/11-373-Red 23-01-2012, Decision 
on the Confirmation of Charges Pursuant to Article 61(7)(a) and (b) of the Rome Statute, paras 293-
300; Prosecutor v. Muthaura, Ali and Kenyatta, ICC-01/09-02/11-382-Red 23-01-2012, paras. 420-
427; Prosecutor v. Abu Garda, Decision on the Confirmation of the Charges, ICC-02/05-02/09-243-
Red 08-02-2010, paras. 173-236. 
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liability under the Statute.1317
 
 
This amounts to 29% of the totality of the cases, a number of which were not even 
challenged at the confirmation level.1318 In light of the significantly lower standard of 
proof, this is a high percentage. Unfortunately, it demonstrates that the Prosecutor 
failed significantly in producing sufficient evidence in support of the cases he himself 
brought before the Court. On a more positive note, it also demonstrates that there is a 
real test at the ICC and that judges are independent of the Prosecutor’s Office. Until 
now, the judges have rigorously applied the requisite confirmation standard and did 
not confirm the cases that should not have been confirmed.1319
 
  
As aforementioned, the burden is on the Prosecutor to prove the case beyond 
reasonable doubt and the only question the judges should focus on is whether the 
Prosecutor met this burden. This is perceived as the principal safeguard against 
wrongful convictions of defendants before international criminal courts and tribunals. 
General Principles 
 
As Coleen Rohan, defence counsel before the ICTY, has stated:1320
The requirement that the Prosecution must prove cases brought in international 
forums beyond a reasonable doubt […] is a critical means of attempting to assure that 
verdicts returned on the international stage, involving, as they do, previous heads of 
state, military, government and political leaders, are as reliable as they can be, given 
the flaws of human nature and the flaws inherent in any system of law. Application of 
this standard of proof assures that all Prosecution evidence will be properly subjected 
to rigorous, thoughtful scrutiny including a thorough examination of its strengths and 
weaknesses. It also obviates, to a significant extent, the concern that verdicts can or 
will be based on rumor, innuendo, assumptions, suspicion, political or ethnic bias or 
 
                                                 
1317 Prosecutor v. Mbarushimana, Decision on the confirmation of charges, 16 December 2011, para. 
292. 
1318 For instance, the defence for Germain Katanga only challenged the legal definition of common 
plan, but did not present a defence on the facts. Similarly, the defence for Abdallah Banda and Saleh 
Jerbo did not challenge the factual allegations at the confirmation hearing. Had they done so, the 
Chamber may equally have found that their guilt had not been established on substantial grounds to 
believe.  
1319 The Kenyan suspects whose cases have been confirmed are disappointed with the result. However, 
they perceived the confirmation as a trial, which it is clearly not. The cases of two suspects were not 
confirmed because the evidence was inherently inconsistent and insufficient to establish substantial 
grounds to believe. See further Prosecutor v. Ruto, Kosgey and Sang, ICC-01/09-02/11-373-Red 23-
01-2012, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges Pursuant to Article 61(7)(a) and (b) of the Rome 
Statute, paras. 82-92; Prosecutor v. Muthaura, Ali and Kenyatta, ICC-01/09-02/11-382-Red 23-01-
2012, paras. 88-100. 
1320 Colleen M. Rohan, ‘Reasonable Doubt Standard of Proof in International Criminal Trials’, Ch 13 
in: Khan, Principles of Evidence (n 2 above).  
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ill-informed, though nonetheless popular pre-conceptions as to who must be held 
liable for individual war crimes and who must not.   
 
If the Prosecutor fails to produce sufficient evidence, the judges can do very little 
other than acquit the accused even if they believe that the accused is guilty as 
charged. His guilt must be firmly demonstrated by evidence produced during the 
course of trial. Surprisingly, in one case, the judges considered themselves competent 
to rely on documents “not specifically tendered in evidence”.1321 This case has, 
however, not established a rule or practice. In general, judges rely solely on the 
evidence produced in the proceedings. Such evidence can, however, be produced on 
the Chamber’s order. If the judges believe there is relevant and reliable evidence 
available which is not produced by the parties, they may request that this additional 
evidence be produced. Such additional evidence may complete or shed doubt on the 
Prosecutor’s case. In one case, additional evidence produced on the Chamber’s order 
has led to the acquittal of the accused.1322
 
  
If at the end of the case two out of these three judges are satisfied that the defendant’s 
guilt has been established beyond reasonable doubt, he risks being sentenced to life 
imprisonment or at least a significant number of years. This is because of the serious 
nature of the crimes most defendants are charged with before international criminal 
tribunals and courts. Given the impact of their decision on the defendant’s life, the 
judges carry a heavy responsibility. This is particularly true in light of the mandates of 
the international criminal justice systems, e.g. the maintenance of international peace 
and security, reconciliation and the manifestation. NGOs, civil society groups, victims 
and other interested persons or organisations also have a keen interest in the outcome. 
Some observers consider it appropriate for the judges to take into account the interests 
of victims and other groups and individuals concerned when determining the 
appropriate sentence to be imposed on the defendant if found guilty.1323
 
   
However, in determining whether the defendant is guilty as charged, such interests 
                                                 
1321 Akayesu Judgment, para 144. 
1322 This occurred in the case of Bagilishema who was acquitted. The judgment was based, in part, on 
the fact that records the Prosecutor had been ordered to obtain on behalf of the defence, significantly 
contradicted what a number of witnesses had said. See Prosecutor v. Bagilishema, ICTR-95-1A-T, 
Trial Chamber Judgment, 7 June 2001.  
1323 Baumgartner, Aspects of Victim Participation (n 1033 above) 434-437. 
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should not play any role. Instead, the judges are expected to engage with the 
information but keep their distance, and determine the guilt or innocence only on the 
basis of the evidence presented. It is this very rationale which explains why the rules 
of admissibility of evidence are so flexible as opposed to jurisdictions with lay jury-
members. Professionally trained judges are assumed to be able to render emotionless 
decisions. Indeed, as one ICTR Trial Chamber put it, “[i]n spite of the irrefutable 
atrocities of the crimes committed in Rwanda, the judges must examine the facts 
adduced in a most dispassionate manner, bearing in mind that the accused is 
presumed innocent. Moreover, the seriousness of the charges brought against the 
accused makes it all the more necessary to examine scrupulously and meticulously all 
the inculpatory and exonerating evidence, in the context of a fair trial and in full 
respect of all the rights of the Accused.”1324
 
  
In reality, this may be difficult even for professionally trained judges. The judges may 
subconsciously have pre-determined views concerning the guilt of the accused. Such 
risk is heightened in light of the participation of victims before the ICC and their 
acknowledged right to the truth, as well as the active role of the media and human 
rights activists in investigating the crimes under the jurisdiction of international 
criminal justice systems, and publicly identifying those who are allegedly responsible. 
In domestic jurisdictions, identified perpetrators in high profile cases causing public 
outrage are usually at a higher risk to be wrongly condemned.
Extra-judicial Considerations 
1325 International 
criminal courts and tribunals exclusively deal with high profile cases. Any human is 
prone to be influenced by extra-legal considerations. A professional judge does not 
stop being a human being.1326
 
 
As Frank put it:1327
 
  
                                                 
1324 Prosecutor v. Akayesu, ICTR-96-4-T, Judgement of 2 September 1998, para. 129. 
1325 The Armytage, Educating Judges, Ch VII ‘The English Criminal Trial: The Credits and the 
Debits’, 262, for instance: Birmingham Six, Guildford Four, Maguire Seven. 
1326 Pompe: bewijs in strafzaken, 51. See also Frank, Courts on Trial, supra note 38, 151-152, where he 
describes psychological factors affecting the mind and the antipathies and sympathies we all have for 
reasons not always rationally explained: “A certain facial twitch or cough or gesture, may affect the 
judge’s initial hearing or subsequent recollection, of what the witness said, or the weight or credibility 
which the judge will attach to the witness’ testimony.” (151). 
1327 Frank, Courts on Trial, supra note 38, 152. 
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Now the trial judge is a man, with a susceptibility to such unconscious prejudiced 
“identifications” originating in his infant experiences. Sitting at a trial, long before he 
has come to the point where he must decide what is right or wrong, just or unjust, with 
reference to the facts of the case as a whole, he has been engaged in making numerous 
judgments or inferences, as the testimony dribbles in. His impressions, colored by his 
unconscious biases with respect to the witnesses, as to what they said, and with what 
truthfulness and accuracy they said it, will determine what he believes to be the “facts 
of the case”. His innumerable hidden traits and predispositions often get in their work 
in shaping his decision in the very process by which he becomes convinced what those 
facts are. The judge’s belief about the facts results from the impact of numerous stimuli 
– including the words, gestures, postures and grimaces of the witnesses – on his 
distinctive “personality”; that personality, in turn, is a product of numerous factors, 
including his parents, his schooling, his teachers and companions, the persons he has 
met, the woman he married (or did not marry), his children, the books and articles he 
has read.” 
 
The most problematic aspect of the ascertainment of the guilt or innocence of the 
accused is that the mind of the triers of fact cannot be controlled or known. A 
standard of proof can be set. However, it is impossible to know, let alone regulate, 
how the triers of fact determine when the requisite standard is met and what level of 
certainty is required for meeting this standard. One can control the type of evidence 
the triers of fact are allowed to consider in evaluating the question of guilt or 
innocence. One can also impose legal conditions for the standard to be met. The 
international judges are for instance obligated to justify in writing if, and on what 
basis the standard of proof was met. This constitutes a safeguard against erroneous 
convictions, as it renders the findings and reasoning transparent. Accordingly, the 
judgement can be put to the test of scrutiny by the public as well as the Appeals 
Chamber. This also guarantees consistency in approach from Chamber to Chamber as 
well as greater certainty before the law. 
 
The obligation upon the judges to justify their findings also ensures that the society at 
large and the people from the affected communities including the victims have access 
to the full truth established in international trials. Thus, the delivery of public detailed 
judgements may also contribute to the secondary mandates, most notably 
reconciliation, peace and security, and the creation of a historical record. 
 
It is therefore a positive phenomenon that international tribunals have incorporated 
the civil law requirement of producing reasoned written decisions. It nonetheless 
remains difficult to assess whether a given decision is fair. Whilst the judges tend to 
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produce very lengthy written findings,1328 it is often impossible to verify which 
factors have led them to decide one way or the other. The reliability and credibility of 
witness testimony is determined on a case-by-case basis.1329 Judges are not required 
to provide reasoning for each step they took in the process of weighing and assessing 
the evidence.1330
 
 Reviewing the judgements, particularly those at the ICTR, one 
cannot help to wonder whether it is a chess game or a search for the truth. The 
judgements contain lengthy analyses on witness credibility. They discuss each factor 
that could potentially undermine or enhance the credibility and reliability of the 
evidence. However, on the basis of such factors, the ultimate determination on the 
witness credibility can easily go either way: credible or not credible. It seems rather 
arbitrary. 
The judgements further do not address any extra-legal considerations that may have 
played a determinative role in the subjective decision-making process of the 
judges.1331 They do not address the personal process the trier of facts has gone 
through to make up their mind about the ultimate issue of guilt or innocence.1332 Nor 
do they disclose the real motives and reasons underlying their findings. If judges are 
even aware of their real motives for deciding as they did, such motives will rarely be 
included in the decision, in particular where the decision was essentially based on 
prejudice.1333
                                                 
1328 This is in accordance with their statutory obligation to do so under Art. 22(2) of the ICTY Statute, 
Art. 21(2) of the ICTR Statute and Rule 88(C) of the Rules. In the Furundzija Appeal Judgment (21 
July 2000), para 69, the ICTY relied on ECHR jurisprudence, stating that the right to a reasoned 
opinion is an aspect of the fair trial requirement embodied in Arts 20 and 21 of the Statute. 
 At least, one cannot be sure that the reasons given for the judges’ 
1329  Ruiz Torija v Spain (1994) 19 EHRR 553, para 29, cited in Furundzija Judgment, ibid, para 69. 
1330 Delalic Appeal Judgment (20 Feb 2001), paras 481, 498; Musema Appeal Judgment, para 20; 
Akayesu Appeal Judgment, para 306. In addition, the Appeals Chamber has stated that although the 
evidence produced may not have been referred to by a Trial Chamber, based on the particular 
circumstances of a given case, it may nevertheless be reasonable to assume that the Trial Chamber had 
taken it into account: Musema Appeal Judgment, para 19; Akayesu Appeal Judgment, para 306. 
1331 According to Frank, “[t]he trial judge is therefore in this position: He can begin with the decision 
he considers desirable, and then, working backwards, figure out and publish an F and an R which will 
make his decision appear to be logically sound, if only there is some oral testimony which is in accord 
with his reported F, and if he applied the proper R to that reported F. If so, it does not matter whether 
actually he believed that testimony, i.e., whether the facts he reports are the facts as he believes them to 
be. In other words, he can, without fear of challenge, “fudge” the facts he finds, and thus “force the 
balance”. No one will ever be able to learn whether, in the interests of what he thought just, or for any 
other cause, he did thus misstate his belief.” See Frank, Courts on Trial (n 12 above) 168. 
1332 Damaška, Evidentiary Barriers, supra note 30, 540, ft note 77. 
1333 Frank, Courts on Trial, supra note 38, 157-159; citing: Rohrlich ‘Judicial Technique’ 17 Amer. Bar 
Ass’n J. (1931) 480: 
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findings match what, in truth, they think.1334
 
 
It is difficult, if not impossible, to explore the mind of any human being, but particularly that of a trier 
of fact. A witness can be cross-examined, which may expose his thoughts to some degree, but no one is 
permitted to cross-examine a judge or to use other methods applicable to witnesses. How, then, can one 
“investigate his secret thoughts …? He is the master of them, and what he says must be conclusive, as 
there is nothing to contradict or explain it.”1335
 
  
In addition, judges in international criminal courts and tribunals suffer from the same 
deficits as investigators in assessing an unknown situation usually not covered by 
their training or expertise. It is questionable how much their professional training 
assists judges in assessing what happened during conflicts in unfamiliar cultures.
Cultural and Linguistic Difficulties 
1336
 
 
It does not help that the deliberation takes place far from the war zone in a quiet office 
in The Hague or Arusha. Many judges have not even visited the crime base and may, 
therefore, have no affinity with the culture under investigation. 
It is, for instance, not uncommon for international judges dealing with African 
conflicts to be presented with command structures based on magic. For instance, in 
his ICC trial, Katanga has alleged that the true war chiefs in his culture were the 
‘féticheurs’, spiritual leaders with magical powers. Katanga testified that it was the 
spiritual leader or ‘sage’ who decided when and where an attack should be launched. 
Such decisions were based on the messages the sages of war received. Prior to an 
attack, the sages would gather the militiamen together and organise a ceremony and 
provide them with ‘fétiche’. The ‘fétiche’ consisted of a mix of herbs and animal 
bones and made the militiamen bullet proof, provided they abided by the rules.1337
                                                 
1334 Frank, Courts on Trial (n 12 above) 167-168 at 167. 
 
1335 Duke of Buccleuch v. Metropolitan Board, L.R. 5 H.L. 418, 434 (1872), cited by Frank, Courts on 
Trial, supra note 38, 167. 
1336 As Wagenaar points out, cultural clashes may already be a problem when judges are dealing with 
an accused from their own society, let alone when dealing with a strikingly different culture. Judges are 
not necessarily trained in establishing facts, particularly not when judges have to deal with superstition, 
prejudice and cultural differences. He also states in his introduction that the authorities have very little 
knowledge outside the strictly legal domain; and worse even, that they make that knowledge secondary 
to abstract legal fictions without any concern whether that undermines the “truth”. Wagenaar, Vincent 
plast op de grond, supra note 129, 7, 10-11. 
1337 ICC-01/04-01/07-T-315-ENG CT2 WT, 28 September 2011, pages 35-37 ; ICC-01/04-01/07-T-81-
Red-ENG WT 25-11-2009, pages 20-21.  
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This has been confirmed by other witnesses.1338 Throughout the trial, the judges have 
expressed genuine interest in this aspect of the story.1339 It will be interesting to see 
whether the judges will treat this evidence, if believed, as mitigating or exempting 
liability. In many African villages, there is a strong belief in mythical powers. It is 
thus difficult for anyone to refuse to abide by the orders of a war sage.1340
 
 
In each individual case in international justice, it is difficult, if not impossible, to 
determine what type of conduct is internationally condemnable in the extraordinary 
circumstances of a conflict. Unlike in domestic systems, the conduct of an accused in 
a war situation is often conformist rather than deviant.1341
 
 Is that a factor that should 
mitigate the sentence? No expert presumably has the expertise to give an authoritative 
answer on this, particularly because every conflict is unique. There is often simply no 
precedent for “reasonable” behaviour.  
To the extent that expert witnesses can give some guidance, the reader is reminded 
that there are numerous problems with expert testimony. Expert witnesses are not 
always impartial and dispassionate even if they try. Moreover, they have not 
personally witnessed any of the events they describe but often rely on anonymous 
sources to reconstruct them. Their sources were not always eyewitnesses to the events 
but may narrate the accounts of others. Such factors are taken into consideration in 
weighing the reliability and credibility of expert testimony.1342 Thus, a finding of guilt 
cannot be made exclusively on expert testimony.1343
 
 Expert evidence may be useful to 
complement eyewitness testimony, but can never replace it. Expert evidence is 
therefore of limited assistance only.  
                                                 
1338 See for instance Witness DRC‐OTP‐P‐0219, ICC-01/04-01/07-T-206-Red-ENG WT, 19 October 
2010, pages 32-33 and 36-41; and Witness DRC‐D02‐P‐0148, ICC-01/04-01/07-T-279-Red-ENG WT, 
10 June 2011, pages 29 and 31-32; see also Witness P-0279, ICC-01/04-01/07-T-144-Red-ENG WT 
20-05-2010, pages 45-48. 
1339 ICC-01/04-01/07-T-325-ENG CT WT, 19 Octobre 2011, pages 28-31 ; ICC-01/04-01/07-T-281-
Red-ENG WT 14-06-2011, page 20-21; ICC-01/04-01/07-T-207-Red-ENG CT WT, 20 Octobre 2010, 
pages 25-26; ICC-01/04-01/07-T-81-Red-ENG WT 25-11-2009, pages 20-21. 
1340 Raimondo, For Further Research, supra note 575. 
1341 Drumbl, Atrocity, supra note 46, 8, 185-187, 211-217, Ch 2. 
1342 Milosevic Decision on Admissibility of Expert Report of Vasilije Krestic (7 Dec 2005), para 5; 
Semanza Trial Judgment, para 279; Bizimungu Decision on Expert Witness Dr Alison Des Forges, 
paras 17 and 25; Karemera  Decision on Joseph Nzirorera’s Motion to Limit the Scope of Testimony 
of Expert Witnesses Alison Des Forges and Andre Guichaoua, paras 5, 17, 25. 
1343 Nahimana Appeal Judgment, para 509. 
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It can also be challenging to assess the demeanour of witnesses from a culture with 
very different customs. A witness’s evasiveness in answering questions can be the 
result of lying, a misunderstanding or a cultural reason the assessor cannot quite 
comprehend. Combs has highlighted many such difficulties. She also pointed out that 
a witness’s lack of education can cause a credible witness to look incredible. On the 
other hand, witnesses can also hide behind cultural differences when, in fact, they are 
stuck in their own lies.1344
 
  
An additional difficulty is caused by multiple translations and interpretations. 
International tribunals have more than one official language. The more languages are 
involved, the more likely mistakes occur in simultaneous translation. The ICC is 
faced with a particular complexity as it deals with a large number of different 
languages spoken by the accused and witnesses, including non-written local or tribal 
languages, for instance Zaghawa spoken by a particular tribe in Sudan. Languages are 
often translated into different languages first before being translated into a language 
which the judges understand, thus widening the gap between them and the witness.  
 
There are already serious discrepancies between the English and French versions of 
the transcript.1345 In light of the recognised potential impact of translation errors on 
the outcome of the case, such discrepancies have led the Chamber in Katanga & 
Ngudjolo to order a full review of the English and French translations of Katanga’s 
and Ngudjolo’s testimonies.1346
 
 
Such translation errors can lead to significant misinterpretations of what the witness 
has said. Inconsistencies between a witness’s testimony in court with his previous 
statement, or between different parts of his testimony could be the result of translation 
                                                 
1344 Combs, Fact-Finding Without Facts, supra note 6, 100-105. 
1345 See, for instance: ICC-01/04-01/07-T-289-Red-Fr ET 11-07-2011,  
T-289, pages 30-31 of the French : “Cependant, moi, je pense peut‐être, lorsquʹil est arrivé à Kinshasa, 
jʹai appris par la voie des ondes et personne ne mʹ a dit que Germain Katanga était le responsable des 
FRPI, mais qualité présidence; en tout cas, ça, je ne... je ne lʹavais pas appris à lʹépoque.”  
This was translated as follows: (ICC-01/04-01/07-T-289-Red-EN ET 11-07-2011, p. 33): People told 
me that Germain Katanga was one of the officials of the FRPI, but I didnʹt know that he was the 
president. In any event, that is something that I had not been told at the time and Iʹm telling you this in 
all sincerity and honesty. 
1346 ICC-01/04-01/07-3216 14-12-2011, Décision relative à la requête de la Défense de Mathieu 
Ngudjolo Chui concernant la révision complète des transcriptions de la déposition de ce dernier ; ICC-
01/04-01/07-T-325, pages 80-81. 
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errors. Witnesses often blame it on interpretation.1347
 
 It could, however, also simply 
be the result of perjury or confusion. Additional difficulties are caused by the 
interpretation of words. As previously discussed, divergent meanings can be given to 
the same terms. Translation therefore renders the task of judging very challenging. 
In these circumstances, the quality of judges is of the utmost importance. It has 
already been noted that this quality varies significantly between excellent and poor. 
Defendants tried by properly trained and experienced judges generally have a greater 
chance of receiving a fair trial. According to Professor Bohlander, the recruitment of 
judges does not measure up and is not always in conformity with the recruitment 
criteria set out in the Statutes.
Quality of Judges 
1348
 
 
Paciocco has pointed out that politics have plagued the judicial appointments process, 
with the result that the decision-makers who have been chosen are not always the best 
qualified.1349 Paciocco finds this distressing, “particularly given that international 
criminal law is in its infancy, and that these judges are the ones developing the 
jurisprudence that may well frame the law for generations.  It is also distressing 
because the rules adopted tend to invite broad judicial discretion; it takes a better 
lawyer to handle that latitude, than to apply a technical jurisprudence, because the 
wise use of discretion requires intimate familiarity with principles, and the purposes 
underlying the rules.”1350 Paciocco rightly observes that good quality decision-makers 
are essential for a satisfying development of international jurisprudence.1351
 
 
                                                 
1347 Combs, Fact-Finding Without Facts, supra note 6, pages 66-79. 
1348 M. Bohlander, Pride and Prejudice or Sense and Sensibility? A Pragmatic Proposal for the 
Recruitment of Judges at the ICC and other International Criminal Courts, 12 New Criminal Law 
Review 529 (2009), 530-531; M Bohlander, The International Criminal Judiciary: Problems of Judicial 
Selection, Independence and Ethics, in M Bohlander (Ed.), International Criminal Justice: A Critical 
Analysis of Institutions and Procedures (2007) 325, at 328-333, 385-386. See also section ‘Does the 
international criminal justice model meet the conditions in Part I? ‘ 
1349 Paciocco, Defending Rwandans Before the ICTR, supra note 190, 12-14. See also Hans S. Nichol, 
quoted by David M. Paciocco, who reported about the ICTR that “the judges - especially because of 
their lack of experience and tact - are the biggest problems.” In: Special Report: U.N. Court Makes 
Legal Mischief, 23 December 2002. This view is shared by Bohlander, ibid. 
1350 Ibid, p. 15. 
1351 Ibid, p. 15. 
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Paciocco expresses alarm at the sight of judges of the Tribunal becoming immersed in 
political issues, such as advocating for victim compensation.1352
 
 Indeed, the 
independence and objectivity of a court are questionable if the judges are too much 
focused on victims.     
It is particularly problematic that judges at international courts and tribunals are not 
necessarily professionally trained as judges in criminal matters. Among them are 
academics and diplomats with no court experience at all. Bohlander, who has 
experience both as an academic and a judge, has no hesitation in saying that, in his 
experience, “judges usually do a better job at academic work than academics at 
judging.”1353 In any judicial system, judges receive some training. In civil law 
jurisdictions this training tends to be longer than in common law systems. However, 
for instance in the UK, judges have been practicing barristers for a significant period 
of time before being appointed.1354 International criminal justice systems are about 
the only courts at least in the western world where persons can become judges 
without judicial training or experience.1355 They do not even receive any training 
upon arrival in the international arena, but must immediately participate in rendering 
judgment on as serious an issue as genocide, war crimes or crimes against humanity. 
In Bohlander’s view, “diplomats, government officials, academics are ill-suited for 
such an important and complex judicial office, absent substantial judicial 
experience.”1356
 
 
                                                 
1352 “ICTR President Calls for Compensation for Victims” ICTR Press, 31 October 2002; Hans S. 
Nichol, “UN Court Makes Legal Mischief” Insight, 23 December 2002, 
www.insightmag.com/news/342415.html. Quoted by David M. Paciocco, ibid, p. 29. 
1353 M. Bohlander, Pride and Prejudice or Sense and Sensibility? A Pragmatic Proposal for the 
Recruitment of Judges at the ICC and other International Criminal Courts, 12 New Criminal Law 
Review 529 (2009), 535. 
1354 In addition, they receive training: http://www.judiciary.gov.uk/training-support/judicial-college. 
1355 Bohlander agrees that this is not a sensible approach and that judges need proper training. See ibid, 
535. See also M Bohlander, The International Criminal Judiciary: Problems of Judicial Selection, 
Independence and Ethics, in M Bohlander (Ed.), International Criminal Justice: A Critical Analysis of 
Institutions and Procedures (2007) 325. 
1356 M. Bohlander, Pride and Prejudice or Sense and Sensibility? A Pragmatic Proposal for the 
Recruitment of Judges at the ICC and other International Criminal Courts, 12 New Criminal Law 
Review 529 (2009), 531. 
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The International Crisis Group in a report in 2001 proposed to revisit the selection of 
the judges in order to ensure that only judges with a real professional experience in 
criminal law would be employed.1357
 
   
These are valid criticisms. Some academic judges have, however, been among the 
better judges.1358
 
 This shows that training and experience does not always guarantee 
better quality. For trial management purposes, it is essential that the presiding judge is 
properly trained and experienced in judging. Academic judges could serve as appeal 
judges, or be part of a trial bench jointly with professional judges. Experience and 
training certainly assist in assessing the credibility and reliability of the evidence.  
Principles of Ascertaining the Facts Applied in ICTY and ICTR 
The ICC has not rendered any final judgement yet. It is currently waiting for the 
Chamber in Lubanga to reach a verdict, but it has not yet been announced. Thus, the 
analysis below is focused on the ICTY and ICTR only. 
 
The ICTY and ICTR have adopted a liberal system of proof, which means that legal 
provisions do not set out minimum requirements for a conviction, or directives to be 
followed in deliberating on the issue of guilt. In principle, the judges are entirely free 
to determine what weight, if any, to attach to the evidence admitted in each case. The 
only two exceptions are embodied in Rule 90(B) of the ICTY Rules and Rule 90(C) 
of the ICTR Rules, requiring corroboration of witnesses who did not take the oath, 
and in Rule 96 ICTY, ICTR Rules, imposing that no corroboration shall be required 
in cases of sexual violence.  
 
The requirements of corroboration at the ICTY and ICTR in specific circumstances 
have strengthened over the years. For instance, untested evidence directly implicating 
the accused must be corroborated.1359
                                                 
1357 International Crisis Group: Tribunal Penal International Pour le Rwanda: l’Urgence de Juger, 7 
juin 2001, Rapport Afrique nr. 30, Nairobi/Arusha/Bruxelles, pg. iii. 
 As was held by the Appeals Chamber, 
1358 The author has appeared before Judge Van Der Wijngaert, an academic judge without any prior 
court experience, in three cases (Limaj, Haraqija, Katanga). In the author’s personal view and 
observation, shared by her colleagues and accused, Judge Van Der Wijngaert has been a proper judge 
with a good sense of what judging is about.  
1359 Martic Decision on Appeal Against the Trial Chamber Decision on the Evidence of Witness Milan 
Babic, para 53; reliance on AM v Italy, App No 37019/97, para 25; Saïdi v France (1994) 17 EHRR 
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“evidence which has not been cross-examined and goes to the acts and conduct of the 
accused or is pivotal to the Prosecution’s case will require corroboration if used to 
establish a conviction.”1360
 
 
Statements admitted under Rule 92quater or Rule 92quinquies of the ICTY Rules can 
only be relied upon if sufficiently corroborated. In the case of Haraqija and Morina 
the Chamber held that  
 
[i]n order for a piece of evidence to be able to corroborate untested evidence, it must not 
only induce a strong belief of truthfulness of the latter, i.e. enhance its probative value, 
but must also be obtained in an independent manner. Rejecting a technical approach to 
this issue, the Trial Chamber holds that corroborating evidence may include pieces of 
evidence that, although originating from the same source, arose under different 
circumstances, at different times and for different purposes. Such evidence would 
indeed meet the requirement of “sufficient corroboration”, which is aimed at preventing 
an encroachment on the rights of the accused.1361
 
  
The Appeals Chamber affirmed that a conviction cannot rest decisively on untested 
evidence. It found that “[w]hether untested evidence is sufficiently corroborated is 
necessarily a fact specific inquiry and varies from case to case”.1362 In this particular 
case, the Appeals Chamber was not satisfied that the untested evidence from the co-
accused was sufficiently corroborated, given that all other available evidence was also 
untested, consisting of double or triple hearsay. The Appeals Chamber, therefore, 
overturned the conviction of one of the accused.1363
 
  
Another category of evidence that is usually expected to be corroborated is evidence 
given by a co-perpetrator or others with a motive to incriminate the accused.1364
                                                                                                                                           
251, paras 43-44; Unterpertinger v Austria, paras 31-33; Lucà v Italy (2001) 36 EHRR 807, paras 39-
45. See also Prosecutor v Haraqija & Morina Appeals Chamber Judgment (23 July 2009), para 61. 
 Co-
perpetrators are frequently considered to be of diminished credibility, given that their 
1360 Martic Decision on Appeal Against the Trial Chamber Decision on the Evidence of Witness Milan 
Babic, para 20; Martic Trial Judgment, para 27; Haraqija & Morina Judgement on Allegations of 
Contempt (17 Dec 2008), para 23; Milutinovic Decision on Prosecution Motion for Admission of 
Evidence Pursuant to Rule 92 quater (16 Feb 2007), para 13; Haradinaj Decision on Prosecution’s 
Motion for Admission of Evidence Pursuant to Rule 92 quarter and 13th Motion for Trial-Related 
Protective Measures (7 Sep 2007), para 12; Prlic Decision on the Prosecution Motion for Admission of 
a Written Statement Pursuant to Rule 92 quarter of the Rules (Hasan Rizvic), paras 22-23; Prlic 
Appeals Decision on Transcripts of Jadranko Prlic, para 53; Blagojevic Trial Judgement, para 26; 
Halilovic Trial Judgement, para 19. 
1361 Haraqija Contempt Judgment, para 41. 
1362  Haraqija & Morina Appeals Judgment (23 July 2009), para 62. 
1363 Ibid, paras 64-69. 
1364 Muvunyi Appeal Judgement, paras. 130-131. 
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answers are not trustworthy because they may seek to put the blame on the accused to 
avoid self-incrimination. Their evidence should, therefore, be treated with suspicion 
even where the co-perpetrator came to testify as a viva voce witness in the case and, 
as such, was subjected to the test of cross-examination. In most cases, although not a 
strict requirement, such evidence is only relied upon if corroborated.1365
 
  
The inherent reliability is particularly undermined where evidence is given in an 
interview with the prosecution by a co-perpetrator who is jointly tried with the 
accused but does not himself testify. Due to the lack of oath and the test of cross-
examination and demeanour such evidence must be treated with caution and, at a 
minimum, be corroborated.1366
 
 
In any other situation - although it is usually preferred that evidence is 
corroborated1367 - the judges are perfectly allowed to rely on non-corroborated 
evidence for the finding of guilt. Provided it is relevant and credible, the Chamber can 
rely on a single testimony.1368
 
  
This is no different when it constitutes uncorroborated hearsay or circumstantial 
evidence which can be relied upon for the finding of guilt, provided it is credible and 
                                                 
1365 See Cyangugu Trial Judgement (25 Feb 2004), paras 92, 95, 108, 113, 118, 131, 135, 141, 174, 
176, 216, 321, 403, 438, 484, 540, 587, where the Trial Chamber required corroboration of such 
testimony. In Limaj Trial Judgement, para 29, the Trial Chamber was extremely cautious of witnesses 
who were motivated by avoiding self-incrimination and considered one witness, who was clearly 
motivated as such, to be of diminished credibility. See also Halilovic Trial Judgement, para 17; Martic 
Trial Judgement, para 25. 
1366 Prlic Appeals Decision on Transcripts of Jadranko Prlic, paras 26, 38, 62; Milosevic Decision on 
Admissibility of Prosecution Investigator’s Evidence (30 Sep 2002), para 18; Blagojevic and Jokic 
Decision on Prosecution’s Motion for Clarification of Oral Decision Regarding Admissibility of 
Accused’s Statement, (18 Sep 2003), paras 24, 26, 28, 33; Limaj Decision on the Prosecution’s 
Motions to Admit Prior Statements as Substantive Evidence (25 April 2005), para 27; Popovič  
Decision on the Admissibility of the Borovčanin Interview and the Amendment of the Rule 65 Ter 
Exhibit List, para 65; and Judge Kimberly Prost’s conclusion in his Partial Dissenting Opinion. 
1367 Kayishema and Ruzindana Trial Judgment, para 80; Musema Trial Judgment, paras 42 and 75: 
“[a]ny evidence which is supported by other evidence logically possesses a greater probative value than 
evidence which stands alone, unless both pieces of evidence are not credible.” Krnojelac Trial 
Judgment, paras 81 and 71; Brdjanin Trial Judgment, para 27. 
1368 Akayesu Trial Judgment, para 135; Rutaganda Trial Judgment, para 18; Musema Trial Judgment, 
para 43; Semanza Appeals Judgment, para 153; Gacumbitsi Appeals Judgment, para 72; Tadic Trial 
Judgement, paras535, 539; Krnojelac Trial Judgement, para 71. This is different in a number of civil 
law jurisdictions which apply the principle unus testis, nullus testis (one witness is no witness), which 
postulates that corroboration of evidence is required before any weight can be attached to it. See, for 
instance, arts. 341(2) and 342(3) CCP of the Dutch Criminal Code of Procedure pursuant to which the 
testimony of a witness or the admissions from the accused must be corroborated. See further: Nijboer, 
De waarde van het bewijs (n 58 above) 43. 
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reliable.1369 However, caution is warranted in such circumstances.1370 Indeed, hearsay 
evidence “may be affected by a potential compounding of errors of perception and 
memory”.1371 Its reliability is usually affected by the fact that the source of the 
information is not tested in cross-examination and often has not taken the oath.1372 
Double hearsay raises greater concerns of reliability because the truthfulness of that 
information depends not only on the credibility of the witness and the accuracy of his 
observation, but also on the credibility and reliability of the declarant.1373
 
 
In Muvunyi, the Appeals Chamber found that the Trial Chamber had not acted 
reasonably and with the requisite degree of caution when it relied on hearsay evidence 
from two witnesses to establish the systematic killing of Tutsi lecturers and students, 
notwithstanding their lack of detail in respect of those killings.1374
 
  
Accordingly, most Chambers are reluctant to rely on uncorroborated hearsay evidence 
even if it is otherwise reliable and credible. Although it is a case-to-case 
determination depending on ”the content of the evidence and the circumstances under 
which it arose”,1375 as well as its voluntariness, truthfulness and trustworthiness,1376 
Chambers rarely rely on hearsay evidence standing alone.1377
                                                 
1369 Muvunyi Appeal Judgement (29 Aug 2008), para 70; Haraqija & Morina Appeal Judgment, para 
62. 
  
1370 Rutaganda Trial Judgment, para 18; Sesay Trial Judgement, para. 495. Milosevic Decision on 
Admissibility of Prosecution Investigator’s Evidence (30 Sep 2002), para 18; see also Kordic & Cerkez 
Appeal Judgment (17 Dec 2004), para 787; Tadic Separate Opinion of Judge Stephen on the 
Prosecutor’s Motion Requesting Protective Measures for Victims and Witnesses (10 Aug 1995) 2–3; 
Simba Trial Judgment (13 Dec 2005), para 209; Naletilic Trial Judgement, para 11; Nahimana Trial 
Judgment, para 97. 
1371 Kamuhanda Decision on Kamuhanda’s Motion to Admit Evidence Pursuant to Rule 89 of the 
Rules of Procedure and Evidence (10 Feb 2003), para 10; Simic Trial Judgment, para 23; Naletilic Trial 
Judgment, para 11 and Krnojelac Trial Judgment, para 70; Naletilic Appeal Judgement, para 217. 
1372 Krnojelac Trial Judgment, para 70. 
1373 Ntakirutimana Appeal Judgment, para 211. See also Aleksovski Decision on Prosecutor’s Appeal 
on Admission of Evidence (16 Feb 1999), para 15; Blaskic Decision on the Standing Objection of the 
Defence to the Admission of Hearsay with no Inquiry as to its Reliability, para 12. 
1374 Muvunyi Appeal Judgement, para 70. 
1375 Aleksovski Decision on the Prosecutor’s Appeal on Admissibility of Evidence (16 Feb 1999), para 
15; Limaj Decision on the Prosecution’s Motion to Admit Prior Statements as Substantive Evidence 
(25 April 2005), para 17. 
1376 Aleksovski Decision, ibid, para 15; Blagojevic and Jokic Trial Judgment, para 21; Halilovic Trial 
Judgement, para 15; Martic Trial Judgment, para 24; Brdjanin Trial Judgement, para 28. 
1377 Limaj Oral Ruling of 18 November 2004, at 447–49; Limaj Decision on the Prosecution’s Motions 
to Admit Prior Statements as Substantive Evidence (25 April 2005), para 27; Prlic Appeals Judgment, 
para 51; also Aleksovski Decision on Prosecutor’s Appeal on Admissibility of Evidence (16 Feb 1999), 
para 25; Popović Decision on Appeals Against Decision Admitting Material Related to Borovčanin’s 
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Inconsistencies with Prior Statements 
Discrepancies between in-court testimony and earlier accounts or between the 
testimonies of different witnesses on the same events in relation to matters peripheral 
to the charges in the indictment in general weaken the credibility of the witness in 
question.1378 Discrepancies must, however, be looked at in light of the testimony as a 
whole, and the overall credibility of each particular witness,1379 as well as the 
testimony of other witnesses,1380 and documents.1381 Significant lapses of time 
between the events, written and oral statements,1382 language and translation problems 
may provide an explanation for discrepancies.1383 Also, different techniques of 
questioning a witness may result in different answers. A witness may, for instance, 
provide new information or additional details in court which he had not provided 
before because he was not specifically asked questions about it.1384 Thus, a lot 
depends on the “conditions under which the prior statement was provided, as well as 
on other factors relevant to, or indicia of, the prior statement’s reliability or 
credibility, or both”.1385
 
  
In general, great faith is placed on the oath. Sworn testimony, particularly when tested 
in cross-examination, is usually given considerably more weight than an unsworn 
written statement.1386
                                                                                                                                           
Questioning (14 Dec 2007), para 50; Prosecutor v. Bizimungu Casimir et al, Case No. ICTR-99-50-T, 
Judgement and Sentence, September 2011, 712. 
 The test of cross-examination is arguably the most effective tool 
to test a witness’s credibility, but it is questionable how much extra value the oath 
1378 Simic Trial Judgment, para 22; Krnojelac Trial Judgment, para 69; Blagojevic Trial Judgement, 
para 23; Prosecutor v. Casimir Bizimungu et al., Judgement and Sentence, ICTR-99-50-T, 30 
September 2011), paras. 119-165. 
1379 Akayesu Appeal Judgment, para 136. 
1380 Simic Trial Judgment, para 26. 
1381 Ntagerura Appeal Judgment, paras 172–74. 
1382 Ibid, para 77; Akayesu Trial Judgment, para 140, where the Chamber held that memory over time 
naturally degenerates. 
1383 Akayesu Appeal Judgment, para 133; Akayesu Trial Judgment, para 137; Rutaganda Trial 
Judgment, para 19; Musema Trial Judgment, para 85. 
1384 Limaj Trial Judgment, para 13; Naletilic Trial Judgement, para 10; Vasiljevic Trial Judgment, para 
21; Fofana Trial Judgement, para. 263; Sesay Trial Judgement, para. 489-491; Norman Decision on 
Disclosure of Witness Statements, para. 25. 
1385 Musema Trial Judgment, para 83. See also: Prosecutor v. Casimir Bizimungu et al., Judgement 
and Sentence, ICTR-99-50-T, 30 September 2011, paras. 119-139. 
1386 Akayesu Trial Judgment, para 137; Musema Trial Judgment, para 86; Naletilic Trial Judgement, 
para. 12. 
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brings.1387
 
 It is uncertain whether the oath has the same value in every culture. 
Particularly the fact that witnesses must take the oath before a foreign jurisdiction in a 
foreign country may undermine the effect of it.  
It is often the case that witnesses have an interest in the outcome of the trial, which 
may influence their testimony even if given under oath. This may occur 
subconsciously, which makes the witnesses still fall in the category of ‘honest’ 
witnesses, or consciously, which transforms them into ‘dishonest’ witnesses. Over 
and over again, history has shown that, notwithstanding the oath, there are ample 
witnesses who deliberately attempt to mislead the court for a variety of reasons. It has 
been evidenced that this is no different in international trials.1388
 
  
The oath aims to ensure that witnesses will be telling the truth in court. They can, 
however, only tell the truth as they perceived it. Perceptions of what happened may 
vary from ‘honest’ witness to ‘honest’ witness, depending on a witness’s background 
and personal circumstances. They may each give a different account of the same 
event while all are telling the truth. As a Cambodian lawyer before the ECCC stated, 
the truth is too complex to be monolithic.1389
 
 
There may also be a disparity between what occurred and a witness’s memory of what 
occurred. Trauma and time lapse may have a particular impact on the accuracy of a 
witness’s testimony. As principal reasons for erroneous identifications, Wagenaar 
mentions the time lapse between the events and the identification, the trauma of the 
witnesses, the confusion with images published in the media and mistakes made in the 
identification process, such as suggestive gestures by the investigator or 
distinguishing features between the image of the alleged perpetrator and the images of 
                                                 
1387 According to Reyntjens, the oath has hardly any additional value as was proven in the ICTR. See 
personal interview, Antwerpen, 20 December 2004. See also: A.L.T. Choo, Hearsay and Confrontation 
in Criminal Trials (Oxford: Clarendon Press 1996), 29-30. 
1388 Zahar, Problem of False Testimony at the ICTR’ in: ‘Klip & Sluiter, Annotated Leading Cases’ (n 
559 above). Combs, Fact-Finding Without Facts, supra note 6, 149 and further. See also examples 
given in this thesis. For instance, Witness 159 who lied under oath in the Katanga & Ngudjolo trial: 
ICC-01/04-01/07-3223 13-01-2012, Order to the Prosecutor regarding the alleged false testimony of 
witness P-159; Public Decision on the Prosecution's renunciation of the testimony of witness P-159, 
ICC-01/04-01/07-2731, 24-02-2011. 
1389 Pierre-Olivier Sur Le livre : Dans les yeux du bourreau. Edition Jean Claude Lattès. 
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the other persons.1390 Misidentification even by many honest and convincing 
witnesses is a common phenomenon and has led the UK to adopt guidelines directing 
juries in eye-witness identification cases.1391
 
  
In this regard, it is troubling that the judges in Gacumbitsi relied on one 
uncorroborated witness, whose oral testimony departed significantly from her 
previous statement,1392 to find that the accused had instructed people through a 
microphone to rape Tutsi women. She had not seen him, but heard his voice through 
the microphone. The Chamber found that she knew him sufficiently well to be able to 
identify him by his voice.1393 The potential unreliability of a voice-identification is 
even more apparent than that of a face-to-face identification.1394
 
 
By contrast, Musliu in the ICTY case of Limaj et al had been acquitted 
notwithstanding that two witnesses who knew him had identified him by his voice as 
he was wearing a mask.1395
 
 
It is also disconcerting that Chambers, in general, have a tendency to believe 
traumatised victim witnesses irrespective of discrepancies in their testimony. Indeed, 
where it concerns victim witnesses, Chambers hold that minor discrepancies are to be 
                                                 
1390 W. A. Wagenaar & J. Groeneweg, ‘The Memory of Concentration Camp Survivors’, 4 Applied 
Cognitive Psychology 77-87 (1990); W.A. Wagenaar: Identifying Ivan: A Case Study in Legal 
Psychology (Cambridge, M.A Harvard University Press, 1988). See also G. Wolters, ‘Herinneringen 
door getuigen’, in: P.J. van Koppen a.o. (eds), Het recht van binnen. Psychologie van het recht, 
Deventer: Kluwer 2002, 397-415; Elizabeth F. Loftus, Eyewitness Testimony (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press 1979). 
1391 R v Turnball [1977] QB 224. In line with these guidelines, juries must be told “to consider the 
circumstances in which the witness saw the defendant, the length of time the witness saw the 
defendant, the lighting conditions, the opportunity for close observation, the previous contact between 
the parties (if any), and so on. Above all, the jury must be told in clear terms that a mistaken witness 
may be a very convincing witness and that an entirely honest witness may none the less be mistaken. 
These rules fall somewhat short of Lord Devlin’s recommendation, but the Court of Appeal is likely to 
quash a conviction if a full Turnball direction is not given to the jury in a case where it should have 
been.” Armytage, Educating Judges, Ch VII ‘The English Criminal Trial: The Credits and the Debits’, 
260-262. 
1392 The Chamber, however, found that the discrepancies were minor and could be explained by the 
lapse of time (Prosecutor v. Sylvestre Gacumbutsi, ICTR-2001-64-T, Trial Judgment, 17 June 2004, 
para. 212).  
1393 Ibid, paras. 210-213. 
1394 See Wagenaar Expert Report in Limaj et al, Defence Exhibit 35. See also: G. Wolters, 
‘Herinneringen door getuigen’, in: P.J. van Koppen a.o. (eds), Het recht van binnen. Psychologie van 
het recht, Deventer: Kluwer 2002, 397-415.  
1395 See Prosecutor v. Limaj et al, IT-03-66T, 30 November 2005, para. 671-688 and see also paras. 26-
28. On appeal, however, one of the judges found that the Trial Chamber had erroneously not relied on 
these two witnesses: Judge Schomberg, see IT-03-66TA, 20-09-2007, p. 120-122. 
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expected in light of the time lapse between the events and the witness’s testimony and 
the impact of trauma, none of which generally discredit the witness.1396
 
  
Frequently, however, the discrepancies judges excuse on such grounds are not that 
minor. For instance, in the Akayesu trial, one witness had previously declared that one 
of his three brothers was killed by the accused by gun while the other two brothers 
were killed by machetes by associates of the accused as they tried to escape. At trial, 
however, this witness testified that the three of them were shot by the accused. His 
testimony also differed from his previous statement in that he had previously stated 
that he had buried his brothers. Under cross-examination, he declared that he had no 
time to bury his brothers and that someone else buried them instead.1397
 
  
These are significant discrepancies which are difficult to explain away because of 
trauma or translation errors. If a witness is so traumatised that he can no longer recall 
whether he buried his brothers or not, then such a witness should not be relied on in 
determining the guilt or innocence of an accused. Nonetheless, the Trial Chamber 
found that the witness gave a truthful account of events and that he did so without 
exaggeration or hostility.1398
 
 Accordingly, the Chamber relied substantially on his 
testimony for finding Akayesu guilty as charged. 
This accords with the Akayesu Chamber’s premise that all the witnesses suffered from 
post-traumatic or extreme stress disorders and “[i]nconsistencies or imprecisions in 
the testimonies, accordingly, have been assessed in the light of this assumption, 
personal background and the atrocities they have experienced or have been subjected 
to”.1399
                                                 
1396 Krnojelac Trial Judgement, para 69; Kunarac Trial Judgement, para 564; Vasiljevic Trial 
Judgement, para 21; Brdjanin Trial Judgement, paras 25, 26; Strugar Trial Judgement, para 8. Fofana 
Trial Judgement, para. 262; Sesay Trial Judgement, para. 489-491. Kayishema and Ruzindana Trial 
Judgment, para 75, where the Trial Chamber also stated that “[t]he possible traumatism of these 
witnesses caused by their painful experience of violence during the conflict in Rwanda is a matter of 
particular concern to the Chamber. The recounting of traumatic experience is likely to evoke memories 
of the fear and the pain once inflicted on the witness and thereby affect his or her ability fully or 
adequately to recount the sequence of events in a judicial context. The Chamber has considered the 
testimony of those witnesses in this light”; see Akayesu Trial Judgment, para 142; Rutaganda Trial 
Judgment, para 22. See also Naletilic Trial Judgement, para 10. 
 Moreover, “there is no recognised rule of evidence that traumatic 
1396 Akayesu Trial Judgment, para 143. 
1397 Prosecutor v. Casimir Bizimungu et al, Trial Judgment, paras. 237, 238. 
1398 Ibid, paras. 161-162. 
1399 Akayesu Trial Judgment, para 143. 
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circumstances necessarily render a witness’s evidence unreliable. It must be 
demonstrated in concreto why “the traumatic context” renders a given witness 
unreliable”.1400
 
  
In general, victim witnesses are believed easier than other witnesses, particularly 
“insider” witnesses. Judges rarely dare to conclude that a victim witness is dishonest. 
However, victim witnesses are human beings like anyone else and equally prone to 
dishonesty as anyone else. They may similarly have an incentive to lie, for instance 
for reasons of revenge, a sense of duty to the community or solidarity with other 
victims. Judges could easily mistake a credible liar for an honest witness, particularly 
if the witness in question was a victim of horrific events. Even for professional 
judges, it is easy to get carried away by the often shocking nature of the victim’s 
narrative.1401
 
  
However, in the ICTR, there has been a change in attitude of the judges. In more 
recent cases, many witnesses are looked at with caution and can be relied on only if 
corroborated. This is the case even for victim witnesses who depart significantly from 
their prior statements.1402
 
 
Adoption of more stringent guiding principles 
Apart from these guiding principles, the judges are entirely free in assessing the 
evidence. Evidence is to be assessed in the overall circumstances and in its overall 
context. The judges should not look at the evidence of each witness separately as if it 
existed in a hermetically sealed compartment; it is the accumulation of all the 
evidence in the case which must be considered. The evidence of one witness, when 
                                                 
1400 Kunarac Appeal Judgment, paras 12 and 267; Furundzija Appeal Judgment, para 109, holding that 
“[t]here is no reason why a person with [post-traumatic stress disorder] cannot be a perfectly reliable 
witness”. Some Chambers have, however, been more cautious in relying on traumatised witnesses. For 
instance, in the ICTY case of Limaj, in evaluating the reliability of the testimonies given by 
traumatised witnesses, the Trial Chamber took into consideration “that any observation they made at 
the time may have been affected by stress and fear; this has called for particular scrutiny on the part of 
the Chamber.” Limaj Trial Judgment, para 15. 
1401 Primo Levi, Les naufragés et les rescapés, cited in book authored by Stephanie Maupas (Juges, 
bourreaux, victimes, voyage dans les pretoires de la Justice internationale, edition Autrement, 2009): 
« Il est naturel et évident que le matériau le plus substantiel pour la reconstruction de la vérité sur les 
camps soit constitué par les souvenirs des survivants. Au-delà de la pitié et de l’indignation qu’ils 
provoquent, il faut les lire d’un œil critique ». 
1402 See, for instance, Prosecutor v. Bizimungu Casimir et al, Case No. ICTR-99-50-T, Judgement and 
Sentence, September 2011, paras. 757-764. 
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considered in isolation, may appear at first to be of poor quality, but may gain 
strength from other evidence in the case. The converse also holds true.1403 Witness 
testimonies can also be relied on in part, and rejected in other.1404
 
 
Thus, in general, there are no clear criteria that should be followed in assessing the 
evidence, which falls within the discretionary domain of the Chamber. On occasions 
defendants have complained that the Chambers have not established sufficiently clear 
criteria in order to assess the weight of evidence.1405 In response the Appeals 
Chamber pointed out that “it is neither possible nor proper to draw up an exhaustive 
list of criteria for the assessment of evidence, given the specific circumstances of each 
case and the duty of the judge to rule on each case in an impartial and independent 
manner”.1406
 
 In this regard the ICTY Trial Chamber in Strugar held that: 
the general background circumstances to material events, and the actual course of 
material events, at times has offered valuable assistance in the task of determining 
where the truth lies in a body of conflicting and inconsistent oral and documentary 
evidence about a particular issue…. As will be seen, the Chamber has accepted some 
evidence notwithstanding the presence of contradicting or inconsistent evidence. At 
times, the Chamber rejected evidence despite the presence of other consistent evidence. 
At times, the Chamber has been persuaded it should accept only part of the evidence of 
a witness, while rejecting other parts. Where this has occurred it has been done in light 
of the other evidence on the issue and only after very careful scrutiny indeed of the 
witness and the evidence.1407
 
 
It is indeed impossible to establish clear guidelines as to how to assess evidence. One 
can regulate the collection, presentation and admissibility of the evidence, but it is 
much harder to set criteria for the assessment of evidence. No criterion can properly 
assist the triers of fact in the determining the key question “whether, and how far, he 
ought to believe what the witnesses say”; and if yes “what inference should be 
drawn”.1408
                                                 
1403 Tadic Judgment on Allegations of Contempt, para 92. 
 Evaluating evidence is a personal business that cannot be regulated. Two 
reasonable persons can look at information and draw completely different 
1404 Prosecutor v. Strugar, Trial Chamber Judgment (31 Jan 2005), para. 7. 
1405 See, inter alia, Kayishema and Ruzindana Appeal Judgment, paras 307–11. 
1406 Ibid, para 319. 
1407 ICTY Prosecutor v Strugar, Trial Chamber Judgment (31 Jan 2005), para 7.  
1408 Frank, Courts on Trial, supra note 38, 152. See also John Henry Wigmore, ‘All the artificial rules 
of Admissibility might be abolished; yet the principles of Proof would remain, so long as trials remain 
as a rational attempt to seek the truth in legal controversies’ (VII Works 599). In:  ‘A Treatise on the 
Anglo-American System of Evidence in Trials at Common Law’ (cited in Twining: Rethinking 
Evidence). 
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conclusions. Guidelines or directives can barely prevent a judge from deciding one 
way or the other.  
 
With regard to assessing documentary evidence, some objective criteria could be 
adopted. For instance, one can argue that a document with an authentic stamp or 
signature has more value than one without. More frequently though in the context of 
international tribunals, a document’s value may only be apparent upon the full 
presentation of the evidence and whether the document actually corroborates or is at 
odds with the larger body of evidence. The weight should also be considered 
significantly reduced when it is not introduced through a witness. Given the lack of 
cultural familiarity of the judges, it will be hard for them to assess whether a 
document is authentic unless an explanation is given as to what it is about. In general, 
judges have assessed the weight of documents fairly. Apart from contemporaneous 
documents, little weight is normally attached to documents. 
  
The primary source of evidence, however, constitutes witness testimony. The 
assessment of witness credibility does not lend itself to strict regulations. A person 
who, on the face of it, has an incentive to lie may in fact not lie; and a person who has 
the appearance to be credible may not be credible. Thus, the assessment of a person is 
a case-per-case determination which can be based only on intuition, at times spot on, 
at other times not at all. 
 
Only a limited number of factors can objectively and in all circumstances be said to 
undermine or strengthen a witness’s credibility. Thus, only broad criteria have been 
developed to assess witness testimony. For instance, it has been held that, in order to 
determine the credibility of viva voce witnesses the Trial Chamber must consider 
“their demeanour, conduct and character”, as well as “the probability, consistency and 
other features of their evidence, including the corroboration which may be 
forthcoming from other evidence and circumstances of the case”, as well as “the 
knowledge of the facts upon which they give evidence, their disinterestedness, 
integrity [and] veracity”.1409
                                                 
1409 Brdjanin Trial Judgment, para 25. See also Akayesu Appeal Judgment, para 128. Blagojevic Trial 
Judgement, para 23.  
 Chambers have further acknowledged that an incentive 
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to lie or a particular bias against or in favour of the accused are factors undermining a 
witness’s credibility.1410
 
 
In addition, corroboration or at least significant partial corroboration could and should 
be made a requirement for any verdict of guilt or significant factual findings 
underpinning the verdict. This would undoubtedly reduce the risk of error. Given the 
importance of fact-finding precision particularly in light of the greater risks of 
fabrication in international criminal justice, requiring corroboration in all 
circumstances may well be advisable. Corroboration should particularly be required 
where there are ample potential corroborative witnesses available. For instance, if a 
witness testifies to a meeting, which was attended by many people, there is no good 
reason to rely on one witness only as evidence that such meeting took place or in the 
manner alleged. 
 
Corroboration of such evidence is even more essential where the defence has called 
one or more witnesses to testify about the same events but with a completely different 
narrative.1411 Also, in situations where the defence relies on an alibi to support its 
assertion that the accused was not present at a particular meeting, his presence at such 
meeting should not be accepted on the basis of one witness alone.1412
 
 
                                                 
1410 Limaj Trial Judgement, para 13. 
1411 The Chamber in Prosecutor v. Nsengiyumva and Bagosora, Judgement and Sentence 18 December 
2008, ICTR-98-41-T, indeed showed reluctance to do. For instance, Witness AAA, a Hutu local 
official in Kigali, testified that, between mid and late April 1994, he attended a meeting of the Kigali 
prefecture security council in which Kabiligi participated as a military representative together with 
Colonel Luc Marchal and General Gatsinzi and that General Kabiligi promised to deliver weapons, 
which was done at the end of April (T. 14 June 2004 pp. 12-13, 17-20, 26-27; T. 15 June 2004 pages 2, 
84-85, 87-89). However, this was contradicted by a defence witness who was said to have held the 
meeting. This witness claimed not to know witness AAA, and that he met Kabiligi only in June 1994 
(T. 23 Feb 2006, p. 4, 61-62, 65-67; T. 24 Feb 2006, pp. 28, 35-37). Even the Prosecution admitted that 
witness AAA is not “worthy of being described as a wholly believable witness” but invites the 
Chamber to accept certain aspects of his testimony (Prosecution Closing Brief, para. 1471). In these 
circumstances, the Chamber did not rely on him (paras. 1548-1557). 
1412 Again, in Bagosora et al, the Chamber did not rely on a witness who testified that Kabiligi presided 
over a meeting at Ruhengeri Military Camp on 15 February 1994. Kabiligi provided an alibi for this 
date. Luc Marchal, the Belgian Colonel in charge of the Belgian UN soldiers in Kigali testified that 
Kabiligi was in a meeting with him in Kigali on that day. He even provided the court with his minutes 
of that meeting. The witness was uncorroborated and convicted and sentenced to death in Rwanda. His 
appeal was pending during his testimony (T. 12 October 2004, pp. 11-12, 48-49), Kabiligi Defence 
Exhibit 85 (Judgment of 16 August 2001, Military Court Rwanda) p. 201. Particularly in light of 
Kabiligi’s alibi, the Chamber did not rely on this witness. Nonetheless, it was not prepared to discredit 
him entirely. See: Prosecutor v. Nsengiyumva and Bagosora, Judgement and Sentence 18 December 
2008, ICTR-98-41-T, paras. 275, 290, 298, 299, 1558-1567. 
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Corroboration, however, does not offer any guarantee of accuracy. As Wagenaar has 
pointed out, even many honest witnesses can mistakenly identify the accused as the 
perpetrator, particularly when they are traumatised and a long time has lapsed.1413 In 
addition, evidence concoction can take place on a large scale.1414 Thus, corroboration 
of testimonies, even by many witnesses, “does not establish the credibility of those 
testimonies”.1415 Some witnesses are so inherently unreliable, and found to be so in 
each and every case in which they testify that they should not be relied on even if 
corroborated. Chambers are very reluctant ever to discredit a witness completely even 
if they lied routinely in previous statements or in Rwandan courts.1416
 
 They treat such 
witnesses with caution but may rely on them in part and where corroborated. In light 
of the frequent allegations of witness tampering particularly at the ICTR, judges 
should be even more cautious than they are today. 
In addition, reliance on double or further remote hearsay, or hearsay evidence from 
anonymous witnesses should be reconsidered. Either more stringent criteria for the 
admissibility of such evidence should be adopted or judges should set aside such 
evidence irrespective of the existence of corroborative evidence. Evidence must have 
                                                 
1413 W.A. Wagenaar: Identifying Ivan: A Case Study in Legal Psychology (Cambridge, M.A Harvard 
University Press, 1988). 
1414 For instance, see: In Prosector v Akayesu ICTR-96-4-A, 16 May 2001 Arret (Requete Aux Fins de 
Renvoi De L’affaire Devant La Chambre de Premiere Instance I), the Defence was unsuccessful in 
reopening the trial, or having fresh evidence admitted on appeal, from a Tutsi witness, BBB, who came 
forward after trial to provide a detailed, notarized statement to the effect that evidence against Akayesu 
was systematically manufactured with the intervention of government agents.  In Prosecutor v 
Ntakirutimana, ICTR No-96-10, ICTR-96-17-T, defence witnesses provided similar testimony 
(Witness 9 and Witness 31). The same thing happened in Prosecutor v Rutaganda ICTR-96-3 (Witness 
DD), (see False Witnesses Testified to Genocide Court” inews@habari.co.tz, March 17, 1999) and in 
the “Media Trial,” Prosecutor v. Nahimana, Barayagwiza and Ngeze ICTR-99-52-T, (Witness RM 14) 
(see “Genocide Survivors Coerced me to Lie, Says Defence Witness,” Foundation Hirondelle - 
Hirondelle Press Agency in Arusha International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, 16 January 2003.)  In 
Prosecutor v Kajelijeli ICTR-98-44-T, a death row inmate testified that he and his family were 
threatened by a Rwandan prosecutor if he testified in the defence of the former Rwandan mayor. He 
claimed that he was promised his death sentence would be commuted if he did not testify (see “State 
Prosecutor Threatened Me Against Testifying, Says Defence Witnesses,” Foundation Hirondelle - 
Hirondelle Press Agency in Arusha International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, 21 November 2002. 
1415 Musema Trial Judgment, para 46; Tadic Judgment on Allegation on Contempt Against Prior 
Counsel Milan Vujin, para 92. 
1416 For instance, Ruggiu was discredited by the Cyangugu Chamber. In Bagosora et al, the Chamber 
did not follow this example but treated him with caution. See Prosecutor v. Nsengiyumva and 
Bagosora, Judgement and Sentence 18 December 2008, ICTR-98-41-T, para. 1984. For other examples 
where inherently unreliable witnesses, who departed drastically from their prior statements, were 
treated with caution, see paras. 251, 252, 258-274, 292-338, 1645, 1715, 1731. The Chamber did not 
discredit a single one of them entirely, but required corroboration. Even Serushago, who gave a 
different account in each case he testified, was treated with caution and relied on in parts (see also 
Nahimana et al Judgment, para. 824).  
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a minimum level of inherent quality before it should be considered even if it is relied 
on only to demonstrate peripheral matters or is heavily corroborated. If sufficient 
other evidence is available, there is no need to rely on such evidence. If insufficient 
other evidence is available, the particular element that is sought to be established can 
simply not be established. Otherwise, a risk exists that the “beyond reasonable doubt” 
standard be lowered to enter a conviction on insufficient credible and reliable 
evidence. 
 
Evaluation by the Appeals Chamber 
 
The Appeals Chamber is often compared with the Appeals Chamber in common law 
rather than civil law jurisdictions, as it usually stays away from the facts. The 
appellate proceedings do not constitute a trial de novo and the witnesses will not be 
called back. It is unusual for the Appeals Chamber to hear new witnesses. New 
evidence on appeal will only be admitted if relevant and credible, it was not available 
at trial and it could have been a decisive factor in reaching the decision at trial.1417 
Thus, unless the Trial Chamber’s factual determination is wholly erroneous, or no 
reasonable Chamber could have reached the same finding, the Appeals Chamber’s 
usual reasoning is that the Trial Chamber was in a much better position to evaluate the 
evidence having been able to assess the demeanour of the witnesses.1418
 
  
The Appeals Chamber rightly refrains from assessing the credibility of witnesses it 
has not seen, or the reliability of their testimonies it has not heard. Yet, the Appeals 
Chamber routinely overturns verdicts. Mostly, findings are overturned on the basis of 
an incorrect application of a legal principle. This is, for instance, the case where 
established facts were not pleaded in sufficient detail in the indictement,1419 or where 
the evidentiary standard of an alibi assessment was incorrectly applied.1420
 
 
                                                 
1417 Rule 115 (B) ICTY/ICTR Rules. See Prosecutor v Semanza (Decision on Additional Evidence) 
ICTR-97-20-A (5 April 2005). See Inneke Onsea and Linda Bianchi, ‘Additional Evidence on Appeal, 
Review Proceedings and the Remedy of Reconsideration’, Ch 16 in: Khan, Principles of Evidence. 
1418 Ibid. See also Prosecutor v. Nsengiyumva and Bagosora, Judgement and Sentence 18 December 
2008, ICTR-98-41-T, para. 18; Krstic Appeal Judgment, para. 40; Munyakazi Appeal Judgment, para. 
8; Setako Appeal Judgment, para. 10; Muvunyi Appeal Judgment of 1 April 2011, para. 10. 
1419 See, for instance, Prosecutor v. Kupreskic et al, Appeals Chamber Judgment of 23 October 2001, 
para. 92; Prosecutor v. Muvunyi, Appeals Chamber Judgment, 29 August 2008, para. 18. 
1420 Prosecutor v. Zigiranyirazo, ICTR-01-73-A, Appeals Chamber Judgment, 16 November 2009, 
paras. 36-52. 
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In addition, the Appeals Chamber can, and often does, review the level of consistency 
and coherency of the Trial Chamber’s own analysis of the facts set out in great detail 
in its judgment easily counting 500 or more pages. For instance, in the case of 
Bagosora et al, the Chamber relied exclusively on prosecution witness HV for finding 
that soldiers participated in the attack at Mudende University in the morning of 8 
April 1994.1421 The Chamber found her identification of at least two soldiers based on 
their camouflage uniforms reliable as she was in a position to follow the attack briefly 
from close-up, heard gunfire and was personally questioned by a soldier.1422
 
  
The Appeals Chamber was not convinced and reversed this factual finding.1423 It 
relied on the Chamber’s own doubts of the same witness’s identification of soldiers 
present at Mudende University in the evening of 7 April 1994, and her identification 
in the evening of 8 April 1994 of masked assailants carrying lists as soldiers.1424 As 
the witness no longer recalled whether the soldiers were wearing berets - the main 
distinguishing feature in the uniforms of soldiers of different units or gendarmes1425 - 
in the opinion of the Appeals Chamber, no reasonable Chamber could have concluded 
beyond reasonable doubt that these men in uniform were in fact soldiers.1426 This was 
so, particularly in light of the witness’s confusion on the issue of identification in her 
written statement of 28 November 1995,1427 as well as the fact that none of the 
Defence witnesses who had witnessed the attack and whom the Trial Chamber found 
credible, had identified soldiers among the attackers.1428 According to the Appeals 
Chamber, the fact that gunfire was used did not necessarily imply the presence of 
soldiers.1429
 
  
The Appeals Chamber did not make its own assessment of the credibility of the 
witness, but relied on the Trial Chamber’s own analysis in finding that the part of 
                                                 
1421 Bagosora Trial Judgment, para. 1248. 
1422 Bagosora Trial Judgment, para. 1248. 
1423 Bagosora Appeal Judgment, paras 352-362. 
1424 Bagosora Appeal Judgment, para. 359, relying on: Trial Judgment, paras. 1246, 1249. 
1425 Bagosora Trial Judgment, para. 166. 
1426 Bagosora Appeal Judgment, paras 361-362. 
1427 Initially, the witness had stated that the soldiers were wearing red caps, but in an addendum to this 
statement on 10 September 2003, the witness corrected this and stated that she only recalled the 
gendarmes wearing caps. See Bagosora Appeal Judgment, footnote 830. 
1428 Bagosora Appeal Judgment, para. 360. 
1429 Bagosora Appeal Judgment, para. 358, relying on the Trial Chamber’s finding that civilians were 
trained and armed (Bagosora Trial Judgment, paras 489, 1203). 
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witness HV’s testimony relating to the identification of soldiers could not serve as the 
basis for a finding beyond reasonable doubt. 
 
In the same judgment, the Appeals Chamber held that the Trial Chamber erred in 
relying on witness XBG whose reliability it seriously questioned. It expressed clear 
concerns about his general credibility and reliability and rejected certain aspects of his 
testimony. The Chamber nonetheless relied on him on the issue of the participation of 
soldiers in a particular attack because this had been consistent allegation.1430 The 
Appeals Chamber, however, noted that his accounts of the circumstances of the 
soldiers’ involvement and role in the killings differed significantly between his prior 
statements to the Rwandan judiciary and his testimony in the case. In these 
circumstances, the Appeals Chamber considered that “a reasonable trier of fact would 
not have relied on Witness XBG’s evidence of soldiers assisting civilians and playing 
a supporting role as Tutsis were sought out and killed, even as mere background 
evidence”.1431 For Nsengiyumva, it made no difference because there was an 
additional witness testifying to the same event who did not need corrobration.1432
 
 
In addition, in correcting errors of law, which the Appeals Chamber does not hesitate 
from doing, the Appeals Chamber often corrects the corresponding factual findings. 
For instance, where the Appeals Chamber finds an error of law arising from the 
application of an incorrect legal standard, the Appeals Chamber will enunciate the 
correct legal standard and review the Chamber’s relevant findings of fact 
accordingly.1433 In doing so, the Appeals Chamber “not only corrects the legal error, 
but, when necessary, also applies the correct legal standard to the evidence contained 
in the trial record and determines whether it is itself convinced beyond reasonable 
doubt as to the factual finding challenged by the appellant before that finding may be 
confirmed on appeal.”1434
 
  
In the ICTY, the Appeals Chamber also often finds that the established facts do not 
                                                 
1430 Bagosora Trial Judgment, paras 1243, 1244, 1254. 
1431 Bagosora Appeals Chamber’s Judgment, para. 257. 
1432 Bagosora Appeals Chamber’s Judgment, para. 258. 
1433 Bagosora Appeals Chamber’s Judgment, para. 17; Munyakazi Appeal Judgment, para. 7; Setako 
Appeal Judgment, para. 9; Muvunyi Appeal Judgment of 1 April 2011, para. 9. 
1434 Ibid.  
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match the legal findings, or that the legal finding is not the only reasonable inference 
that can be drawn from the facts.1435 It has also found that the Chamber erred in not 
drawing the only reasonable inference on the facts.1436 For instance, in the case of 
Martić the Appeals Chamber found that the Chamber had erred in establishing a link 
between the defendant and the perpetrators of acts of destruction a number of murders 
because the evidence did not demonstrate that he controlled or influenced these 
perpetrators most of whom were unidentified.1437 Orić was acquitted on appeal 
because only one of his subordinates had been identified as having committed crimes 
against Serbian detainees. In addition, the evidence failed to demonstrate that Orić 
was even aware of the commission of these crimes, let alone that his one subordinate 
took part in them.1438
 
 
Thus, with increasing frequency, the Appeals Chamber reverses the Chambers’ 
verdicts, both the legal and factual findings. The time that the Chamber’s verdict was 
final is clearly over. Common law practitioners find this problematic, particularly 
when an acquittal is reversed or the sentence is increased.1439
                                                 
1435 See, for instance: Prosecutor v. DRAGOMIR MILOŠEVIĆ, IT-98-29/1-A, Appeals Judgment of 12 
November 2009, where the Chamber found that it was unreasonable for the Trial Chamber “to infer 
that Milošević ordered the shelling of the BITAS building and the Markale Market on the mere basis 
that the incidents in question were similar to the ones that took place in his presence and thus were part 
of “the overall plan and general orders of Milošević” (para. 293). 
 It is also not a foregone 
conclusion that the Appeals Chamber always gets it right and issues better judgments 
than the Trial Chambers. Nonetheless, it means that more eyes have gone over the 
1436 For instance, in the case of Veselin Šljivančanin, the Appeals Chamber entered an additional 
conviction for aiding and abetting the murder of 194 prisoners on the basis that “upon learning of the 
order to withdraw the JNA troops from Mrkšić at their meeting of the night of 20 November 1991, the 
only reasonable inference is that Šljivančanin must have been aware that the TOs and paramilitaries 
would likely kill the prisoners of war and that if he failed to act, his omission would assist in the 
murder of the prisoners” (Prosecutor v. Veselin Šljivančanin, IT-95-13-A, Appeals Judgment of 5 May 
2009 and 8 December 2010  (Case number IT-95-13/l-R.1) para. 63; also paras. 74, 75, 81, 99, 100, 
103). The conviction was later vacated when new evidence was presented to a new Appeals Chamber 
(Prosecutor v. Veselin Šljivančanin, IT-95-13/I-R.1, Appeals Judgment of 8 December 2010, paras. 23, 
30, 32, 36). 
1437 Prosecutor v. Martic, IT-95-11-A, Appeals Judgment of 8 October 2008, paras. 192-193, 199-201, 
207-208, 210-214. 
1438 Prosecutor v. Orić, IT-03-68-A, Appeals Judgment of 3 July 2008, paras. 47-48, 57, 60, 188-189.  
1439 The most striking example is the case of Haradinaj, Balaj and Brahimaj, two of whom were 
acquitted (Haradinaj and Balaj), and who are now being re-tried on the basis that the Prosecutor was 
given insufficient time to seek to arrange for the appearance of two reluctant witnesses (Prosecutor v. 
Haradinaj et al, Appeals Chamber Judgment, IT-04-84-A, 19 July 2010, paras. 41-43). These 
witnesses, however, still refuse to appear. Meanwhile, the Prosecutor has been allowed to call 
additional evidence (Interview with Gregor Guy-Smith in The Hague, 12 April 2011). See further 
above, section ‘uncooperative witnesses, ICTY’.  
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facts, which increases the chances of fact-ascertaining accuracies. The evaluation of 
factual witnesses correctly remains within the Trial Chamber’s domaine. 
 
The scope of the appeal review at the ICC is yet to be determined but appears to be 
wider than that at the ICTY and ICTR. The Statute and Rules do not impose any limit 
on the production of new evidence and explicitly leave open the possibility for the 
Appeals Chamber to call witnesses.1440 It is, however, highly unlikely that the 
appellate proceedings will be the equivalent of a trial de novo.1441
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
PART IV 
 
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1440 Article 83(2) ICC Statute.  
1441 Since the ICC has not yet completed any of its trials, its jurisprudence cannot form part of the 
analysis on the evaluation of the evidence. 
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CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, I agree with Combs that the ascertainment of the facts in international 
tribunals thus far has been highly problematic. This thesis has identified numerous 
causes of fact-ascertaining inaccuracies. They will be discussed below. 
 
Can a Mixed System be a Fair and Effective Truth-Ascertaining System? 
 
Mixed Legal Principles 
Many observers have expressed concern that blending the civil law and common law 
types of procedure can lead to a dysfunctional international court or tribunal. This 
thesis, however, suggests otherwise. Whilst a number of difficulties have arisen due to 
unfamiliarity of international practitioners with the new procedure, this is not the 
main cause of fact-ascertaining impediments. International lawyers had to adjust 
themselves to a new way of thinking, which initially did not come naturally but has 
improved over time. The initial adjustment problems were principally based on 
criticism against the other system, rather than the mixing of systems. Slowly, a new 
international vocabulary and philosophy is emerging. 
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In law, with some exceptions, international justice has taken the best of both worlds. 
It has combined the two-party common law model with the judge-led civil law model 
in a manner doing justice to the philosophy behind both models. Whilst the parties 
retain their independence in conducting investigations and presenting their cases to 
the judges, the judges have discretion to intervene in that independence where 
necessary to uphold the fairness and expeditiousness of the proceedings or to 
ascertain the truth.  
 
The Statutes and rules give important weight to the rights of the accused, which take 
precedence over the rights of the victims and witnesses. Provided the judges are fair, 
as they should be according to the Statutes and rules, the defence has a genuine 
opportunity to present its case in a fair manner in equality with the Prosecution. The 
parties must respect the dignity of the witnesses in testing their credibility. If not, the 
judges legitimately have a discretion to intervene. Humiliating witnesses is not 
necessary for the ascertainment of their credibility and should indeed be disallowed 
by the judges. 
 
The judges are also entitled to fill in the evidentiary gaps left by the parties. They can 
ask additional questions and order that further evidence be produced. If done 
properly, this discretion can genuinely contribute to the ascertainment of the truth. It 
ensures that the parties cannot manipulate the truth and present only partially what a 
witness has to say in favour of their case. It equally ensures that the Court can 
complement the two one-sided truths presented by the parties if this is in fact the case. 
 
The powers of the judiciary remain, however, limited in conducting investigations. In 
the absence of investigative judicial officers, the judges exclusively rely on the parties 
to collect the evidence. This thesis has demonstrated that the parties do not have equal 
opportunities in conducting investigations. In addition, the means available to the 
defence are not always adequate. To remedy this imbalance, the ICC drafters sensibly 
included an obligation on the Prosecution to search for incriminating and exculpatory 
information equally. If done properly and not at the expense of defence investigations, 
this provision strengthens the truth-ascertaining system. 
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Thus, overall, there is no problem with mixing the two types of procedure, provided 
that the legal principles are truly implemented in practice. They complement each 
other and fill each other’s gaps.  
 
In theory, international justice systems also meet the requirements set out in Part I. 
The proceedings are transparent, open and fair and potentially offer the judges 
sufficient access to relevant and reliable information from all sides. In theory, the 
judges are highly experienced and professionally trained. They should thus be able to 
engage with the information while keeping an appropriate distance to the information 
providers. 
 
Mixed Legal Principles Applied in Practice 
The fact-ascertaining impediments are not so much caused by the law, but rather by 
the law in action. The implementation of the law depends on the quality of those 
implementing it, as well as the conditions in which they must carry out this task.  
 
As regards the conditions unique to international justice, this thesis has focused 
particularly on the reliance on State cooperation and cultural diversity.  
 
State Cooperation 
This thesis has established that there is a dilemma between the need to cooperate with 
States while conducting investigations independently of those States. A particular 
problem arises where the State was one of the belligerents in the conflict. Such a State 
has a clear interest in who will be charged. If a State does not agree with the 
Prosecutor’s focus of his investigations, it may seek to manipulate or even prevent 
them. Thus, in order for the Prosecutor to be successful some level of political 
compromise may be deemed necessary. However, the ICTR and ICC Prosecutors 
have clearly gone too far in this respect, effectively rendering immunity to rebel 
groups associated with a number governments. The ICTY has not compromised, but 
managed nonetheless to get everyone on its list. The ICTY Prosecutor had the 
advantage of being backed by the European Union and NATO. Had the ICTR and 
ICC Prosecutors been firmer in their refusal to compromise, they may also have had 
the political support of such international organisations. 
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Cultural Diversity 
This thesis has also raised the problem of cultural and linguistic differences between 
the witnesses and their assessors, as well as the problem of perjury. These problems 
occur both at the investigative and trial stages. This thesis has also pointed out the 
dangers for investigators and judges to be carried away by the horrific victim stories 
and to be too victim-driven. This may lead them to believe victim witnesses too easily 
without adequately scrutinising their credibility and the reliability of their stories. 
 
Overall, the ICTY has done a much better job at ascertaining the facts than the ICTR. 
Investigators got their hands on more reliable evidence than at the ICTR. Contrary to 
Combs’ assumption, the principal explanation for this difference between the two 
tribunals is not that the cultural differences with African regions are greater than with 
the former Yugoslavia. Without underestimating the problems caused by cultural and 
linguistic diversity, this thesis has demonstrated that such problems are not 
insurmountable, nor the principal cause of the fact-finding impediments described in 
Combs research as well as this thesis.  
 
The main problem is the quality of people working in the international criminal courts 
and tribunals. This thesis suggests that the quality of those involved in the 
international law implementation varies significantly and can be improved.  
 
Standard of Proof Beyond Reasonable Doubt 
Combs’ research principally focuses on the role of the judges. She concludes that the 
judges do not always apply the standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt. This thesis 
has not looked at the correctness of the actual findings. However, it has identified 
numerous problem areas. It establishes that Chambers regularly find a fact proven 
beyond a reasonable doubt on the basis of a single witness or on two or more 
unreliable witnesses. In light of the numerous problems addressed in respect to 
witness testimony, particularly the alleged witness interference at the ICTR, it is hard 
to imagine any situation where a finding based on a non-corroborated witness can 
objectively be seen as proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Similarly, if unreliable 
testimony is corroborated by other unreliable testimony, the standard of proof beyond 
reasonable doubt is not reached. It may be more likely than not that the accused is 
 
 
359 
guilty as charged, but that does not equal the standard of proof beyond reasonable 
doubt. To that extent, Combs is correct.  
 
The ICTY has not relied on equally unsafe evidence. It must, however, be 
acknowledged that it did not have to. In most cases, there are many documents in 
support of witness testimony. There are tapped telephone conversations, videos and 
contemporaneous documents including agendas, military documents and written 
orders. The ICTY also did not have to deal with the same level of alleged witness 
tampering as the ICTR. Thus, as a result, judges were able to apply the standard of 
proof beyond reasonable doubt without the unfortunate consequence that most of the 
accused are acquitted. 
 
Until now, the ICC has not yet demonstrated whether it rigorously applies the 
standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt. However, the Pre-Trial Chambers have 
shown preparedness not to confirm cases where the “substantial grounds to believe” 
standard has not been met. This aspires confidence in the future of the ICC. 
 
The quality of judges varies significantly. Defendants in front of properly trained and 
experienced judges generally have a greater chance of receiving a fair trial. The 
willingness to acquit has also increased with time. Initially, almost all accused were 
found guilty. However, there is a drastic change, particularly at the ICTR. In recent 
judgements, high profile accused including ministers have been acquitted. The 
Appeals Chamber has also become increasingly rigorous in overturning Chambers’ 
findings. Thus, there is clearly a change in the attitude of the judges. There is more 
awareness of problems with the evidence even where it stems from victims. It is much 
more likely for an accused to be acquitted or receive a reduced sentence nowadays 
than it was initially.  
 
The best judges are not always recruited. However, there have been excellent judges 
among them. In any event, this thesis suggests that the main failure of the 
ascertainment of the truth is not caused by the judiciary. Rather, this thesis has 
identified the failure of the Prosecution to adequately investigate the charges as the 
principal cause of fact-finding impediments.  
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Judges must be able to trust the Prosecution in conducting adequate investigations, 
particularly given that they have no judicial officers at their disposal who they can 
send out for clarifications. Their own experience in the field, if any, is limited to 
judicial site visits. Important as they may be, they cannot replace adequate 
investigations. 
 
Once the evidence is presented to the judges for their assessment, their capacity to 
rectify inadequate investigations is limited. They can call additional witnesses but 
even then they rely on the evidence brought to their attention. They cannot make their 
own independent inquiries. If the evidence is insufficient, they can only do one thing, 
and that is to find that the standard of proof is not met. However, this does not 
necessarily suggest that the truth has been found. Some of the accused are acquitted 
simply because the Prosecution has failed to produce sufficient reliable evidence 
demonstrating their guilt. This is regrettable if good quality evidence is readily 
attainable but has not been presented to the Chamber. It is suggested that this is often 
the case in international justice.  
 
Victim Participation 
Another area of concern is victim participation. What was a good idea in theory may 
not work so well in practice. This is, however, not due to the blending of systems, but 
rather to the unique circumstances in which international justice systems operate. 
Victim participation significantly burdens the system while it remains to be seen 
whether it delivers justice to the victims. It does not bring them closer to the 
courtroom as their interests are served by lawyers who barely know their names. It 
creates expectations for victims that may not be fulfilled. For now, it is unclear what 
the system can offer to a continuously increasing number of victim participants. 
Unmet expectations can lead to a ‘third victimisation’ as Judge Van Der Wijngaert 
called it.1442
 
 
It is difficult to verify the veracity of the stories of the victim participants. Most of 
them will never appear before the Court. Accordingly, their stories are not tested 
through examination by the judges and, or the parties. Given the potential financial 
                                                 
1442 C. Van Der Wijngaert, lecture on victim participation, supra note 539, at 14. 
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gain for victim participants, their applications should be scrutinised more carefully. 
Already, there have been cases of victim applicants who were not who they claimed 
they were.1443
 
 
In the courtroom, victim representatives act as additional prosecutors even if they are 
meant to be neutral. It is perhaps unfair to expect victim representatives who clearly 
have an interest in the outcome of the case to be neutral. The reparation of victims 
depends on the finding of the guilt of the accused. Thus, the outcome is more 
important for them than for the Prosecution. This can create an unfairness to the 
accused, depending on how much leeway the judges offer to victim participants. 
Different Chambers react differently to victim participants. While the Chamber in 
Katanga & Ngudjolo has fairly balanced the rights and interests of the different 
parties and participants, the Chambers in Bemba and Kenya favour victim participants 
too strongly. 
 
In charging and selecting appropriately the suspects before the ICC, victim 
participants could make an effective contribution. Victims have a very direct interest 
in who is charged for what crime. Their potential claim for reparation depends on 
whether the Prosecutor has selected the crime for which the persons concerned are 
victims. Thus, it would only be fair for them to challenge a Prosecutor’s decision not 
to prosecute a particular person. However, the role of the victims in this regard is 
limited. Victims are not in a position to challenge a non-prosecution and cannot 
expand the scope of the charges. Victims can only request that charges be added if 
they can be justified on the basis of the evidence brought by the Prosecution. 
 
As this thesis has addressed, the Prosecutor’s selection of suspects does not always 
appear to be based on complete independence and impartiality. In light of its 
dependence on State cooperation, it is not always evident that the Prosecution can be 
fully independent. An independent voice of the victims could therefore ensure that the 
selection process is less influenced by political considerations. 
 
                                                 
1443 See above, section ‘Victim Participant: Who Are They?’ 
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Accordingly, it is suggested that victim participants be given greater powers to 
challenge the charges and non-charges against suspects at the preliminary stages. 
However, their participation in the proceedings themselves should be reconsidered. 
There could be a separate reparation stage once the guilt of an accused is established 
in the courtroom. Victim participants can then fully participate and seek to gain 
reparations for their sufferings. There is, however, little added value to their 
participation in the criminal proceedings. 
 
Victim participation may raise unrealistic hopes both as to the righting of individual 
wrongs and as to the issue of compensation since no price is high enough to remedy 
the injuries suffered. It is also unclear how victim participants will be remedied. 
Given their increasing number, whatever they will receive in compensation will 
probably be below expectations. This may then result in a “tertiary victimisation” as 
Judge Van Der Wijngaert called it.1444
 
 
Recommendations for  Improvement 
 
In conclusion, there is ample room for improvement. To address the cultural issues 
properly, expert witnesses could be called. Judges can also learn a significant deal by 
listening to the factual witnesses. Key is that judges are aware that witnesses do not 
all react in the same manner and that their demeanour can sometimes be explained by 
their cultural background. Cultural differences can also be exaggerated. To evaluate 
this properly, it helps for the judges to have sufficient experience domestically in 
dealing with many different types of witnesses.  
 
It is certainly recommended, as suggested by Combs, that judges move to the location 
in each and every case. Such a judicial site visit can be fruitful, not only to verify 
whether witnesses could have seen what they claim they, but also for the judges to get 
a sense for the local culture. 
 
Most importantly, high quality judges must be recruited. As aforementioned, the 
quality of judges can and should be increased. Bohlander has suggested a sensible 
                                                 
1444 C. Van Der Wijngaert, lecture on victim participation, supra note 539, 14. 
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way to improve the recruitment procedure of judges. He proposes to create an 
international pool of potential candidates consisting of national judges with solid 
experience in criminal trials and who are familiar with international criminal justice. 
This pool of judges should receive training from internationally qualified trainers at 
the national judicial academics. From this pool, a selection is made on the basis of 
merit alone. Court experience as a defence or Prosecution trial attorney could be 
accredited. However, diplomats and academics without any court experience should 
be exempted.1445
 
 
I agree with this proposition. However, I would not entirely exclude academics. 
Academic judges can be well-equipped appeal judges. They could also be equipped as 
trial judges provided that they are in a bench with a highly experienced presiding 
judge.  
 
 
Standard of Proof Beyond Reasonable Doubt 
Combs argues that it is not realistic to tackle the fact-finding impediments to such an 
extent that accuracy of the outcome can be guaranteed. Yet, she is of the view that 
convictions are needed to meet the objectives of international justice. She holds that 
acquittals in international justice are more expensive than in domestic justice. She 
bases this on the immense suffering of the victims and the need for these courts to 
work effectively because of the expenses involved. Essentially, she bases it on the 
secondary objectives of the international courts and tribunals. In light of this, she 
suggests lowering the standard to a level which is more realistically achievable.1446
 
  
Combs is not alone in this view. May and Hoskins state, “if standards are too high, 
then it appears that the legacy of impunity, far from being successfully countered, will 
in fact be continued through international criminal trials.”1447
                                                 
1445 Bohlander, Pride and Prejudice, pages 537-540.  
 They suggest that 
“careful consideration may need to be given to whether it is possible to ease specific 
standards so as to make convictions possible but in a way that avoids the appearance 
1446 Combs 343-364. 
1447 L. May & Z. Hoskins: International Criminal Law and Philosophy, Cambridge University Press, 
New York 2010, page 243. 
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or reality of replicating problematic patterns displayed during conflict or by repressive 
regimes.”1448
 
  
Also, in the context of the trial of former President of Malawi who was acquitted due 
to lack of evidence to prove that he ordered the killings, Kadri, one of the Prosecutors 
involved, observed that “for many people the fairness of the proceedings stood in 
contrast to the inexplicability of the verdict, a salutary reminder that due process 
alone will not deliver justice.”1449
 
 
This thesis, however, suggests that there is no need to lower the standard. The 
standard can be met if investigations are conducted more efficiently. Domestic justice 
similarly deals with fact-finding impediments and has had to find practical solutions, 
over the years. A practical solution is not to lower the standard. This undermines 
justice and increases the chances of wrongful convictions. It is not clear on what basis 
Combs believes that most people in international tribunals are guilty but that their 
guilt cannot be established. This is a dangerous suggestion and not justified in the 
absence of sufficient evidence to prove it.  
 
There is no legitimate reason to treat international justice differently from domestic 
justice in this regard. In both, one hopes that most defendants who appear are guilty. 
If not, it means that the Prosecution has not done its job properly. If someone is not 
guilty, ideally the person is filtered out at an earlier stage. However, it happens that 
innocent people are being charged. This is precisely why it is so important to have a 
careful evaluation on the basis of proof beyond reasonable doubt. The primary 
purpose of any trial is to establish whether the accused is guilty as charged. This 
should not be conflated with victims’ justice. 
 
Chuter rightly suggests that it is a very dangerous notion that an international tribunal 
can only be successful if it achieves a high conviction rate.1450
                                                 
1448 Ibid. 
 On the contrary, it is 
healthy for a judicial system to acquit. Acquittals show that a justice system works. 
Only then will the Prosecutor be pushed to do a better job in the future. This is very 
1449 Sadakat Kadri: Prosecuting Hastings Banda in Malawi, Chapter 13.2 (Personal Perspectives) in: 
Lattimer & Sands: Justice for Crimes Against Humanity, 347-354. 
1450 Chuter, War Crimes, supra note 75, 205. 
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clear in the ICTR. For years, Prosecutors got away with inefficient investigations, as 
their suspects were routinely found guilty. Recently, however, they do not get away 
with such conduct any longer. They are often criticised for failing to disclose 
exculpatory evidence. Recently, judges have been more prepared to acquit if the 
evidence is too unconvincing. Had this occurred at an earlier stage, the ICTR would 
most likely have operated much more efficiently. 
 
Investigations 
The option of investigative judges has been discussed. This shifts the burden of 
impartiality to the investigative judges rather than the Prosecution. This is an option 
that could be explored, provided that the investigative officers do not take over 
completely from the defence. They could operate alongside the parties. This may, 
however, be a costly option. Instead of changing the structure of international justice, 
it is better to improve the system internally. First and foremost, the Prosecution can 
and should change its investigation strategy.  
 
Most importantly, the Prosecution should recruit competent investigators with an 
open mind. It should have its investigators in the field and conduct onsite 
investigations. Rather than rely on intermediaries whose identities are often not 
disclosed to the defence, it is suggested that they should employ local investigators. 
Being officially employed, local investigators are scrutinised to a much greater extent 
than intermediaries. As well, the Prosecution must take responsibility for their 
conduct. The best investigative teams are mixed, consisting of at least one local and 
one international investigator. The investigative team should receive proper training 
in investigative techniques. 
 
The investigators must thoroughly scrutinise the credibility of their witnesses. To be 
able to better assess their demeanour, investigators should familiarise themselves with 
the local culture. They should also employ an interpreter who they fully trust, and 
instruct them not to be overly creative in interpreting but rather to translate exactly 
what the witness has stated. 
 
It is not sufficient to interview witnesses at length. Investigators should refrain from 
asking leading questions. They should interview the witnesses on numerous occasions 
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to evaluate whether they are consistent. Their stories must be verified by speaking to 
other sources. To the extent possible, investigators should always look for 
corroboration. If a witness testifies to a meeting attended by various other people, 
investigators should seek to interview these other people as well and compare their 
stories. This proposed method is more time-consuming. However, it is of the utmost 
importance for an adequate truth-ascertaining system that the investigations are 
conducted thoroughly.  
 
If investigations are efficient, there is no need to charge defendants with membership 
of a joint criminal enterprise instead of other modes of liability, unless this is the most 
appropriate liability mode on the basis of the evidence. It should not be relied on to 
avoid difficulties in proving allegations under another mode of liability, as was 
suggested by Combs.1451
 
 
Secondary Objectives 
 
It is difficult to determine in any situation whether the secondary objectives, e.g. 
reconciliation, peace and security, and contribution to a historical record have been 
achieved. International courts do not operate in a vacuum but are part of numerous 
efforts to rebuild a transitional society. They are not “ends in themselves”, and can 
only be successful if other measures are simultaneously being taken.1452 The impact 
of an international criminal tribunal can be the work of generations, “changing over 
time and in the light of myriad mediating factors”.1453 Clark suggests that “if impact is 
not static but fluctuating, which further compounds the problem of measuring direct 
impact, there is arguably a strong case to be made for longitudinal approaches to 
impact assessment. Yet, such approaches themselves present considerable challenges, 
not least in terms of time and resources.”1454
 
  
                                                 
1451 Combs, 321-333. 
1452 Drumbl, Atrocity, supra note 46, 205, 209; Chuter, War Crimes, supra note 75, 233-240. 
1453 Diane F. Orentlicher: Shrinking the Space for Denial: The Impact of the ICTY in Serbia 
(Washington D.C.: Open Society Justice Initiative, 2008) p. 29 
<www.soros.org/initiatives/justice/focus/international_justice/articles_publications/publications/serbia
_20080520/serbia_20080502.pdf> 1 December 2009. See also: Koskenniemi, Between Impunity and 
Show Trials, supra note 18, 33-34. 
1454 Clark, Transitional Justice, Truth and Reconciliation, supra note 68, page 247. 
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Thus, it is too early to assess properly whether the international tribunals and courts 
have achieved their secondary objectives. However, it is not too early to make a 
number of preliminary observations. The effectiveness of a truth-ascertaining system 
in a wider sense than the legal establishment of guilt depends on the perception of the 
affected communities. Only if they accept the outcome as truthful can the secondary 
objectives potentially be met. This thesis has established that the truth about a conflict 
“is multilayered and complex”, and, thus, there is not one mechanism which “can 
capture the truth completely”.1455 It has also concluded that it is a difficult task to 
establish a truth that is “embracing enough to connect profoundly different views”.1456
 
  
Clark’s empirical research conducted in different parts in the former Yugoslavia with 
the involvement of different ethnic groups suggests that the ICTY did not bring the 
ethnic communities closer together, at least not yet. In Clark’s observation, the three 
ethnic groups still believe in their own truth, deny their own crimes, and disregard 
some of the findings made by the ICTY. Clark concludes that this widespread denial 
on all sides has obstructed the reconciliation process.1457
 
 
Indeed, many Serbs continue to argue that the ICTY is an anti-Serb court, particularly 
because the highest acquittal and low sentencing rate is among the Muslim 
defendants. Also, many Serbs, including the less radical ones, disagree with the 
finding that the massacre at Sebrenica amounted to a genocide. Some go further and 
disagree with the number of deaths. The Croats are dissatisfied because their main 
hero, Gotovina, has been convicted. The Muslim communities are irritated because 
their heroes had to face international justice too.1458
 
  
Overall, however, the ICTY has considerably more legitimacy in the eyes of the 
affected communities than the ICTR or the ICC. Many individuals among all ethnic 
communities in the former Yugoslavia continue to have faith in the work of the ICTY 
and acknowledge its findings as truthful. The radical voices appear to have a limited 
                                                 
1455 DeLaet, Gender Justice, supra note 59, at 174. 
1456 Minow, Between Vengeance and Forgiveness, supra note 59, 63. 
1457 Clark, Transitional Justice, Truth and Reconciliation, supra note 68, 249, 256-257, 259-261; E. 
Stover The Witness: War Crimes and the Promise of Justice in The Hague (University of Pennsylvania 
Press, 2005), 143-144. 
1458 Clark, Transitional Justice, Truth and Reconciliation, supra note 68, 249. 
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audience only. The legitimacy of their arguments is undermined by the fact that the 
crimes of all ethnic groups have been addressed.1459
 
 
An international tribunal cannot achieve more than that. There will always be people 
or interested groups who will contest the legitimacy of the tribunal and the accuracy 
of the outcome. Reconciliation between the ethnic communities has not been a great 
success. The ethnic communities continue to be suspicious of one another and stick to 
their version of events. However, reconciliation is a process which does not happen 
over night. Tribunals are not the only institutions that seek to assist this process. 
Accordingly, their achievements must be considered in light of other peace and 
reconciliation initiatives. If nothing else, at least the ICTY judgements opened a 
debate about the past atrocities. This is the first step to reconciliation. Seeking to 
achieve more is unrealistic and therefore unwise. A modest contribution to peace and 
reconciliation would be a great achievement.  
 
The reconciliation of the different views concerning the Rwanda conflict has proved 
impossible and remains unresolved. The gap between different views, particularly of 
Rwandans, appears to be growing and any possibility of reconciliation between 
Rwanda’s ethnic groups (Hutu and Tutsi) seems to be increasingly remote.1460 The 
reason is that the entire focus has been on the genocide committed against the Tutsi 
population. The Hutu population is bitter about the fact that their suffering has not 
been acknowledged or addressed.1461 Local communities in the DRC similarly appear 
to have little faith in the tribunals. Many of them are of the view that the selection of 
suspects by the tribunals are politically motivated.1462
 
  
This apparent lack of faith from the local communities does not mean that attempts to 
run international justice courts and tribunals should be dismissed altogether. 
However, it is important to be realistic about what international justice can achieve. It 
                                                 
1459 Personal conversations with people in Kosovo (May 2005, July 2007), as well as Serbian attorneys 
in The Hague (2004-2005). 
1460 Personal conversations with Rwandans of Hutu and Tutsi origin, particularly those living in exile. 
Over the years, their views have radicalised. See also Tribunal Penal International Pour le Rwanda: 
Modele ou Contre-Modele pour la Justice Internationale? Le Point de Vue des Acteurs, Conference 
held in Geneva in May 2009 (‘the Geneva Conference’), where some participants expressed views that 
victims and perpetrators cannot be expected to reconcile. 
1461 Clark, Transitional Justice, Truth and Reconciliation, supra note 68, 250-251. 
1462 Personal conversations with local people in Ituri and North Kivu, February - March 2010. 
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is a stretch from reality to consider international courts and tribunals capable of 
establishing the truth about the allegations against an accused on trial while 
simultaneously establishing the truth about the conflict, restoring peace and security 
and reconciling different communities who were previously at war with each other. 
The claim that international criminal justice can achieve all these objectives at the 
same time and through the same process equates aspiration with empiricism. Moral 
claims are often taken as empirical statements, which is not only scientifically 
unsound but also manipulative.1463
 
 
Accordingly, it is strongly suggested that international tribunals and courts should not 
focus on the secondary objectives although positive steps in their direction are of 
course welcome. Tribunals should keep it simple and focus on establishing the facts 
as accurately as possible in the circumstances. If this is done properly, there is a much 
greater chance that the secondary objectives will also be served. A realistic and 
modest perspective of what can be achieved is appropriate. The ascertainment of the 
truth can never lead to absolutely certain results, let alone in the uncertain 
circumstances in which international tribunals must operate. International tribunals 
are conditioned by their structure and lack of independent modus operandus. Many 
obstacles had to be overcome in securing arrests and conducting investigations. The 
fact that these courts and tribunals have managed to function at all is an achievement 
in and of itself.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1463 Borer, Truth Telling as a Peace-Building Activity in: Borer, Telling Truths, supra note 40, 26-27; 
also: P. Hayner, Unspeakable Truths: Confronting State Terror and Atrocity (Routledge, 2001), 6; 
Jonathan Allen, ‘Balancing Justice and Social Unity: Political Theory and the Idea of a Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission’ University of Toronto Journal 49, no. 3 (Summer 1999) 316-317; Michael 
Ignatieff: ‘Articles of Faith’ Index on Censorship 25, no. 5 (Sept. 1996), 110. 
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